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Abstract:  The following examines the relationship between the United States and Jordan 
after 1967.  It focuses on the leadership of the US starting with the Nixon administration 
and ending with King Hussein of Jordan’s death during the Clinton administration.  It 
argues that King Hussein became a vital ally to the United States in preventing the 
expansion of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  Jordan’s role as an American ally 
during the Cold War was particularly important because of the inherent hostility of the 
Arabs towards the US because of its support of Israel.  Jordan became an important piece 
of the American strategy to stop the spread of the Soviet Union in this vital region.  In 
addition, because of Hussein’s practical nature and desire to work with both the US and 
Israel, Jordan became an important element for American efforts to find a peaceful 
solution to the conflicts between Israel and the Arabs.  Hussein used his role to secure 
Jordan as an important ally of the United States and that close relationship remains 
twenty-years after his death.  In return for his efforts, the United States granted Jordan 
military, diplomatic, and economic aid that allowed for the survival of Hussein’s 
Hashemite dynasty.  While ideologically compatible with the US goals in the region, 
Hussein’s need for American support led him to align with American interests.   
Hussein’s actions during the period are important to understand the development of the 
American relationship with Jordan and the broader Middle East along with broader 
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 On July 26, 1994, King Hussein bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
addressed a joint session of Congress after the signing of the Washington Declaration and 
announced the end of the state of war between Israel and Jordan.   Hussein spoke of his 
enduring friendship with the US, saying, “I have sought over thirty-four years, since the 
presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, to ensure that [the friendship between Jordan and the 
United States] be honest and true.  It has been a friendship built on mutual respect and 
common interests.  I am proud to remind you how we stood shoulder to shoulder during the 
long years of the Cold War.  And now together we share a great hope.  To establish lasting 
peace in the Middle East.”1  Hussein reminded Congress and the American people that for 
decades, Jordan had been and continued to be a reliable partner in the Middle East for the 
United States.  This speech was the culmination of years of work by Hussein to bring peace 




Following the formation of Jordan by the British after World War I, the leaders of 
Jordan frequently had a tight relationship with the West.  While King Hussein was originally 
supported by the British, he later became one of the most important American allies in the 
Middle East.  Because of his geographical location in the Middle East, his pragmatic 
disposition, and his need of outside support to survive, King Hussein established a 
relationship with the United States that is still strong long after his passing.  This relationship 
has endured terrorist attacks on American interests and its allies from groups located in 
Jordan, a number of Middle Eastern conflicts, the Cold War, the rise of Arab nationalism, the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and a large scale American war in the region.  Despite these 
challenges, Hussein successfully formed a working relationship with a wide variety of 
American administrations that both protected his kingdom and demonstrated his increasing 
value to the United States.  The United States responded to that relationship with both 
civilian and military aid along with the diplomatic support that was fundamental for the 
survival of the Hashemite dynasty in the Middle East.  Since 1967 until his death in 1999, 
King Hussein worked with seven Presidents to make Jordan one the closest and most 
strategic allies of the United States in the Arab world.   
 King Hussein was born in Amman, Jordan on November 14, 1935, thirteen years 
before Israel declared independence and while Jordan still existed under the mandate of 
Great Britain established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement at the conclusion of World War I.  




Palestinian assassin on July, 20, 1951.  He was succeeded by his eldest son King Talal bin 
Abdullah until he abdicated his throne due to a medical condition and his increasingly erratic 
behavior.2  After Talal’s abdication, his eldest son Hussein came of age and took the throne 
on May 2, 1953, when he was only seventeen years old.  King Hussein’s primary education 
took place at Victoria College, a British-run primary school, in Alexandria, Egypt.  After that 
Hussein attended school in Great Britain at the Harrow School and briefly attended the 
British military academy in Sandhurst.3  Hussein’s upbringing in British schools combined 
with Jordan’s already deep connection to Great Britain gave Hussein a special affinity for the 
West along with the ability to understand Western attitudes and sensibilities.  Hussein’s 
affection for the West was seen throughout his life, but especially in his relationship with his 
fourth wife, Queen Noor, and his love for Harley Davidson motorcycles.    
 Hussein’s grandfather also had a unique relationship with Jordan’s neighbor Israel 
that continued throughout Hussein’s reign.  Starting with Israel’s declaration of independence 
and continuing after it, King Abdullah frequently worked with the Israelis to serve the 
interest of Jordan.  He repeatedly attempted to persuade the Jews in the British Mandate of 
Palestine to join with Jordan under his leadership where he would allow them to live safe and 
free under his protection.4  Hussein continued that relationship and, despite some setbacks, he 
had a relationship with Israel unlike any other nation in the Arab world.  Through that 
relationship, Hussein frequently interacted with Israeli leaders to try and solve the issues of 




 After World War II, Great Britain pulled back from its involvement in the Middle 
East.  Until that point, British personnel worked throughout Jordan in all levels of the 
government including the government bureaucracy and the military.  The Jordanian military 
called the Arab Legion, was led by British officer John Bagot Glubb beginning in 1939.  
Glubb was usually referred to in the region as Glubb Pasha, an honorary title from the 
Ottoman period that showed the respect many in Jordan had for Glubb.  The other major 
British figure was Alec Kirkbride, who served as a top advisor to King Abdullah and 
represented British interests in Jordan.5  British officers had full control over the Jordanian 
military and while they technically reported to King Hussein, the still took orders from Great 
Britain.  In addition, Kirkbride set up a colonial style government that consisted of Jordanian 
workers with British officials at the management levels of the bureaucracy.  
 The British position in Jordan ended after the Suez Crisis in 1956.  On October 29, 
1956, Israeli invaded Egypt and attempted to remove President Gamal Abdel Nasser because 
of his opposition to the British control of the Suez Canal.  Before the invasion, Nasser 
nationalized the British built and owned Suez Canal, and the invasion was largely a response 
to that.  Great Britain and France soon joined the invasion under the auspice of returning 
security and stability to the canal zone.6  The American rejection of this invasion led Hussein 
to want to replace Great Britain with the US as his chief benefactor.  On November 9, 1956, 
Hussein’s chief of staff contacted the American representative in Jordan and told him that 




told the Americans that he was anti-communist and pledged to follow America’s lead in the 
region.7  While Hussein did not get an immediate agreement, it led to his first meeting with 
Dwight Eisenhower in March 1959.  While meeting with Eisenhower, Hussein attacked 
Egypt’s relations with the Soviet Union and stressed the threat of Soviet imperialism in the 
region.  For his troubles, Hussein received $47.8 million in aid from the US.8  This was 
Hussein’s first in-person contact with an American president and it set the stage for his 
continued relationship with every president through Bill Clinton. 
 The Middle East witnessed more turmoil throughout the 1960s.  A growing feud 
developed between Hussein and Nasser influenced Hussein’s relationship with the United 
States.  Nasser came to power in Egypt when the free officer movement over through King 
Farouk in January 1952.  Nasser took power in October 1954 with a regime friendly to the 
Soviet Union and hostile to monarchies.  While Nasser officially took a stance of neutrality 
in the Cold War, his support of socialism, the willingness of the Soviet Union to deliver 
weapons and his hostility to Egypt’s former colonial masters, made Nasser’s Egypt a threat 
to both Hussein and the American interests in the region.9  The relationship between Egypt 
and Jordan worsened in 1962 when Jordan supported the monarchy in Yemen against the 
Egyptian backed forces in North Yemen Civil War.10  Nasser accelerated the tensions 
between Jordan and Egypt when he commenced a propaganda campaign to target the 
monarchy.  Nasser accused Hussein of being a puppet of the West and disloyal to the Arab 




the Egyptian people on February 22, 1967.11  In addition, the Arab socialist party called the 
Baath Party took control of Iraq and Syria in 1963.12  Both regimes would be hostile to 
Jordan’s relationship with the US and friendly with the Soviet Union, further highlighting the 
need for Jordan to align with the United States.    
 By the start of 1967, Hussein felt encircled by governments hostile to his rule in 
Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Israel.  While Israel was not in an active conflict with Hussein, Jordan 
was the home of many Palestinians refugees from the Israeli War of Independence in 1948, 
or as the Arabs called it the nakba which translates to the catastrophe.  His relationships with 
his neighbors put more pressure on Hussein to stay on good terms with the United States.  He 
continued to seek out American arms and in 1965 he received a massive shipment from 
President Lyndon Johnson, including over two hundred advanced tanks.  Because of 
concerns from Israel, Hussein needed to promise Johnson in writing that the tanks would not 
cross the Jordan River.13  While this arms package brought Jordan and the United States 
closer together, it also showed Hussein that many of his deals with the US would require the 
approval of Israel.  The importance of understanding the American-Israeli relationship would 
prove helpful for Hussein later when he needed that alliance to support his regime.    
 Before 1967, the territory of Jordan consisted of present day Jordan, the West Bank 
and the holy city of Jerusalem.  King Hussein and his family traced their heritage back to the 




of the Islamic sites in the city a family legacy.  Located in Jerusalem is the Al-Asqa Mosque, 
which was started by the Second Caliphate Umar in 685 and finished under al-Walid in 705, 
is considered the third holiest site in Islam. 14  The mosque is also called the Dome of the 
Rock and it is the site where Muhammad began his journey to heaven.  In addition, both 
Hussein’s grandfather and great-grandfather are buried on the site.15  This site had special 
meaning to Hussein and his family and he strove throughout out his reign after 1967 to return 
his family’s special role in caring for the site.   
 On June 5, 1967, the Six-Day War began between Israel and the Arabs.  Leading up 
the war, Nasser dramatically increased tension between Egypt and Israel by expelling the UN 
observer force out of the Sinai and closing the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping.  Israel 
responded with a surprise attack on Egyptian forces on the morning of June 5.  Hussein 
joined Egypt in the fight after facing public pressure from Nasser to unite against the 
Israelis.16  The decision to enter the fighting with Egypt and Syria was disastrous for 
Hussein.  Jordan lost a large portion of the country to the Israelis, including Jerusalem and 
what is now known as the West Bank.  In addition, seven hundred soldiers were killed with 
another six thousand wounded.  Jordan also faced the task of absorbing another wave of over 
four hundred thousand Palestinian refugees who poured over the border to escape the Israeli 




 Soon after the defeat of the Six Day War, Hussein realized if he ever hoped to regain 
his land, he needed to improve relations with the United States and rebuild his country.  He 
also needed economic assistance to deal with the massive refugee crisis and the incorporation 
of this huge Palestinian population into Jordan.  Over the next thirty-seven years, Hussein 
would become one of the strongest US allies in the region with the hopes of accomplishing 
these goals.  Hussein knew that his relationship with the United States would largely be 
based on his interactions with Israel and his value in preventing Soviet expansion in the Cold 
War.  While having almost no natural resources and only one major port in Aqaba, Hussein 
managed to place himself at the center of American foreign policy in the Middle East for 
next four decades.     
  While Hussein had an avidity for the West and the United States that he gained from 
his British education, he faced local and regional challenges because of that avidity.  After 
the Six Day War, Hussein had a huge Palestinian population in Jordan that eventually grew 
to over one million people.  While this group had Jordanian passports and used the Jordanian 
dinar, they did not have any natural loyalty to the Hashemite dynasty.  Hussein needed to 
balance his desire to work with the United States and Israel with the knowledge that a sizable 
portion of his population opposed that relationship.  This problem only grew with the rise of 
the Palestinian nationalism represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization out of the 




not take control of the organization until 1969, and he transformed it into a viable power in 
the region.   
 While growing Palestinian nationalism represented a challenge to Hussein, so did the 
rise of Nasser’s form of Arab nationalism.  Hussein faced frequent challenges from his 
neighbors because of his weakened status and his contacts with the West and Israel.  Leaders 
like Hafez al-Assad in Syria and Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr in Iraq represented a constant threat 
to Hussein and Jordan because of their superior military and both states’ desire to incorporate 
Jordan into their countries.  In fact, in 1970 Syria invaded Jordan in an attempt to remove 
Hussein under the pretext he opposed the Palestinian militant’s efforts to fight Israel.  
Hussein not only faced the military threat from his neighbors, but he endured frequent 
propaganda assaults for his interactions with the West and Israel.  Finally, Hussein’s 
relationship with Saddam Hussein of Iraq was the greatest challenge to American-Jordanian 
relations.  Hussein was in an impossible situation, he had most of the Arab world and his 
biggest patron the United States against Iraq and Saddam, but he faced economic ruin and a 
popular uprising if he did not support Iraq.  Hussein tried to work with both sides, ultimately 
failing to achieve his goal of a peaceful end to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, damaging his 
status throughout the Arab world and with the United States.  
 Hussein’s also endured pressure because of his position in the Cold War relative to 




Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the Palestinians.  Hussein faced frequent threats from his neighbors 
because of his interactions with the Israel and his support of “American imperialism.”  This 
took the form of propaganda assaults and in at least once instance a military invasion.  
Hussein established early on in his reign that he did not sympathize with the Soviet cause.  
Despite that, he was not above using the fear of Soviet expansion to increase his leverage 
with the United States. 
 There have been a number of things written about Hussein in the past.  The two most 
important books are Avi Shlaim’s, The Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and 
Peace; and Nigel Ashton’s King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life.  Both books are 
excellent examinations of King Hussein’s reign in Jordan and benefited from their 
unheralded access to King Hussein and the Jordanian government.  Both of their focuses is 
on the history of Hussein and the inner workings of Jordan along with his family and political 
life at the head of the Hashemite Kingdom.  In addition, Madiha Madfai’s Jordan, the United 
States and the Middle East Peace Process examines how Jordan worked with the United 
States and attempted to make a deal with Israel up until 1991.  While Madfai’s book is 
excellent, it was written in 1992 and therefore did not have access to many of the American 
sources that only recently been declassified.  He also completed it before the US and Jordan 
repaired their relationship after the damage from the Gulf War, culminating in the signing of 
the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.  Both events are important for understanding Jordanian 




In addition, more sources are coming to light that provides an Arab context to the 
events of the region including, Abdul Salam Majali, Jawad A. Anani, and Munther J. 
Haddadin’s Peacemaking: An Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty.  The 
lead negotiators of the treaty wrote Peacekeeping and provided a detailed account of the 
negotiations.  Adan Abu-Odeh’s Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom, 
provides a detailed account of the internal thinking of the Jordanian government.  Abu-Odeh 
served as the information minister of Jordan, chief speechwriter for Hussein and the royal 
representative to Parliament.  In addition, Mohamed Heikal provides a series of works that 
presented an insider account of Egypt’s view of the Middle East.  From his position as an 
important confidant to Nasser and the head of the largest newspaper in Cairo, Heikal 
provided a detailed first-person account of many aspects of Jordan’s relationship with Egypt 
and the broader Arab world.   
 Finally, more American sources are not available that had not been in the past.  
Newly declassified documents from all the American presidential administrations have 
provided a clearer picture of the American attitude towards Jordan and the role it played in 
American foreign policy.  In particular, new volumes from The Foreign Relations of the 
United States focusing on the Nixon and Carter administration illustrate Hussein’s role in 
American foreign policy for the region.  In addition, Dennis Ross’s The Missing Peace and 
Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israeli Relationship from Truman to Obama and William 




Decades of Decision: American Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-76; and the 
recently updated, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics provide an insider account of the 
American decision making process.  Finally, the former CIA station chief in Amman and 
later the personal attorney for Hussein, Jack O’Connell, recently released King’s Counsel: A 
Memoir of War, Espionage, and Diplomacy in the Middle East that shows both the American 
and Jordanian views of many events in the region.  
 The following will attempt to build on that work and focus more on the relationship 
between Hussein and the United States starting with the Nixon administration and continuing 
through Hussein’s death in 1999 during the Clinton administration.  Through previous works 
and newly declassified sources, the goal is to show that Jordan became a fundamental ally in 
the region for the United States that was vital to keeping the Middle East out of the control of 
the Soviet Union and an important element in the American goal to achieve a settlement 
between the Arabs and the Israelis.    
 The first three chapters of the book will examine the Nixon and Ford administrations 
and their attempts to find a peaceful solution between the Arabs and Israel.  During this 
period, the Nixon administration attempted numerous efforts in the peace process including 
Secretary of State William Rogers’ Rogers Plan and Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy.  In 
addition, the United States played an instrumental role in aiding Hussein as he took on the 




Finally, during the Nixon administration a large-scale war occurred in the Middle East in 
1973 that brought both the Soviet Union and the United States close to conflict.  Hussein also 
faced numerous challenged to his position as the main representative of the Palestinian 
people, especially after the Rabat resolution in 1974.  Throughout the Nixon administration, 
Hussein frequently demonstrated his value to the United States and the American leadership 
reciprocated that view through their continued attempts to support Hussein’s position in the 
region.       
 The fourth chapter will focus on the Carter administration and its relationship with 
Hussein through the Camp David Peace Accords and the Arab reaction to the Egyptian and 
Israeli peace process.  While the Camp David process was successful, the Carter 
administration had numerous disappointments in the relationship between Jordan and the 
United States.  The chapter will explore Jordan’s hope for the Geneva process, started under 
the lead of Kissinger and continued under Carter, and its disappointment when that process 
was abandoned to support an agreement between Egypt and Israel.   It will also show that 
while the Carter administration was disappointed by the opposition of Hussein to the Camp 
David Accords, it welcomed his support after the threat of Soviet expansion in the region and 
the fall of the Shah in Iran weakened the American position in the Middle East.    
 The next two chapters will explore the Reagan administration and Reagan and 




number of attempts at solving the dispute between Jordan and Israel, culminating in an effort 
to stop the Palestinian uprising known as the intifada.  In addition, the diplomacy 
surrounding the Reagan Plan and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon illustrated the difficulty 
Hussein and the Americans would have in working with Israel on a peace plan.  Hussein also 
played an important role in Reagan’s efforts to support Iraq in its conflict with Iran.  During 
the Reagan administration, Hussein frequently attempted to work with the PLO and Arafat to 
forge an agreement with Israel, hoping to restore Jordan’s role as a key partner with the West 
Bank.  Finally, the nature of Hussein’s involvement with the American-led peace process 
changed in 1988 when Hussein announced Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank and 
the Palestinian territories, officially ending his ability to lead the Palestinians in the peace 
process.    
 Chapter 7 will focus on Hussein’s role in the American-led war against Saddam 
Hussein of Iraq over his invasion of Kuwait and its immediate aftermath.  This crisis placed a 
great strain on American and Jordanian relations because of Hussein’s relationship with Iraq 
and Saddam Hussein.  Because of Jordan’s economic, military and historical relationship 
with Iraq, many in the United States for the first time questioned Hussein’s loyalty to 
American interest.   After the conflict ended with Saddam’s defeat, Hussein’s ability to work 
with Bush to restart the peace process began repairing that relationship.  Hussein’s support of 
the Madrid Conference under the leadership of Secretary of State James Baker slowly 




 The last chapter will examine both the Palestinian and Jordanian peace process with 
Israel during the Clinton administration.  It will explore Hussein’s efforts with both the 
Israelis and the PLO to achieve a peaceful settlement in their dispute.  In addition, it will 
show that importance of the United States in the culmination of those negotiators through an 
Israeli – Jordanian peace treaty.  Finally, it will demonstrate Hussein’s value in assisting the 
United States’ efforts to broker a deal between Israel and Palestinians through the negotiation 
of the Hebron Protocol and the negotiations at the Wye Conference.   
 In total, the chapters will demonstrate that despite having a weakened military, no 
historical ties to the United States, no natural resources of value, and no control of a major 
sea port or transportation hub, the United States valued the relationship with King Hussein 
and Jordan because of its geographic location and the moderation of the King.  Hussein’s 
attitude towards the West was important for promoting American interests in this vital region 
through his affability to the peace process and his willingness push back against Soviet 
expansion.  In addition, Hussein nurtured that relationship because it was key to his survival 
and promoting the stability of his kingdom, while it also provided his best hope for returning 
the land lost in 1967.  Hussein also believed that the United States would serve both his and 
the regions interests through its active participation.  In 1981, Hussein described his attitude 
towards the United States, saying:  
Our confidence is built on the principles the United States has stood for in the 




them into practice.  We recall the period of World War I when my great-
grandfather was leading the Arab struggle for freedom and independence from 
the Ottoman Empire.  It was President Wilson, alone among the leaders of the 
great powers, who stood up for the right of peoples to self-determination as 
mora than a phrase or ideal.  It was, he said, “an imperative principle of 
action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.  It was twenty-
five years ago that I made the decision to lead Jordan into the closest possible 
friendship with the United States.  I was twenty years old at the time and 
President Eisenhower became a source of sound advice and inspiration to me.  
I took encouragement from the fact that he expressed and also practiced high 
ideals.18 
 
The relationship started with Eisenhower and continued through eight more presidents and 
while the relations between many of those presidents had their challenges, Hussein continued 
to strive to have a close relationship between Jordan and the United States, a goal that each of 











THE NIXON ADMINSTRATION AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE 
 
The year 1969 began to see drastic changes in both the United States and Jordan.  
The Nixon administration came to Washington and brought with it a new vision for both 
the Middle East and the Cold War.  At the start of the administration, Nixon appointed 
Henry Kissinger as National Security Advisor and gave him the control over much of 
American foreign policy, especially on issues that affected the Cold War with the Soviet 
Union.  Nixon and Kissinger’s realist approach to the Cold War allowed for repeated 
indirect confrontations with the Soviet Union, connecting seemingly unrelated events 
around the world to the larger ideological conflict of the Cold War, and to above all else, 
preserving the American position in the world as the superior rival of the Soviet Union 
and its related proxies.  This attitude shaped American foreign policy in South East Asia, 
Latin America, and the Middle East throughout Nixon’s time in office.  This was 
especially true in the Middle East and Jordan where during the six years of the Nixon 




Israel and the Arabs along with a civil war in Jordan and numerous peace proposals.  The 
Nixon administration always viewed war and peace in the Middle East through a Cold 
War lens that directed American policy for the region.   
For King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan, 1969 began a dramatic change in his 
position in the Middle East and the world.  Still suffering from the Six Day War between 
the Arabs and Israel, King Hussein began the process of rebuilding his country, satisfying 
the demands of a large refugee population, and navigating through Great Power 
diplomacy in the backdrop of the Cold War.  In addition, he faced hostile neighbors on 
almost all of his borders that included radical Arab regimes dedicated to his removal and 
Israeli regime that occupied much of the land previously belonging to his nation.  
Hussein also faced a dire internal threat from radical Palestinian militant organizations 
that wanted to control Jordan in order to continue its war with Israel.  He maintained his 
personal survival and that of his monarchy by balancing diplomacy and conflict all while 
embracing the support of his allies to advance his position.  Without Hussein’s relentless 
effort to protect his kingdom from outside agitators, Jordan would not have survived in 
its current form and become a valued ally of the United States in the Middle East.  The 
friendship between Jordan and United States was important for the survival of Jordan and 
maintaining America’s position in the Middle East relative to the Cold War.      
Nixon’s first term in office brought fundamental changes to the relationship 




attempting to achieve a lasting peace in the region in the wake of the devastation from the 
Six Day War of 1967.  Secretary of State William Rogers’ attempt to move the peace 
process forward showed the value the United States placed on cultivating the relationship 
with the moderate Arab regime in Jordan.   While it eventually failed, during the 
preparation and its implementation, it became evident that the United States wanted to 
use Jordan as a potential breakthrough to achieve a strategic position in the Middle East 
to counter the Soviet Union.  The internal deliberation of the Nixon administration in 
preparation for the Rogers’s initiative and through its early stages of development 
demonstrated that the United States viewed Jordan as an important ally in the region both 
for maintaining peace with Israel and for stopping the expansion of the Soviet Union.   
The Six Day War of 1967 devastated Jordan.  The military alone lost one hundred 
and seventy-nine tanks, fifty-three armored personnel carriers, 1062 guns and 3,166 
vehicles.  The vehicle losses alone accounted for eighty percent of Jordan’s armored 
units.  It also lost five hundred and fifty soldiers captured, seven hundred dead, and 
another six thousand wounded or missing.1  In addition, the fighting caused over three 
hundred thousand refugees to enter Jordan combined with the loss of thirty-five to forty 
percent of Jordan’s annual GDP.2  King Hussein and Jordan found themselves in the 
weakest strategic position since its founding, forced to rely on outside assistance to 




Because of his weakened position, Hussein needed to use every opportunity to 
strengthen his nation.  This included using the fears of the Cold War against the West to 
gain support for his struggling monarchy.   In January 1968, in a meeting with US 
Ambassador to Jordan Harrison Symmes and the CIA Station Chief of Amman Jack 
O’Connell, King Hussein told them that he was considering meeting with the Soviet 
Union to discuss arms.  He believed that the United States did not intend to give Jordan 
significant weapons to defend itself out of deference to Israel.  He also was angered with 
the Johnson administration because they would not persuade the Israelis to stop their 
reprisal attacks on the east bank of the Jordan River.  He felt that he was not an ally of the 
Fedayeen forces, and Israel was continually punishing him for their actions.  Later, in a 
discussion between Hussein and US Treasury Secretary David M. Kennedy, Hussein 
said, “How can I devote my army to the service of the Israelis in protecting them from 
hostile Arab attacks by a passionate and displaced people when the inevitable 
consequence of a failure on my part would be retaliation by the Israelis which would 
contribute even further to my own downfall?”3 In addition, he was not getting the needed 
equipment from the Americans to stage any offensive against the Palestinian forces inside 
his country.4  It took a personal plea from O’Connell, who had spent almost a decade 
working in the Jordanian capital of Amman, to get Hussein to reconsider meeting with 
the Soviets.  Eventually, O’Connell and General Amer Khammash, head of the Jordanian 




and allowing it to face both internal and external threats.5    In addition to the threat from 
the Israelis, Hussein needed to improve his military if he had any desire to challenge the 
Palestinian militants in his country.  Because of his opposition to two groups opposed to 
the US, the Fedayeen and the Soviet Union, Hussein demonstrated it was in the American 
interests to supply him with needed armaments even if Israel opposed some of that aid.  
Contrasted with President of Egypt, Gamal Nasser’s actions, where he embraced both the 
Soviet Union and the Fedayeen, Hussein’s role as an American ally is particularly 
important.   While the US had friendly relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, neither 
nation dealt much with Israel, justifying Hussein’s importance to American interests in 
the region.    
Hussein and the United States frequently faced tension over the issue of military 
aid.  The US faced a conflicting desire to balance the goal of making sure Israel remained 
the dominant military power in the region while preventing the Soviet Union from 
expanding their influence to the rest of the Arab world through their transfer of military 
equipment to the Arabs.  This occurred for a number of reasons.  First, Israel was the only 
Western-style democracy in the region.  Israel also situated itself as an American ally 
against Soviet expansion in the region, especially compared to the Arab nations of Egypt, 
Syria, and Iraq, which were fully committed patrons of the Soviet Union.   Finally, the 
White House feared the electoral power of a large American Jewish population.  For 




to balance that consideration with his decisions in the Middle East.   Nixon said of the 
Jewish issue that he believed that he faced an “unyielding and short-sighted pro-Israeli 
attitude prevalent in a large and influential segment of the American Jewish community, 
Congress, the media, and in intellectual and cultural circles.  In the quarter century since 
the end of World War II, this attitude had become so deeply ingrained that many saw the 
corollary of not being pro-Israeli as being anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic.”6  Israel’s 
ability to pressure the Nixon administration angered Nixon.   He would have liked to 
provide Hussein with more aid, but because of Israel’s support in Congress, it limited his 
ability to provide that aid.  The consistent support of Israel from Congress limited the 
ability of the Nixon administration to respond to events in the region, a problem that 
became more important as Israel’s conflicts in the Middle East continued to escalate. 
In the fall of 1969, the States Department and the White House began discussing 
the issue of bringing peace and stability to the Middle East through negotiations and 
diplomacy under the direction of the United States.   Allies in the region began to inform 
Kissinger of the growing threat of radicalism in the Middle East and that it had the ability 
to overwhelm friendly nations in the region.  Kissinger received these warnings not only 
from King Hussein in Jordan, but also from Saudi Arabia and Iran.7  In a meeting with 
Nixon and Kissinger, Hussein told them, “The situation was getting more and more 
desperate.   If there were no solution within six months, he was afraid the extremist 




in favor of starting a peace process than Kissinger.  Rogers believed that the United 
States could still lead in a peace process and reap enormous benefits if it was successful.  
He argued that the US should articulate a peace plan between Israel and Jordan based on 
Israel returning to the 1967 lines.  In addition, Israel could agree to larger land swaps if 
the Arabs gave them stronger guarantees on a durable and binding peace.  Rogers 
believed that if an adversary in Egypt was getting an American peace proposal, an ally in 
Jordan should receive similar treatment.  In addition, the Johnson administration 
promised King Hussein that the United Sates would push Israel to return to the pre-1967 
lines if Hussein gave his support for United Nations Resolution 242.9  Hussein believed 
that this promise was ironclad, and he trusted the new administration to deliver it to him.  
Kissinger believed that this path was doomed to failure, and its likely outcome was to 
antagonize both sides, damaging US relations with both the Arab world and Israel.  
Kissinger also warned Nixon that pursuing this plan could just as easily lead to war in the 
Middle East after its assured failure.  Kissinger argued that if the United States attempted 
to force peace negotiations on Israel and they failed, the Arabs might believe that the only 
way to change the status quo and achieve their objection would be through war.10  Both 
Kissinger and Rogers were correct in their assessment in part.  Rogers’ view that the US 
needed to move forward with a peace process or they faced the prospect of increasing the 
power of the radicals in the region proved correct.  Kissinger’s view that the process was 




US and the Arab world also proved true.  Because of Israel’s relative strength after the 
Six Day War, they had no interest in making the sacrifices for peace.  Israel was 
especially reluctant when it came to making a deal with Jordan and Hussein.  The Israeli 
leadership believed that they had much more defensible borders after the 1967 war, 
especially because of the absorption of the West Bank, and they were reluctant to give up 
that security.  The only possibility of getting Israel to make concessions to the Arabs in 
their current state was through pressure from the United States, and the Nixon 
administration had no desire for that.   
Another possible benefit for the US focusing on a peace process in the Middle 
East was to improve the American position with the Arabs relative to the Cold War.   If 
the Nixon administration achieved peace between Israel and the Arabs, it would improve 
the American position with many of the Arabs, especially nations like Egypt, who had 
aligned with the Soviet Union.  The Nixon administration worried about the large 
shipments of Soviet arms heading towards the region.   In addition, the Soviet Union 
began to take a larger interest in the constant attacks on the Egyptian-Israeli border.  In a 
letter to Nixon, Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Premier, warned that if Israel did not ease up 
its attacks, the Soviet Union would dramatically increase its arms shipment to Egypt and 
other friendly Arab nations.11  In a speech in Moscow honoring the visiting President of 
Egypt, Gamal Nasser, Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet General Secretary, said, “Israel 




the Arab countries and to the rupture of friendship between the Arabs and the Soviet 
Union.”  Israel’s actions would force the Soviet Union to respond with dramatically 
increased aid.12  In 1970, the Soviet Union placed a large number of military personnel 
into Egypt.  This included over two hundred pilots, fifteen thousand members of a missile 
crew, and over one hundred and fifty Soviet aircraft.13  The White House opposed this 
dramatic escalation in Soviet troops because the US felt obligated to match all Arab 
military gains with Israeli gains to maintain Israel’s military superiority.  It was also easy 
to envision an attack by Israel or Egypt escalating into a great power conflict if either side 
felt the status quo changed by the influx of new weapons, providing a new incentive for 
open warfare.  The White House feared that the dramatic increase in military equipment 
could lead Egypt to attack Israel and take their land back by force or for Israel to attempt 
preemptive attack to limit Egypt’s ability to gain military superiority.    
Even before Rogers officially formulated his plan, opposition to it came from 
many directions.  Kissinger was the main opponent to the plan inside the Nixon 
administration.  He feared that pressuring Israel would give a boost to Arab radicals who 
opposed any peace settlement regardless of Israel’s willingness to compromise.  He 
reasoned that if the US forced Israel to negotiate, the more radical Arab states would 
demand more as a way take advantage of the increased pressure on Israel, never 
committing to a negotiation that could conclude with a peace deal.  If negotiations failed, 




Palestinians would attempt to block any settlement with the goal of decreasing the 
stability of the region and making the rule of Hussein vulnerable in Jordan.14  Increased 
instability also benefited the Soviet Union, as they would take advantage of the instability 
to increase the value of their assistance to the Arabs.  Kissinger’s view was that both 
sides were unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices for peace, and the US would only 
have negative outcomes if it pressured them to do it. 
In a meeting between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on 
April 14, 1969, Dobrynin told Kissinger he wanted the US to come up with settlement 
terms and sell them to Israel while the Soviets would agree to do the same with the 
Arabs.  Kissinger believed that the Soviets wanted him to sell the Arab position to the 
Israelis, mainly, that Israel would withdraw from land captured in 1967 and the Arabs 
would agree to some form of settlement with Israel that did not include a peace treaty.  
He believed the process would not open up a general dialogue that ended in a settlement 
that both sides accepted.  Kissinger argued that there was two possible outcomes in the 
Soviet backed peace process.  If the US forced the Israelis to agree to these principles, the 
Arabs would credit the Soviet Union for this achievement.  If it failed, the Arabs would 
blame the US because of their inability to bring Israel to the table.  Therefore, in 
Kissinger’s view, there was little benefit for the United States in pushing this Soviet 




The White House also received some mixed signals from the Arabs about the 
possibility of negotiations led by the US and the USSR.  In a meeting between Hussein 
and Nixon on April 8, 1969, Hussein told Nixon that he and Nasser were both willing to 
sign any document with Israel that did not include a peace treaty.  In addition, they both 
supported UN Resolution 242.  Hussein explained to Nixon that if Israel gave Gaza to 
Jordan, then he was willing to agree to a settlement on exchanges of land on the West 
Bank.  This was an important change from Jordan’s position since 1967.  Up until this 
point, Hussein and the other Arabs demanded the complete restoration of their land from 
before the 1967 war.  Hussein was also willing to consider a demilitarized zone and free 
access through Suez and the Strait of Tiran.  The King told Nixon that he spoke for 
himself and Nasser.  The problem was that on April 11, Nixon and Kissinger met with a 
top advisor to Nasser, Mahmoud Fawzi, who expressed less of a desire for direct 
negotiations with Israel and made no commitments on allowing Israel access to Egyptian 
waterways.16  This was a consistent problem for the Nixon administration.  The Arabs did 
not speak with one voice and it was difficult to determine what their actual position was 
with regards to peace with Israel.  In addition, while Hussein was enthusiastic about 
reaching a peace deal because of the obvious benefits to his country, the rest of the Arabs 
did not share that desire and only wanted peace on their terms. 
To build on what he told the White House, Hussein made a speech the National 




Israel.  He said he received Nasser’s pledge to allow Israel free access to the Suez in a 
deal.  In mentioning Palestinian refugee rights, he floated the idea of compensation as an 
alternative to resettlement.  “Once their rights have been restored . . . then the final step 
toward peace will not be far off.”  He also acknowledged that the Arabs would need to 
address Israel’s right to exist and guarantees of its security in a final settlement.  One of 
the most important demands made by Hussein revolved around Jerusalem.  He said, “We 
cannot envision any settlement that does not include the return of the Arab parts of the 
City of Jerusalem to us with all our holy places.”17  He offered Israel “The end of 
belligerency.   Respect for and acknowledgment of sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of all states in the area.  Recognition of the right of all to live in 
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats of act of war.  
Guaranteeing for all the freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez 
Canal.”18  He said Israel would need to return all land taken in the 1967 war.  While this 
had some similarities to the Rogers Plan, it was different in a number of important 
aspects.   Mainly, it did not call for a binding peace settlement and did not allow any land 
swaps to make up for Israeli settlements now built on the West Bank.  More importantly, 
while Hussein said he had assurances from Nasser, there is no evidence that this actually 
occurred.  In fact, while Hussein presented Nasser’s position as reasonable, in the future, 




Hussein.  Nasser showed that he viewed his position as the head of Arab nationalism as 
more important that peace with Israel.     
Israel opposed starting any new talks based on the mediation of the main four 
powers, the US, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, for a number of reasons.  
First, Israel was comfortable with the current status quo.  They believed that for the first 
time since their creation, they had a security situation that made them the clear dominant 
power in the region and valued the land they gained through the war in 1967.  Second, 
the Soviet Union was firmly on the side of the Arabs and so to maintain their standing in 
the Arab world, they would take a hardline Arab position.  Both Israel and the United 
States also felt that Great Britain and France were taking positions to improve their 
standing the in the Arab world so they would be more inclined to side with Egypt and 
Syria in any negotiation.  That left only the United States actively addressing the Israeli 
position.  In addition, since Jordan had no active links to the Soviet Union, Israel did not 
feel the Kremlin should be included in talks with Jordan.19  Prime Minister of Israel 
Golda Meir said of the four-party talks, “The Russians were feeding and manipulating the 
entire Egyptian war effort; the French were almost as pro-Arab as the Russians; the 
British were not far behind the French; only the Americans were at all concerned with 
Israeli’s survival.”20    
The initial discussion about the US position on opening up peace talks formally 




discussed in what specific forum these negotiations should take place.  Rogers believed 
they should occur under the auspices of both the Soviet Union and the United States.  He 
believed that it would take both the US and the USSR to pressure the parties into 
reaching a settlement.  Kissinger had a negative view of the potential of negotiations 
from the beginning.  He believed the State Department wanted the US to lay out ahead of 
time to the Soviets what the proposed border solutions would look like, in particular, 
Israel would give back almost all of the land taken in 1967 and the Arabs, in turn, would 
end their state of belligerency with Israel.  To add to the pressure to formulate a plan, a 
UN General Assembly meeting was happening the following week, and the White House 
wanted to be clear on directions for Rogers in his meetings with foreign leaders, 
specifically the Soviet Union, concerning Middle East peace.21  
Immediately, Kissinger was concerned about the State Department’s heavy focus 
on the United Arab Republic.22  Kissinger said, “The US cannot proceed on an Israel –
UAR settlement alone.  If we are going to press for a settlement, it must include Jordan.  
We have a much greater interest in getting our friend Hussein’s territory back than 
Nasser’s because of Hussein’s moderate and pro-Western position.”  He also did not 
believe that Soviets and Nasser would agree to just a UAR-Israeli settlement because it 
could isolate Nasser in the Arab world, undermining Nasser’s position with the more 
radical Arab regimes.23  It was also not in the American interests for the only major Arab 




Jordan, it was better to have the Soviet Union argue their position if they desired to 
achieve results.   
Kissinger also noted that it would take American pressure on Israel to get them to 
agree to a large settlement.  He felt that if the US was going to pressure Israel, they 
needed to do it forcefully for it to have an impact, including the threat of an arms 
reduction in response to any Israeli opposition.  Otherwise, the US would alienate the 
Arabs, who believe that the US can get Israel to do whatever it wants, and the Israelis 
with no real credit for the US from either side.  Other than try to push for some sort of 
peace settlement, Kissinger did not believe that the US had many good options.  Other 
options he considered but ultimately rejected were to try to make an arrangement with 
USSR that kept both nations out of Middle East if the Arabs and the Israelis start a 
conflict.   He felt that a war could be inevitable and hoped to prevent it from escalating to 
a battle of the Cold War.  He believed that the Soviet Union would not participate openly 
in this plan.  The US could also take a stand on refugee settlement or try to mediate an 
agreement between the Palestinians on the West Bank and the Israelis, to end that part of 
the conflict.24  The problem with this was there really were no organized Palestinians that 
either the US or Israel was willing to negotiate with.  Finally, Kissinger also worried that 
if they forced Israel to give up some of their land and security in a peace deal, it would 
make it much more difficult to pressure them on commitments against the deployment of 




Israel had nuclear weapons and feared their deployment in another Israeli-Arab conflict.26  
While Kissinger favored maintaining the status quo until the US conditions on the ground 
were favorable to the US, he reluctantly gave the Rogers Plan his public support.        
After weighing the alternatives, the White House agreed to allow the State 
Department under Rogers to move forward with his attempt to reach a settlement in the 
region.  The US decided not to include the USSR in any direct talks between Jordan and 
Israel because both nations were aligned with Washington.  The Soviets wanted to 
participate in the Israeli-Jordanian talks to shield Nasser from any potential Arab 
backlash, but the White House remained firm on the exclusion of the Soviet Union in 
talks with Jordan.  The US made its demands of the Arabs clear to the Soviets.  They 
wanted “the Arabs to commit themselves to ending the state of belligerency and 
establishing a formal state of peace, ending terrorist attacks on Israel, some sort of formal 
recognition of Israel, real security arrangements and guarantees for Israeli navigation 
through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran.”27  This was the minimum the Americans 
expected from the Soviets and the Arabs to agree to put increased pressure on Israel to 
agree to a settlement.   
In the talks between the Soviets and the Americans, the sides clashed on the issue 
of final boundaries.  The Soviets called for Israel to return to pre-1967 boundaries 
including Jerusalem as the starting point for negotiations.  The US had told the Soviets 




believed Jerusalem should be part of Jordan, and Israel and Jordan should discuss that 
issue without Soviet participation.  The US was willing to argue for prewar lines with 
Egypt with some security arrangement for Gaza and the port city of Sharm al-Shaik.  
Concerning the Soviets, the US believed, that the Soviet Union was willing to argue for 
peace now because a reduction in tensions supported its interests in the region.  Kissinger 
assumed that the Soviet Union would currently not prefer a large-scale conflict between 
the UAR and Israel, for fear that the Israelis would crush the UAR forces, possibly 
requiring the Soviet Union to intervene and save them.  In addition, Kissinger believed 
that the US and Israel had vastly superior equipment and Moscow would not want to be 
part of another devastating defeat like the Six Day War, especially since the Soviet Union 
held the Arabs’ fighting ability in such low regard28   
 One important reason for the talks to proceed came from the desire to improve 
relations between the US and Jordan.  Kissinger said, “We are experiencing somewhat of 
a crisis of confidence from Hussein.  He is going through another bout of despair and has 
cited our present position on the Israeli-UAR border questions as weakening his own 
position.”  Kissinger believed that Hussein felt that if the US was willing to pressure the 
Israelis to leave the Sinai, then he should expect a similar result in a final settlement 
despite the difference in value that the Israelis placed on the Sinai compared to the West 
Bank and Jerusalem.  Kissinger hoped to show Hussein that the US valued his 




Israelis to a greater degree than Kissinger would argue for the Egyptians, even though it 
was less likely to succeed.29  It was important for Kissinger to demonstrate the continued 
value of his friendship with the Jordan if he hoped to maintain their positions as an 
important American ally in the region.  In the past, Hussein demonstrated that he could 
be a voice of moderation in the region and support American interests, but he needed 
assurances from the US that they would support his regime if he sided with them as 
opposed to the Soviet Union. 
 Kissinger also believed that settlement talks would be in the interest of US-
Jordanian relations.  He said, “King Hussein’s ability to maintain a pro-Western posture 
and keep his distance from the Fedayeen is gradually decreasing” because of the constant 
conflict between Palestinian forces and Israeli forces on the Jordanian border.30  He 
hoped that if that border became quiet, Hussein would face dramatically less pressure 
from the more radical Arab states because of his connections to the West and his 
opposition to the Palestinians.  This is why Kissinger ultimately relented on his public 
opposition to the Rogers Plan.  He believed it would still fail, but allowed it to progress 
while undermining it when it violated his view of a potential settlement.     
 Kissinger believed Israel was the main obstacle in securing an agreement.  
Kissinger said, “If we contribute to the Israeli feeling that we are further undermining 
their bargaining position and backing away from support for them, they may well be 




getting a Jordanian-Israeli agreement, he said, “If we won Egyptian and Israeli agreement 
on conditions for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war borders, we would have to produce 
comparable Israeli withdrawal from Jordan’s West Bank.  The Israelis are even more 
likely to resist this, especially in Jerusalem, then they are withdrawal from the Sinai.”31  
Kissinger believed that if the US was able to get a deal for the Soviet’s ally in Egypt, to 
retain their standing with Jordan, they needed to get a similar deal that at the time did not 
seem likely.   
 On December 10, 1969, Secretary of State Rogers gave a speech where he 
announced what became known as the Rogers Plan for restarting the peace process in the 
Middle East.   He said, “Our policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent 
peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdrawal from occupied 
territory when their territorial integrity is assured as envisaged by the Security Council 
resolution.”32  The basis of the plan was for the Arabs and the Israelis to “stop shooting, 
start talking.”  The first step would be to propose a ceasefire between Israel and UAR 
along with any other Arab countries involved, which included Jordan.  The ceasefire 
would be for a limited time, July 1 to September 15.  Israel would stop deep air raids into 
Egypt and Egypt would pledge not to change the situation on the ground.  This step 
would also need the backing of the USSR because only the USSR could stop Egypt from 
its continued effort to move Soviet made missiles into the canal zone. Once the ceasefire 




Jarring would begin.33  Ambassador Jarring was the Special Middle East Envoy for UN 
Secretary-General U Thant and held that position after the end of the 1967 war and the 
passing of UN Resolution 242.  Rogers closed his speech by saying:  
We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established 
and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the pre-existing lines 
should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to 
insubstantial alterations required for mutual security.  We do not support 
expansionism.  We believed troops must be withdrawn. . . .  We support 
Israel’s security and the security of the Arab states as well.34 
   
 The official mandate for the Jarring negotiations was:  
that [all parties] accept the UNSC Resolution of November 1967 in all its 
parts and will seek to reach agreement on ways of carrying it out; and that 
the UAR (Jordan) accept the principle of a just and lasting peace with 
Israel, including recognition on their part of Israel’s right to exist and that 
Israel accept the principle of withdrawal from occupied territories in 
accordance with the SC resolution of November 22, 1967.35   
 
These basic principles had a broad agreement between all parties but they differed greatly 
on the details.  For example, Israel was willing to leave some of the occupied territories, 
but not all of them, especially where Israeli settlements started to form.  In addition, 
while the Arabs were willing to end the state of war between them and Israel, they did not 




 The two most contentious issues facing the talks were the final settlement of 
Jerusalem and what to do with the thousands of Palestinian refugees from both the 1948 
and the 1967 war.  Rogers said: 
We believe Jerusalem should be a unified city . . . .  There should be open 
access to the unified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities.  
Arrangements for the administration of the unified city should take into 
account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the Jewish, Islamic, and 
Christian communities.  And there should be roles for both Israel and 
Jordan in the civic, economic, and religious life of the city.36   
 
This point was crucial because it took into consideration Jordan’s most important issue.   
For decades, the Hashemite family had a role in overseeing the Muslim holy sites in 
Jerusalem.  With the Israeli occupation after 1967, that role ended.  Hussein would find it 
difficult to reach any settlement with Israel that did not recognize Jordan’s unique role in 
the administration of Jerusalem.  When it came to the case for refugees, Rogers said, 
“There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those 
Palestinians who the wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless. . . .  We believe [a] 
settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the 
legitimate concerns of the governments in the area.”37  This is one of the first instances 
where the United States publicly sympathized with the Arab refugee problem.   Rogers 
recognized that while difficult, any peace deal would need to deal with the fate of the 
over one million Palestinian refugees, despite the protest from Israel.  In addition, it was 




impact on Jordan from the large refugee population that fled to Jordan after both the 1948 
and 1967 war.         
 In the past, Nixon had shown private concern for the Palestinian refugee problem.  
While he was Vice President, Nixon told Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion “the 
Arabs were effectively using the refugee problem as a political weapon” and stressed “the 
importance to Israel of finding some means to offset this.”38  From Nixon’s point of view, 
the refugee problem was more of a political issue that Israel and the Arabs needed to 
solve, not a humanitarian disaster that the international community needed to fix because 
of fairness and justice.   
Rogers also felt that changes on the ground would make a settlement easier.  
Rogers believed that because of Soviet actions in the Middle East, Israel no longer had a 
supreme military advantage over the Arabs.  He said, “Intelligence evaluations indicate 
the weight of the Soviet presence has already reduced the material and psychological 
advantages previously enjoyed by the Israelis.”39  Rogers believed that if the United 
States were willing to put some pressure on Israel over the issue of arms shipments, they 
would be more likely to compromise on border issues fueled by their desire to regain the 
upper hand over the Arabs with regards to military superiority.  Rogers’ view was correct 
and frequently demonstrated by future American administrations.  The only way Israel 




concessions valuable to Israeli interests through either a dramatic increase in military 
capability or the threat of cutting their aid.   
The reaction to Rogers’ speech and his plan was decidedly mixed.  Arab 
newspapers, especially ones with a noticeable tilt towards the Soviet Union condemned 
the plan.  They argued that the United States’ goals continued to promote the imperialism 
of Israel.40  Nasser and the Soviet Union also stated an early reluctance to sign on to the 
plan.  The Soviet Union called it “one-sided” and Nasser rejected any direct negotiations 
with Israel or any deal that only Egypt and Israel signed.  In addition, Nasser continued to 
oppose any deal that prevented Egypt’s military from entering the Sini Peninsula and 
granting Israel freedom through Egyptian territorial waters.41  Despite, the initial negative 
reaction from the Arab world, eventually they became more conciliatory.   When the 
United States announced the plan, Hussein’s first inclination was to support it but he did 
not want to go against Egypt.  He cabled Nasser and told him “What you accept, we 
accept, and what you reject, we reject.”  Once, Egypt accepted the Rogers Plan, Hussein 
quickly followed.42  Hussein’s position in the Middle East was still too weak to oppose 
Nasser and Egypt, especially without assurances that it would succeed.  In addition, 
Hussein’s relationship with the US was still in its infancy and he had no guarantee that 
they valued his continued leadership of Jordan, allowing him to challenge the views of 




According to Egypt’s Foreign Minister Mahmoud Raid, Jordan was opposed to 
the Rogers Plan mainly because it did not give Jerusalem back to Jordan as a starting 
point for negotiations.  Despite that, both Egypt and Jordan felt it was important for 
relations with the United States not to reject the plan out of hand.  Because of that, Nasser 
and Hussein agreed that Egypt would accept it and Jordan would remain more neutral to 
it publicly.43  Even though they announced an agreement with the plan, Nasser still 
publicly rejected portions of it.  In particular, he opposed any binding peace agreement 
with Israel or to have the Sini Peninsula demilitarized.44  Nasser and Hussein wanted to 
continue to hope that the Americans would push the Israelis into an agreement while 
frequently moving their goals to achieve a maximum settlement from the Israelis.  While 
Hussein could have stressed to the Egyptians his opposition to parts of the plan, in the 
future he frequently demonstrated his affability to a plan similar to Rogers if it achieved 
his goal of regaining the West Bank and Jerusalem.  While the Rogers Plan did not 
guarantee that at the onset, Hussein’s future actions showed he was willing to agree to a 
solution based on the Rogers Plan despite what he may have said to the Egyptian 
leadership.  
Other than the fate of Jerusalem, Jordan and Egypt had another reason to oppose a 
peace plan with Israel, mainly, the constant threat of radical Arab states.  At the Arab 
League Summit in Khartoum Sudan on September 1, 1967, the Arab states passed a 




negotiations with it, and the insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own 
country.”45  This document became known “3 no’s policy” and was an issue for Hussein, 
Nasser, and later Sadat when contemplating making a deal with Israel.  This policy was 
one of the reasons why the Arabs only wanted group or indirect talks with Israel, so not 
to violate the “no negotiation” point.  According to Mahamed Heikal, a close aide to 
Nasser and Egypt’s Information Minister, Nasser did give Hussein a little room on this 
issue.  When Arab League passed the resolution, Nasser told Hussein, “Although we have 
refused to negotiate, you are an exceptional case.  Go to the Americans, kiss their hands 
if necessary, find a way to negotiate.  The important thing is to regain those territories 
before Israel changes their character even if you have to make a separate peace with 
Israel.”46  In private, Nasser knew that if Hussein hoped to get the land lost in 1967, he 
would need American support to accomplish that.  Nasser could not express that opinion 
publically and still retain his desired position as the head of the Arab nationalism 
movment.   
To try to gain Jordan’s support, Rogers sent a letter to Jordan’s Foreign Minister 
Zaid Rifai telling him the US had delayed a shipment of fighter planes to Israel.  He also 
said, “Jordan should understand, however, that it will be impossible for us to keep aircraft 
question in abeyance in absence of ceasefire, standstill on new installations and talks 
started between parties under Jarring’s auspices.”47  Rogers hoped to show Hussein and 




table.  In addition, it had the added benefit of demonstrating to the Arabs that they could 
not rely on the Soviet Union to help them to achieve their goals, only the United States 
could effectively bring Israel to the table.    
Rogers also used the promise of more military aid to increase Hussein’s desire to 
participate in the peace process and remain a strong ally of the United States.  In May 
1970, Hussein contacted the State Department with a request for an increase in military 
aid, particularly new artillery.  He also mentioned that the Soviets had offered him an 
increase in artillery shipments.  The White House initially worried that the increase in aid 
would alter Israel’s view of the balance of power in the region.   The White House 
eventually concluded that they needed to continue to support Hussein and while the 
artillery shipment would strengthen Jordan, they could provide a corresponding increase 
to Israel, and so Israel did not feel threatened by it.  In addition, it was paramount to keep 
the Soviet Union from gaining entry into Jordan.48  The threat of the Soviet Union 
gaining a foothold in Jordan was important to overcome some opposition in the NSC to 
the increased arms shipment to Jordan.        
Israel’s reaction to the Rogers Plan was firmly negative.  Meir wanted to 
completely reject the Rogers Plan from the beginning.  The Israeli ambassador to the US, 
Yitzhak Rabin, returned to Israel from Washington to express the need for Israel to take a 
more moderate approach.  He feared that after the US and President Nixon expressly 




the request and opposed the plan, it would severely damage relations between the two 
nations.   In addition, Rogers made it clear to Rabin, that Israel would damage future 
military aid with an outright rejection of the plan.49  Rabin’s belief that Israel should not 
reject the plan out of hand was correct.  If Israel did not even consider the American 
proposal, the Nixon administration would have had less incentive to consider Israel’s 
interests in future negotiations.  In addition, Israel still relied on the Americans to 
maintain their security and needlessly angering them could put that support in jeopardy. 
In the first public statements on the Rogers Plan in a letter to the United Nations, 
Meir blamed the conflict on “aggressive policy of the Arab governments.  Their absolute 
refusal to make peace with Israel and the unqualified support of the Soviet Union for the 
Arab aggressive stand.”  The letter stated, “The negotiations for peace must be free from 
prior conditions and external influences and pressures.  The prospects for peace will be 
seriously marred if states outside the region continue to raise territorial proposals and 
suggestions on other subjects that cannot further peace and security.”50  Meir also told the 
Knesset, “Nobody in the world can make us accept it.  We didn’t survive three wars in 
order to commit suicide.”51  Meir’s attempt to link the Arabs with Cold War proved to be 
a potent weapon to gain support for Israel in Congress and some levels of the Nixon 
administration.  
In a discussion with Nixon, Meir addressed the issue of a Palestinian state 




problem would eventually end with a call for a separate Palestinian state located on the 
West Bank.  She also believed that this new Palestinian state would be openly hostile to 
Israel.  She said, “Between the Mediterranean and the borders of Iraq, in what was once 
Palestine, there are now two countries, one Jewish and one Arab, and there is no room for 
a third.  The Palestinians must find the solution to their problem together with that Arab 
country, Jordan”52  Hussein viewed this attitude as a threat to his monarchy and it was a 
threat that the Israelis would continue to deploy against Jordan.  Many Israeli leaders 
argued that the Palestinians did not need a state because Jordan should be their state.  If 
Jordan absorbed the rest of the Palestinian population, it would be unlikely that Hussein 
could retain his monarchy because the increase in Palestinians in Jordan would eventually 
overwhelm the native Jordanian Bedouin population that Hussein relied on to support his 
monarchy.  
The Israeli cabinet accepted and rejected different parts of the Rogers Plan, which 
created more confusion with the US.  After seeing the outline of the plan for six weeks, 
Golda Meir still had issues with it.  In particular, she wanted to accept the terms in the 
letter from Nixon, but not in the official proposal sent to Jarring.  In a letter to Meir, 
Nixon talked more about Israeli security and was vague on actual settlement issues.    
This caused confusion and anger in the White House.  For one, they believed that Israel 
already agreed to the initiative and was now going back on their word.  In addition, the 




then have no response without seriously damaging its position in the Arab world.  Nixon 
needed to show the Arabs that he had some ability to get Israel to stick to its original 
position and that the United States was an honest broker in the talks.  That all would be 
jeopardized if Nixon allowed Israel to backtrack on its agreements.53 
Despite both American and Israeli predictions, Egypt agreed to the plan on July 
22.  Nixon wrote to Meir to ask her to accept the plan to stop the fighting and attempted 
to reassure her of the American view of a final settlement.  Nixon said: 
Our position on withdrawal is that the final borders must be agreed upon 
by the parties by means of negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador 
Jarring.  Moreover, we will not press Israel to aspect a solution the refugee 
problem that will alter fundamentally the Jewish character of the State of 
Israel.  Or jeopardize your security.  We shall adhere strictly and firmly to 
the fundamental principle that there must be a peace agreement in which 
all parties undertakes reciprocal obligations to the others.54 
 
Despite Egypt’s apparent acceptance of the Rogers Plan, the Fedayeen responded 
to the plan with outrage and rejection.  Because Arafat was in no position to challenge 
Nasser, he set his sights on Hussein.  On August 15, Arafat said, “We have decided to 
convert Jordan into a cemetery for all conspirators.  Amman shall be the Hanoi of the 
revolution.”55  This foreshadowed the growing tension between the Palestinian forces and 
Hussein that would later lead to all-out conflict between the two sides.  In this statement, 
Arafat likely had a number of goals.  First, he wanted to block any peace plan that did not 




removal of King Hussein.  Second, he wanted to link the Palestinian cause with the wider 
Soviet-inspired anti-imperialism ideology.  His goal was to show the Soviets that by 
supporting him over Hussein, it was a victory in the wider Cold War.  Finally, Arafat 
could not openly challenge Nasser without losing much of his support and financing in 
the Arab world.  This left Arafat with only the option of undermining Hussein to further 
his ambitions of a Palestinian state under his leadership.      
By the summer of 1970, it was clear that the Rogers Plan was not moving forward 
as the Secretary of State hoped.  While Kissinger took every opportunity to undermine 
Rogers behind the scenes, he blamed the collapse on a White House that did not fully 
engage in the process because it did not believe that the parties were interested in peace at 
this point.  Kissinger said, “neither side would state anything other than its maximum 
program – Israel unwilling to forgo wholesale alterations of frontiers, the Arabs 
demanding total withdrawal and reluctant to undertake significant commitments for 
peace.”56  While the fighting between Israel and its neighbors slowed down due to the 
ceasefire, the belligerents made very little progress in completing a final settlement that 
ended the conflict for good.    
After the plan’s collapse, Kissinger summed up the error in American assumption 
in the Middle East as follows:   
We had assumed that major power talks might break the impasse.  In fact, 




assumed that the Soviets, in order to defuse the situation and limit Soviet 
involvement in Egypt, might feel an interest in pressing Nasser to 
compromise.  On the contrary, Moscow had deepened its military 
commitment, thus encouraging Nasser’s war of attrition against Israel.  
We had assumed Israel might in the end go along with a properly balanced 
American proposal.  But the Israelis had flatly rejected our various plans 
while asking us to support them militarily and economically whether or 
not there was progress in negotiations.  We had assumed that the 
Palestinians could be dealt with in a settlement purely as a refugee 
problem.  Instead, they had become a quasi-independent force with a veto 
over policy in Jordan and perhaps even Lebanon.57 
 
In a speech on May 1, 1970, Nasser illustrated Kissinger’s view of the problems 
in the Middle East.  He called on the United States to “refrain from giving support 
to Israel as long as it occupies our Arab territories – be it political, military or 
economic support.”  If the US did not comply, “the Arabs must come to the 
inevitable conclusion that the United States wants Israel to continue to occupy our 
territories so as to dictate the terms of surrender.”58  This validated Kissinger’s 
fear that the problem with attempting a peace negotiation at this time and failing 
further alienated the Arabs, pushing them further into the Soviet sphere. 
 The failed Rogers Plan was important for a number of reasons.  While it 
did not succeed, it was the Nixon administration’s first attempt to solve the 
complex problems of the Middle East.   Nixon believed that the Rogers Plan 
would allow Arab leaders to see the US differently and agree to talks without 




Kissinger and Nixon that King Hussein was friendly to the West and could be 
counted on to embrace the American point of view for issues in the region.  The 
Americans also believed Hussein was an important part of their Cold War alliance 
system and because of that, Jordan should in the future get enough military aid to 
survive.   Finally, the United States firmly supplanted Great Britain as Jordan’s 
closest Western ally, permanently altering Jordan’s lead partner during a crisis.   
This new partnership became much more important when the Palestinians and 
other radical Arab states directly challenged Hussein’s reign.  Because Nixon, 
Kissinger, and Rogers took an interest in helping King Hussein throughout the 
peace process, it demonstrated to the King that he had a loyal ally in Washington 
and had a better chance of achieving his goals through that partnership.  This 
improved Hussein’s view of the White House, and the Nixon administration 
became an important ally for Hussein and Jordan.  This was important because 















After the failure of the Rogers Plan, the White House was growing more 
concerned about instability in Jordan.  By the summer of 1970, Jordan faced a more 
aggressive Palestinian faction that desired a confrontation with Israel and anybody else 
that got in their way, King Hussein included.  The strength of the Palestinian militants 
and sheer size of the Palestinian population residing in Jordan made them a unique threat 
to the reign of King Hussein.  Hussein faced a number of problems because of the 
Palestinians.  First, their continued attacks against Israel frequently caused counterattacks 
in Jordan.   Second, members of the leadership of many of these Palestinian groups 
believed Hussein blocked their path to control over a Palestinian state based in Jordan, 
leading them to continually challenge his rule.  Third, many of the Palestinian groups had 
a large base of support in other Arab countries, particularly Iraq, Egypt, and Syria.  
Because of this, Hussein felt pressure to support the Palestinians or face attempts by his 
neighbors to undermine his regime.  Finally, the Palestinian population frequently 
clashed with the traditional Jordanian population, leading to conflict between the sides 
that often ended in bloodshed.  While Hussein preferred to accommodate the Palestinians, 




to retake control of his country.  Hussein’s success would not have been possible without 
the support of the United States and the Nixon administration.     
 Hussein’s feud with the Palestinian militants also reverberated in Washington.  
To many in the American leadership, the Palestinian forces were another element of 
Soviet aggression.  The Palestinians frequently used rhetoric that corresponded with 
Soviet ideology.  In addition, since Soviet-allied states like Syria and Egypt supported the 
Palestinians, it increased the American perception of a Soviet-Palestinian nexus.  Because 
of this, the Nixon administration viewed the survival of Hussein in his conflict with the 
Palestinian militants as another battlefield in the larger Cold War.     
There were many different factions in the Palestinian movement but the three 
main ones were Fatah, led by Yasir Arafat, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP), led by George Habash, and the Popular Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) led by Naif Hawatmeh.  These main groups had a 
similar end goal, mainly the destruction of Israel, but had distinct ideologies and 
methods.  The Arabs, Israelis, and the Americans referred to the militants as the 
Fedayeen, which translated to those who sacrificed themselves for the cause in Arabic.  
The Fedayeen believed that only through direct military action against Israel would the 
Arabs be able to remove Israel from Arab land and achieve the return of the land lost in 
1967. 
 The largest faction was Fatah under the leadership of Yasir Arafat.  Palestinian 
exiles started Fatah in Kuwait in 1959.  After the 1967 war, Arafat was able to use his 




an umbrella organization consisting of many Palestinian groups and financed by other 
Arab regimes, especially Egypt.   The PLO charter denied Israel’s right to exist and 
called for an Arab state made up of Palestinian refugees to take its place.  In addition, its 
main goal was the “elimination of Zionism in Palestine.”  It called Zionism, “racist and 
fanatic . . .  expansionist and colonialist in its aims.”1   Before taking over the PLO, 
Arafat was largely based in Syria and seen as a rival of Nasser’s supported PLO.  Many 
considered Fatah the most successful group in taking on Israel.  Before the 1967 war, 
Fatah had led sixty-one attacks directly at Israel, far more than the other Fedayeen 
groups.2  After the 1967 War, Arafat used his success in fighting the Israelis to get 
Nasser’s support and take control of the PLO in 1969.  The PLO was by far the largest of 
the Palestinian groups and had thousands of fighters and activists.      
 George Habash’s PFLP was more Marxist than the PLO.  While protesting both 
American and Israeli imperialism, Habash also emphasized Palestinian nationalism.  The 
PFLP’s ideology was more violent than the PLO and focused more on terror attacks 
rather than the the liberation of land occupied by Israel.  Between 1968 and 1971, it was 
one of the most active international terrorist organizations in the world.  In 1970, Habash 
boycotted the PLO because it was not radical enough.  At its height, it was much smaller 
that the PLO, containing under two thousand members.3  
  On February 22, 1969, Naif Hawatmeh split from the PFLP and created his own 
group, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.  The PDFLP was 
even more radical than the other groups and much more Marxist.  Hawatmeh believed 
that many Arab regimes were not sufficiently radical and he hoped to inspire the Arab 




Syria and supported by the Syrian leadership, Hawatmeh became a rising threat to King 
Hussein because of his frequent calls for regime change.    
 Early on there were concerns from the Americans, Israelis, and Jordanians about 
the makeup of the Palestinian radical groups and their connection to the Soviet Union and 
the larger Cold War.  These groups often used the language and symbols of the Soviet 
Union, leading many to believe there was a deep ideological connection.  The PDFLP’s 
emblem was a hammer and sickle along with the Arab star and crescent, showing some 
connection to the Soviet Union.  In an interview, Hawatmeh said, “It had become clear 
that the path to national liberation is that of revolutionary people’s war – that is according 
to the Vietnamese example.  As Lenin says, a people who cannot use arms will remain a 
people of slaves”5  They also chanted slogans like “Long live the memory of Comrade 
Ho Chi Minh” and “From Vietnam to Palestine, one struggle, one fight.”6  In addition, 
the PDFLP also posed a threat to Jordan.  They opposed the rule of King Hussein and did 
not recognize his authority over them.  One of their often-repeated slogans was “No 
authority above the authority of the resistance.”7 
 Habash and the PFLP also had a connection to the Soviet Union that was not 
widely known at the time.  Dr. Wadi Haddad was the number two man in the PFLP and 
also its chief of foreign operations.  Starting in 1970, Haddad was also a KGB agent.  He 
began working with the Soviet Union for the express purpose of gaining more advanced 
weapons for strikes on Israel and its allies.  This included RPG-7 anti-tank rockets, 
silencers, ammunition, and other heavy weapons.  He also attempted to kidnap and 
assassinate the CIA Beirut station chief under orders from the Soviet Union.  In addition, 




While American officials did not know that the Soviet Union had a connection to these 
Palestinian militant groups, many in the Nixon administration believed it without specific 
evidence.  This was important because the Nixon administration viewed any actions by 
the Palestinian militants as an effort by the Soviet Union to diminish the American 
position in the region.      
 Arafat and the Fatah also had some connections to the Soviet Union.  Before 
1970, Moscow did not view the Palestinians ideologically serious, even calling them 
“terrorist elements having no contact with the masses.”9  After some military victories 
against the Israelis and with the support of their client Nasser, the Soviet Union began to 
pay more attention to the Palestinian militant groups.  In the summer of 1968, Nasser 
took Arafat to Moscow on a secret trip to introduce him to the Soviet leadership.  Arafat 
hoped to convince them of his hatred for both Israel and the United States and show that 
he could be an ally to the Soviet Union in the region.  Arafat was able to convince 
Brezhnev of his value and the Soviet Union began providing Fatah weapons to fight the 
imperialist and their allies.10  Brezhnev saw the Palestinians as a progressive force in the 
region fighting against Israeli and American imperialism, leading him to be sympathetic 
to their cause.11  The Soviet support for Fatah was important because it gave Arafat both 
diplomatic support and military aid that he needed to continue his war against Israel.  In 
addition, the Soviets saw Arafat and his forces as an opportunity to undermine pro-
American regimes like Hussein in Jordan.   
 The US also feared the Soviet connection to radical regimes and how it affected 
the survival of American allies in the region.  As early as 1963, the CIA argued, “Some 




probable that they will not be able to prevent some kind of revolutionary upheaval in the 
years ahead.”12  The CIA feared the Soviet Union would take advantage of the upheaval 
to install an anti-American and anti-Israeli regime in the heart of the Middle East, 
severely undermining American goals for the region.  This was particularly a threat to a 
state like Jordan because of Hussein’s support of the US and the instability caused by the 
large Palestinian refugee population.   
 A resolution by the Palestine National Assembly on July 17, 1968, also placed the 
Palestinians on the Soviet side of the Cold War.  It said the enemy of Palestine comes 
from three independent forces; Israel, world Zionism, and world imperialism under the 
direction of the United States.  It continued to say that “The true nature of the Palestinian 
war is that of a battle between a small people, which is the Palestinian people, and Israel, 
which has the backing of world Zionism and world imperialism. “ 13  The resolution also 
called for a plan to “frustrate any political solution to the Palestine problem.”  Finally, it 
argued that any peace settlement would eventually put pressure on friendly nations, like 
the Soviet Union, to allow the immigration of their Jewish citizens to the state of Israel so 
all friendly Arab states should oppose it. 14  Because of their Soviet support, many in the 
Nixon administration believed that any action that helped the Palestinian militant groups 
also supported the Soviet Union and forcing the American government to oppose it. 
 The support of the Soviet Union was invaluable to the Fedayeen, especially since 
in the summer of 1970 the Palestinian militant groups began to cause more trouble in 
Jordan.   On June 9, 1970, the PFLP, led by George Habash, attempted to assassinate 
King Hussein.15  Habash argued that the first step in the liberation of Palestine from the 




this was the first of numerous attempts on his life by the Palestinian Fedayeen.  Hussein 
did not respond to the attack for fear that any harsh military response would outrage the 
more radical Arab regimes and lead to his isolation.  He still believed that he could reach 
some form of accommodation with the Fedayeen that kept him in power and allowed 
them some movement to strike at the Israeli occupation.   
 A statement by the Palestine National Council, the legislative body of the PLO, 
illustrates the Fedayeen’s hostility to Hussein.  It called for a “national democratic regime 
in Jordan” with the removal of the monarchy and the establishment of a state where 
Palestinians in the West Bank would have an equal voice in the actions of the 
government.  To help achieve this, the statement calls for “day-by-day mass struggles” to 
cripple the Hussein regime.  It hoped to “to achieve freedom for Palestinian revolution to 
act in and from Jordan and to establish its bases in Jordanian territory, and to expose the 
conspiracies of the subservient regime and its misrepresentation in this connection.”  
Finally, it called for the Palestinians in Jordan to “resist terrorist policy measures and all 
aggressions against the freedoms and the rights of citizens to expose and resist imperialist 
capitalists.”17  These statements were a direct threat to Hussein and his rule.   They linked 
him with the hated Israelis and the Americans and challenged his right to continue his 
monarchy in Jordan.  It also demonstrated that the PLO and many of its supportive Arab 
regimes believed that Hussein’s monarchy should end, replaceing it with one more 
aligned with the broader goals of the Palestinians and the Arabs. 
 One of the main problems with the Fedayeen operating in Jordan for Hussein was 
the Israeli retaliation in response to Fedayeen attacks. Israel believed that it needed to 




freely on their soil, Israel would hold them responsible for the actions of the Fedayeen.  
For example, on May 22, the PFLP launched an attack from Lebanon where they 
ambushed an Israeli school bus, killing eight children.  Israel responded by shelling the 
village where the attackers came from, killing twenty and wounding forty.  In addition, 
Israel began to institute Israeli Defense Force (IDF) patrols in southern Lebanon to 
protect against further militant infiltration.18  The Israelis hoped that if their responses 
were harsh enough, the Arab leadership would take some action to limit the activities of 
the Palestinian militants. 
In February of 1968, a Fedayeen group attack Israel from Jordan and Israel 
responded with a large air and artillery strikes in the area of northern Jordanian city of 
Irbid.  It killed fifty-six and injured an additional eighty-two, many of which were 
civilians.  In response, the King said, “anyone who chooses to operate from our territory 
should do that through us and according to our planning.”  The minister of the interior 
also added, “We shall not allow any group to act on its own in such an extemporaneous 
manner.  The government of Jordan is determined to protect the security of Jordan and 
the rule of law.”  Through these statements, it was obvious that the Jordanian government 
placed the blame on the death of civilians on the Fedayeen and not Israel.  The Fedayeen 
responded with mass protests in the major Jordanian cities, leading the government to 
back away from these statements and continue to allow the Fedayeen full 
maneuverability inside Jordan.19  The actions of the Fedayeen put Hussein in an 
impossible position.  If he cracked down to harshly on the Palestinians, he faced protests 




nothing, the Israelis would continue to attack Jordan with the potential to destabilize the 
monarchy. 
 Despite the risks from any choice Hussein made, he did not want to face similar 
attacks again and attempted to institute more control over the Palestinians residing in 
Jordan.  In addition, he also started to respond more forcibly when challenged by the 
Palestinians in all areas of his leadership.  On June 9, 1970, Fedayeen forces freed some 
militants held in Jordanian prisons.  Hussein responded by allowing Jordanian tanks and 
artillery to shell a Palestinian refugee camp.  After four days of fighting, over four 
hundred people died with another seven hundred and fifty wounded.20  This was one of 
the first forceful retaliations by the Jordanian army and was a preview of more violence 
to come.   
 After an assassination attempt on Hussein that killed one of his bodyguards on 
June 7, Prime Minister Rifai contacted the US embassy and told them the Hussein was 
planning to retaliate against the Fedayeen and asked the US to persuade Israel not to 
attack while his forces were away from the front line.  Israel replied that they would not 
attack Jordan during these movements.  Eventually, the Fedayeen and the Jordanian 
government agreed to a cease-fire but not before between two hundred people died, 
including civilians.  Hussein was under pressure to end the fighting after the PFLP took 
sixty-eight foreign hostages at a hotel in Amman and threatened to kill them all if there 
was not a ceasefire.  Hussein agreed to some of the demands of the Fedayeen including 
the removal of his military commander and prime minister.  In addition, all sides agreed 
to return to their bases.  King Hussein’s position was weaker because of this intervention 




inclined to sympathize with the Palestinians.21  This was one of the first attempts by 
Hussein to use the Americans to persuade the Israelis not to attack Jordan.  Hussein used 
his improved relationship with the Nixon administration to gain Israeli assurances that 
they would not take advantage of his weakened state and use it to seize more land from 
Jordan.  This was a direct benefit of Hussein’s willingness to work with the Nixon 
administration during the failed Rogers Plan and affirmation of his value in the larger 
Cold War.  Hussein’ ability to work with Israel through the American would be important 
later when Hussein faced an even greater threat from the Palestinian Fedayeen.    
The continued cycle of attack and then retaliations between Israel, Jordan, and the 
Fedayeen had the potential to get out of control in the summer of 1970.  On June 3, the 
Fedayeen launched a rocket attack on the Israeli city of Beit Shean.  Israel responded by 
bombing Irbid, killing seven civilians.  Jordan felt the need to respond and fired artillery 
at the Israeli city of Tiberias.  After the fighting had ended, Jordanians contacted Israel 
through the American embassy in Annan.  Hussein said, “the Jordanian Government was 
doing everything it could to prevent Fedayeen rocket attacks on Israel.  [The] King 
deeply regretted [the] rocket attacks.  [The] Jordan Army [was] under orders to shoot and 
kill any Fedayeen attempting to fire rockets and [the] Fedayeen leaders [have] been told . 
. . that violators would be shot on sight.” The American government urged Israel to 
accept the King’s desire for a ceasefire and give him the breathing room he needed to 
deal with the Fedayeen.  Israel agreed and suspended its efforts on direct retaliation 
against Jordan.22 




We had thousands of incidents of breaking the law, of attacking people.  It 
was a very unruly state of affairs in the country and I continued to try.  I 
went to Egypt.  I called in the Arabs to help in any way they could, 
particularly as some of them were sponsoring some of these movements in 
one form or another, but without much success, and towards the end I felt 
I was losing control.  In the last six months leading up to the crisis, the 
army began to rebel.  I had to spend most of my time running to those 
units that left their positions and were going to the capital, or to some 
other part of Jordan, to sort out people who were attacking their families 
or attack their soldiers on leave.  I think that the gamble was probably the 
army would fracture along Palestinian-Jordanian lines.  That never 
happened, thank God.23 
 
 Hussein was growing more frustrated by the actions of the Palestinians.  In a 
meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad on August 20, 1970, Hussein 
explained to him the problems with the Palestinian Fedayeen organizations.  Hussein said 
he “deplored the attitude of some Palestinian elements who believed that the occupation 
by Israel of further Arab territories would force the Arab countries into mobilizing their 
resources to confront Israeli aggression and eventually liberate Palestine.”24  Hussein 
believed that many of the Fedayeen leadership wanted to commit an act that forced a 
massive retaliation by Israel, leading to another Israeli-Arab war. 
 Starting in the fall of 1970, tensions between Hussein and the Fedayeen reached 
its peak.  On September 6, another assassination attempt on Hussein occurred, this time, 
the attackers killed a number of Hussein’s bodyguards.  Hussein and his daughter 
Princess Alia barely escaped unharmed.  After the attempt of his life, Hussein addressed 
the nation and said, “The citizens are scared and worried of what might happen at any 
moment as a result of the shootings, which exposes innocent people to danger, the public 
life to damage.  People’s business and trade have been stalled.  The public potential and 




and schools have ceases to function.”25  Hussein felt the need to take a more forceful 
approach, ending their ability to use Jordan as a base to attack Israel and the Jordanian 
monarchy.    
 In response to Hussein’s speech, the High Council of the Jordanian Trade Union 
called for a strike.  Pro-Fedayeen members dominated this organization and their plan 
was to cripple the capital with a strike of both public and private business.  The Fedayeen 
leadership believed that this would either force Hussein to depart in exile or make more 
accommodations with the Fedayeen, further weakening his standing in the country.26  The 
Fedayeen hoped that if Hussein’s position continually weakened, they would have the 
power to take control of Jordan.  If the Hussein did not stand up to the Fedayeen, he faced 
not only a growing threat from them, but also an internal challenge to his rule from 
Jordanian nationalists tired of the constant provocations from the Palestinians.  The call 
for a strike did not have the desired effect.  In fact, it made Hussein more determined to 
confront the Fedayeen and remove them as a threat to Jordan.   
On September 9, things escalated further when the PFLP hijacked three Western 
planes and forced them to land in Jordan. The airliners contained hostages from Israel, 
Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany, and the United States.  The hijackers landed in an 
abandoned airstrip outside of Amman and threatened to blow up the planes with the 
passengers on it if the Western governments did not release a number of Palestinian 
prisoners in their custody.27  One of the more infamous prisoners that the hijackers called 
for the Americans to release was Sirhan Sirhan, Robert Kennedy’s assassin.28  The PFLP 
also said that they would only exchange passengers without dual Israeli citizenship.  The 




They also gave the West seventy-two hours to comply before they started to kill the 
hostages.29  Through these hijackings, the Palestinian militants wanted to demonstrate the 
weakness of Hussein and his inability to rule his country.  An additional element of the 
militants’ actions was it demonstrated to the West that Hussein could not protect their 
interests in the region.  Because of this, Hussein needed to react forcefully to the 
hijackings.   
 The hijacking immediately forced the Americans and other Western powers to get 
involved in Jordan.  The Nixon administration had a number of concerns about the 
situation.  First, they were worried about the lives of the hostages.  Second, they worried 
about the ability for Hussein to respond and survive an open conflict with the Fedayeen.  
They also were concerned about showing a united front with other Western nations 
against the PFLP.  If one nation agreed to the demands of the hijackers, then the US also 
would face increasing pressure to give into the demands of the hijackers.  They also 
feared outside involvement in the crisis, mainly the large Iraqi force already stationed in 
Jordan and if the United States had the ability to intervene to stop an outside attack.  
Since the end of the 1967 conflict, Iraq stationed seventeen thousand units in Jordan 
under the auspice of being in place to defend Jordan from another Israeli attack.  Because 
of the hostility between Iraq and Jordan, Hussein also worried they were there to 
undermine his regime given the right opportunity.  Finally, that the hijacking crisis had 
the potential to bring down Hussein and to lead to a hostile Arab government aligned 
with the Soviet Union.   
 Kissinger immediately saw the threat the Fedayeen placed on the hope for any 




control, the peace initiative will go by the board.  Israel has to have a government to deal 
with that can fulfill its obligations.  The President’s instincts are to crush the Fedayeen 
now.  Although he may reconsider, we must make sure such a move doesn’t fail because 
we didn’t have a good plan.”30  Assistant Secretary of State Joe Sisco worried about the 
long-term implications of direct American involvement.  He said if we used American 
forces to prop up the King, it “could only mean a temporary prop for the King.  We 
would have to stay for some time, and, even then, the moments we got out, the King 
would be in a much weaker position politically.”31  Sisco believed that it would be 
impossible for Hussein to remain in power, even if he removed the Fedayeen with 
American help, because the images of an American force arriving in Jordan to attack the 
Palestinians would permanently destroy any relationship Hussein had with the rest of the 
Arab world. 
 In response, Hussein formed a military cabinet and began to strike at Fedayeen 
positions throughout the country.  Hussein placed Wasfi Tall in charge as Prime Minster.  
Tall was extremely loyal to Hussein and equally hostile to the Fedayeen and their 
leadership.  When he formed the cabinet, he hoped that this would bring the Fedayeen to 
the bargaining table.  At a minimum, he wanted Arafat and Fatah to separate themselves 
from the PFLP and PDFLP and eventually to disband the most radical organizations.32  
Hussein believed that if he could get rid of the most radical elements of the Fedayeen, he 
could retake control of his country.  Hussein also faced pressure to act from his troops.  
Bedouin troops fiercely loyal to the King led the army.  They were tired of the 
lawlessness, repeated attacks, and humiliation at the hands of the more radical Palestinian 




neighborhoods by the more radical groups.  They also believed they needed to stand up 
and respond to the constant attacks on the King.  Some units started to fly brassieres from 
their tank antennas with the implicit message to the King that if he were going to force 
them to act like women, they would dress the part.33  The combination of pressures, along 
with the repeated assassination attempts, made Hussein more determined to wipe out the 
Fedayeen threat once and for all.  He needed to demonstrate to the forces that supported 
him and to the West that he had the strength to take on this threat and end it before it 
continued to grow, threatening Western interests throughout the region.        
 The Fedayeen did not intend to negotiate with Hussein.  In response to the 
possibility, Arafat told Hussein that he did not have total control over all the Palestinian 
groups and he could only guarantee the King twenty-four hours to evacuate himself and 
his family.34  As the fighting escalated, Hussein faced another threat.  The Jordanian 
government received word from the Iraqi government that if the Jordanian army did not 
stop shelling Fedayeen positions, the Iraqi army would intervene.  Hussein was obviously 
worried about this threat because Iraq had seventeen thousand troops stationed in 
Jordan.35  In fact, the position of the Iraqi troops was also an issue with the Nixon 
administration.  They received some intelligence that the Iraqis might have participated in 
the hijacking.  In a cable sent to the White House, the CIA reported that their information 
from a reliable source was that some Iraqi troops were in the area when the Jordanian 
army arrived at the airport.  Hussein’s inner circle believed that the Iraqis had a long-
standing relationship with the PFLP.  They believe that the Iraqis misjudged world 
reaction and were now trying to distance themselves away from the PFLP so the world 




 From early on, Jordan feared an intervention from Iraq.  On September 2, Zaid 
Rafai, the chief of the royal court and a top aide to King Hussein, contacted the American 
embassy and asked if Jordan would have US support in case of an attack by Iraq.  The 
previous day the Iraqi contacted Hussein and threatened intervention if the shelling of the 
Palestinians did not end.  While being close to Hussein, Rafai was also a student of Henry 
Kissinger at Harvard and he hoped to use that relationship to have a direct line to the 
White House around the more hostile State Department.  Rafai faced some resistance 
even getting an official response from the Americans.  This was largely due to a conflict 
between the State Department, the CIA, and the White House.  Ambassador Harry 
Symmes led the State Department’s response and he believed that Hussein could not last.  
Symmes even had some communications with the Fedayeen leadership while he was the 
American ambassador to Jordan.  Symmes gave his opinion of the situation while 
stationed in Washington.  Because of his continued hostile attitude towards Hussein, 
Hussein expelled him from Jordan on May 7, 1970.37  The CIA and the White House 
believed that not only could Hussein survive, but also he was an important ally in the 
region and a voice of moderations that the United States needed to nurture.38   
 On September 15, King Hussein contacted the new American ambassador to 
Jordan, Dean Brown, and informed him that he was prepared to retake control of his 
country.  He wanted American help to keep Israel from making the situation worse by 
either invading to strike at the Fedayeen or taking advantage of Hussein’s weakened state 
to strike at Jordan.  He also wanted to know if the Americans were willing to intervene if 
Jordan faced an external threat.  Brown told the White House that he believed that 




felt that Hussein might be just using increased pressure to negotiate better terms with the 
Fedayeen that retained his power but did not fully restrain the Fedayeen forces from 
striking Israel.39  Hussein had threatened to wipe out the Fedayeen before, only to pull 
back once pressure from the rest of the Arab states began.  The US did not want to 
support Hussein’s actions publically against the Fedayeen if he was unwilling to attack 
the militants aggressively.  Any overt actions to support Hussein against the Fedayeen 
would diminish the rest of the Arab worlds’ view towards the Americans, a risk that some 
in the Nixon administration did not want if Hussein planned only a minor strike against 
the Fedayeen forces. 
 Because Great Britain had a historical tie to the Hashemite monarchy and to 
Jordan itself, the White House began coordination with them.  Kissinger told the British 
Foreign Minister Sir Dennis Green that that the United States, “Attached the greatest 
importance to the King’s survival.” In addition, he told him that American military 
involvement is possible as a last resort but Nixon had made no decisions on the matter.  
At this point, Nixon preferred no confrontation at all and opposed any Israeli actions.  He 
would rather have the US military intervene if it was necessary and keep Israel out of 
Jordan.40  Nixon believed that Jordan’s position in the Arab world would be better after 
the conflict if the US responded compared to if Israel intervened.  Regardless, Nixon’s 
contention that the US military might need to save Hussein demonstrated the value the 
administration placed on Hussein’s survival.      
 The White Houses viewed the threat of a Palestinian takeover of Jordan as a 
potentially disastrous development in the region.  Alexander Haig said, “The PLP 




Union’s two chief clients in the region, Jordan’s neighbors Syria and Iraq.  Because this 
operation could have no other purpose than an eventual attempt to invade and destroy 
Israel, the fall of Hussein would certainly mean a preemptive Israeli invasion of Jordan.”   
Nixon described the situation as “a ghastly frame of dominoes with nuclear war waiting 
at the end.41  Nixon rightly worried that a Middle East conflict could lead to a 
confrontation between the superpowers because this occurred during the October War in 
1973 when the US raised their Defense Condition to DEFCON 2.   
 At the White House, many believed that if the Iraqis directly intervened, the 
Israelis would respond and attack the Iraqi forces.42  Because of the Soviet Union’s close 
relationship with the Iraqi government, Kissinger and the White House were concerned 
over how much control Moscow had over the Iraqi forces.  In response to the fighting, the 
Soviet chargé d’affaires Yuli Voronstove said, “The Soviet Government appeals to the 
Governments of Iraq and Jordan to demonstrate farsightedness and reasonable restraint so 
that an end can be brought to the dangerous developments in Jordan.”  He also said that 
any fighting between the Arabs can only assist the enemies of the Arab nations, the 
Israeli aggressors and the imperialist forces behind them.”43 
 Kissinger believed that the United States had a number of roles to play in 
managing the crisis.  First, he wanted to keep the Soviet Union and their allies out of 
Jordan.  He also wanted to secure the hostages, with American forces if their lives 
became truly in danger, and he wanted to provide encouragement to Hussein to allow him 
to retake full control of his country.  Kissinger recommended and Nixon approved the 
movement of US forces to the region to demonstrate the value the US placed on 




Lebanon.  The USS John F. Kennedy left Puerto Rico and headed towards the region.  
That put three carrier battle groups in the region or on the way.  In addition, an 
amphibious task force with twelve hundred Marines was to remain in the Mediterranean 
Sea after a training mission.  Finally, the helicopter carrier the USS Guam and the cruiser 
the USS Springfield moved to within striking range of Jordan.  Movements on this scale 
were not covert.  The hope was that the Soviet Union would take notice and keep its 
allies in the region from intervening for fear of it exploding into a larger conflict.  The 
United States did not announce these movements publically, as to not increase the sense 
of a major international crisis but the White House believed the Soviet Union would 
receive the intended message.44   
 When contemplating the increased American military movements, the National 
Security Staff in the White House attempted to assess how the Soviets would view these 
actions.  Helmut Sonnerfeldt, a top aide to Kissinger, did not believe that the Soviets 
would directly intervene against Jordan.  The Soviets main concern, he argued, was how 
the crisis in Jordan would affect the UAR and any precedent it could set about US 
intervention.  Because of this, the Soviet response would focus on keeping the Americans 
from intervening, even if that meant pressuring the Arabs to stop the conflict.  In 
addition, he thought it was possible that the Soviets would be supportive of an Arafat 
regime because of his connections to Moscow if Hussein did fall but ultimately unwilling 
to commit Soviet forces to accomplish the change.  Because of that, Sonnerfeldt believed 
that the Soviet would be pleased with the removal of Hussein, just not at the expense of a 
wider conflict.  Finally, Sonnerfeldt argued if Israeli forces attacked the Iraqi forces, that 




direct attack on their client state.  If that occurred, the United States needed to be 
prepared in case it caused an escalation into a broader Middle East war.45  The possibility 
of this crisis escalating to a larger regional war was a real possibility.  Sonnerfeldt’s 
argument that the Soviet Union would not let a combined American and Israeli force a 
crush an important regional ally without entering the conflict was probably true.  If the 
fight stayed an inner-Arab dispute, both the US and the Soviet Union had less incentive 
to get directly involved.   
 The American mobilization did have an immediate impact.  According to Andre 
Rochat, who was the representative from the International Red Cross that was negotiating 
for the release of the hostages, the rumors of American troop movements placed the 
Fedayeen in a state of panic.  Nixon believed that this movement encouraged the 
Fedayeen to release eight hostages, including an American.  The White House and the 
State Department debated over if they needed to send another message to the militants.  
Kissinger wanted to send instructions to the more radical Arab nations that the US would 
hold them responsible if anything happened to the hostages.  Sisco and Rogers worried 
that the PFLP would kill some hostages just to prove their strength and wanted a 
statement that the US had not contemplated any military action at this point.  Eventually, 
in a compromise, Nixon’s Press Secretary Ron Ziegler read a statement from the Red 
Cross that said no military action was forthcoming.46  By having Ziegler read a statement 
from the Red Cross, no official American statement existed that said the US was not 
considering the possibility of involving the military in the crisis.  The Nixon 




this as a threat to, but not enough of a threat for the PFLP to overreact and kill some of 
the American hostages.    
 After the crisis, when discussing why it was in the American interest to support 
Hussein, Kissinger said, “it was important to demonstrate that friendship with the West 
and a moderate foreign policy would be rewarded with effective American support.  It 
was necessary to arrest the progressive radicalization of the Middle East, which 
accelerated after the dispatch of Soviet missiles and combat personnel to Egypt.  Nasser’s 
technique of blackmailing the United States with Soviet threats had to be shown as 
futile.”47  Kissinger could have made a similar argument about the Soviet backed states of 
Syria and Iraq.    
 While Hussein’s forces were doing well against the Fedayeen, on September 18, 
the situation on the ground dramatically changed.  Forces associated with the Palestinian 
Liberation Army (PLA), a group based in Syria, came across the northern border of 
Jordan and engaged the Jordanian military.  In addition, a large Syrian tank formation 
also crossed the border.  While Syria painted the tanks with PLA colors and decals, there 
was no doubt in the mind of Hussein and the Americans that this was a Syrian invasion 
force.48  Jordan repelled the initial Syrian invasion force.  The next day, Syria crossed the 
border with over three hundred tanks and a large contingent of mechanized infantry, 
removing what little doubt remained over who was leading the attack.49  This was a major 
escalation in the crisis.  It posed a threat to both Jordan and the United States because a 
Soviet backed Arab regime entered Jordan with a massive invasion force, strong enough 




 On September 19, Hussein addressed his cabinet and said, “The Syrians have 
entered the country and are approaching Irbid.  Our troops are fighting back but the 
Syrians are still advancing.  As a precaution we might need the help of friends, and I 
want you to give me the mandate to ask for such help if I have to do so.”50  Hussein knew 
that he might need assistance from either the United States or even Israel.  Because of the 
controversial nature of that decision, he wanted the cabinet’s full approval so not to be 
undermined by it a later date.  The debate inside the cabinet room demonstrated the major 
dilemma of the conflict.  Some thought the fight with the Palestinians and the Syrians 
was an internal Arab matter and should not involve outside forces.  Another group 
believed that because of the airline hijackings, the assassination attempts on Hussein, the 
constant unauthorized strikes on Israel, and the prior evidence that Arafat and the 
Fedayeen wanted control of Jordan, the survival of the monarchy was at stake and 
Hussein and his allies should do everything possible to protect it.  Because of these 
factors, all sides of the debate reached a consensus that if Jordan needed help, Hussein 
had their mandate to ask for it.  What was not clear was that Hussein was willing to take 
help from anyone, including Israel.  The cabinet ministers expected aid to come from the 
United States or Great Britain, none contemplated the possibility of an Israeli force siding 
with Jordan.51   
 Despite their historical connection to the King, the British were unwilling to help.  
Foreign Minister Green when talking to the Prime Minister Edward Heath best expressed 
their attitude.  Green said, “The Palestinian revolt strikes a very deep chord in the Arab 
hearts.  Any Western country therefore which intervenes to try to save Jordan will be 




which none could foretell. . . .  Jordan as it is not a viable country.”52  Great Britain, 
already still trying to repair the damage from the Suez Crisis, did not want to increase the 
Arab hostility towards them by intervening to save Jordan. 
 The Syrian invasion changed the calculation for the White House.  Because of the 
close connections between the Syrian and Russian military, the White House did not 
believe Syria would invade Jordan without the minimal support of Moscow.  Kissinger 
told Nixon that the Soviets “were either incompetent or forcing a showdown.  If they are 
incompetent we will have an easy victory.” 53  Left unsaid was that if they desired a 
showdown, American prestige in the region and the world would force an American 
intervention.  Because of the preset American forces already in the region, Kissinger was 
confident the US would succeed there also. 
 To illustrate how serious the Nixon administration took this new escalation, 
Rogers called Voronstov and said: 
At this moment, the situation is being further and dangerously aggravated 
by the intervention into Jordanian territory of armored forces from Syria 
and the concentration of further offensive force in Syria along the 
Jordanian border.  The US Government has condemned this intervention 
in Jordan and has called for the immediate withdrawal of the invading 
forces.  This intolerable and irresponsible action from Syria, if not 
immediately halted and reversed could lead to the broadening of the 
present conflict.  The US Government calls upon the Soviet Government 
to impress upon the Government of Syria the grave dangers of its present 
course of action and the need both to withdrawal these forces without 
delay from Jordanian territory and to desist from any further intervention 
in Jordan.  The Soviet Government cannot be unaware of the serious 
consequences which could ensure from a broadening of the conflict.  For 






Another technique the Nixon administration used to put pressure on the Soviets was to 
either ignore their requests for explanations or refuse to acknowledge actions that might 
increase tensions.  For example, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vaily Kuznetsov 
contacted Ambassador Beam on September 19; he asked about the purpose of the 
increased movements of the Sixth Fleet and expressed the Soviet desire that the 
Americans and the Israelis should not intervene.  Beam replied he knew nothing of the 
movements and made no statements about intervention.55  The White House hoped that 
the lack of communication would worry Moscow, forcing them to be more cautious.   
 By September 19, Hussein’s situation became more desperate.  He worried about 
a sustained invasion from Syria that would overrun his forces.  He contacted the 
American embassy and asked about possible US reconnaissance flights over the 
battlefield.  He also needed intelligence on the state of the Syrian forces around Irbid and 
if they dug in their forces prepared to for a long-term conflict with Jordan.56  In addition, 
he worried that the Iraqi force would join in the fighting, overwhelming him and allowing 
the Fedayeen to capture Amman.  If Amman fell, Hussein believed his military would 
also disintegrate, forcing him to abandon his throne.      
 Luckily for Hussein, the Iraqi military never engaged their forces to aid the 
Fedayeen or the Syrian invasion.  Some in the Nixon White House believed that it was 
because of the show of American military strength and the repeated warnings about 
outside intervention.  The CIA station chief in Amman, Jack O’Connell, believed another 
possible reason existed.  He believed it was not Cold War politics or the direct threat by 
the US, but a counter-intelligence operation led by General Abud Hassan, head of the 




received old plans for American military action in Jordan.  He doctored those plans to 
make it look like a current American plan to come to Jordan’s aid.  Hassan knew of an 
Iraqi double agent working with Jordanian intelligence and gave him those plans, 
knowing that the plans of an American attack would make it to Baghdad.  In addition, in 
the presence of the Iraqi military attaché in Jordan, General Zaid bin Shakir mentioned a 
meeting with an upcoming American advanced team. This further confirmed the phony 
plans already in possession of the Iraqi government.57  However, not a direct cause, this 
plan would not have worked without the increased military activity ordered by Nixon.  
The actions by Nixon gave credence to the possibility that the US would intervene to 
save Hussein, encouraging the Soviet Union to pressure its supporters in the region to 
deescalate the crisis.   
 On September 20, Hussein’s forces still were unable to advance against the Syrian 
tank units.  That morning, the King made his first official request for assistance from the 
United States.  He asked for a public statement that the US would get involved militarily 
if there were a sustained attack by an outside power.  Hussein hoped that the threat of 
American involvement might get Syria to retreat.  In addition, Hussein and the White 
House worried about another front opening up against Hussein.   The US had intelligence 
reports that Libya threatened to intervene to help the Fedayeen but at this point, Egypt 
was restraining them.  In addition, Ambassador Brown contacted the State Department 
worried about a possible shift in the Egyptian position.  He feared that Egypt would drop 
it support for Hussein and might even consider intervening if the damage to the Fedayeen 
became too great.58  The threat of Egyptian involvement could have led to Israel and the 




and Israel would have viewed the actions by Egypt as an attempt to surround Israel with 
hostile regimes, forcing them to respond.      
 Later in the day on September 20, Hussein was still waffling on if he wanted an 
attack on the Syrian forces by an outside power.  At first, his top advisor Rifai contacted 
the British to see if they were available to aid Jordan.59  Jordan preferred an intervention 
from the British because from Hussein’s point of view, the historical ties between Jordan 
and Great Britain would allow him to frame the intervention not as an invasion by the 
West, but a historical ally is assisting Jordan from domination by an outside power.  
Hussein informed the American embassy that the Syrians had taken Irbid and he wanted 
to go to the Security Council to call for a ceasefire.  The US believed that any Security 
Council meeting would lead to “a propaganda battle.”60  In addition, as a rule, Kissinger 
historically did not like to use the Security Council for a ceasefire until his side was in the 
preferred position.  He demonstrated this belief frequently in the October War of 1973 
where he repeatedly held off a ceasefire until the Israelis secured their position in their 
war with Egypt and Syria.    
 On the morning of September 21, Ambassador Brown received a message from 
Hussein.  It said: 
Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion.   
Northern forces [are] disjointed.  Irbid [is] occupied. . . .  I request 
immediate physical intervention both air and land as per the authorization 
of [the] government to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and [the] 
independence of Jordan.  Immediate air strikes on [the]invading forces 





This message did not say specifically whom it was asking assistance from, implying that 
it could come from the US, Great Britain, or even Israel.   
 The Nixon administration viewed the situation with a Cold War attitude.  
Kissinger received some intelligence that the Russians gave the Syrians free reign to act 
as they saw fit, neither encouraging nor discouraging action.  Nixon believed that the 
Soviets’ attitude towards the crisis was, “Stir it up boys; give them trouble.”62 Because of 
the Soviet dimension and the possibility of it spreading to a full Arab-Israeli war, Nixon 
initially favored using American forces as opposed to Israeli forces.  He believed that 
American forces would keep other Arab countries out and that the Soviet Union was less 
likely to intervene directly for fear of a direct engagement with the Americans.63   The 
same could not be said if it was an Israeli attack.  Nixon also worried about American 
credibility.  He said, “If they do it, either we have to do something – cannot let the 
Syrians get away with this – or we’ve got to support the Israelis in doing something.   We 
cannot make a public statement and not back it up.”64  Many of Nixon’s actions during 
his administration occurred because of his desire to maintain credibility in the face of 
perceived Soviet aggression.  This frequently occurred throughout the Vietnam War 
where Nixon and Kissinger linked the American response to the need demonstrate 
American willingness to confront the Soviets to maintain American credibility 
throughout the world.      
 The National Security Council meeting on September 20 discussed the problems 
of American and Israeli intervention.  They immediately decided against an Israeli-
American joint action.  Kissinger and his Nixon’s staff believed that would damage any 




with his neighbors.  The problem with a solely American response was the limited 
resources in the region and if those resources had the ability to sustain a long campaign.  
The only air support available came from the aircraft carriers off the coast of Lebanon.  
To get any supplies or armor into Jordan, it would be necessary to use land access 
through Israel.  In addition, if the American forces on the ground needed support, the 
only assistance readily availed came from Israel.  This again would make it look like a 
joint Israeli-American strike something the NSC already rejected. 65  Because of these 
reasons, the NSC believed that if Jordan needed an outside military force, the IDF was in 
the best position to intervene.  It was in the United States’ interest to keep the Soviet 
Union from intervening on behalf of Syria and the best way to achieve that goal would be 
a limited Israeli attack on behalf of Jordan.    
 To retain the possibility of American military action and at the very least make 
Syria and the Soviet Union believe American military action was possible, the White 
House ordered an improvement of the status of an airborne brigade in Germany.  In 
addition, they put the 82nd Airborne Division on full alert.  They also ordered a 
reconnaissance plane from a carrier in the Mediterranean Sea to travel to the Tel Aviv 
airport to pick up targeting information.  The benefit of improving the alert status of the 
airborne brigade in Germany was that it would dramatically cut the time they could be on 
the ground in Jordan if needed to save the King or American personnel.66  Putting the 
82nd airborne on full alert would signal to both the Syrians and the Russians that the 
United States was contemplating American military involvement and in turn, force them 
to reevaluate their decision to intervene in the Jordanian civil war.  Finally, by sending a 




easily spot, the US could reinforce the possibility of imminent American military action 
along with planning for a coordinated attack with Israel. 
Kissinger believed that the United States needed to show that they were serious 
about defending Jordan.  If they only took minor steps to avoid escalating the situation, it 
could signal to the Russians that the US was not serious in its resolve.  That would 
encourage the Russians and their allies to match the US actions, and eventually, either 
lead to the fall of the Hashemite Monarchy or direct military confrontation by the Cold 
War adversaries.67  Another worry was a stalemate and the Syrian occupation becoming 
the new status quo for northern Jordan.  If Hussein could not push the Syrian forces out, 
Syria or a combination of the Fedayeen supported by Syrian and Soviet equipment could 
annex the northern section of Jordan.      
Also on September 20, with the White House’s approval, Israel sent 
reconnaissance flights over Jordan to get an accurate view of the battlefield.  Early the 
next morning, Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak Rabin contacted Kissinger 
and informed him the situation around Irbid was dire.  Rabin believed that the Syrian 
forces remained strong and Syria had the ability reinforce them.  In addition, he reported 
that the Syrians had strengthened their position around Irbid and would be hard to 
displace.   Rabin also let Kissinger know that the Israeli leadership believed that airstrikes 
might not be enough, and Israeli ground troops could be needed.  The White House 
wanted to avoid any Israeli ground incursion if possible because it could inflame the 
region and damage the standing of the King.  Rabin also promised that the Israeli would 
wait until they completed their reconnaissance flights and then consult with the White 




initial Israeli response.  They needed to worry that Israel could use Hussein’s weakened 
state to push for a larger incursion into Jordan, hoping to retain some of the lands after 
the crisis ended.  In addition, in the past, many in the Israeli government did not respect 
Hussein’s value to the American interests in the region and saw his removal as an 
opportunity to create a Palestinian state inside of Jordan, allowing them to annex the 
West Bank.   Because of this, Nixon and Kissinger needed to restrain Israel, only 
allowing them to intervene if it was necessary for Hussein’s survival.    
 In the first meeting of the Israeli cabinet, there was a split on what to do with the 
Jordanian request for assistance against Syria.  Prime Minister Meir and Ambassador 
Rabin argued in favor of some intervention.   They believed that Israel had had a long 
history with the Hashemite monarchy, and in general, it had been a positive one.  This 
relationship was far more positive than with any other Arab leader.  They believed that 
despite Hussein’s actions in 1967, this relationship allowed for the best chance of peace 
with an Arab government in the near future.  Opposed to them were more radical leaders 
led by Ariel Sharon, Moshe Dayan, and Simon Peres.  They tended to believe that King 
Hussein could not survive much longer anyway and because of that, it was preferable to 
stay out of the fighting.  Some even argued that it was in Israel’s best interest to facilitate 
a Palestinian takeover of Jordan because it would settle the debate of a Palestinian state.69   
If the Palestinians controlled Jordan, the Palestinian’s claim to the West Bank as a future 
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital would be dramatically weakened because 
they no longer were stateless.  Sharon and Dayan hoped to make Jordan a Palestinian 




The cabinet finally agreed to make plans to help Hussein if it became necessary.  
The IDF drew up plans to move against the Syrian forces by both land and air.  They also 
made contingencies of what do to if the Jordanian government fell.  In this scenario, 
Israel believed that Jordan would be broken up by all its neighbors, mainly Iraq, Syria, 
and Saudi Arabia.  Israel planned that if this looked like a certain possibility, it should be 
ready to take their share.  This would include the Gilead Heights, Kerak , and the port 
city of Aqaba.70  In addition to their desire to expand their boundaries, Israel believed that 
if a more radical regime replaced Hussein, it would need a larger buffer against the 
hostile forces, necessitating more land.   
The Israelis did try to get some concessions out of the United States in return for 
any intervention to save Hussein and Jordan from the Syrians.  Rabin asked Kissinger 
and Sisco for support if the Egyptians responded by attacking in the Sinai.  In addition, 
they wanted support and protection if the Soviets intervened to stop an Israeli attack on 
Syria. Finally, Israel wanted more arms.  Kissinger agreed to almost all of it, including 
the replacement of any equipment or ammunition used in the fighting, but did not 
guarantee the US would enter the fight if the Soviets also did.71  This last point was not as 
significant since the US under Nixon and Kissinger repeatedly showed in the future, they 
would not allow the Soviet Union to attack an ally without repercussions for fear of 
losing American prestige to the Soviets.  Kissinger preferred to have maximum flexibility 
to respond to a crisis with the Soviet Union, and that is why he did not give the Israelis 
the assurances they desired. 
With Golda Meir in flight back to Israel from the United States, acting Prime 




Aviv on September 21.  He said, “[I am] following [the] developments with deep 
sympathy and goodwill.  In [the] view to clarify [the] situation [I] suggest [an] immediate 
meeting with you or with your authorized competent representative.  Pick a time of your 
convenience.”72 
Hussein replied:  
[I am] extremely grateful to [my] old friend for [his]concern.   [The] 
situation [is] grave up north.  [I am] trying to reorganize and given a 
chance we may be able to contain [the] threat.  However, [the] threat of a 
breakthrough does exist.  And this will require immediate action.  I would 
have loved to have this chance to meet, but [it is] physically impossible at 
this time.  [I] will arrange a meeting as soon as possible.  [In the] 
meantime please keep in touch through this channel.  Best regards and 
wishes.73 
 
Hussein hoped to keep the Israelis out of Jordan up until the last minute when a Syrian 
advance on Amman became certain.  At only this point was he willing to risk the fallout 
from an Israeli intervention to save his monarchy. 
Like the Americans, Hussein also worried about the impact of an Israeli ground 
invasion.   In a message between Zeid Rifai and Brown, Rifai told him that Jordan was ok 
with ground operations by Israel against Syria, as long as it did not take place in Jordan.  
Rifai believed that if Israel attacked Syria inside Syria, the Syrian forces would return to 
defend against the Israeli offensive.  Hussein could then explain to the other Arab nations 
that he did not collaborate with Israel, but Israel reacted on its own against Syria.  Brown 
also made it clear to the White House that in his view, the best position for the United 
States was that King Hussein could meet the Syrian threat on his own.  Otherwise, it 




heart.” Brown was also unsure of the reaction of the Jordanian military to an Israeli 
ground force.  He could not guarantee that they would not view the Israelis as a threat and 
break off the attack with the Syrian to engage the Israeli forces.74  While a direct Israeli 
intervention would have damaged Hussein’s regime, he was probably correct in his belief 
that he could have survived it if Israeli forces only attacked Syria through Syria and not 
in tandem with the Jordanian forces.  In addition, the preparations for an Israeli attack 
could force the Syrian to retreat to repel it, making actual Israeli intervention 
unnecessary. 
In further communication between Brown and Secretary of State Rogers, Brown 
made it clear that Jordan was only asking for military ground forces if they came from the 
United States or the United Kingdom and planned to engage Syria inside of Jordan.   
Hussein was asking for airstrikes from anyone who was in a position to provide them, 
including the Israelis.75  From the perspective of Hussein, he could disavow or deny 
airstrikes from Israel, but he could not deny the presence of ground troops.  In addition, 
he did not trust the Israelis to use ground forces on the Syrian tank columns and then 
retreat.  Hussein feared it was just as likely they would use it as an excuse to take more 
land in northern Jordan.  Hussein had a much better relationship with both the United 
States and the UK, trusting they would not do anything that would permanently damage 
his reign.  Finally, the US could order ground intervention under the pretense of stopping 
Soviet aggression, not as an attack on the Arab or Palestinian cause.   
Later on September 21, the Israelis contacted Alexander Haig and informed him 
that they no longer believed that air strikes alone would successfully end the conflict.  




hours.  Haig informed the Israelis it would take more time to respond.  Nixon’s advisors 
were not unanimous on the position of an Israeli ground attack.  Nixon’s first inclination 
was to approve it.  Kissinger and Rogers worried it could explode into a larger conflict 
with the Soviet Union and wanted to wait at least until King Hussein made a direct 
request.   Sisco agreed with Nixon believing that Hussein was going to need Israeli 
ground forces to survive.  Kissinger also believed that there was more time to decide.  His 
reasoning was that the IDF would require a full mobilization in case the fighting 
escalated after an invasion.  This would at least take forty-eight hours.  He also believed 
that if the Syrians saw an Israeli mass mobilization, it might give them pause and retreat 
or stop their advancement.  In addition, he believed that the Syrians might face pressure 
to end the fighting by other Arab leaders, particularly Nasser, so as not to have another 
humiliating defeat like the 1967 conflict.76 
The fear of a repeat of 1967 debacle was valid.  Nasser did receive a message 
from Moscow that said, “[The Soviet Union is] asking us to exercise the utmost restraint 
because the international situation is becoming extremely delicate and any miscalculation 
might result in the Arabs losing all the reputation which they have recovered over the 
past three years.”77  The Soviet Union did not want another defeat by their proxy against 
an American proxy and they concurred with the American belief that currently, Israel 
remained a much stronger and effective fighting force.   
In a conversation between Haig and Nixon, Nixon wanted to make sure he 
explained to the Israelis precisely the American position.  Nixon’s principles were: 
First, the operation must succeed; success diplomatically as well as 




the direction of accomplishing a true air action alone . . . if, however, that 
proves to be militarily and overall inadequate, again what is necessary to 
achieve success would have our support . . . action on the ground as 
distinguished from the air must strictly be limited to Jordan.78   
The White House staff all agreed that Israel could bomb Syria proper, but any invasion of 
Syrian land by Israeli ground forces had the potential to spill into a larger conflict 
involving the US, the Arabs, and the Soviet Union.   
Nixon also faced another issue, the response to the crisis by Congress and the 
American public.  With all the troop deployments, it became clear the Nixon 
administration would have to explain the situation both to the public and Congress.  This 
was important because if the situation continued to escalate, Nixon would need both 
congressional and public support to use American resources in the region effectively.   
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said, “Whatever we do, we should make it clear that 
Jordan has been attacked and that the survival of the King is crucial for U.S. interests, 
especially the long-term perspective.”79  To accomplish this, the NSC produced talking 
points to give to members of Congress.  They said, “At stake is the regime of King 
Hussein, a moderate leader friendly to the United States and prepared if he can to make 
peace with Israel.  If he falls, the prospects are for radicalization and possible partition of 
Jordan among elements hostile to Israel and the United States.  If Hussein falls, there will 
remain little hope for an Arab/Israeli settlement in the foreseeable future.”80  The Nixon 
administration hoped to persuade Congress and the public that helping Jordan was in the 
US’s interests by focusing on the importance of Israel’s security and the American 
position in the region in relation to the Cold War.  The administration believed by doing 




September 22, became the turning point in the conflict.  Hussein and the 
Jordanian military launched a highly coordinated air and ground offensive outside of 
Irbid.  While the Jordanian air force was smaller than the Syrian air force, Hussein and 
his advisors did not believe that Syria planned to use them in this fight.  They believed 
that because Syria tried to mark their tanks with PLA, symbolizing that this was 
competently a Palestinian operation, they could not do the same thing with their planes.81  
While it strained believability that the Palestinian forces bases in Syria had hundreds of 
tanks to invade Jordan, the idea of a Palestinian air force was a step too far in the minds 
of Hussein and his advisors.  In addition, internal dissension in Syria also played a role in 
the lack of an air attack.  Hafez al-Assad was the head of the Syrian air force and opposed 
the leadership of President Salih Jadid.  Because of this, Assad refused to use Syrian 
fighter jets to protect the Syrian tank forces from the air.82  Assad and his loyalist 
eventually placed blame on Jadid for the failures in Jordan and removed him from power.   
Also on the September 22, Jordan received assurances from Iraqi Vice President 
Harden al-Takriti that his forces did not intend to intervene in the conflict between Syria 
and Jordan.  They even allowed the Jordanian military to pass through their lines in one 
instance to attack the rebel positions.  While both the Iraqi and Syrian government were 
Baathists, they did not like each other and had a rivalry that extended beyond Jordan.83  
This removed another potent threat against Hussein, allowing him to concentrate his 
attack on Syria and the Fedayeen.  In addition, the United States received intelligence that 
the Soviets began to urge the Syrians to withdraw.  Other sources added that Syria and 
the Soviet Union became worried about the Israeli mobilization and the possibility of this 




Kissinger to continue the escalation gave the Soviets pause for fear that the Syrian 
invasion could blow up into a large regional war that they opposed.  While the Soviet 
Union might have supported the Syrian actions if it had the possibility to remove an 
American ally in the region, they demonstrated that despite that desire, they were not 
willing to have an actual confrontation with the Americans to achieve that goal.  
To increase the pressure on the Syrians and their supporters in Moscow further, 
the White House authorized four destroyers to head to the region and two attack 
submarines to join them on September 23.  The goal of this was to show both the 
Russians and the Syrians that the United States was not bluffing, and increase pressure 
for a full Syrian withdrawal.  Kissinger feared that the Syrians would hold their position 
and dig in, creating a zone of control in northern Jordan.85  This action would weaken 
King Hussein further and could lead to an Israeli attack, increasing the scope of the 
conflict.  In addition, Hussein could not expect to survive long as the leader of Jordan if a 
hostile Syrian force dedicated to his removal occupied a large section of his country.  
With Jordan taking control of the airspace and looking like they would succeed, 
the White House wanted to make sure that the Israelis did not use this as an opportunity 
to attack.  Despite the agreement on this broad goal, there was a conflict between the 
State Department and Kissinger over how to do it.  Kissinger did not want to send an 
official message for fear that it would leak and show a lack of resolve by the US before 
the conflict was clearly over.  Rogers believed the US needed to make it clear to Israel 
that they no longer supported an attack.  Nixon ordered Sisco to contact the Israelis and 
tell them that the US wanted some consultation with Israel before any strike took place.86  




of Israeli involvement.  He said, “The U.S. does not want the Israelis to move unilaterally 
. . . [and] Israeli interests differed from U.S. interests and that we did not want to be 
drawn into the conflict as a result of Israeli initiatives.”87  This theme of conflict between 
the State Department and Kissinger occurred throughout the crisis.  Kissinger wanted to 
be more aggressive and was far more concerned about the perception of American 
actions throughout the world while Rogers was more concerned about the details of 
diplomacy and the impact of taking an aggressive approach to the crisis and the potential 
for it to spiral out of control.  Nixon usually decided on a more aggressive posture, but, at 
least acknowledged Rogers’ concerns over the potential for too much escalation leading 
to a larger conflict.      
With the main fighting over, Nasser called for an Arab summit that occurred from 
September 22 to the 25.  Nasser had concerns about the destruction of the Fedayeen and 
the implications of the conflict for the broader Middle East.  He also had concerns about 
increased American involvement.  This fear intensified when a number of his advisors on 
the ground in Jordan told him they believed that the plan to strike at the Fedayeen came 
from the CIA.88  In a meeting with Hussein, Nasser told him, “I oppose any action you 
may be contemplating to take against the Fedayeen.  I don’t want you to liquidate them or 
them to liquidate you.  No doubt you have the strength to crush them, but to do this you 
will have to slaughter 20,000 people and your kingdom will be a kingdom of ghosts.”89  
Nasser preferred to have the Palestinian militants available to strike at Israel if he ever 
needed them in any future conflict.  Because of that, he opposed any actions by Hussein 




By the end of September 24, Arafat agreed to a cease-fire, and Nasser called for 
another meeting of Arab leaders in Cairo to take place on September 27, for a broader 
discussion of the situation.  While the Palestinian forces and the Jordanian government 
agreed to a more formal cease-fire, the King’s forces continued to restore his control over 
the nation.  While he continued to destroy the Fedayeen positions, Hussein received a 
protest letter from the Russians ordering the Jordanian to stop their aggressions against 
the Palestinians because it “only served the interests of the imperialists and Israel.”90  
This letter had little impact because Hussein knew he had the full support of the United 
States and the Arab nations were no longer an immediate threat to his survival.     
Over the next ten months and culminating on July 12, 1971, the Jordanian forces 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Tall continued to remove the Palestinian fighters 
from Jordan.  On the July 12, Jordanian forces attacked the Fedayeen militants in the area 
of Jerash-Aijoun.  The military killed or captured most of the remaining Fedayeen forces 
in the area.   The rest evacuated to Syria.   The Jordanian public considered Tall a hero 
and he explained that Fedayeen forces were in an “occupied area subject to the harshest 
conditions of evil and terror.”  Tall promised Hussein he would “purge the ranks – all the 
ranks – of those professional criminals who pose as Fedayeen.”91  On July 15, Tall said 
the military would “seal every channel of evil regardless of how small it may be . . .We 
shall not tolerate the chaos of the past, undisciplined commands and attacks on our 
citizens and soldiers.”92  Because of Tall’s role in driving out the Palestinian forces, the 
Black September group assassinated Tall while he attended a meeting with other Arab 
leaders in Cairo.93  This was particularly devastating for Hussein because Tall was a close 




released Tall’s assailants on bail, allowing them to escape the consequences of their 
actions.94  This incident also further undermined Hussein’s relationship with Anwar 
Sadat, who replaced Nasser upon his death on September 28, 1970.   
The consequences of the Jordan civil war and the Syrian invasion had a long 
lasting impact on the Middle East.  Nobody suffered more than the Palestinian Fedayeen 
forces and the Syrian government.  While speaking at the Arab summit to end the 
fighting, Arafat pleaded with the other leaders for help and said, “There is a sea of blood.  
Some twenty thousand of our people are killed or wounded.”95  At one point, things were 
so bad for the Palestinian fighters, over one hundred militants crossed the border with 
Israel and surrendered to the IDF with the hope of being spared from annihilation by the 
Jordanian army.96  Arafat and the remaining Fedayeen forces eventually evacuated to 
Syria and to Lebanon where they continued their campaign against the Israelis but lost 
the support of Jordan and many other Arab states.  In total, the Palestinians claimed to 
lose thirty-five hundred civilians killed and nine hundred fighters.  The Jordanians 
captured over twenty-three hundred fighters.97  In total, the Palestinian Fedayeen lost 
almost half of their fighting force through casualty or capture during the whole of the 
conflict.  In addition, Arafat faced an internal threat for his failed leadership during the 
war.  Within the next year, he faced two different assassination attempts by rival 
members of Fatah who blamed him for the failures in Jordan.98   
Syria also suffered because of the defeat in Jordan.  In material costs alone they 
lost over one hundred and twenty tanks, more than twenty percent of their total tanks 
available, and had six hundred casualties. 99  In addition, Assad used the failure of the 




Syria permanently in the hands of him and his family.100  This failed invasion hurt Syria’s 
standing in the wider Arab world and poisoned relations with Jordan for years.  In 
addition, it caused Syria to deepen its ties to the Soviet Union in order to replace all its 
losses during the conflict.   
The war also changed the relations between Jordan and Israel.  Dayan believed 
this newfound cooperation limited the chances for misunderstanding and conflict between 
the two nations.  For example, the Yom Kippur War did not escalate into an Israeli-
Jordanian conflict because of this new attitude.  Dayan still believed that King Hussein 
was naive to the realities of differences between the two nations but felt they could at 
least sustain an end to the active fighting between Israel and Jordan.  For example, he did 
not take King Hussein’s assurances that all issues would be solved by the return of land 
lost in 1967 war, especially with regards to the issues of Palestinian refugees and Israeli 
security necessities, but still believed that King Hussein was an “enlightened man of the 
world” and somebody that Israel could eventually make peace with.101  The improvement 
of this relationship led to a series of secret meetings between Hussein and representatives 
of Israel in an attempt to reach a peace accord.  While those efforts failed to produce a 
settlement between Israel and Jordan, Hussein and the Israeli leadership continued their 
communications leading to an improved relationship between the two nations.    
The impact of the conflict also influenced American-Jordan relations.  The Nixon 
White House viewed Hussein as a reliable friend in the region who was willing to take on 
the radicals and was strong enough to survive.  To help stabilize the King, on September 
26, the White House ordered the Pentagon to replenish food supplies for the Jordanian 




wounded.102  This also resulted in a new round of military aid for Jordan.  Nixon allowed 
for ten million dollars in direct military assistance and pledged to ask Congress for an 
additional thirty million which was granted.103  A reporter on the ground after the conflict 
ended said she spotted a Jordanian soldier outfitted with American gear and American-
made uniforms.  She said, “While talking with a soldier, we noticed that he was wearing 
American-made equipment, in this case a cartridge belt plainly marked ‘US’.  We pointed 
to it and he said, ‘Yes we are the American army in Jordan.’”104  The conflict firmly 
established Jordan as a client of the US in the region and Hussein would continue to rely 
on the relationship in the future to maintain the security of his regime.    
All sides of the conflict clearly saw the Jordanian-Syrian phase of the fighting as a 
part of the Cold War.  After the fighting, Jordan’s Minister of Information Adnan Abu-
Odeh said, “many commando organizations [were] Marxist and Yasir Arafat had been 
misled by Marxist propaganda.”105  In October 1970, Brezhnev said the Soviet Union 
focused on stopping the intervention of the imperialist powers but also “tried to 
contribute in every possible way toward . . . stopping the extermination of the units of the 
Palestine resistance movement.”  He added that the defeat of the Palestinian forces was 
“truly tragic.”106  Secretary of State Rogers said, “An additional benefit of our handling 
of the Jordanian crisis was the fact that Syria had suffered massive casualties that would 
further serve as a deterrent to the future aggressiveness.  Further, the Palestinian 
extremist had been badly hurt. . . .  all of this constituted a further drain on Soviet 
resources.”107   
The conflict and the Soviet actions also reinforced Kissinger’s attitude toward the 




him that the Soviet Union did not know that Syria was going to invade Jordan.  In 
addition, he assured Kissinger that “Soviet advisors had left their Syrian units before the 
latter crossed the frontier.”  This confirmed Kissinger’s belief that even if the Soviet 
Union did not order the Syrian invasion, they at the very least supported it.  He argued 
that if Soviet advisors were with Syrian army all the way to the border than they had 
ample time to dissuade them from the invasion if it was what the Soviet Union desired.108  
In addition, at a meeting at the Soviet embassy on September 22, Voronstov told 
Kissinger that the Soviets believed Syria would not withdrawal but had agreed to not 
advance any further.  This reinforced belief of Kissinger that the Soviets did have some 
control over the actions of Syria despite their protests, otherwise they would not be 
pushing for Syria to remain in Jordan.109  Later, Kissinger would sum up his view of the 
crisis as follows:  
Syria invaded Jordan; Israel mobilized.  The Middle East seemed on the 
edge of war.  The United States massively reinforced its naval forces in 
the Mediterranean and made clear that it would not tolerate any outside 
intervention.  It soon became apparent that the Soviet Union would run no 
risk of confrontation with the United States.  Syria withdrew and the crisis 
ended, though not without having first demonstrated to the Arab world 
which superpower was more relevant to shaping the future of the area.110 
 After the crisis, when discussing why it was in the American interest to support 
Hussein, Kissinger said:  
It was important to demonstrate that friendship with the West and a 
moderate foreign policy would be rewarded with effective American 
support.  It was necessary to arrest the progressive radicalization of the 
Middle East, which had been accelerated by the dispatch of Soviet 
missiles and combat personnel to Egypt.  Nasser’s technique of 
blackmailing the United States with Soviet threats had to be shown as 





Kissinger could have made the same point about Syria.      
 In addition to the improved relations with Jordan, the United States also attempted 
to improve relations with other Arab regimes after the conflict ended.  A statement from 
the State Department to be delivered to all the Arab capitals said, “While it in 
understandable that feelings are deep when such bloodshed has been involved, we believe 
Hussein [was] forced in [this] situation by Maoist-inclined forces among [the] 
Palestinians, and that he is fully capable of putting his house in order and maintaining the 
broad support of his entire population.”  They also stated that “If there are real villains in 
[the] Jordan tragedy they are clearly George Habash, Hawatmeh and other in the 
leadership of [the] extremist groups.”112  The United States hoped to show other more 
moderate Arab regimes, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, that they were not hostile to the 
Palestinians, but only the radicals.  In addition, they wanted to demonstrate to the 
moderate regimes that these radicals might eventually turn their sights on them, and as 
the US has demonstrated in Jordan, it was willing to support its allies from outside 
aggression.   
William B. Quandt, an aide, to Kissinger also argued that the United States played 
a vital role in the conflict.  He said the American actions were important for two reasons.  
“First, King Hussein needed encouragement to draw full on his own military resources.  
He seemed to be afraid of committing his own air force without assurances that outside 
help would be available if he got in trouble.”  Second, “Left to their own devices, Israeli 
leaders might have responded to the Jordan crisis differently.  By working closely with 





The crisis also dramatically improved the relations between Israel and the United 
States.  The Nixon administration placed a great deal of value in the fact that Israel was 
willing to come to the aid of an American ally when asked.  Michael Oren, the future 
Israeli Ambassador to the United States said, “The White House. . . would long 
remember Israel’s readiness to fight at America’s behest.  Over the next three years, 
American military aid to the Jewish state multiplied tenfold and pressure for Israeli 
territorial concessions ceased.”114 
The impact on Jordan was also important.  Hussein finally had full control of his 
country and no longer worried about retaliation by Israel for events he could not control. 
In meeting between Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and King Hussein on October 3, 
Hussein explained to Allon in more details about how he viewed the conflict.  Hussein 
believed that after the Palestinians called the general strike, he would have faced a larger 
revolutionary movement in the following days.   After the fighting had ended, Jordan 
held over twenty thousand Palestinian prisoners.  This also included some Chinese 
advisors, highlighting to some the connection between the Palestinian militants and the 
larger Marxist/anti-imperialist movement.  His intelligent service was using documents 
captured from Fatah bases to round up more Fedayeen leaders and Hussein believed that 
with this information he would eventually be able to destroy the Fedayeen in Jordan.  The 
reaction from most of the Arab leadership pleased Hussein.  While he was encouraged to 
end the bloodshed, most had no love loss for Arafat.  Hussein told Allon that Saudi 
Arabia did not end their financial support of Jordan.  Libya, under the leadership of 
Muammar Gaddafi, had the loudest opposition to the Jordanian actions and was one of 




For the first time since the conflict in 1967, Hussein finally had full control over 
his nation.  By the end of 1971, almost all the Palestinian forces left Jordan and Hussein 
no longer feared retaliation from Israel over actions by the Fedayeen.  Hussein faced an 
extreme threat to his survival and demonstrated there was no length he would not go to 
save his monarchy.  He would even use the Israelis if that became necessary.  In doing so, 
Hussein proved to the United States that he was a capable ally that they could rely on to 
promote stability and moderation throughout the region.  It also established Hussein as a 
moderate voice in the region, one who would take on the radicals, with force if necessary, 
to promote stability in the region.  The US now had a much stronger partner in the heart 
of the Middle East that could promote their interests to the broader Arab world.  The 
crisis improved relations between the US and Jordan and established a working 
relationship between Hussein and the Israeli leadership that would be important during 










NIXON AND FORD IN THE SHADDOW OF WAR 
 
After the fighting had ended in Jordan, King Hussein hoped to continue his quest 
for peace in the region with the support of his new, tighter relationship with Washington.  
During the second half of the Nixon administration and the Ford administration after 
Nixon resigned in disgrace, Hussein continued to play a constructive role in promoting 
American interest in the region, while trying to cement Jordan’s position as a key 
American ally.  Hussein did this through a number of peace plans, most notably the 
United Arab Kingdom plan, and a major regional war that involved both the Soviet 
Union and the United States actively assisting their allies in the region.  Hussein also 
used the American fear from the Cold War to promote his and Jordan’s interest.  Despite 
his efforts, outside events usually thwarted his goals.  These included domestic political 
trouble for Nixon, domestic issues in Israel, and Arab actions that did not account for 
Jordanian interests including another major Arab-Israeli war.  Finally, the removal of 
Hussein as the representative of the people of the West Bank damaged his ability to 
negotiate with the Israelis and solve the Palestinian issue.       
 Hussein continued to believe that through a close relationship with the US, he 




with regaining the territory lost in the 1967 war.  In addition, Hussein hoped that the 
continued relationship with the US would protect him from the most radical elements in 
the Arab world and if needed, repel external threats similar to the Syrian invasion in 
1970.  To accomplish this feat, Hussein immediately began an effort at a new peace 
settlement with Israel that he hoped would eventually lead to the return of the West Bank 
and Jerusalem to Jordanian control now that he assured the threat to his regime from 
Palestinian militants had passed.    
In a speech to the Jordanian public on March 15, 1972, King Hussein announced 
his new plan for a settlement of the Palestinian problem and the continued conflict with 
Israel.  He called for the creation of a United Arab Kingdom which consisted of two 
states under one rule.  The Jordanian state would reside on the East Bank of the Jordan 
River with the capital of Amman.  The Palestinian state would be in the West Bank and 
would include any other liberated areas that wished to join.  This implied the eventual 
integration of Gaza into the Jordanian federation.  The capital of the Palestinian state 
would reside in the holy city of Jerusalem.  Both states would fall under a united 
kingdom located in the capital of Amman and have a united armed forces under the head 
of the state, King Hussein.  The central government would manage international affairs 
including the military, trade, and diplomacy.  An elected governor of each state would 
lead day-to-day operations of each state but who would have some subservience to 
Hussein.  Hussein said: 
The new phase which we look forward to will guarantee the 
reorganization of the Jordanian-Palestinian house in a manner which will 
provide it with more intrinsic power and ability to work to attain its 
ambitions and aspiration.  Proceeding from this fact, this formula will bind 




strengthen their brotherhood and march as a result of enhancing man’s 
responsibility in each bank on bases more suitable for serving their 
national aspirations without prejudice to any of the rights gained by any 
citizen, where he be of Palestinian origin living in the Jordanian region or 
a Jordanian origin living in the Palestinian region.1 
 
 Hussein believed this plan had the potential to accomplish a number of his goals.  
It would allow him to secure his place, and his family’s place as the undisputed ruler of a 
united Jordan while at the same time increasing the viability of a Jordanian nation.  He 
said, “we shall put the Jordanian - Palestinian house in order so that intrinsic strength and 
ability to attain our ambitions and goals will be enhanced.  This formula will tighten the 
bonds of the two banks.”  Hussein believed that the plan would promote both Jordanian 
and Palestinian nationalism and give his main constituency, the Jordanians on the East 
Bank, more control over their lives separate from the plight of the Palestinian refugees 
settled in Jordan2  Finally, it would recognize Hussein’s role as the protector of the holy 
sites in Jerusalem.    
 Hussein’s calls for direct voter participation and self-determination were aimed at 
the Americans and the West because of their commitment to the ideals of democracy and 
representative government.   He hoped that with the focus on self-determination, leaders 
in Washington would favor the plan.   He announced his plan just before a scheduled trip 
to Washington with the hope of capitalizing on this theme.3  Despite his hope and the 
positive nature of the trip to Washington, Hussein did not get the support he wanted for 
his plan.  In talks with Nixon, Rogers emphasized that Hussein was a strong ally of the 




desired.  While the White House delivered this reality to Hussein, they attempted to ease 
the pain by increasing aid to Jordan.4    
Another headwind against a dramatic peace deal with the support of the United 
States was the political season in Washington.  In December 1971, Nixon designated 
Kissinger with running the American response to issues in the Middle East.  According to 
Kissinger, “Nixon did not believe he could risk recurrent crises in the Middle East in an 
election year.  He therefore asked me to step in, if only to keep things quiet.”5  In a 
meeting between Kissinger and Golda Meir on December 2, 1971, Kissinger and Meir 
agreed to stop searching for a comprehensive agreement in the Middle East for the time 
being.   Instead, only talks concerning Israel and its neighbors would commence with the 
hope of minimizing any entanglements, while pushing to later any attempts at a large 
settlement with the broader Arab world.6  The importance of the Jewish vote in the 
upcoming election would limit Nixon’s ability to respond to a new crisis in the Middle 
East.  It gave Israel too much leverage with Nixon, making his order for Kissinger to 
limit the potential problems a prudent step. 
The impact of the Jordanian Civil War also influenced the United States not to get 
involved.  Because Israel willingly came to the aid of the United States when it needed 
support for its ally Jordan, Nixon and Kissinger saw Israel as a more reliable ally then 
any time before.  Because of these actions, American military aid to Israel increased 
tenfold and the United States stopped trying to pressure Israel into making large 
territorial concessions to the Arabs in order to achieve peace.7  In fact, from 1967-170 
American military aid to Israel averaged $47 million dollars a year.  From 1971 to 1974 




a state perusing the Nixon administration’s view of the Cold War, with Jordan, Israel, 
Iran, and Saudi Arabia, providing a bulkhead against Soviet expansion in the region and 
maintaining the status quo of American dominance and unfettered access to the natural 
resources of the region.9  For these reasons, the United States had very little incentive to 
start new initiatives that had the potential to end that favorable status quo.     
 Despite the initial reluctance of the United States, Hussein still moved forward 
with promoting his plan to the most important Arab states.  He hoped that if he had their 
support, it might increase the pressure on Israel and the United States to agree reluctantly 
to negotiate with him.  Hussein sent a letter to Assad asking for his support of his plan 
even though at that point Jordan still did not have any diplomatic relations with Syria and 
the wounds from the Syrian invasion during the Jordanian Civil War were still fresh.  In 
the letter, Hussein claimed that he discussed the plan with a number of Palestinian leaders 
and had their support.  In addition, he argued that this was the most realistic way to end 
the occupation during the foreseeable future.  Hussein argued that any independent 
Palestinian state formed in the current situation would not be strong enough to withstand 
pressure from Israel, making a federation with Jordan the most logical step.  Finally, 
Hussein assured Assad that once the Palestinian liberation of the occupied territories was 
complete, the people of those territories would have the ability to decide if they wanted to 
continue to maintain their association with Jordan.10  Hussein would frequently use this 
idea of self-determination for the Palestinian population.  It had a number of benefits.  
First, it embraced the legacy of Woodrow Wilson and his call for self-determination after 
World War I, linking his ideas to American ideals.  Second, it Hussein hoped to assure 




attacks on them from the Jordanian Civil War, but was willing to allow them to decide on 
their future.          
 Hussein faced difficulties in his attempt to get Egyptian approval.  Days after 
Jordan and the Palestinian militants agreed to a ceasefire, which was brokered by Nasser, 
Nasser died from a heart attack on September 28, 1970.  The new leader of Egypt, Anwar 
Sadat did not think as highly of King Hussein as his predecessor.  Sadat’s political 
training in Egypt’s Free Officer Movement informed his negative attitude towards 
monarchs.  In fact, he believed that Hussein would work with the Israelis or the 
Americans to thwart the Arab cause if it served his immediate interests.  Soon after 
Nasser’s death on November 19, 1970, Hussein contacted Sadat asking for a meeting in 
Cairo.  While he agreed to the meeting initially, Sadat canceled it after learning of secret 
meetings between Hussein and Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon   In addition, in 
private meetings with various Palestinian groups, Sadat told them to ignore any actions 
Hussein took with Israel and oppose any settlement.11       
 When Hussein approached Sadat about his United Arab Kingdom Plan, Hussein 
argued, “The PLO had imported a dangerous ideology, nearly causing the collapse of 
Jordan.  Meanwhile, Israel was moving forward the creation of a weak puppet Palestinian 
entity on the West Bank so that they can swallow it when they wish.”12  Sadat rejected 
Hussein’s plan because he thought it was a scheme pushed by the Americans.   In 
addition, he believed it was an attempt to give Jordan control over Gaza and through it, a 
link to the sea.  In addition, he viewed it as a means of cut off the Egyptians from the 
Palestinians by severing their connection to the Gaza.13  Sadat told Hussein that his plan 




further express its outrage of the plan, Egypt broke off diplomatic relations with Jordan 
on April 6, 1972.15 
 The leading Palestinian groups also opposed it.  The central committee of the 
PLO rejected it outright and accused Hussein of “offering itself as an accomplice to the 
Zionist Enemy.”  It also accused Hussein of being a “subservient and collusive regime” 
towards the Israelis.  Fatah used the plan as an excuse to continue their feud with 
Hussein.   In a statement they said, their dispute was with “the King, the Hashemite 
dynasty, and the regime” for their collusion with Israel and the US.  It also accused 
Hussein of siding with Zionism and imperialism to destroy the Palestinians.16  Finally, 
they rejected Hussein’s ability to negotiate for the Palestinians.  The PLO central 
committee said, “The people of Palestine alone, and in the necessary atmosphere of 
freedom, can decide their own future and the future of their cause.”17  The reaction of the 
PLO showed signs of future problems for Hussein.  The Arabs and the Palestinians would 
continue to challenge Hussein’s ability to speak for the Palestinian people in the West 
Bank and Jordan.    
 Like the Arabs, Israel also was not an enthusiastic supporter of the ideas promoted 
by Hussein and the Israeli government immediately rejected his plan.  Prime Minister 
Golda Meir opposed it for many reasons.  First, it had a huge impact on Israel’s security 
without any negotiations on how that threat could be relieved.   Second, it did not call for 
a lasting or binding peace with Israel, the minimum Israel needed to trade land for peace.  
Finally, she said the plan was a “pretentious and one-sided statement which not only does 
not serve the interests of peace, but is liable to spur all the extremist elements whose aim 




behind Hussein’s plan by noting that “the historic right of the Jewish people to the Land 
of Israel is beyond challenge.”19  This statement meant that the current state of Israel did 
not intend to give up land they felt historically tied to the Jewish people, this included the 
West Bank.    
 Another issue encouraging Israel not to move forward on Hussein’s peace plan 
was the benefits of the status quo.  Israeli Labor Party leader Shimon Peres said the 
relationship between Jordan and Israel “is distinct not in a passive sense – nonaggression, 
non-belligerency – but it also has an active component.  This includes open bridges for 
people and goods, negations of war and terrorism, mutual dislike of the Russians, and an 
attempt to maintain a . . . consistency in our relationship” which could all go away with 
failed negotiation.20  Israeli politicians saw no need to risk the status quo through a large 
public negotiation between Israel and Jordan, especially for relatively minimal gains in 
terms of security.        
Despite Meir’s initial public rejection of Hussein’s United Arab plan, she was 
willing to meet with him to discuss it further.  She did this because of the close 
relationship between the two governments and the desire to keep Hussein friendly 
towards Israel.  Those meetings began on March 21, 1972.   Meir told Hussein she was 
opposed to his plan partly because it did not openly talk about peace with Israel.  Hussein 
assured her that he did foresee an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the West 
Bank then placed under a Jordanian federation until both sides agreed to a final 
settlement.  Meir questioned if Hussein would agree to border changes not based on the 
1967 lines, allowing Israel to retain some of their settlements constructed after 1967 war.  




Jerusalem where a large Arab population remained.  Hussein acknowledged that the 
negotiations would need to address the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and 
Jerusalem but he emphasized he needed to retain most of the West Bank to make the deal 
palpable to the rest of the Arab world.   In addition, he believed that Jerusalem could 
remain the capital of both Israel and the Palestinian part of the United Arab Kingdom.  In 
the interest of Israeli security, Hussein pledged to make the West Bank a demilitarized 
zone.21  While Jordan and Israel did not reach an agreement, both leaders pledged to 
continue the dialogue.  The meetings between Meir and Hussein to discuss the United 
Arab Kingdom Plan were important for a number of reasons.  First, many of the solutions 
proposed by Hussein would continue to form the basis of future peace talks between 
Israel and Jordan.  This also included talks sponsored by the Americans.  In addition, it 
established a working relationship between Hussein and Israel that would be important in 
limiting the fallout in future Israeli-Arab crises.  
 On June 29, 1972, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan met with Hussein to 
discuss the United Arab Kingdom plan.  Dayan took a more hardline position than Meir 
and he opposed returning to Jordan any land captured in the 1967 war back.  Instead, he 
tried to convince Hussein that Jordan should sign a peace deal or a mutual defense pact 
with Israel.  He tried to persuade Hussein that Golda Meir was much more likely to give 
him favorable terms than any other Israeli leader, including himself.  Hussein was 
unwilling to make a formal defense pact but did not reject it out of hand with the belief 
that he might one day in the future need Israeli assistance like he did in 1970.22 
 Despite the meetings between Jordan and Israel, there was no chance for an 




quo in the West Bank.  Israel, with a dominant military and continued American support, 
had no reason to make the compromises necessary to reach an accord with Jordan.  Even 
though the American government enthusiastically supported making a deal with Hussein 
because of his affinity for the West, they were not willing to threaten Israeli aid to force 
them to work with Hussein.  For Hussein, he could not agree to any deal that did not 
return the West Bank to Jordan.  Besides the historical and familial link to holy sites in 
Jerusalem, Hussein could not survive in the Arab world if it appeared he abandoned the 
Palestinians to Israel.  In addition, even a defense pact was unlikely because Hussein 
could not expect to survive solely with the defense of IDF.  While a defense pact would 
protect him from external threats, any agreement with Israel that did not return much of 
the land from 1967 would increase the internal threats to his rule.  He needed to make an 
agreement that increased or at the very least stabilized his prestige in the rest of the Arab 
world if he hoped to survive.    
 Despite the failure of the United Arab Kingdom plan, it did have a lasting impact 
on the region and in Jordan.  Its most significant consequence was on the relationship 
between Jordan and the Palestinian people.  According to one of the authors of the plan, 
Adnan Abu-Odeh, because Hussein argued for a separate Palestinian state inside a larger 
federation, he acknowledged for the first time that Jordan might not be reunited with the 
West Bank.  In addition, in the minds of many Jordanians, it further separated them from 
the Palestinians.  This was true because, in the past, the Jordanian government treated 
Palestinian refugees as Jordanian citizens.  This plan said the Palestinians were no longer 
Jordanians, but something distinctly different with just a causal relationship with state 




organizations and causes and now concentrated their activism on a separate distinct future 
of Jordan without any association with the Palestinian cause.23    
 After the failure of the United Arab Kingdom Plan, there was not much 
movement on the Jordanian - Israeli front until after Nixon won reelection in 1972.   
Once Nixon was assured another four years in the White House, or so he believed, 
Kissinger and Nixon now had more room to focus on solving the problems in the Middle 
East.  This included trying to persuade Israel to come to some accommodation with 
Jordan and to continue to support Hussein in his attempt to regain much of the land lost 
in 1967.  In addition, throughout 1973, the threat of a Middle East war greatly increased, 
and that threat would have a long and lasting impact on the American role in the region.    
 On July 8, 1972, Egypt took steps that would begin to reshape the balance of 
power in the region and refocus American attention on the Middle East.  Anwar Sadat 
informed the Soviet ambassador to Egypt, Vladimir Vinogradov, that the Soviet Union 
had ten days to remove the over 15,000 military personnel from Egypt.  Sadat hoped that 
this would ingratiate him with the Americans, but the only message he received was from 
Rogers who informed him that while the United States appreciated his actions, there was 
only so much they could do to persuade Israel to make fundamental changes to their 
approach to peace.  In addition, Rogers explained to Sadat that Kissinger and the White 
House was currently focused on issues with Vietnam and unable to meet with the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister Hafez Ismail in the near future to discuss restarting the peace 




 With the backdrop of the Soviet expulsion, Hussein and Sadat met on December 
17, 1972.  In a meeting with Jordanian Prime Minister Zeid Rifai, Hussein and Sadat, 
Rifai “argued that the Soviets having reached an understanding with the United States, do 
not wish to anything that might jeopardize their newly-established working relationship” 
so will not be much help in the quest to reach a peace deal with the Israelis that return 
much of the land lost in 1967.  Because of this, Hussein argued that the best way for the 
Arabs to achieve their goals was through the United States.  Sadat agreed but still felt that 
the Soviet Union could play a role in the negotiations.25  Despite the break with the 
Soviet advisors, Sadat still used the Soviet Union as his major arms supplier and still 
needed to keep the option of their support if his attempts with the United States failed.  
Finally, Sadat argued that a military strike would be the only thing to change the Israeli 
attitude.  He believed that he could sustain any counterattack by the Israelis.   In addition, 
Sadat said, “under no circumstances should Jordan in any way become involved in 
Egypt’s war of attrition because the Israelis would quickly overrun the East Bank and 
destroy the Jordanian army.”26  Finally, Sadat told Rifai:  
I realize my limitations.  I am not good at blitzkrieg.  The Israelis are good 
at blitzkrieg.  I will fight a war of political reactivation and not of military 
liberation.  I will wage a limited war; cross the canal, secure a bridgehead 
and stop.  Then I will ask the Security Council to call a ceasefire.  This 
strategy will ensure my victory in the battle, cut my losses and reactivate 
the peace process.27 
 
This was the first hint to both Jordan and the United States that Sadat still believed that a 
military option was necessary to retake much of the land lost in 1967.  Most 
policymakers in Israel and the United States discounted this possibility because of the 




Sadat eventually demonstrated that he believed the only way for the Arabs to regain the 
land lost in 1967 was through military conquest.   
 There were other signs of a change in Arab attitude towards the stalemate in the 
region.  In January of 1973, eighteen Arab leaders met in Cairo to discuss a common 
defense against Israel.  In this meeting, the Jordanians agreed to the reactivation of a 
Jordanian front and the appointment of Egyptian War Minister Marshal Ahmed Ismail 
Ali to head the combined forces.  Jordan also made a statement that they will not permit 
the Fedayeen to return to Jordan to launch attacks on Israel. 28  Because Jordan took both 
actions, the status quo was not dramatically altered.  Hussein believed he needed to show 
some Arab unity to protect his position against the more radical Arab regimes, but after 
the war with the Palestinian militants, the repeated assassination attempts, and the murder 
of his trusted ally and friend Wasfi Tall, Hussein refused to allow the Fedayeen back into 
Jordan under any circumstance.  While Israel could view Hussein allowing the Egyptian 
military back into Jordan as provocative, it only mattered if there was another war.  At 
this point, both the US and Israel believed that it was unlikely that the Arabs would start 
another conflict with their complete failure of 1967 still fresh in their minds.  In addition, 
while there were some military discussions, War Minister Ali did not take full command 
of any forces inside Jordan.  
 Despite this meeting, the White House still believed that Hussein was a strong 
ally in the region and a force for peace and stability.  Kissinger accepted the belief that 
King Hussein was the most willing to work for peace with Israel.  Hussein’s only 
hesitation came from his position in the Arab world and the threat from other radical 




go first, but he would gladly join in the later stages.  He hoped that this would allow him 
to maintain his position in the Arab world and have the anger from Arab radicals more 
focused on another regime better suited to handle it.29  Hussein would hold on to this 
belief in the future, impairing his relationship with the Americans.  While his beliefs that 
he needed another more powerful nation like Egypt to make the first steps towards peace 
with Israel if he hoped to survive, it diminished the attitude of some American 
policymakers towards Hussein.  Hussein could not afford to be isolated and maintain his 
regime.    
Nixon believed that it was important for the US to promote a peace process to 
provide stability for the region, but he believed that Kissinger did not want to force Israel 
to make the hard choices necessary for peace because of pressure he received from the 
Jewish community.  Nixon also felt that providing some settlement in the Middle East 
was important for the Cold War.   He believed if nothing were accomplished then the US 
would face “100 million Arabs hating us and providing a fishing ground not only for 
radicals but, of course, the Soviets.”30  Despite the fact that Egypt expelled the Soviets, 
Nixon still believed that most events in the Middle East resulted from elements of the 
Cold War as was seen in his view of the Jordanian conflict with Syrian and the Fedayeen.  
Nixon ignored the reality that while the Cold War played a role in the actions of the 
Middle East, local and regional issues, with both the United States and the Soviet Union 
playing a supporting role, frequently drove events.    
 In preparation for a meeting with King Hussein on February 6, 1973, Kissinger 
argued in the White House the importance of Hussein to American interests in the region.  




managed to wrest both independence and dignity from the initial disdain 
of Arab nationalist and the self-confident domination of the imperial 
power.  [He] did so moreover, at a time when the nationalist movements 
were aimed as much at the ruling monarchies as at the European colonial 
countries.  The Hashemite kings were forced into a precarious balancing 
act.  They needed outside support against radical pressures, especially as 
these were increasingly bolstered by other Arab states and by the growing 
Soviet power.  But they did not behave as the surrogates of foreigners.  
Rather they strove for, and succeeded in articulating, a form of Arab 
nationalism that asserted an Arab identity while affirming friendship for 
the West, seeking to demonstrate that Arab aspirations could be fulfilled 
through moderation.31 
 
Because of Hussein’s position as one of the most consistently pro-Western regimes in the 
Arab world, in Kissinger’s view, it was necessary for the United States to promote and 
cultivate that relationship.    
One of the first matters of discussion for Kissinger and Hussein in their meeting 
on February 6, 1973, was the impact of the surprise expulsion of Soviet advisors from 
Egypt.  Hussein predicted three responses by the Soviet Union.  First, Hussein believed 
that the Soviet Union would dramatically increase military aid to Egypt.  He believed that 
the Soviet Union would need to do this to salvage any influence it could with Egypt.  In 
addition, he believed that the Soviet Union would greatly increase its aid and advice to 
Syria.  If the Soviet Union “lost” Egypt, it would need to maintain one client state in the 
region.  Since Syria was one of the more radical regimes in the Middle East, this posed a 
problem for both Hussein and the United States.  Syria was also the only Arab nation to 
invade Jordan.  With a dramatic increase in Soviet arms, Hussein needed to worry about 
retaining a balance of power between him and his rival.32  Finally, Hussein believed the 
Soviets would oppose any settlement between the Arabs and Israel unless it were a 




of complications for the Americans.33  In previous negotiation attempts, the United States 
did not want to include Jordan in a group settlement because the US did not want 
Jordan’s interests sacrificed to complete a larger peace deal and did not want the Soviets 
to have any role in deciding the outcome from two American allies.  The US worried that 
if Jordan were included in a large group negotiation, Israel would be reluctant to 
complete a deal on the West Bank, thus making it impossible to complete the 
comprehensive negotiation.  Israel placed special importance on the land it took from 
Jordan in the 1967 war for strategic and cultural reasons.  The holy city of Jerusalem was 
located in this patch of land, containing holy sites for all the major religions.   Secondly, 
Israel always wanted to retain the land in the West Bank to extend their frontier and 
protect its major population centers from Arab attacks.  Finally, with a large negotiated 
settlement with Soviet participation, Moscow would get the credit with the Arab world if 
it succeeded and could blame the American failure to get concessions from Israel if the 
talks failed.  This gave Kissinger little incentive to stake American prestige on a 
comprehensive deal. 
Hussein also warned Kissinger that one possible reason for Egypt expelling the 
Soviet advisors were that the Soviets held Egypt back from any large military actions.34  
The Soviets had demonstrated in the past they feared any attack against Israel by large 
Arab force would fail, hurting both the Arab and Soviet position in the Middle East, 
especially after the disaster of the 1967 war.  In addition, if there were a large, binding 
peace settlement in the region, the Arab nations would become less dependent on Soviet 
arms, diminishing Soviet influence in the region.  Because of this, from the Soviet view, 




the best way to get the attention of the Americans was to describe the problems of the 
region through a Cold War prism.  This way, the US could frame their support for 
Jordan’s position not as a threat to Israel, but as something necessary to maintain 
dominance over the Soviets in the region.      
After Hussein’s discussions with Kissinger, he met privately with Nixon.  In that 
meeting, Hussein said that in his discussions with Arab leaders, he made it clear he 
wanted to improve relations between his nation and Egypt and Syria.  Despite that desire, 
there were two points where Hussein would not change his position.  He said, “We 
cannot, however accept any normalization of relations with these two counties by 
compromising two of our cardinal principles, refusing return of any Fedayeen forces to 
Jordan. And resumption of hostilities on our front with Israel or handing over command 
of the armed forces to a unified command.”35  This was important for Nixon because it 
highlighted to him why the United States could trust Hussein to maintain peace in the 
region.  In response, Nixon told Hussein that the US would pledge $100 million in aid to 
Jordan.  This would come in a variety of ways.  The US would give Jordan $10 million to 
modernize the military along with another $40 million in general military aid, $50 million 
in budget aid and $10 million in economic development aid.36   
Also of interest to Nixon, Hussein speculated on his views of the recent Soviet 
action in the region.  He said the Soviets are “concentrating on Iraq, which poses a 
nuisance to Iran and a threat to the Gulf States. . . .  The Soviets are apparently most 
interested in Syria and it is possible that they, either directly through their excessive 
military assistance, or indirectly through Iraq, may eventually bring Syria and Iraq into 




saying, “we are constantly urged to bring to the attention of the United States 
Government the need for greater U.S. involvement in the Gulf in order to assist those 
states to ward off communist and extremist influences that are increasingly coming to 
bear on the area.”38  It was in Hussein’s interests to emphasize the threat from the Soviet 
Union to America’s position in the region despite the apparent break between Moscow 
and Cairo.     
The Egyptian actions towards the Soviet Union also influenced the way Israel 
viewed Hussein and Jordan.  In a cable from American Chief of Mission Owen Zurhellen 
on February 13, 1973, he said, “[The] Israelis are convinced that Hussein now wants 
peace, but in five years since [the] Six Day War their asking price for that settlement has 
grown. . . .  Israel now feels they can . . . get recognition of all [of] Jerusalem as 
sovereign Israel, cessation to Israel of one-third [of the] West Bank, and open borders 
allowing free trade, travel and settlement.”39  Zurhellen believed that Hussein could never 
live with those terms and the best hope forward might be to complete a deal between 
Egypt and Israel, allowing an increase in Israeli security.  If Israel felt more secure, they 
might be more willing to cut a realistic deal with Hussein.  Zurhellen also said that while 
Hussein wants credit from Israel for his willingness to be the first Arab state to recognize 
it, Israel does not place too much value on that is less influential in the Arab world than 
someone like Sadat.  He also felt that the Cold War was a hindrance to peace at the 
current moment.  He believed that Israel felt because the Soviet Union was taking less of 
a role in the region, the United States would be less inclined to force Israel to make the 
hard choices necessary for peace because they no longer had to worry about Soviet 




was correct.  If the Soviets’ pressure on Jordan and Israel eased, the Israel knew that the 
US would not want to do anything that negatively affected the status quo.  Like Nixon, 
the Soviets had very little incentive or ability to change the situation in the Middle East 
without drastic action.       
On February 23, Egyptian Prime Minister Hafiz Ismail arrived in Washington to 
discuss the peace process with both Nixon and Kissinger.  In those meetings, he said 
Egypt was willing to end the state of war between Egypt and Israel, but could not 
conclude a formal peace treaty without a settlement with the other Arab nations.  In 
particular, he needed a settlement with Jordan and Syria along with some conclusion to 
the remaining Palestinian issues.  Ismail’s view of the West Bank and Jordan was also 
important.  He told Kissinger that Egypt had no preference with whom the Israelis settled 
with, either Jordan or an unnamed Palestinian leadership.  He was even willing to accept 
the Israeli Allon plan, which would have stationed a sizeable Israeli military presence on 
the Jordan River and Hussein had repeatedly rejected.41  His only two requirements were 
that there needed to be Arab control of East Jerusalem and that Egypt got a voice on who 
would be the ultimate government on the West Bank.  This left open the possibility of 
Egypt working with the PLO to take control of the West Bank and Gaza.  This was 
different and important in Kissinger’s eyes because it showed that the PLO was gaining 
strength and influence, while also demonstrating the still low regard some in the Arab 
world had for King Hussein.  In addition, “it meant that Hussein might be used to extract 
territory from Israel but not be able to retain it.  And for Israel, negotiations with Hussein 
were thus becoming only the admission price to confrontation with its mortal enemy, the 




for peace because it would undoubtedly sacrifice a loyal American ally in King Hussein.  
Kissinger and Nixon could not easily replace Hussein, a reliable friend, with Egypt who 
up until six months previous was a solid supporter and client of the Soviet Union.    
On February 27, Hussein again met with Kissinger and laid out his view of a 
peace negotiation between Israel and Jordan.  Hussein wanted most of the West Bank 
returned to Jordan sovereignty.  He was willing to make some changes on the border as 
long as Israel gave Jordan Gaza.  Gaza was important to Jordan because it provided them 
access to the Mediterranean Sea.  Hussein was also willing to allow a small Israeli force 
or settlement on the Jordan River.  This concession was important to Israel because it 
provided a trip wire against an Arab invasion from the East.  Hussein believed that this 
type of peace proposal had to be presented to the Israelis by the Americans or the 
government in Tel Aviv would dismiss it.  Hussein also told Kissinger he believed that 
they had two to three years to come up with a settlement between the Arabs and the 
Israelis before the region would explode into conflict again. 43  Hussein wanted to be 
clear that while he was willing to make concessions to Israel on the West Bank, he was 
still not willing to sacrifice Jordanian control over at least the Arab sections of 
Jerusalem.44  Most of Hussein’s predictions on the region were correct, except this last 
one.  War would come much sooner and unfortunately, his assessment of the possible 
timing of a conflict gave the Americans a reason to wait until after the Israeli elections on 
October 30 to push for a peace settlement. 
Kissinger’s attempts to persuade the Israelis to negotiate with Hussein in good 
faith also failed.  From Israel’s perspective, they were the dominant military power in the 




little incentive to sacrifice what many Israelis believed was their historical homeland for 
an empty peace with the Arabs.  In addition, Israel believed that the longer the status quo 
of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank persisted, the more likely it would 
permanently take hold.  When Golda Meir met with Kissinger on March 1, she told him 
that there were already negotiations between Jordan and Israel and the United States did 
not need to get involved.  In addition, Meir told Kissinger that there was no reason to 
accelerate talks because the Israeli Defense Force was so strong, no Arab nation could 
launch an effective attack.45    
The summer of 1973 brought both more signs for peace and the growing prospect 
that war was possible.  A surprising approach for engagement came through the CIA 
station chief in Beirut, Robert Ames, in July.  An aide to Yasir Arafat contacted Ames 
about opening a dialogue between the PLO and the United States.  Ames passed the 
information to the American ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms.  In a meeting with 
Kissinger, Helms told him that Arafat wanted to talk to the US under the premise that 
Israel could not be removed and was going to be a permanent member of the Middle 
East.  Arafat also communicated to Helms that, “the Palestinians must have a home and 
that home will be Jordan.”46  While the Palestinians believed their homeland could be in 
Jordan, this did not include Jordan still under the control of Hussein.  Helms believed that 
this could be a breakthrough because it acknowledged that Arabs could not defeat Israel 
and implied that this reality could result in a formal recognition of Israel by the 
Palestinians.  The talk of supporting the removal of King Hussein bothered Kissinger.  He 
told Helms, “I considered King Hussein a valued friend of the United States and a 




Palestinian organization given legitimacy in the West Bank would use the region to 
attack both Hussein and the Israelis. He also did not believe that just the West Bank 
would satisfy Arafat.  Eventually, the Palestinian forces would move to expand either in 
Jordan or Israel.  Because of this, Kissinger ordered Helms not even to reply to Arafat’s 
message.47  Because of Kissinger’s relationship with Hussein, he had little incentive to 
replace him with Arafat, who was consistently hostile to the United States despite any 
overtures he was currently making.  Hussein had already demonstrated to Kissinger that 
he was someone the US could count on and trust in the region, leading him to reject 
Arafat’s overtures.      
Despite Kissinger’s decision, Helms pressed Arafat’s case to the White House and 
the State Department and argued the benefits of dealing with Arafat through a Cold War 
prism.  He told Kissinger that Arafat was receiving pressure to establish a government in 
exile to replace Hussein in the West Bank and eventually all of Jordan.   Because of that, 
Helms believed that “Arafat wants a real state or nothing.”48  In regards to the Soviet 
Union, Helms said:  
The Soviet Union . . . seeks to exploit [an] area of conflict or potential 
conflict in the area to enhance Soviet interests, weaken those of the United 
States and outflank China from the South.  Supporting radical regimes in 
Iraq and South Yemen, the Dhufari rebels, a revolutionary new regime in 
Afghanistan and an India which constitutes a latent threat to Pakistani 
security, the Soviet Union either ferments instability or tries to increase its 
potential for doing so.  However, the Soviets seem unlikely to pursue their 
goals in the region so vigorously as to destroy détente with the United 
States.49 
 
In Helm’s view, despite being removed from Egypt, the Soviet Union still had a presence 




long as it did not threaten to permanently undermined détente.  What Helms did not take 
into account was Arafat’s willingness or ability to work with the US.  Given the 
opportunity in the future to moderate his ways, Arafat consistently chose a more radical 
path, even when it led to the rejection of contact with the United States.  If Kissinger and 
Nixon took Helm’s advice, the likely result would have been a hostile Palestinian state in 
Jordan, continuing to attack Israel while being hostile to an American role in the Middle 
East. 
In May, Hussein again tried to sound the alarm in both Tel Aviv and Washington 
that the outbreak of war was approaching because of the lack of progress towards a peace 
settlement.  In a meeting between Kissinger and Israeli ambassador to the United States 
Simcha Dinitz on May 3, Dinitz explained to Kissinger that he received a message from 
Hussein that there was a massive Arab built up around the nations surrounding Israel.  
Hussein believed that this had the potential for disaster and wanted Israel to pass the 
information to the United States.  Hussein, for example, believed that Iraq was going to 
attempt to station troops in Jordan again, but instead of focusing on him, it was in 
preparation for a war with Israel.  Both Kissinger and Dimitz felt that Syria would not 
take any action against Israel without support from the Soviet Union and the Soviet 
Union would not want to jeopardize their upcoming conference with the US.  Because of 
this, they believed that despite their intelligence agencies confirming some of the things 
Hussein was reporting, there was no real threat in the short term.50 
On May 17, Hussein sent a direct message to Kissinger and told him that his 
intelligence learned that Syrian forces have been working on night fighting in preparation 




equipment, including advanced radar equipment and surface-to-air missiles.  He also said 
he was receiving pressure from Egypt to join his force with Egyptian under one command 
again.  He believed that Egypt might strike Israel followed by an attack from Syria.51  
Despite the fact that both the United States and Israel ignored his repeated warnings, 
Hussein still tried to maintain his position as an ally to the US by pledging not to turn 
over his forces to a foreign command like in 1967.  He hoped that war could be avoided, 
but if not, to stay out of it as much as possible.    
In the view of Hussein, another sign of the possible coming conflict came from 
the desire of Egypt and Syria to mend relations with Jordan.  Between the Syrian invasion 
and King Hussein’s United Arab Kingdom Plan, Jordan no longer had direct relations 
with two of its neighbors.  On May 31, Mahmoud Riad, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, 
flew to Damascus to get Assad to ease the pressure on Hussein.  Up until this point, 
Hussein faced countless attacks from the Arab media, with the backing of both Sadat and 
Assad, for his dealings with Israel and his continued opposition to the Palestinian militant 
groups.  Riad convinced Assad to ease the attacks on Hussein because he might be 
necessary in a war with Israel.  The next day, Riad flew to Jordan and told him of the 
desire from both Syria and Egypt to improve relations.  He told Hussein that Egypt and 
Syria worried about the Syrian forces during any conflict with Israel.  Mainly, they 
worried that Israel would move through Jordan to encircle the Syrian army.  Hussein 
pledged not allow Israel to enter Jordan and to station his troops in a formation to make it 
difficult for the encirclement of the main Syrian force.52   
The White House also received warnings from the intelligence community that 




the overriding desideratum is some for a military action which can be sustained long 
enough, despite Israeli’s counterattacks, both to activate Washington and Moscow and to 
galvanize the other Arab states, especially the major oil producers, into anti-American 
moves.”53  This was one of the first warnings that a major conflict in the Middle East 
could have a disastrous impact on American access to oil reserves in the region.  The CIA 
accurately reflected Sadat’s view of the situation.  He did believe that something needed 
to change the status quo in the region or Israel would never negotiate in good faith with 
the Arabs nor would the US pressure Israel to make concessions in a deal with the Arabs. 
On June 17, Nixon met with Brezhnev and the topic of the Middle East was a 
major component of that discussion.  Brezhnev wanted Nixon to agree to a set of 
principles that both sides would be forced to accept.  For example, he argued that the US 
should force Israel to give up land taken in 1967 and in return, they would get peace and 
access to the Suez Canal.  Brezhnev argued that if Nixon would not agree to this, he 
could not guarantee that Egypt or Syria would not use military force to change the status 
quo in the region.  Nixon again rejected Brezhnev’s overture, saying that the United 
States was not willing to force Israel to start negotiations on the basis of the Arab 
position, arguing it would automatically lead to failure.  Nixon believed that the real 
reason Brezhnev wanted to bring about a peace plan was because he “was aware of the 
slow but steady progress we had been making in reopening the lines of communication 
between Washington and the Arab capitals; and he was also aware that if America was 
able to contribute toward a peaceful settlement of Arab-Israeli difference, we would be 
striking a serious blow to the Soviet presence and prestige in the Middle East.”54  It is 




because Egypt had limited communications with the Soviet Union after Sadat expelled 
their military advisors.  Brezhnev likely hoped to use the threat of a new war as an 
incentive to get the US to pressure Israel with the ultimate goal of restoring relations 
between the Soviet Union and Egypt. 
Kissinger attempted to reassure Hussein and thank him for retaining control of his 
forces in Jordan by discussing an increase in military aid in letter on June 2, 1973.  
Hussein wanted an additional $10 million in direct military aid but in May, Kissinger 
asked him to try to get it from Saudi Arabia and if that was impossible, the US would fill 
his request.  When Hussein told Kissinger in July that the only way he could get the aid 
from Saudi Arabia was if he placed his forces under a joint Arab command, Kissinger 
relented and agreed to order the Pentagon to assess the needs of the Jordanian military 
directly.55  Like Hussein, Kissinger worried that Jordan could easily be dragged into a 
conflict with Israel if Hussein lost control of his forces.  Kissinger needed Hussein to 
remain a force for stability in the region, which was impossible if his military was under 
the control of one of the more radical regimes like Egypt, or worse, Syria.       
On July 7, Hussein met with Helms while visiting Tehran and told him that he 
was worried about a threat from Iraq and Syria and that a joint Arab attack could occur as 
early as that month.  In fact, to show Helms the seriousness of the threat, Hussein gave 
him the proposed war plan of both Syria and Egypt.  He did not say how he got it, but 
expressed that both Syria and Egypt were determined to regain the land lost in 1967.  
Hussein also said that a large group of Palestinians had recently left Jordan for Iraq to 




Helms to explain to Washington that he needed more weapons if he was going to 
continue to resist pressure to put his forces under the command of Egypt.56   
Hussein also tried to warn the British of the possibility of war.  In meeting with 
Prime Minister Heath on July 12, 1973, Hussein warned the British leader that Sadat was 
growing frustrated by the stalemate with Israel and his inability to regain the land lost in 
1967.  Hussein said, “In such circumstances there was a strange logic which led President 
Sadat to believe that a disastrous war would be preferable to a continuing stalemate.”57  
Hussein hoped that by delivering this news to his strongest Western allies, it might 
persuade them to finally put some pressure on Israel to negotiate with the Arabs in good 
faith to avoid another costly conflict.  
On September 10, Sadat invited Hussein to a meeting in Cairo.  Sadat called the 
meeting between Syria, Jordan, and Egypt with the hope of reestablishing military 
coordination and restoring ties between the three nations.  Originally, Sadat wanted 
Hussein to agree to allow Palestinian guerrillas back into Jordan for a return of Egyptian 
and Syrian diplomatic relations still suspended over Hussein’s United Arab Kingdom 
plan.  Hussein rejected this and threatened to end the conference so Sadat removed this 
request.  Hussein believed the meetings with Assad and Sadat were a success and that any 
military actions would take place after a long preparation.  He was unaware of secret 
meetings during the same conference between Sadat and Assad that formalized a more 
detailed war plan.58  While Hussein accepted the benefits of improved relations his 
neighbors, Sadat and Assad were more interested in gaining access to an eastern front for 




have any clear signal that this was Sadat’s intention, but he accepted the improved 
relations with Syria and Egypt because it would help maintain his position in Jordan.   
Hussein met with Golda Meir on September 23, and told her about the Cairo 
summit and that he planned on letting the PLO open some offices in Jordan but would not 
allow them to carry out any strikes on Israel.  In addition, he told her “From a very very 
sensitive source in Syria . . . [we have learned] all the units that were meant to be training 
and were prepared to take part in this Syrian action are now, as of the last two days or so, 
in position of pre-attack. . . .  Now this has all come under the guise of training. . . these 
are the pre-jump of position and all the units are now in these positions.”  He also 
stressed to her that if attack occurred from Syria, he believed that Egypt would join in.59  
This meeting was controversial both inside the Arab world and Israel.   Once the fighting 
started, the Israeli public blamed Meir for not acting on Hussein’s warning and some in 
the Arab world accused Hussein of revealing the upcoming Arab attack.  This was not 
Hussein giving a detailed war plan to the Israelis, mainly because he did not have access 
to a detailed war plan.  In fact, even years later he would deny having any information 
that the attack was occurring.  In a later interview, he said he was out riding a bike with 
his wife when his security service notified him that the fighting had started.60  
On the morning of October 6, the crisis Hussein had been warning about for 
months began.  Golda Meir contacted the White House and told them Israel had 
confirmable intelligence that the Egyptians and the Syrians planned to attack that night at 
6:00 pm Israeli time.61  This conflict was called the Yom Kippur War in Israel and the 
October War by the Arabs and brought about a fundamental change in the region.  The 




said he would attempt to stop it before it started.62  Kissinger contacted both the Russians 
and friendly Arab nations in a failed effort to stop the fighting before it could begin.  An 
important point from the American perspective of how this event played out was that it 
occurred in the middle of the Watergate scandal.  Because of this, most of the actions by 
the United States were under the direction of Kissinger.  While it is accepted that Nixon 
was kept informed, Kissinger clearly led the American response.63        
When the fighting started, Israel could not mobilize quickly enough and faced a 
far superior force.  One of the reasons they did not fully mobilize at the first sign of a 
possible attack was because they did not want to give the Arabs a reason to attack and 
have the world blame them for the start of the conflict.  Defense Minister Moshe Dayan 
felt this was important because it would be easier to receive American support if the 
Arabs started the conflict and he felt Israel could successfully defend against any Arab 
invasion.  On the Syrian side of the battlefield, Syria launched the attack on the Golan 
Heights with over nine hundred tanks, nine hundred artillery pieces, and another four 
hundred and sixty tanks ready in reserve.  In that position, Israel only had one hundred 
and thirty-seven tanks to repel the invasion.  The Syrian forces advanced through the 
Golan Heights, moving much farther than Israel imagined possible.  It took another two 
days, on October 8, for Israel to mount an effective counterattack.64   
The Israelis responded with a successful and brutal air assault on Syria and in the 
capital of Damascus.  While their invasion force met heavy resistance, the IDF slowly 
moved through the Golan Heights and into Syria proper.  By October 16, the IDF moved 
their forces within twenty miles of Damascus.  The Syrian forces and their allies, mainly 




miserably.  After October 16, the fighting on the Golan Heights greatly diminished and 
both forces dug in with little intention of moving for the next few weeks.65       
The start of the fighting on Israel’s southern front also began with a large Arab 
push before the eventual Israeli response.  Israel was outgunned five to one in tanks and 
twenty to one in artillery when the fighting started with Egypt.  Most of the Israeli heavy 
weapons were not forward deployed and it took time to get them activated and moved to 
the frontlines.  The original Egyptian thrust was highly effective and massive in size.  In 
total, over ten thousand five hundred artillery and mortar shells fell on the Israeli front 
line within minutes of the start of the conflict.  By October 7, sixty percent of the Israeli 
tanks in the Sinai were either destroyed or abandoned.  The first major Israeli 
counterattack also failed to move the IDF forward and pushback the advancing Egyptian 
army.  By the night of October 8, the Israeli leadership was in a full-blown panic about 
their situation.   It reached such a level of despair the Dayan was advocating mobilizing 
high school students to join the fight.66    
On the night of October 9, Egypt paused its advance and began to move more 
units across the canal and into the Sinai.  There was some dispute inside the Egyptian 
government over what to do next.  The original plan was at the point to sue for peace, 
hoping to maximize Egyptian gains and hopefully regain much of the land lost in 1967.   
Unfortunately, Egypt was so successful, Sadat believed they could achieve more.  In 
addition, the Syrian front was not going as well, and Sadat argued that Egypt needed to 
continue their advance to take pressure off Assad.  Egypt failed to advance any further 
and in their attempt severely weakened their forces.  The next ten days saw Israel finally 




assisted through a large airlift of supplies.  By October 19, Sadat realized the precarious 
situation he was in and asked the Soviet Union to call for a ceasefire.  While the Soviet 
Union and the US worked out the ceasefire terms, Israel encircled the strategic Egyptian 
Third Army near the Suez Canal.  The situation got so bad for the Egyptian government, 
they considered evacuating the leadership from Cairo for fear of being overrun by the 
Israelis.67   
From the beginning of the fighting, Hussein worried about being dragged into the 
conflict.   He told Ambassador Brown he was concerned “the Israelis will not be content 
to drive the Syrians back to the cease-fire line but will want to pursue and destroy even if 
it takes them to Damascus. . . .  A large-scale Israeli invasion of Syria . . . could drag 
Jordan in.”  Hussein also asked the US to get Israel to stop using Jordan airspace to attack 
Syria.  For example, Israel was using the airbase at Mafraq as a waypoint for their strikes 
into Syria.  Hussein believed that this continued violations of Jordanian airspace was a 
humiliation to his air force and had to end.  He worried that his air force might react to 
the continued violations without his approval, forcing the conflict on Jordan.68  Hussein 
could not maintain his position with the Arabs if he overlooked blatant Israeli incursions 
into Jordan.  At the very least, he would have needed to put up some token resistance to 
the continued Israeli attacks.  Hussein hoped that through his close relationship with 
Kissinger and Nixon, they could persuade the Israelis to avoid entangling Jordan in the 
conflict.    
On October 8, while the Arabs were still having success, Hussein received a 
message from King Faisal of Saudi Arabia asking Jordanian permission to allow Saudi 




more active participant in the fighting.   Hussein rejected the Saudi request but urged the 
Americans to get a cease-fire at the UN so he would not be forced to get involved.69  
Because Saudi Arabia was one of the more moderate regimes and friendly to the West, 
Hussein worried that the pressure he would face from the more radical regimes would be 
hard to avoid.  In addition, Hussein also believed that the war would eventually turn 
against the Arabs and then the Egyptians would ask for help, causing another calamity 
similar to the debacle of 1967.  Eventually, Hussein relented and allowed the Saudis to 
use Jordan to move some of their forces to the battlefield.  Unfortunately for the Arab 
cause, the forces sent by many of the Arab nations were not very useful in repelling the 
Israelis.  One main reason was the lack of coordination amongst the Arab forces.  
Hussein’s nephew described the battlefront as chaotic.  He said, “We had to make our 
own way up to the frontlines.  We groped our way blind to the Golan Heights.  It was 
complete chaos.  The Saudis sent a brigade.  They went up a hill one night and they 
decided to go to sleep, only to wake up the next morning surrounded by Israeli soldiers. . 
. .  Their artillery did not even have ammunition.”70  This was a theme in many of the 
Arab conflicts with Israel.  They lacked communication and coordination, resulting in the 
eventual destruction of the more cohesive Israel military. 
Once the fighting started, both superpowers saw the conflict in terms of the Cold 
War.  The Soviet Union immediately tried to pressure Jordan into entering the war on the 
side of the Arabs.  Hussein contacted the White House on October 9 and told them he 
received a message from the Soviet Union.  According to Hussein, the Soviet chargé said, 
“the Soviets fully support the Arabs in [the] conflict with Israel. . . .  [The] Soviet Union 




Kissinger also says he received a similar message from the leadership in Algeria.71  
Kissinger believed this pressure was going to continue until the end of the conflict 
because the Soviet Union needed to show that it supported the Arab cause in the hope of 
regaining the influence lost when Egypt expelled the Soviet advisors.  Hussein also 
explained to Kissinger the impact of the conflict in the broader Cold War and the recent 
American attempts to improve relations with the Arabs.  Hussein said:  
Lastly there are your interests and ours at stake.  I am saddened by the fact 
that the Soviets are identified with the Arab effort, whereas the United 
States is identified with Israel.  A cease-fire . . . must come as soon as 
possible to save so much which is at stake. . . .  Whether this could come 
soon or whether it would be accepted by the fighting parties and others I 
would not know, but it would certainly improve the image of the United 
States.72 
 
Kissinger believed that the end of the conflict would give the US an advantage in 
the Cold War.  He hoped that the result of the conflict would be that the Arabs would 
know that the Soviet Union would not be able to get them what they wanted and would 
have to rely on the United States if they hoped to get a cease-fire and the return of their 
land.   Secretary of State James Schlesinger believed that the conflict would either cost 
the Soviet a lot of money or alienate the Arabs from the Soviet Union because they were 
unwilling to replace the Arab loses.  He said “The Soviets are going see $2-$3 billion 
worth of their equipment going up in smoke again.  At the moment, they do not seem 
disposed to replace it.”73  
 By October 11, when it became clear the tide of the battle was turning, Hussein 
felt increased pressure to intervene.  Egypt needed Jordan to either allow for another front 




to resist allowing the PLO back into Jordan and replied to a message from Sadat asking 
for help by telling him that he could not open a second front on his own because he 
lacked the airpower to support them and they would be wiped out by the IDF.  He did 
offer to send some forces to help Syria.74  Hussein summoned British Ambassador to 
Jordan Glen Balfour Paul to update him on the situation as of October 11.  Hussein told 
Paul that he received a direct request from the Syrians to send units to the Golan Heights 
to fend off the Israeli counter attack.  In addition, he said Sadat was pressuring him to 
either allow the Fedayeen back into the country to open up a second front or commit the 
Jordanian military to the fight.  Hussein told Paul that he “had reluctantly decided that, if 
he was to retain any Arab credibility at all, he must make the gesture . . . of an armored 
brigade to relieve the Syrian left wing.”  Hussein also explained that he feared that if the 
Syrian regime was overrun by the IDF, then the government might fall and be replaced 
by a more communist influenced group similar to Iraq.75  While it is unclear what would 
replace the Assad regime if Israel overran it, especially considering Assad was favorable 
to the Soviet Union already, Hussein’s contention that he needed to do something to 
retain credibility with the Arab world was correct.  He already faced pressure from Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, and Syria to intervene and that pressure would only continue as the 
situation deteriorated for the Arabs. 
 The United States attempted to convince Hussein to delay as long as possible 
from getting involved.  Kissinger told Hussein that that he was aware of Sadat’s request 
for help.  Kissinger said, “I urge you to delay such a decision as long as possible, and at 
least for another 36-48 hours.  I am making a major effort through quiet diplomatic 




and your help.”  Hussein replied that the Middle East was on a path to destruction.  He 
also told Ambassador Brown he was “neither mad nor sick but would rather die with his 
soldiers than live in a dishonored, ruined country under the thumb of the Soviets.”76  
Hussein felt that if the fighting did not stop soon, his government would face increase 
pressured from the radical Arab nations influenced by the Soviet Union, likely leading to 
the demise of his regime.    
  On October 12, Kissinger met with Israeli Ambassador Dinitz to discuss the 
situation with Jordan.  Kissinger told him that he was aware of Israeli opposition to 
Jordan sending any forces but encouraged them not to engage them directly.  He 
emphasized that Hussein was facing increased pressure from the other Arab states to get 
involved and this was the minimum they felt they could do. 77  Kissinger also contacted 
British Prime Minister Edward Heath about the situation with Jordan.  They both 
received the message from Hussein that he was facing increased pressure to get involved.  
Heath agreed with Kissinger that Hussein was taking the minimal steps in the conflict and 
the Israelis should not see it as a threat.  Heath said, “I think this is the best arrangement 
really.  Let him appear to be doing something when he really isn’t.”  Both men agreed to 
contact Israel and attempt to persuade them to leave Hussein’s forces alone.78      
On October 13, Hussein contacted Kissinger and told him that he needed to do 
something to counter Iraqi and Soviet threats towards him.  Hussein feared that if he did 
nothing, the Soviet-backed Iraqi government would use it as a pretext to destabilize or 
threaten the monarchy.  Kissinger told Hussein to “continue his efforts to circumscribe 
the area and scale of the conflict.  We all faced a very difficult situation, but I had no 




the disaster that had again struck the Middle East.”  Kissinger also told Hussein that he 
“urged restraint on the Israelis, and it was therefore equally important for his forces to act 
with circumspection.”79   
 Once he decided to send some forces to the battlefront, Hussein attempted to 
show both the US and Israel that it was the minimum he could do and still maintain his 
position in the Arab world.  His main objective though was to commit enough forces to 
remove the threat from the more radical Arab regimes but still not damage his 
relationship with Israel and the United States.  Hussein sent a message to Golda Meir and 
said that he did not want to commit his forces to a senseless war but feared for Jordan’s 
long-term survival if it was the outcast of the Arab world.  Hussein told her that his only 
sensible option was to send a very small force into Syria, close to the Jordanian border.  
He believed this would not impact the battle in any significant way.  He also told Meir 
that he believed this would give him enough credibility with the other Arab nations to 
prevent any long-term damage to his standing in the Arab world.  He hoped Meir would 
respond by not attacking his forces if possible.80   
 Hussein placed the Jordanian units in Syria under the command of Crown Prince 
Hassan, who was Hussein’s brother, to make sure the Jordanian forces did not get too 
involved in the fighting.  Hassan ordered the brigade commander to “stall, to maintain 
[the] cohesiveness of the unit, and not take direct orders from [the] Syrians.”81  Hussein 
also traveled to the front lines to survey the battle for himself and to make sure the 
Jordanian forces did not get too involved.  Luckily for Hussein, his closeness with the 
Israelis saved his life.  During the fighting, an Israeli force was ordered to bomb a 




worked on Jordanian issues for the military intelligence unit, saw unusual activity in the 
Jordanian camp.  He believed that it could mean Hussein was visiting the front line.   He 
immediately called off the strike, potentially saving Hussein’s life.82      
On October 18, Sadat attempted to contact Hussein to convince him to allow 
Fedayeen forces to attack an Israeli communications center.  The Jordanian government 
repeatedly delayed saying the King was out of contact.  After four days, Hussein replied 
with a dozen questions about the nature of the attack, and if it was even worth it 
considering the risk to Jordan of a massive Israeli retaliation.83  Despite the mounting 
Arab losses, Hussein refused to let the Fedayeen back into his country for fear he would 
never be able to remove them again and eventually, they would resume their attacks 
against his regime.  Hussein maintained his position of doing the minimal amount in the 
conflict so the Arabs could not accuse him of abandoning the cause nor upset his prior 
relationship with the United States and Israel.  Any actions Hussein could have taken 
would not have fundamentally changed the situation on the battlefield, only opened up 
Jordan to an Israeli counterattack.       
On October 23, Kissinger talked to Golda Meir who complained about Jordanian 
violations of the ceasefire.  Jordan accepted a cease-fire on the West Bank but its forces 
in Syria continued periodic engagements with the Israeli forces.  Because there was never 
any real fighting on the West Bank, Jordan’s acceptance of a ceasefire there was 
worthless to the Israelis. In addition, while on the Syrian front fighting continued because 
of the Arab forces, on the Egyptian front, the Israelis continued to violate the ceasefire in 
an attempt to encircle the Egyptian Third Army around the Suez.  This all complicated 




After October 23, when the Soviets and the United States agreed to a ceasefire 
plan quickly, there was still some opposition from Syria.  While Egypt and Israel agreed 
to the terms of the ceasefire, Syria did not immediately respond.  Hussein contacted 
Kissinger through Brown to tell him of this dilemma.  At this point, thinking the fighting 
was over, Hussein had already moved more troops into Syria and placed them under 
Syrian command.  He hoped this would improve his political standing in the Arab world 
after the fighting ended.  Hussein told the White House that he learned Iraq was 
pressuring Syria to maintain the fight.  He told Kissinger that he was sending a delegation 
to Damascus to tell Assad that the Jordanian forces were pulling out if he did not make a 
decision on the ceasefire.  In addition, he told Kissinger that his sources believe that the 
Soviets were not living up to their end of the bargain.  He asked Kissinger to “Please get 
in touch with Brezhnev and tell him that it is essential that [the] Syrians and Iraqis accede 
to [the] cease-fire.”85 
By October 26, Jordan removed their forces from Syria, telling Assad that even 
though Israel still occasionally violated the ceasefire agreement, Jordan feared that they 
might also violate it on the eastern front and because of that, the Jordanian armed forces 
needed to return to defend Jordan.  In reality, Hussein knew that Israel had no intention of 
attacking Jordan at this point, but he saw no need to keep his forces in Syria where there 
was potential for them to become involved again in the fighting.86  Hussein did not want 
to risk an escalation that could damage his relationship with the US or Israel over Assad’s 
refusal to end the conflict.      
 The losses from all sides of the October War were dramatic for all involved.  




Egypt had over twelve thousand soldiers killed and another thirty-five thousand wounded 
with an additional eighty-four hundred captured.  Syria had over three thousand dead, 
fifty-six hundred wounded and four hundred and eleven captured.  The equipment losses 
from both sides were also massive.  Egypt and Syria each lost close to a thousand tanks 
compared to Israel, which lost around four hundred.  To make matters worse for the 
Arabs, Israel repaired most of its armored vehicles while much of the Arab armored 
vehicles were abandoned and eventually recommissioned by the Israelis.87  Both sides 
lost a large proportion of their military capability but by the end of the fighting, the Arab 
nations were in a much worse position then when they started.   
 Of all the sides involved in the fighting, Jordan came out the best.   In the brief 
encounters between the IDF and the Jordanian army, Jordan lost twenty-two tanks.  In 
addition, because of the chaos, they lost an additional six tanks to artillery fire from Iraqi 
forces.88  Hussein was able to improve relations between him and the other Arab leaders 
while risking very little of his armed forces.  In fact, after the fighting end, militarily, 
Jordan was one of the stronger Arab nations.  In addition, Hussein again showed 
Washington that he was a reliable ally that they could count on in a crisis.  Finally, 
Hussein hoped that he demonstrated to Israel that he was not a threat to them even when 
they were at their weakest, and instead, could be a reliable partner for peace if they were 
willing to negotiate.     
 After the fighting had ended, Kissinger focused on maintaining the ceasefire and 
attempting to start a peace process.  During the middle of the October War, the infamous 
“Saturday Night Massacre” occurred and from that point on, Kissinger almost had full 




the Watergate scandal.89  Kissinger began a series of trips to the region, visiting all the 
major capitals, hoping to begin with disengagement talks that would eventually lead to a 
permanent settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 
 On November 8, Kissinger flew to Amman to discuss the ceasefire and the next 
steps with Hussein.  Kissinger believed that the visit was more about reassuring the King 
about the American view of a peace settlement rather than promoting a cease-fire.  
Because Jordan did not fully enter the war, there was no fighting to stop and no violations 
of the overall cease-fire in Jordanian territory.  Hussein told Kissinger, “Jordan is the 
Arab country most involved in terms of both land and population.  Participation in the 
war could have led to the destruction of Jordan and the creation of a vacuum which 
radical elements would have filled.  Non-participation could have led to the total isolation 
of Jordan and to our becoming the scapegoat.”90  Hussein hoped to have the best of the 
both worlds, credit from Israel and the US for not attacking Israel, along with support 
from the Arabs because he sent forces to Syria.  He hoped that this would assure his 
position in any peace settlement to come.  When Hussein met with the Soviet ambassador 
to Cairo after the ceasefire, he told him that that “he repeatedly made offers to Sadat and 
Assad to enter in the war, but that although Assad welcomed the king’s intention, Sadat 
flatly rejected it.”91  While this was not completely true, Hussein only offered token 
assistance, Hussein hoped to place himself at the center of the Arab movement after the 
end of the war making it difficult for the other Arab regimes to target his monarchy with 
propaganda and positioning Jordan to benefit from any settlement.    
Hussein explained to Kissinger his future vision of the peace process for Israel 




Our situation is different from that of Syria and Egypt, which are not 
connected with the Palestinian problem and which already had 
international boundaries before the 1967 war.  Jordan’s 1967 border was 
the armistice demarcation line. The West Bank is both Jordanian territory 
and part of Palestine.  The population is Jordanian and Palestinian.  The 
rights of the Palestinians have to do not with the West Bank and Jordan 
but with Israel.  The question is who represents the Palestinians.  Our 
position is that the West Bank is Jordanians-Palestinian territory occupied 
by Israel.  It is Jordan’s duty to recover that territory with minor changes 
on a reciprocal basis.  In addition, we cannot give up responsibility for the 
Moslem and Christian parts of Jerusalem which should, however, remain a 
unified city.92 
 
Kissinger informed the King that because of the situation on the ground, he could 
not wait to begin the process of de-escalation until the Palestinian issue was worked out.   
Kissinger believed that the Israeli position was too strong.  Both Syria and Egypt had 
pressing military issues that needed to be resolved quickly.   In Syria, the Israeli forces 
were very close to the capital city of Damascus.  In Egypt, the Egyptian Third Army 
remained surrounded in the desert and could not hold out much longer.  Kissinger 
believed that a conference in Geneva that included all the warring parties along with the 
US and the USSR would be the best place to begin to work out these issues.  Kissinger 
invited Hussein to the Geneva Conference and asked him to be the spokesman for the 
Palestinian cause.93      
After the fighting had ended, Kissinger believed he needed to have some 
communication with the PLO to advance any American sponsored peace process.  On 
November 3 1973, Kissinger sent General Vernon Walters to meet with the PLO at the 





The United States has no proposals to make. . . .  The Palestinians must 
understand however, that the United States has a fixed principle it does not 
betray its friends.   We regard the King of Jordan as a friend.  We would 
expect, nevertheless, that in the context of a comprehensive settlement, the 
relationship between the Palestinian movement and the Hashemite 
Kingdom could develop in the direction of reconciliation. 94  
 
Kissinger hoped that his message would make it clear to the PLO that it had only one 
maneuver possible in the mind to the United States.  Arafat needed to come to some kind 
of agreement with King Hussein that allowed him to continue as the head of Jordan.  If 
Kissinger had succeeded, he would have allowed Hussein to cement his rule in Jordan, 
while removing the PLO’s threat to Jordanian stability.  It also would have shown 
Hussein that the US continued to look out for his interests while it continued the peace 
process.     
 Kissinger proposed a meeting in Geneva in December 1973, that would include 
the US, USSR, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria with the goal of beginning the disengagement 
process.  Both Kissinger and Hussein were optimistic for the conference, believing that 
after debacle during the first phase of the October War, Israel should no longer feel 
invulnerable.  In a meeting with Brent Scowcroft on November 6, 1973, Hussein told him 
his views of the Middle East after the war.  He told Scowcroft that he believed nations 
like Jordan, Egypt, and Syria wanted peace and was willing to say so publically.  He also 
mentioned nations like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait wanted peace but would only follow 
others.  He believed Iraq and Israel were rejecting peace because of domestic political 
problems.  Hussein argued that if the US could work with the Palestinians and get them 
to accept peace, it would be unlikely any Arab nation would not join in.  In addition, 




US could show goodwill, it could replace the Soviet Union’s prior relationship with these 
nations.  Finally, Hussein told Scowcroft that he would try to use his influence to get an 
end to the Arab oil boycott against the US that started in response to the American airlift 
of supplies to Israel.95  Hussein’s assessment of the situation was largely correct with the 
exception of Syria.  Assad still did not have any desire to agree to a peace deal with Israel 
and the position of the other Arab states did not influence him.  In fact, Syria’s position 
was much close to Iraq where they did not want peace and looked to the Soviet Union for 
increased support.  Like Hussein, Kissinger also believed a Cold War component existed 
in the Geneva talks.  In a meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammad Hassan 
El-Zayyat, Kissinger said, “we must settle [the Middle East crisis] but not under Russian 
pressure.  If there is Russian pressure, we will switch back to Israel because we must 
demonstrate that the Soviet Union cannot settle the problem.”  He also blamed the 
American decision to send arms to Israel as a response to the Soviet Union sending arms 
to the Arabs.96   
Hussein entered the conference with specific goals.  Before the conference began, 
Hussein told Kissinger he wanted him to convince the Israelis to pull back from the city 
of Jericho on the West Bank.  Hussein felt this was reasonable since Jericho was a city 
consisting of only Arabs.  Hussein felt this would give him some standing with the other 
Arab nations and cement his position as the lead negotiator for the West Bank.  Kissinger 
also believed this was not an unreasonable request and agreed to pass it on the Israelis.  
When he did, the Israelis rejected it.  Kissinger believed that the combination of the 




election, and the upcoming Geneva Conference were too much to upheaval to allow the 
Israelis to make more concessions to Hussein at that time.97 
 The Geneva Conference began on December 21, 1973, and immediately did not 
go in the direction Hussein had hoped.  Syria refused to show up in protest against the 
Israelis and the lack of a Palestinian representative.  Jordan was upset because the summit 
seemed to focus purely on a disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt.  
Because Jordan had no direct fighting with Israel, they had no need for a disengagement 
agreement.  Rifai opened up the Jordanian delegation by saying, “The question of 
withdrawal, boundaries, Palestinian rights, refugees, obligations of peace and the status 
of Jerusalem are all common concerns and collective responsibilities.  My delegation 
therefore is not prepared to conclude any partial settlement with Israel on matters that are 
of joint interest with our Arab brothers.”98  Another issue facing Hussein was that unlike 
other Arab nations who could show support for the PLO to prevent attacks by other Arab 
radicals, Hussein could not support the PLO without creating a direct threat to this 
regime.  He needed to establish the precedent that he was speaking for the Palestinians 
with the hope of maintaining some control of the West Bank in any permanent 
settlement.99    
 Israel believed that the conference would last a long time and even rented an 
office complex nearby with the goal of completing a full disengagement agreement 
before they left Geneva.  Unfortunately, without the participation of Syria and 
Kissinger’s view that negotiations should only proceed in a deliberate, step-by-step 
approach, the conference only lasted two days.  There were very little direct negotiations 




peace.  According to the Israeli delegation, “Kissinger was careful not to annoy the Israeli 
government unnecessarily by insisting on a comprehensive settlement which would 
inevitably require Israel to make concessions for which it was not ready.”  Kissinger 
hoped that by not forcing Israel to make hard decisions at Geneva, he could slowly build 
towards an agreement that made those decisions possible after a buildup of trust between 
Israel and the Arabs.100  The flaw in Kissinger’s logic came from his belief that the 
Israelis wanted a broad peace agreement with the Arabs.  While the surprise attack rattled 
the Israeli public, the leadership still was not willing to give up all the land it captured 
during the 1967 conflict, making a comprehensive agreement between the Israelis and the 
Arabs impossible.      
 The conference ended with an agreement for more meetings between the parties, 
along with an Israeli-Egyptian working group focused on disengagement.  Jordan 
attempted to get a similar working group between Jordan and Israel, but the Israelis 
rejected it since they were not currently engaged in fighting with the Jordanians.  Hussein 
and Rifai felt used.  They came to realize that the conference was not a peace settlement, 
but an elaborate way to provide a forum for Egypt and Israel to negotiate.  Despite that 
belief, Jordan agreed to continue to work with the US on a peace proposal between 
Jordan and Israel.101    
 After the conclusion of the Geneva Conference had produced no permanent 
settlement or final disengagement agreement, Kissinger began what was called “shuttle 
diplomacy” where he continually flew between the various Arab capitals and Israel in the 
quest for movement on a peace proposal.  During these negotiations, both Jordan and the 




the prospect of the Palestinian groups like the PLO becoming the primary representative 
of the Palestinian people, limiting Jordan’s ability to negotiate with Israel. 
 Kissinger continued to present Israel with Hussein’s view of a possible settlement 
between the two nations.  Jordan’s new disengagement plan called for both Jordan and 
Israel to each pull back eight kilometers from the Jordan Valley.  Jordanian civil 
authorities would take over the area evacuated by the Israeli Defense Force.  Hussein also 
promised that no Jordanian military forces would cross the Jordan River or enter the 
eight-kilometer zone.  Hussein also wanted a working group established by the 
Jordanians, the Israelis, and the Americans to officially establish Jordan as the spokesman 
for the Palestinian cause.  Kissinger believed Hussein’s proposal was “moderate and 
statesmanlike” but unfortunately, Kissinger ran into the same problems he experienced 
previously.  Mainly, because of a combination of security and national politics, Israel was 
reluctant to agree to a disengagement with Jordan that resulted in returning part of the 
West Bank.  Israel again rejected any evacuation from Jericho because it felt that it 
needed a large security barrier in the Jordan Valley as stated by the Allon Plan.  In 
addition, the National Religious Party, an important member of the current Israeli 
governing coalition, refused to give up any portion of the West Bank.  Despite Kissinger 
framing the choice between negotiating with Hussein or Arafat, the Israelis preferred to 
negotiate with neither.102    
A combination of Arab, American, and Israeli politics made solving the Jordanian 
question impossible.  In Israel, the current government, just recently formed, had a one-
vote majority in the Knesset.   In addition, outgoing Prime Minister Golda Meir promised 




to seek the support of the Israeli public.   This made it extremely difficult for new Prime 
Minister Rabin to even discuss a settlement with Jordan.  First, after finally forming a 
government, he would have to call immediately for new elections so the people could 
vote on the settlement.  In addition, because of the time, it would take to form a new 
government, it would freeze any negotiations on other fronts for up to a year.  In addition, 
because Nixon was facing the consequence of the Watergate scandal, he was in no 
position to pressure Israel to make a concession.  Finally, both Sadat and Assad had little 
trust for Hussein, thus no incentive to place his interests above their own in the 
negotiations.103     
 Both Kissinger and Hussein worried about the consequences of repeated rejection 
by the Israelis of a moderate settlement between Jordan and Israel.  In a meeting with 
American Jewish leaders on February 8, 1974, Kissinger said:  
I predict that if the Israelis don’t make some sort of arrangement with 
Hussein on the West Bank in six months, Arafat will become 
internationally recognized and the world will be in chaos.  But at the 
moment in Israel the balance of power is held by the religious party.  
Hussein wants only a foothold on the West Bank so he can claim he 
speaks for somebody. . . .  Israel [will continue] to ignore it for six months, 
maybe a year – at the price that at the end of the year, the terrorists will 
dominate.104 
 
Kissinger believed that the Arabs could easily get frustrated with Israeli opposition and 
allow the PLO to take over negotiations.  In addition, allowing Arafat and the PLO to 
take control also benefited the other Arab countries by allowing them to focus solely on 
their interests without concern for the Palestinians since they now had their own official 




 On August 9, 1974, the situation dramatically changed for the United States.  
Because of the Watergate scandal and the threat of impeachment, Nixon resigned from 
the presidency making Gerald Ford the President.  Despite being a well-respected 
Congressman from Michigan, up until this point, foreign policy was not a major focus for 
Ford.  Because of that, he allowed Kissinger to continue his leadership role in the Middle 
East.  Kissinger would continue his active “shuttle diplomacy” with the hope of settling 
some of the issues in the region through a step-by-step approach with the goal of building 
enough momentum to lead to a comprehensive solution for all parties.      
 Hussein attempted to make another offer to Israel while meeting with Kissinger 
and Ford on August 16, 1974.  Hussein explained that he was willing to accept the Allon 
plan as long as it was the first step and not the end of the negotiation.  In addition, he told 
Kissinger and Ford that he favored a separate Jordanian-Israeli negotiation or a joint 
negotiation with Egypt.  Hussein was unaware that Egypt already ruled out a joint 
negotiation with Jordan.  Hussein argued that if he succeeded in talks with the Israelis, he 
would not face opposition from the Arab states if he agreed to allow the Palestinians in 
the West Bank to vote on staying tied to Jordan.  Kissinger promised to explore the joint 
negotiation with Egypt but believed Egypt preferred to negotiate alone.105 
 Despite the reasonableness of Hussein’s offer, Kissinger made little progress 
when discussing it with Rabin on September 11, 1974.  Rabin asked Kissinger not to 
pressure him to sign any deal that would necessitate Israeli elections.  Rabin had just 
taken over as Prime Minister for Golda Meir in April 1974.  His majority in the Knesset 
was particularly small and to assure his election, Rabin publically accepted Meir’s 




on the West Bank.106  While Kissinger understood the problems with Israeli politics, he 
still argued to Rabin the need for Israel to open up a serious negotiation with Jordan. He 
told him the threat of the PLO increasing their power existed as long as the Arabs saw no 
progress on the Jordanian front.  He explained to Rabin that if he wanted to deal with the 
threat of the PLO becoming the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people, completing a 
deal with Hussein was his best option.  Rabin’s biggest fear was that if Israel made a deal 
with Hussein to turn over a large portion of the West Bank to Jordan, the Arabs would 
quickly call for Hussein to give control of that land to the PLO, creating another hostile 
state on Israel’s border.107  Rabin’s fear for the future of the West Bank would eventually 
come true, not because he made a deal with Hussein, but because he refused to.  
Kissinger’s belief that eventually the Arabs would empower the Palestinians through 
Arafat occurred soon after Rabin’s latest rejection of Hussein’s overtures. 
 A dramatic change in the peace negotiations occurred in October 1974.  An Arab 
summit consisting of twenty-four Arab nations occurred in Rabat, Morocco.  At this 
summit, a resolution was passed that called for the “the right of the Palestinian people to 
establish an independent national authority under the command of the PLO, the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is 
liberated.”108  Because of Arab pressure, the vote was unanimous, including Jordan.  For 
the first time since 1948 and the creation of Israel, Jordan gave up its right to speak for 
the people of the West Bank.  Because of Rabin’s refusal to work with Hussein and 
Kissinger’s unwillingness to pressure the Israeli government into making even moderate 
concessions to Jordan, it led to the Arabs removing Jordan from the peace process over 




 Before the summit, Hussein’s advisors argued that he should avoid Rabat so that 
any resolutions the Arabs passed at the summit did not bind Jordan.  Hussein disregarded 
their advice after receiving assurances from Kissinger that the US was pressuring friendly 
Arab governments to block any resolutions concerning the Palestinians.109  Kissinger 
believed that Egypt and Saudi Arabia would block any movement to make the PLO the 
sole negotiator of the Palestinians.  In fact, the Saudis argued for the PLO and Egypt only 
made a half-hearted effort to put forth an alternative that still recognized Jordan’s role in 
the West Bank.110  This had a long lasting impact on the peace process because it 
effectively replaced Hussein with Arafat as the voice of the people from the West Bank.  
Egypt decided to align with the Palestinians at Rabat because of frustration over 
Kissinger’s negotiating strategy.  Kissinger had argued for a step-by-step approach while 
the Arabs demanded to move to a final settlement, assuring their ability to regain the land 
lost to Israel on the battlefield.  Sadat’s only challenge to making the PLO the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people came in the form of a resolution establishing the 
PLO as a government in exile.  When the rest of the Arabs rejected that and again called 
for a resolution naming the PLO as the sole voice of the Palestinian people, Sadat agreed.  
The success of the Rabat Summit in the view of the Arabs was reaffirmed a month later 
when the UN General Assembly called for the Palestinian people to have the right of self-
determination and made the PLO an official observer at the UN.111  It would have 
mattered little if Hussein accepted the advice of his advisors and avoided Rabat.  The 
other Arab governments would have still pressured him to accept their resolutions and 
any hesitation by Hussein would have only isolated him.  Because Israel was unwilling to 




The Israeli government immediately reacted to the situation at Rabat.   Rabin said, 
“The Rabat Conference decided to charge the organizations of murderers with the 
establishment of a Palestinian State, and the Arab countries gave the organizations a free 
hand to decide on their mode of operations.”  He also said that the Israeli government 
rejected the outcome from Rabat because of its encouragement “to terrorist elements” and 
said Israel would not “negotiate with a body that denies our existence as a State and 
follows a course of violence and terrorism for the destruction of our state.”112  Because of 
Rabat, Israel now rejected any negotiations over the future of the West Bank.  While this 
statement froze the peace process over the West Bank, it resulted in very little actual 
change because even before Rabat, Israel refused to make any real concessions with 
Jordan over the West Bank, concessions that could have prevented Rabat in the first 
place.   
 Hussein believed this was a dramatic failure for Jordan, the United States, and the 
Arabs.  In a speech after the summit, Hussein explained that the Rabat resolution was 
actually in Israel’s interest.   He argued that Israel supported the status quo and the 
continued occupation of the West Bank.  If Jordan remained the voice for the people on 
the West Bank, Israel would face pressure from the United States to continue to negotiate 
towards a final settlement.  By placing the PLO as the lone voice of the people of the 
West Bank, the Arabs gave Israel and the United States a legitimate reason to end 
negotiations over the area.   This allowed Israel to expand settlements in the West Bank 
and take more control over Jerusalem.   The King concluded by saying, “There no longer 
existed an Arab government which could defend directly the Palestinian interests.”113  In 




suspended the Parliament.114  He did this because half of the Jordanian Parliament 
consisted of people from the West Bank and he wanted to show the Arab world that if he 
could not speak for the Palestinians, they should not have a voice in the Jordanian 
government.        
 The Arabs’ decision at Rabat benefited nobody more than Yasir Arafat and the 
PLO.  The PLO received international legitimacy through recognition by the UN General 
Assembly on November 13, 1974.  To mark the occasion, Arafat gave a speech to the 
General Assembly demonstrating his continued hostility to Jordan, the US, and Israel.  
He argued that the US was punishing the Palestinians and the Arabs because of “their 
efforts to replace an outmoded but still dominant world economic system with a new, 
more logically rational one.”115  He called for the world to choose peace over, 
“colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism in all its forms, including 
Zionism.”116  He also declared that only the PLO represented the Palestinian people and 
as the head of the PLO he spoke for the Palestinians, reaffirming the implication of Rabat 
that Jordan no longer had a role in determining the outcome for the West Bank.117   
 After the Rabat decision, Ford and Kissinger realized immediately the 
consequences of this action for Jordan, Israel, and the United States.  In a memo to Brent 
Scowcroft a few days after the summit, Ford said, “The tragedy is that Israel could have 
prevented this situation from developing had it heeded our repeated urgings of the past 
six months and offered Sadat or Hussein enough to make possible for them to move 
along together. . . .  As it was, Sadat and Hussein went to Rabat with no precise or 
meaningful offer.”118   Kissinger also believed that the US Congress had a role in 




negative views on the nuclear reactor for Egypt gave the impression we were reneging on 
our commitments. . . .   This and the public attacks on me in the United States and 
elsewhere . . . raised doubts among Arab leaders about whether the US was able to 
continue to play and effective role as peacemaker.”119  While Congress’ refusal to pass 
the aid bill for Egypt did not help the situation, Kissinger’s weakened state was not 
caused by attacks from Congress but the result of Nixon’s failures and the position of the 
new Ford administration.   In addition, even if Congress gave Kissinger everything he 
wanted, it is likely that Israel would have continued to resist any compromise on 
returning land on the West Bank to Jordan. 
 Despite these setbacks, Kissinger still attempted to bring Jordan back into the 
negotiation.   He did this for a number of reasons.  First, Jordan remained an important 
ally and Kissinger hoped to deliver to them what he promised in the past.  Second, the 
Soviets continued to play a role in the Middle East and Kissinger hoped to keep them out.   
Kissinger still faced two major problems.  Israel had no intention of giving up large 
amounts of land to Jordan and Egypt had no intention of bringing Jordan into their talks 
for fear that it might jeopardize them.  In a meeting between Kissinger and Rabin on 
March 10, 1975, Rabin argued that while Israel was willing to negotiate with all its 
neighbors, Egypt should be done first and separately because it is the easiest deal to 
complete.  In addition, while Israel was willing to negotiate with its other neighbors, 
those negotiations should not be connected to any other agreements nor share the same 
pattern.120  Israel made clear it did not feel the need to negotiate with Jordan and did not 




 Despite Jordan’s disappointment in Israel’s unwillingness to negotiate, Hussein 
and Rifai continued to play a constructive role in the negotiations.  After coming to 
Assad’s defense in the October War, relations between Syria and Jordan dramatically 
improved.  On March 16, Hussein and Rifai warned Kissinger that Syria was unhappy 
about the pace of negotiations and the lack of a disengagement agreement on the Golan 
Heights.  Assad told Hussein, “What we lost by force we will have to regain by force.” 
Rifai tried to persuade Kissinger to get something for Assad so he did not have an 
incentive to blow up the talks.  In addition, he believed that Egypt should also try to help 
Assad’s position with the Israelis.121    
 Another issue Kissinger faced was the desire of some to have another Geneva 
Summit.  Kissinger opposed this because he believed it was important to keep the Soviets 
out of the trilateral talks between Egypt, Israel, and the United States.  Hussein told the 
American ambassador to Jordan, Thomas Pickering, that the Soviets were pressing him to 
return to Geneva, despite his insistence he said could not go because of the Rabat 
resolution.  Hussein blamed the Soviets for pushing other Arabs and the Palestinians on 
the resolution at Rabat.  Hussein also said that because of Rabat he would only negotiate 
on the behalf of the West Bank if, at the end of the talks, the West Bank could vote to 
decide the future role of Jordan.  He believed that the PLO would never agree to this for 
fear of losing the vote and the West Bank to Jordan.  In addition, he believed that Israel 
would also oppose this plan because they could not guarantee that Jordan would remain 
in control of the West Bank and not be replaced by some Palestinian organization.122  
Hussein’s view was correct, Israel had no intention of returning most of the West Bank to 




state on that territory.  Israel had little incentive to replace Hussein, who kept the 
Palestinians from launching large-scale terrorist attacks against Israel, with Arafat, who 
would likely encourage them.     
 In a meeting between Kissinger, Rifai, and Hussein on March 16, Hussein and 
Rifai made it clear the consequences of failure to get a disengagement agreement with 
between Egypt, Israel, and Syria.  Hussein said, “it would be a major blow to political 
moderation across the Middle East and condemn the area to another war.” Rifai explained 
that it would be another example of the US “giving up its friends and allies – Vietnam, 
Korean, Cambodia, Greece, Turkey and now Sadat and other moderates in the Middle 
East.”  Rifai also told Kissinger that if the negotiations fail, the Syrian would argue that 
the only option was war.  From their perspective, “If Kissinger can’t persuade the Israelis 
to withdraw from a few kilometers in the Sinai, how can he promote a total 
settlement.”123 
 Kissinger also worried about the Soviet reaction if the agreements failed.   In NSC 
meeting on March 28, 1975, Kissinger said, “the Soviets will be a much bigger threat 
than in the past.  In 1967 and 1973 they stood aside while their Arab allies were 
humiliated.  The . . . resentment is building up and is likely to push them to be less 
cautious this time in showing their power.  This is all the more true since they see the US 
as weak and unwilling to stand up for its commitments anywhere in the world.”124  In the 
end, Kissinger believed that the Soviets would intervene to help Syria using the argument 
that they were attempting to move the intractable Israelis back to the 1967 line.  Kissinger 
also believed that much of Western Europe would agree with this attitude.  He also 




in Israel, which would be impossible with the current attitude of Congress and the 
American public in the aftermath of the American involvement in Vietnam.125    
The peace process had no real movement as late as October 1975.  Even then, for 
Jordan, there was still not a clear option with the decision of the Rabat Summit still 
active.  Hussein told Kissinger that the only way he could negotiate with Israel for the 
Palestinians was if the Israelis offered a grand deal on withdrawing from much of the 
West Bank and he got agreement from the Egyptians and the Saudis that he should 
proceed.  Hussein was unaware that Sadat was arguing that the United States should 
ignore Hussein and concentrate on the Palestinians all while pushing a larger Egyptian-
Israeli settlement.126 
By the end of 1976, Kissinger had obtained the agreement of Israel, Egypt, and 
Jordan to all negotiate a substantial withdrawal of Israeli forces.  Hussein was again 
willing to participate as long as Egypt agreed, but because of Rabat, Egypt’s focus was 
on their own interests and had no desire to deal with Jordanian issues.  Because Ford lost 
to Carter, Kissinger was unable to participate in the next step, leaving further negotiations 
to the next administration.  Still, Kissinger considered it a breakthrough that for the first 
time, Israel showed a willingness to give Jordan significant land in the West Bank in a 
final settlement agreement that would end the state of belligerency between the two 
nations.127  
The second half of the Nixon administration and the brief time Ford was in charge 
of the White House saw dramatic changes in the Middle East and the US relationship 




ultimately ended in failure because of Israeli resistance to any settlement with Jordan that 
did not allow them to retain much of the West Bank.  Hussein also tried to use his 
relationship with Israel and the United States to prevent another costly war.  Like his 
peace proposals, this effort also ended in failure.  During that conflict, Hussein 
successfully used his relationship with the Americans to persuade Israel not to attack 
Jordan.  Hussein also successfully committed his forces just enough to counter Arab 
attacks against his regime.  Despite his failure to prevent the conflict, Hussein 
demonstrated to the US that he continued to be a reliable ally in the region and he was 
able to resist Arab pressure to intervene in conflicts that were against his and American 
interests in the region.  In addition, he placed Jordan as an important barrier to Soviet 
expansion and ally for the American position in the Cold War agreeing to limit Soviet 
involvement in the peace process that followed the conflict. 
The Rabat Summit fundamentally altered Hussein’s ability to move forward with 
the peace process.  While Hussein would have liked to work out a settlement with Israel, 
the Israeli domestic political situation would not allow for any concessions towards 
Hussein.   In addition, the problems associated with Nixon’s resignation eliminated 
Kissinger’s ability to bring pressure on Israel to make the needed concessions.  These 
failures ultimately led the rest of the Arab nations to strip Hussein of the legitimacy to 
negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, empowering Arafat as the true representative of 
the Palestinian people.     
While the negotiations continued, Hussein saw the outlines of his next major 
issue, mainly, Egypt no longer had an interest in a group settlement between the Arabs 




problem, Hussein maintained his friendship with the US and continued to promote peace 
and stability in the region even if it did not lead to Jordan’s preferred settlement.  
Hussein’s actions showed Nixon administration that Jordan was a key ally in the region 
and an important pillar in the American plans to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle 
East.  Hussein hoped to be able to continue his place in the American sphere in the 












CARTER, HUSSEIN AND THE MARCH TOWARDS CAMP DAVID 
 
While the Nixon-Ford administrations cemented Hussein’s role as a valuable 
American ally, providing benefits in both aid and security, he was unable to complete his 
main goal of returning much of the land lost in 1967 back to Jordan.  Hussein hoped that 
new president Jimmy Carter would continue the quest for peace in the region and finally 
allow him to become the leader of a united Jordan Valley that included the important 
holy sites in Jerusalem.  Hussein believed that his established role as a voice of 
moderation in the region would lead the US to support his claim to the West Bank.  
Hussein believed that because Carter campaigned on dealing with the issues of the 
Middle East, he would have an American leader who could successfully argue his 
position to the Israelis.  Hussein also hoped that after superpower confrontation during 
the October War, the US would be more likely to support the Arabs in the peace process 
to assure their position in the Cold War.  Despite Hussein’s aspirations, the Carter 
administration would eventually continue what Hussein viewed as the worst part of 
Kissinger’s efforts, a focus on Egypt to the detriment of the rest of the Arab world.  The 
main vehicle for those discussions was the Camp David peace process which severely 




relationship between Hussein and Carter, they eventually put their differences aside and 
recognized the importance of Jordan to maintaining American interests in the region, 
especially when confronting the growing threat of radical Arab regimes along with the 
expansion of the Soviet Union.   
 The relationship between Hussein and the Carter administration did not begin on a 
good note.  On February 18, 1977, a story in the Washington Post detailed secret 
payments from the CIA to King Hussein going back twenty years.  The CIA 
acknowledged the payments to the Intelligence Oversight Board set up by President Ford 
to investigate abuses in the CIA.  The code word for the operations was called “No Beef” 
and the amount of funds distributed accounted for millions of dollars reaching $75 
million by 1976.  The article said that while Hussein was not a US puppet, “he rarely 
drifted outside the US orbit.”  It also noted that “Hussein’s decisions have often been 
highly compatible with US and Israeli interests” since the expulsion of the PLO in 1970.1  
When Carter learned of the payment program, he ended it immediately.  Despite that, 
news of its existence was deeply embarrassing for Hussein.  For years, Hussein faced 
accusations that he was an American or Zionist puppet who would sell out the 
Palestinians at the first opportunity he had and this story added to that narrative in the 
radical parts of the Arab world.  Carter immediately realized how damaging this story 
could be.  When the White House got word that the Washington Post was working on the 
Hussein story, Carter called Post executive editor Bill Bradlee and reporter Bob 
Woodward into the Oval Office to discuss the proposed article and its implications.  
Carter did not ask them not to publish but requested that they at the least wait until 




Middle East attempting to restart the Geneva talks, Carter worried that this story would 
damage those efforts.  Carter also told them the Middle East negotiations were at a 
sensitive point and they should think about doing what was best for the country.  Despite 
Carter’s pleas, the story was published the next day.2  After it had published, Carter sent a 
personal note to Bradlee telling him, “the publishing of the CIA story as the Secretary of 
State was on his Middle East mission and about to arrive in Jordan was irresponsible.”3 
Jack O’Connell, the CIA station chief and eventually Hussein’s personal lawyer 
in the US, contended there were serious flaws in the Woodward piece.  He said Hussein 
received five thousand dinars a month which was the equivalent of about fifteen thousand 
dollars.  O’Connell said that when the payments started, they were used to prop him up 
because he was so new to power and had not established himself yet.  Hussein would 
give the money directly to military leaders to retain their support.  Eventually, Hussein 
was able to get support from other Arab monarchies and no longer needed the cash from 
the CIA.   The CIA continued to give it to him anyway because it was such a small 
amount and they did not want to insult him or give him the belief they were pulling away.  
The larger sums Hussein received later were to protect his family through the hiring of a 
security service.  O’Connell said that money came directly to him and his law firm and he 
used it to protect Hussein’s family while they were educated in the United States.4  As a 
result of Carter’s decision to stop the payments, Hussein moved his children out of the 
US.   The CIA continued to fund Jordan’s intelligence services, but through direct 
payments to them and not through Hussein, minimizing the impact of Carter’s decision.5  
Other contemporary sources support O’Connell’s argument that the large sums of money 




addition, while Hussein had a lavish lifestyle, demonstrated by his love of fast planes and 
motorcycles, it is likely that much of the money he received went to supporting his 
military because their support was paramount for Hussein to maintain his position as the 
head of Jordan.         
Carter eventually apologized to Hussein for how the story came out.  He did not 
want this news story to damage relations between Jordan and the US when he was 
preparing to make a new push for peace.  In addition, he reminded Hussein that he had no 
power in his country to silence the press, but was still deeply sorry for the unfair 
embarrassment it caused.6  Carter knew because of its location and relationship with the 
Palestinians, Jordan would be important in finding a lasting solution to the problems of 
the region.  He also believed that Hussein would be a vital part of those efforts and did 
not want to harm the relationship before it truly began.     
Despite the rocky start to their relationship, Carter had a deep interest in working 
on the problems of the Middle East.  He campaigned on solving the problems of the 
region and saw those problems as a facet of the Cold War.7  He believed that the Soviet 
rhetoric of liberation influenced the region, and solving these problems would make it 
possible to stop Soviet gains throughout the Middle East.8  Carter also worried about the 
impact of a limited oil supply on the US.  He feared that the Soviet Union was attempting 
to limit the US access to raw materials through Middle East expansion.9  He worried that 
if there were another long war in the Middle East, it would be difficult for the US to 
provide a sustained effort of resupplying Israel’s military needs without a dramatic 
impact from an Arab oil boycott.  He also believed that the threat of an oil embargo 




Israel.10  Carter and his advisors felt that the situation in the Middle East was in a good 
place for American involvement which could realistically result in a solution.  They 
believed that the Arabs were moderating and the Israelis under Rabin could agree to a 
comprehensive solution.  The Carter administration wanted to succeed where Nixon 
failed, to finally bring peace and stability to the Middle East.  The combination of these 
events led the National Security Council to recommend to Carter that solving the Middle 
East issues should be an urgent priority.11   
Vance also agreed with Carter’s assessment that the oil embargo of 1973 
influenced how the administration viewed the region.  He said “No longer could the 
United States afford to leave primary responsibility for the initiative to achieve a 
settlement in other hands.  Nor could the United States appear in Arab eyes as insensitive 
to the Palestinian problems and occupation of Arab lands.”  Because of this, along with 
American economic interests and competition with the Soviet Union in Third World, the 
United States under Carter took more of a neutral mediator role rather than the ally of 
Israel as seen in the Nixon administration.12  They believed that Israel would need to 
make concessions for peace and reflexively did not support the Israel position on dealing 
with the Arabs like past administrations.  As Carter and Vance explained, the reliance on 
oil was the main reason for American interests in the Middle East.  The results of the 
Arab oil embargo and the shock it brought to the American economy demonstrated why 
the US could not allow a hostile Soviet Union to take over the region.  Even though 
Hussein and Jordan had no oil reserves, his position of promoting stability in this vital 




Hussein also had hopes that the new administration would work to bring peace to 
the region.  When Hussein met with new Secretary of State Vance in Amman on 
February 19, 1977, he told Vance that he believed Egypt was desperate for peace with 
Israel because of Sadat’s gambit during the October War and the de-escalation talks.  
Hussein believed a more radical regime would overthrow Sadat if he could not achieve a 
breakthrough that returned much of Egypt’s lost land.  Hussein also told Vance that for 
Jordan to participate in any peace negotiation with Israel, the Palestinians needed to be 
included because of Rabat.   He believed Egypt was the biggest barrier to the inclusion of 
the PLO because of Sadat’s hostility to the organization.  In addition, he believed that 
Sadat worried that Israel and Egypt would conclude an agreement only to see it vetoed by 
the Palestinians.13  Hussein argued that the best way to include the Palestinians without 
opposition from Egypt or Israel was to allow them to be part of a united Arab delegation.  
At this point, the Palestinians refused to join a Jordanian delegation, which was the 
preferred solution to the Palestinian problem for the Americans and many of the Arabs.14  
Including the Palestinians was still a major problem for both the US and Israel.  Since the 
PLO had continually refused to recognize Israel, both the US and Israel refused to 
negotiate with them.  Without a change of attitude from the PLO, it would be hard for the 
US to include them in any future peace negotiation.  Hussein’s solution to this problem 
was to link the Palestinians and Jordan and allow the Palestinians to have the right to 
determine the nature of that relationship.  He also believed issues like the right of return 
or just compensation for giving up that right could be worked out at a later time.  Hussein 
still felt that Jordan should retain some control over the Arab parts of Jerusalem and 




include free movement for all people in the united city with it serving as the capital of 
both Israel and a Palestine state tied to Jordan through a federation of some form.  In 
addition, unlike Sadat, Hussein stressed he was willing to sign a formal peace treaty.15  
The end result of this plan was very similar to Hussein’s United Arab Kingdom proposal 
that he previously made.  Hussein continued to promote this idea because it solved a 
number of problems for the region and him personally, not from a sense of altruism for 
the Palestinians.  Hussein believed that the people of the West Bank would support 
unification with Jordan, enlarging the Jordanian nation.   It would also return the city of 
Jerusalem and it holy sites to his family’s control.  Finally, it would allow for the peace 
deal with Israel that he always desired and improved relations with the US, allowing for 
increase economic and military aid.     
Hussein visited the White House on April 25, 1977, where he told Carter he 
feared Israel had become so strong that they believed they no longer have to make hard 
decisions.  In fact, he argued that some in Israel wish there was more hostility with its 
neighbors, if only to tighten the relationship between Israel and the United States.  
Hussein said “they lack the courage to gamble on peace” and feared that the region could 
face a disaster if there were no movement towards a solution soon.16  Because of that, 
Hussein believed it was going to take as a significant effort by the United States to 
convince Israel to participate in a comprehensive peace process.  
 In the meetings with Carter, Hussein proposed a similar plan to the one he 
previously presented to Nixon and Kissinger.  He needed Israel to withdraw from the 
West Bank, but he was willing to agree to some land swaps as long as they were fair.  He 




Carter that both sections of Jerusalem had to be under a joint control, not just the Arab 
side.   Hussein wanted to make sure that the Arab sections of Jerusalem did not receive 
unequal treatment by allowing Israel to retain complete sovereignty over part of the 
capital.  He finished by telling Carter that if the US could get Israel to agree to these 
terms, he was willing to move forward despite the protests from the other Arab states.  
Hussein also suggested that he felt if the international community took control over the 
West Bank with the promise that Palestinians would eventually have the right to self-
determination, then this could overcome the problem of Israel refusing to work with the 
PLO.17  While this plan seemed reasonable from Hussein’s perspective, the Israelis would 
not share this view because Israel would never accept removing Jerusalem from Israel’s 
sovereignty.    
 In the preliminary talks between the Arabs and Israel, Carter emphasized a major 
sticking point between the Arabs and Israel was over the definition of peace.  The Arabs, 
especially Syria and Egypt, believed a peace process should end with an agreement that 
stopped the fighting, nothing more.  Israel on the other hand, wanted something more 
binding.  For example, Israel believed that they needed trade and open borders between 
their neighbors, not just an announcement that the Arabs accepted Israel’s right to exist.  
Israel felt that as these connections grew, it was less likely of hostilities would return 
because of the economic consequence of war.  Hussein told Carter he believed that it 
would be difficult to reach that level of agreement with most of the Arab nations, but he 
remained willing.18 
Another issue Hussein had with the United States was his ability to purchase 




their military to be a force for stability in the region.  Originally, Jordan requested one 
hundred F-5Es, an aircraft developed in the early 60s, but now wanted a mix of F-5Es 
and the much newer F-16 Fighting Falcon.  Carter’s initial response was to suggest 
maybe the US would give fewer arms to Israel so Jordan and the other friendly Arab 
allies would not need as much   Hussein replied he was fine with that proposition if there 
were peace, but the threat of the continued Soviet build-up in Iraq and Libya also posed a 
threat to his nation.  Jordan’s Prime Minister, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharf, countered 
Carter’s objections by telling him, “Our armed forces have been a source of stability in 
the area in recent decades.  These forces have helped us to deter aggression and they have 
not been used only in our confrontation with Israel.   We have also needed them to 
confront radical forces in the area.”  They also told Carter that Iraq was a threat to 
Kuwait, and with new weapons, Jordan would be in a position to join with Saudi Arabia 
and Iran to counter that threat if necessary.19  The implication from this request was that 
if the US wanted Jordan to retain its place as defending the position of the West in the 
region, they needed to arm them like that was the case.  The example of Kuwait and Iraq 
was especially relevant for this argument.  Iraq and its Baathist leadership was a client of 
the Soviet Union and had historical claims on its southern neighbor, the American 
friendly and oil rich Kuwait.  Hussein hoped to use this as an example of a way his 
stronger military could be used to serve the larger interests of the US in the region by 
defending Kuwait if it became necessary.  Carter agreed to raise Hussein’s aid an 
additional $23 million and promised to examine other issues like a water project in the 




Hussein’s first visit with Jimmy Carter came at a time of deep personal grief for 
the King.  His third wife Alia recently died in a helicopter crash and Hussein was still 
dealing with the loss.  During his first night in Washington, he was invited to sit on the 
Truman balcony with Carter and his wife Rosalynn.  Carter suggested the activity 
because he knew it was possible to see a steady stream of planes landing at Washington 
National Airport and Hussein had an affinity for flying.  During their discussion, Hussein 
began to weep when describing his late wife.  Carter felt a great deal of sympathy for him 
and offered to send him to the Georgia coast where Hussein could recuperate and rest in 
private.  Hussein thanked him and after he left Washington, spent a week in Georgia with 
friends of the Carter family.21  While later Hussein and Carter would have major policy 
differences, for Hussein, the generosity and compassion Carter showed persuaded him to 
disagree in strict policy terms, and to never wage personal attacks against Carter for his 
efforts at the peace process.22 
After talking with the Arab leaders in the region, the Carter administration came 
to the conclusion that the best venue for solving the outstanding issues between the Arabs 
and the Israelis would be in a large peace conference in Geneva.   William Quandt and 
Harold Saunders,  whom both worked with Kissinger on the Middle East and continued 
that role with the Carter administration, told Carter that the smaller step-by-step approach 
of Nixon and Kissinger no longer worked and the likeliest chance at success was a 
comprehensive agreement.23  Brzezinski realized early on the difficulties they would have 
with the Israelis.  He said:  
We expected Israeli opposition, for it was our feeling that the Israelis were 
essentially playing for time, and were more interested in preserving an 




broader peace in the Middle East. . . .  But the Israelis could not be 
expected to soften their position unless the Arabs too, showed some 
willingness to accommodate.24   
 
The Israeli attitude towards external security also influenced its unwillingness to 
make significant concessions with towards the Arabs.  Israel believed that they needed 
more weapons and land to retain their superior position.  One of their biggest worries was 
the smallest section of pre-1967 Israel centered on Tel Aviv that only measured a few 
miles between the Arab position and the Mediterranean Sea.  Israel’s defense planners 
worried about the possibility of the Arabs seperating North and South Israel at this point.  
Tel Aviv, Israel’s second-largest city, was located on the coast and was only a little over 
thirty miles to the West Bank.  The Israelis believed that the only reason the Arabs did 
not attack was because of their military strength.  While they hoped peace could be 
possible, they felt it would only occur if Israel were so strong that the Arabs had no other 
options.  Because of that, Israel hoped to delay any peace proposal, especially on the 
West Bank and the Golan Heights, until their strength was overwhelming.25 
The effort to restart the peace process hit a major setback with the Israeli elections 
in May 1977.  When a Likud governing coalition replaced the Labor Party led by Rabin 
and Peres.  The election of the Likud government made it extremely difficult for Hussein 
to move forward on any peace plan.  Likud was an ultra-nationalist party that called the 
West Bank Judea and Samaria, which referred to their biblical names.  They did this to 
show that the Jews were there first and Israel was just reclaiming Jewish land that went 
back to biblical times.  In a letter to President Ronald Reagan, Begin described Judea and 




Judea and Samaria where our kings knelt to God, where our prophets brought forth a 
vision of eternal peace, where we developed a rich civilization which we took with us in 
our hearts and in our minds on our long global trek for over eighteen centuries and with 
it, we can back home.”26  In addition, the Likud platform said that those lands were an 
important part of Ertz Israel which translates to the land of Israel.  It did not acknowledge 
the Palestinians or grant them the right to live in the West Bank with ideas of self-
determination.  Likud’s 1977 political philosophy said, “the right of the Jewish people to 
the Land of Israel is eternal, and is an integral part of its right to security and peace.  
Judean and Samaria shall therefore not be relinquished to foreign rule; between the sea 
and Jordan, there will be Jewish sovereignty alone.”27  Because of this, once Menachem 
Begin became Prime Minister under the Likud government, the possibilities of peace in 
the eyes Hussein and the Jordanians seemed remote.  The Jordanians feared the 
consequences of the new Likud government so much that they made contingency plans in 
case the Israelis annexed the West Bank and expelled all the Palestinians to Jordan.  They 
also feared that the new Israeli government would try and destabilize the monarchy, with 
the hope of it being replaced by a Palestinians government.  In that case, they could force 
more Palestinian to Jordan, making that the new Palestinian homeland and leaving the 
West Bank for continued Israeli expansion.28   
Despite his tepidness of the new Israeli government, Hussein attempted to explore 
where the new Israeli administration stood on the peace process.  He secretly met with 
new Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan in London on August 22, 1977.  The meeting 
did not go well from the perspective of either Israel or Jordan.   In the meeting, Dayan got 




According to Dayan, Hussein was still bitter about the Rabat resolution and felt that if the 
Palestinians and the PLO did not want his help, then he saw no need to provide it.  
Hussein’s only concern while talking to Dayan was the East Bank and making sure Israel 
did not interfere with it or do anything to risk instability.  He seemed like he no longer 
had the desire to take risks in clashing with the Arabs or the Israelis over a land and 
people that did not want his help.  When Dayan asked if Hussein was willing to divide 
parts of the West Bank with Israel, he replied that he could not ask any Arab village to 
sacrifice itself and join Israel.  He also mentioned that he would be considered a traitor in 
the Arab world for “selling Arab land to the Jews so he could enlarge his own 
kingdom.”29  Hussein viewed the meeting as a sign that the new Israeli government had 
no desire to make the necessary sacrifices for peace.  He said of the meeting, “I saw my 
friend Moshe Dayan who become the Foreign Minister of the Likud here in London.  His 
attitude was even harder than it had been earlier and that was the end of that.  We never 
had any contact for a long period.”30 
Without any movement on the peace process and despite the difficulty of the new 
Israeli government, the Carter administration began to work on setting up the new 
Geneva Conference.  One of the first major issues concerning the conference was what to 
do with the Palestinians.  In 1975, a letter of understanding was signed by Nixon and the 
Israelis.   This letter was drafted during Kissinger’s attempt at shuttle diplomacy and was 
an effort by the United States to get Israeli participation in further peace negotiations.  
While the letter mainly dealt with security and military aid matters, it also contained a 
clause about the Palestinians and the PLO saying the US pledged to not deal with, 




existence.31  Because of that promise, the US did not have a vehicle for dealing with the 
PLO while the Arabs united at Rabat and said only the PLO could speak for the 
Palestinians.    
The US began attempting to bring the PLO into the negotiating process by trying 
to convince them that recognizing Israel, or at least UNSC Resolution 242, would lead to 
an improvement in the lives of the Palestinians and greater international acceptance of the 
PLO.  On August 5, 1977, Vance visited Hussein in Amman to discuss the upcoming 
negotiations.  Hussein expressed his fear to Vance that the Arabs expected too much out 
the negotiations and could react if Israel and the US do not provide meaningful gains.   
Hussein believed that if progress was not made quickly, “there will be a political reaction 
which will favor the forces of extremism in the area.”  He was also worried that the 
election of Begin would make any progress impossible.  Vance believed that the talks 
would progress favorably but was concerned about the Palestinian issue.  He told Hussein 
that if the Arabs could get the PLO to accept Resolution 242, then, the US could argue to 
Israel that is the equivalent of the PLO accepting their right to exist.32  Vance hoped that 
Hussein could use his influence in the region to persuade the PLO to recognize Israel’s 
right to exist.   
Vance also presented Hussein with Carter’s draft proposal for the Geneva talks.  
The plan had five main ideas that all parties should agree to before the negotiations 
began.   This included the idea that the result would be a comprehensive settlement 
reflected by a peace treaty.  That the basis for negotiations would come from UN Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338.  He also wanted an agreement that after a peace treaty 




region.  This included both political and economic exchanges.  Carter also wanted an 
understanding that eventually a phased withdrawal of all forces to safe and recognizable 
borders would occur.  It particular, Israel needed to realize that at the end of the 
negotiations, they would not be able to continue to have a military presence in the West 
Bank and the Sinai.  Finally, a non-militarized Palestinian entity would be created in the 
West Bank that would have the option through free election to determine if they wanted 
to be independent or part of Jordan.33 Hussein was pleased with these basic principles 
because they were similar to his view of how the negotiations should proceed.  When 
Vance presented these points to Begin, he rejected the notion of a Palestinian entity 
saying that “this would inevitably lead to a PLO-dominated, Soviet armed state.”  Israel 
also would only accept the Palestinians at the negotiations if they were part of the 
Jordanian delegation and not identified as representatives of the PLO.34  The Israeli 
leadership used the threat of the Cold War to pressure Carter into supporting their 
position against the PLO.  By arguing, both in public and private, that the PLO would 
become a Soviet proxy in the region, it made it more difficult for Carter to support 
including them in the negotiations.  The PLO did not make that effort any easier by 
maintaining its position that called for the destruction of Israel.  In addition, while Begin 
said he wanted a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, he knew that the PLO would not 
work with Jordan and Hussein and his real goal was to block any substantial negotiation 
over the final solution of the West Bank.  The process of delaying any negotiations over 
the West Bank would become a bedrock principle of the various Likud governments all 




The next day, Hussein responded to Carter’s proposed negotiation points.  
Hussein believed something needed to be included about Palestinian refugees if the US 
wanted a lasting peace.  It did not necessarily need to be a full right of return for the 
Palestinian refugees displaced in the 1948 and 1967 wars, but must include some form of 
compensation to replace the land lost when the Palestinians evacuated them during the 
conflicts with Israel.  In addition, he wanted Vance to know that Jerusalem needed to be 
included in the negotiations, along with a guarantee that the Arabs would have access to 
the Muslim holy sites.  The Arab part of Jerusalem also must be under Arab sovereignty.  
Otherwise, Hussein appeared very happy about Carter’s broad outline for negotiations.35  
While from an Arab perspective the access to the Muslim holy sites was important, 
Hussein’s call for Arab sovereignty was focused on Jordanian interests rather than a 
united Arab interest.  Hussein wanted the control of Jerusalem returned to his family, not 
to any future Palestinian or Arab entity created out of the West Bank and Gaza.   
On June 22, 1977, Brzezinski put forth a plan to Carter outlining his vision of 
what the US should do about the Palestinians.  He called for a return of Hussein’s United 
Arab Kingdom Plan from 1972.  He believed that the Palestinian part of the Kingdom 
would be demilitarized and be stationed by UN troops to maintain peace and stability.  
The Palestinian section would also be linked with Jordan, with Hussein retaining control 
over foreign policy and security.  Because of Rabat, this plan would now need the 
support of Palestinians on the ground, which Brzezinski believed to be impossible 
without Arab help.  He also called for a united Jerusalem that contained both the Israeli 
capital and an administrative capital for the Palestinian part of the Jordanian federation.  




Brzezinski’s view that the only way to accomplish this would be through broad Arab 
support was correct.  Unfortunately for Hussein, the view of the other Arab leaders 
towards Hussein’s plan had not changed.  
Once again, the Carter administration tried to bring the Palestinians into the 
negotiation by informally discussing the option of self-determination after an 
internationally backed transition from Israeli control to Palestinian autonomy.  The goal 
was that at the end of the transition, the people of Palestine would vote on remaining part 
of Israel, independence, or some link to Jordan.  The Carter administration still believed 
it was important to get the PLO and the Palestinians involved in the negotiations and 
hoped that this plan would persuade them to participate.  On September 10, 1977, 
meeting with Landrum Bolling, acting as an unofficial representative of the Carter 
administration, in Beirut on Arafat described his opposition to the creation of a 
Palestinian entity with joint control by Jordan and Israel or an international body that 
allowed for some form of self-determination at a later date.  Arafat believed that Hussein 
would use his position to “threaten people, bribe and corrupt those he could get to follow 
him so that, in the end, he would destroy our right to have an independent state.”37  In 
that scenario, Arafat would never have a leadership role in a Palestinian state or entity.    
Hussein also attempted to get the Palestinians to participate in the Geneva talks in 
some form.   In a meeting in early 1977, Hussein tried to convince Arafat to send 
representatives to the conference.  He also urged them to accept UN Resolution 242.  
Despite the attempts by Hussein to mend fences with the PLO, all was not forgiven.  
Hussein refused to allow more members of the PLO into Jordan or for the PLO to open 




the Palestinians in negotiations because of Rabat.38  Arafat still refused to join the 
negotiations as part of a Jordanian delegation or to accept UNSC Resolution 242.  
Despite these rejections, the relationship between Hussein and the PLO did improve 
during 1977.  One of the main reasons was the PLO’s active involvement in the Lebanese 
Civil War.  During that conflict, PLO forces fought Syrian-backed forces for control of 
Lebanon.  This conflict caused both Arafat and Assad to look for friends in the region 
and caused both leaders to strive to improve the relationship with Hussein.  In fact, the 
Cairo Summit in 1977 saw the PLO revoke their resolution calling for the removal of 
Hussein and acknowledge Jordan’s role in the West Bank.39  The restoration of the 
relationship between Hussein and Arafat would become important because that 
relationship formed the basis for many of the attempts at the peace process during the 
Reagan administration.  It was important for both Arafat and Hussein to end their 
hostility towards each other to promote the interests of the Palestinians to the United 
States.     
In August 1977, Vance made a trip to the Middle East to discuss the Palestinian 
issue with various Arab leaders.  Vance believed that the solution to the Palestinian issue 
was to create a UN trusteeship in the West Bank and Gaza that lasted a few years while 
the Palestinians transitioned to some form of an entity based on self-determination.  
Vance received positive feedback from the main Arab leaders he visited, including 
Hussein.  Another issue was getting the PLO to participate in negotiations.  To do this, 
Vance needed them to accept Israel’s right to exist through the acceptance of the major 




that he needed the PLO to agree to if it wanted to be involved with the US.   The 
statement said:  
The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, with 
the reservation that it considers that the resolution does not make adequate 
reference to the question of the Palestinians since it fails to make any 
reference to a homeland for the Palestinian people.  It is recognized that 
the language of Resolution 242 relates to the right of all state in the 
Middle East to live in peace. 
 
Vance believed that this eliminated the main objections of the PLO, mainly that the UN 
resolutions did not address the problems of the Palestinian people and refugees, but still 
met the minimum requirement that the PLO recognized Israel.  Much to his dismay and 
the dismay of his Arab allies, the Executive Committee of the PLO immediately rejected 
it.40  This made it significantly harder for the US to argue for Palestinian participation.  
The only avenue left for Palestinian participation in any peace conference was through a 
delegation with Jordan or a united Arab delegation that still would not include active 
members of the PLO leadership.   
An additional stumbling block was Egypt’s position on a united Arab delegation.  
Egypt did not support a joint Arab delegation for fear that Assad, Hussein, or the 
Palestinians could then sink the negotiations with opposition to a part that did not include 
Egypt.   Sadat was determined to get the Sinai back and did not want to threaten that goal 
by being linked to other nations.  In addition, because of Egypt’s negative relationship 
with the PLO, it did not want the Palestinians to have a separate voice in the talks but 




opposition by Israel and make it more difficult for the Palestinians to break up the 
negotiations because they did not achieve all their goals on the West Bank.41    
In July 1977, Hussein met with Sadat to try and persuade him to join a group 
delegation of Arabs for the proposed Geneva conference.  Sadat was outraged at the 
thought, saying he would never take orders from a Ba’athist, referring to Assad.  Hussein 
reminded Sadat that it was not too long ago that he fought side by side with Assad.  
Hussein kept pressuring Sadat to agree to at least meet with the other states to discuss the 
proposal and every time Sadat found some excuse why he would not.  To Hussein, this 
was the clearest sign that Sadat had plans of his own for peace with Israel and did not 
want to be tied to down in a joint negotiation.42   
On October 1, 1977, the Soviets and the Americans released a statement that 
called for another Geneva peace conference to settle all the remaining issues in the 
region.  Both the US and the USSR would co-chair the summit.  they called for “a 
comprehensive settlement to the Middle East problem” that addressed all key issues such 
as:  
withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 
conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question including ensuring the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; termination of the state of war 
and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual 
recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
political independence.   
 
They also called for demilitarized zones under the control of the UN, including US and 
USSR troops to maintain the peace if necessary.  Unlike Nixon, Carter was less 




of war in the region remained and was a bigger threat to the Cold War status quo and he 
was determined to nullify it.43  Carter’s belief was supported as a result of the October 
War where continued escalation between the US and the Soviet Union brought both sides 
close to active participation in the conflict.    
The statement was met with outrage by the Israelis.  What the statement did not 
mention was UN Resolution 242.  This was important to the Israelis because they had 
argued in the past that all negotiations should be based on 242 because it called for the 
“the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or 
acts of force.”  It was also somewhat vague on the return of land taken in 1967.44  In 
addition, the Israeli position had always been to focus on secure borders which did not 
necessarily mean a return to the pre-1967 lines.  Israel was also angered by the talk of the 
legitimate representatives of the Palestinians, which they believed referred to the PLO.  
In fact, because it was also a Soviet statement, it lent more weight to this criticism since 
the Soviets often referred to the PLO as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians.  
Finally, the agreement did not mention a peace treaty but just the settlement of issues.  
The Israelis worried that this meant a non-binding agreement, something they had always 
opposed.45  Because the statement with the Soviet Union did not mention 242, Israel 
wanted some assurances that past statements by the US still held.  These included an 
affirmation of 242 and 338, rejection of the PLO, and calls for safe and secure borders 
based on a peace treaty.  In a meeting with Carter on October 4, Dayan told him that if it 
were necessary for Israel to accept the statement from the USSR and the US, it would be 
unlikely that they would participate in the Geneva Conference.  Carter assured him that 




the guaranteed outcome of the negotiations.  Dayan also told Carter that Israel was not 
willing to allow for a Palestinian state and needed to keep many of their settlements along 
with some military installations.  Dayan also said he was willing to listen to proposals 
made by Hussein and would not reject them out of hand, but Israel had security needs in 
the West Bank that would make it impossible to fully return to the pre-1967 lines or give 
the Palestinians a state.46   
Vance continued the discussion with Dayan on October 5 and encouraged him to 
accept the joint US-Soviet statement.  He argued that the US blocked a number of 
demands made by the Soviets that Israeli would have opposed.  This included Moscow’s 
desire for the statement mentioning Palestinian national rights.  The implication of that 
phrase was that at the end of the negotiations, a Palestinian state would reside in the West 
Bank.  Dayan ignored Vance’s arguments but eventually agreed that the Israelis would 
negotiate a working paper with the US that formed their basis for their attendance at 
Geneva.  The paper called for a single Arab delegation, separate bilateral working groups 
for negotiation, and the West Bank and Gaza to be discussed in a working group that 
included Egypt and Jordan.47  This working paper contradicted many of the goals of the 
joint US-USSR statement and focused less on Palestinian rights, and more on joining 
them with Jordan and Egypt. 
During the planning for Geneva, Hussein was as hopeful as possible that the 
Carter administration understood the issues of the Palestinians and would try to work 
towards peace that benefited Jordan.  He told Carter that he was “encouraged by your 
personal perseverance in this matter and your wise and fair judgment.  I shall continue to 




lead to a just peace in our region and a positive era of relationship between the Arab 
world and the United States.”48  Hussein was particularly encouraged by Carter’s 
attempts to deal with the Palestinian issue in light of the Rabat resolution while still 
envisioning a role for Jordan in the West Bank in the future once peace was achieved.    
The plan for Geneva took a dramatic turn on November 9, 1977. In a speech to 
the Egyptian Parliament, Sadat announced that he would meet the Israelis anywhere for 
peace and was willing to go to Jerusalem if necessary.  On November 20, Sadat arrived in 
Jerusalem and spoke in front of the Israeli Knesset.  In his speech, Sadat made it clear 
that he was on his own by telling the Israelis he did not consult with other Arab leaders 
before he decided to come there and that many were opposed to his visit.  Sadat said he 
came “to assume the responsibility on behalf of the Egyptian People and to share in the 
fate-determining responsibility of the Arab Nation and the Palestinian People . . . in a bid 
to save . . . the entire Arab Nation the horrors of new, shocking and destructive wars.”49   
Sadat’s speech in front of the Knesset immediately drew a response around the 
world.  Many in the Arab world denounced it.  The PLO issued a statement condemning 
“Sadat’s treasonous visit.”  They called for the creation of a “Steadfastness and 
Confrontation Front composed of Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Democratic Yemen, Syrian and 
the PLO to oppose all capitulationist solutions planned by imperialism, Zionism, and 
their Arab tools.”  They also condemned the planned Geneva Conference and Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 for not recognizing the legitimate national rights of the 
Palestinians.  In addition, they called for a boycott of Sadat and Egypt.50  This statement 
was signed by all the major factions of the PLO and showed that the radical regimes 




support of Syria and Iraq, it was seen as a warning to Jordan not to join with Sadat.  
While Hussein wanted peace, it would be difficult to achieve that goal and maintain his 
leadership role in Jordan if two of the states bordering on Jordan continued to undermine 
his regime in response to that peace deal.  Hussein wanted peace, but not at the expense 
of his regime.      
The PLO responded in other ways towards Sadat’s efforts in Jerusalem.  On 
February 18, two PLO terrorists entered a hotel in Cyprus and murdered Youssef el-
Sebai.  El-Sebai was the editor of a popular newspaper in Cairo and a close friend of 
Sadat.  The terrorists announced that “everyone who went to Israel with Sadat will die, 
including Sadat.”  Sadat was furious about this attack.  He told Israeli Defense Minister 
Ezra Weizman, “I have excluded the PLO from my lexicon.  By their behavior, they have 
excluded themselves from the negotiations.”51  Another group of PLO-backed terrorists 
landed a boat on the shores of Tel Aviv on March 11, where they proceeded to attack a 
highway, hijack a taxi and a bus and murdered thirty-eight Israelis including thirteen 
children including the American niece of Connecticut Senator Abraham Ribicoff. 52  The 
PLO was announcing to the world with these attacks that they could and would scuttle 
any talks between the Arabs and the Israelis.  It was also a demonstration to the US and 
its allies in the region that the PLO had the power to disrupt a peace process if they chose 
to do it.   This would have been a particular worry for Hussein because of his large 
Palestinian population and the fear that the PLO could increase opposition to his rule if 
they did not approve of a peace process.  
The mayors of many of the West Bank towns also released a statement.  They 




PLO as the sole voice of the Palestinian people but thanked him for calling for a 
comprehensive peace, not just one between Egypt and Israel.  They recognized the 
sacrifices that Egypt and its people hadmade for the Palestinian cause.  They also called 
for the strengthening of the alliance between all Arabs, Egypt included.53 This showed 
the people of the West Bank were not as radical compared to the PLO and many would 
work with an agreement that gave them self-determination and a chance to end the 
occupation.    
News reports immediately recognized the issues facing Hussein because of 
Sadat’s trip.  A New York Times report argued that Hussein was in a tough position 
because he could not support it without upsetting Syria who vehemently opposed it, 
calling it the “trip of shame.”  Some in the King’s inner circle believed that this allowed 
Hussein to continue talks with Israel more openly than he has in the past.  Hussein 
believed that for the trip to be successful, the break between Syria and Egypt would need 
to be repaired.54  Because of this pressure, Hussein attempted to take a neutral stance in 
public while discussing his misgivings about the trip in private.    
Hussein had a number of issues with Sadat’s trip.  Most importantly he saw the 
trip as a threat to the Geneva Conference and an attempt by Sadat to negotiate a separate 
peace with Israel while leaving out the rest of the Arabs and the Palestinians out of the 
process.  When Hussein first publically addressed Sadat’s trip to Israel, he took a mixed 
view.  He praised Sadat for his courage but worried about the actual impact of the 
initiative.   He hoped to encourage the rest of the Arab world to unite and continue to 
work towards the proposed Geneva conference.  Hussein believed that neither Sadat’s 




return of Arab land. 55  While he opposed to Sadat’s unwillingness to coordinate with the 
other Arabs and damage the prospect of the summit at Geneva, Hussein did appreciate 
the value in upending the status quo.  From Hussein’s perspective, Sadat’s trip had the 
potential to shape world opinion, improving the chances of a settlement with Israel.   
Hussein also had a personal objection to Sadat’s trip to Israel which he explained 
in a meeting with Brzezinski.  Hussein said of the Sadat trip, “The visit to Jerusalem 
under occupation had great religious significance. . . . We lost Jerusalem in 1967 under 
Egyptian command.  We knew we would lose, but we went into the war anyway.  Under 
Egyptian command and responsibility, the West Bank was lost.  The Sadat visit was a 
very, very , big shock.”  He also mentioned his family’s historical connection to the 
Jerusalem along with the fact his grandfather was buried there after being assassinated 
while visiting the religious sites.56  Hussein was trying to show Brzezinski how 
personally connected he was to Jerusalem and because of that how hurt he was by Sadat’s 
visit without any consultation.   Hussein was reflecting to Brzezinski the personal attitude 
of many Arabs on Sadat’s visit to Israel.    
After Sadat’s trip occurred, Hussein immediately met with Assad to gauge his 
reaction to it.  Assad told Hussein that he was outraged by Sadat’s actions and would 
never agree to anything that came out of it.  Assad also blamed the United States for 
being complicit in Sadat’s attempt to negotiate without the rest of the Arabs.  Assad 
threatened to allow the Soviet Union to build a nuclear base in Syria in response.  
Hussein also believed that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf states agreed with 




a de facto recognition that Jerusalem was the capital of Israel and this was unlikely to 
change.57  
Immediately following the speech, Hussein talked with both Ambassador 
Pickering and Sadat and told them that he would like to be included in future talks.   
Hussein was reassured by Sadat when he told him that he believed the West Bank should 
be linked to Jordan.  Sadat argued that while a vote might be necessary, in a year or less 
the PLO would have almost no influence in the West Bank and the Palestinians would 
likely want to stay connected with Jordan.58  To Hussein, this was the first 
acknowledgment by another Arab leader that Jordan should have control over the West 
Bank since the decision at Rabat.  Hussein’s outrage over Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem was 
eased if Sadat could assure him that the West Bank would eventually return to Jordanian 
control.    
Soon after Sadat’s trip, Hussein met with Vance and discussed his reaction.   
Hussein told Vance that he believed that Sadat “had something up his sleeve” to make a 
separate deal at the expense of the other Arabs.  In particular, Hussein was concerned 
because he was with Sadat just days before the trip and nothing was mentioned.  Hussein 
also gave Vance an update on Assad’s attitude and relayed his view of a conspiracy led 
by the Americans and his threat to embrace the Soviet Union.59  The threat about Soviet 
involvement in Syria was a particular concern for the Carter administration because, after 
the Egyptian expulsion in 1972, the Soviets’ position in the Middle East was limited to 




Israel also responded to Sadat’s gambit but not in the way many Arabs hoped.   
Despite the reaction of the Israeli government, many in the Israeli pubic believed that 
peace would quickly be agreed to between Egypt and Israel.  They expected both sides 
would make the needed compromises to achieve that peace.  This attitude was felt by 
many Israeli politicians and the Israeli public.60  On December 28, 1977, Begin gave a 
speech in the Knesset that outlined his view for the West Bank and Gaza.  He called for 
elections that had very limited responsibilities.   He believed that the Palestinians would 
not have their homeland, but could become either Israeli or Jordanian citizens.  In 
addition, he said, “Israel stands by its right and its claim of sovereignty to Judea, 
Samaria, and the Gaza district.”  It called for any final status to the sovereignty of those 
areas to be decided by negotiation.61  This plan was not seen by people outside of Israel 
as a concession.  In fact, it would make permanent the Israeli military presence in the 
West Bank and preclude the Palestinians from ever having the right to determine their 
political status.  This speech was called the Begin Plan and was widely dismissed by 
everyone but the Israelis.  In another speech, Begin announced that he wanted to meet 
with all of Israel’s neighbors without preconditions to reach peace and set up economic 
activity between the nations.  When he referred to the issue of the Palestinians, he called 
them the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael and asked them to discuss their common future.62  The 
implication was that the Palestinians in the West Bank only had the option of joining 
Israel, with no hope of independence or any political or economic separation from Israel.   
The US also reacted to the speeches of Sadat and Begin.  Immediately following 
the speeches, the Carter administration attempted to retain focus on a comprehensive 




ended the hopes of the proposed Geneva Conference.  It took a couple of months, but 
eventually the Carter administration realized that only possible peace process now was a 
bilateral negotiation between Egypt and Israel that they eventually hoped could bring in 
other Arabs, especially Jordan.63  On January 4, 1978, while visiting Egypt, President 
Carter made a statement on supporting the new bilateral talks between Egypt and Israel.  
In the statement, Carter discussed the issues with the Palestinians and the need to address 
those issues.  He said, “there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its 
aspects.  The problem must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and 
enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.”64  This 
statement became known as the Aswan statement and it was important because no US 
president had ever discussed the issue of the Palestinians in such a way.  Up until this 
point, many in Israel and their allies in the US did not even consider the Palestinians a 
legitimate group.  They believed they were just Arabs and should have been absorbed 
into the country where they currently resided.  t was also important because it did not 
single out Jerusalem as a separate negotiating point, implying that it was part of the 1967 
land that Israel had to return.  Carter’s statement gave encouragement to the Arabs that 
this president might finally take their issues seriously and encourage Israel to make the 
sacrifices necessary for peace.  
In regards to Begin’s speech, the United States did not reject his ideas and seemed 
to accept some of it, leading to fear in the Arab world that the US, particularly with 
respect to the Palestinians, was abandoning its previous position that a settlement had to 
be based on UN Resolution 242.  When Under Secretary of State Alfred Atherton met 




that these past few months had been “the most distressing of my life.”  Atherton assured 
Hussein that the US position had not changed.  They still supported a settlement with 
Israel returning most of the land captured in 1967.  In addition, Atherton explained to 
Hussein that the US believed that at this critical time, direct negotiations between Israel 
and the Egypt with the US mediating was the best hope for a breakthrough.  While the 
US hoped to get public support for the Camp David talks, Hussein at this time would not 
grant it.  He told Atherton he agreed with the need for direct negotiations but could not 
join because of Rabat and the lack of the inclusion of the Palestinians.   Hussein also 
expressed concern that the negotiations would lead to some combination of Jordanian 
local control with Israel remaining responsible for security.  He feared that this was an 
attempt to give Israel control over the West Bank and use Jordan as a cover.  He 
vehemently opposed any plan such as this.  Finally, Hussein encouraged Atherton to 
include the Palestinians if he wanted to reach a successful, long-lasting agreement. 
As 1978 progressed, the US still hoped to convince Hussein to join the 
negotiations.   oth the US and Egypt worried that without Hussein’s participation, Egypt 
would face increasing pressure from the other Arab states not to sign a deal with Israel.  
Sadat believed that if Hussein joined the negotiation, then he could not be accused of 
abandoning the Palestinians they would have representation in the form of Hussein.  In a 
meeting with Ambassador Pickering on March 5. 1978, Hussein reiterated his position 
that he could not agree to speak for the Palestinians unless he had assurances ahead of 
time that Israel would agree to a total withdrawal of the West Bank and the Palestinians 
would have the opportunity for self-determination.  He said it would be suicide to 




the United States for not pushing more for a united Arab front at the Geneva Conference 
and instead focusing on strictly Egypt and Israel. 
Throughout 1978, Hussein continued to face pressure from all sides on the Sadat 
trip to Israel and the possibility of bilateral talks between Egypt and Israel.  The 
Americans continued to pressure Hussein to support Sadat, even though he believed 
Sadat had no intention of arguing for Jordan’s interests with Israel.  Assad and other Arab 
leaders continued to pressure Hussein to reject Sadat’s approach and condemn him for his 
negotiations with Israel.  Finally, Hussein faced another assassination attempt in February 
of 1978 that illustrated the personal threat to him if he backed Sadat.   alestinian militants 
snuck surface-to-air missiles into Jordan with the goal of shooting down Hussein’s plane.   
While the plot was foiled, it reiterated to Hussein the dangerous position he was in.66  
Hussein realized that by staying neutral and attempting to show moderation, he generally 
would not upset either side enough for them to attempt actively to dethrone him.     
Egypt also attempted to persuade Hussein to join the negotiations.  Sadat believed 
the Hussein would be happy with an administrative role over the West Bank and through 
that, could be enticed to join Egypt in the negotiations.  Sadat had hoped that if another 
Arab nation also began discussing terms with Israel, the pressure on him from other 
Arabs would be reduced.  At the Rabat summit, Hussein said, “he would work for the 
accomplishment of an Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories.”  He also 
said that once the area was liberated from Israeli occupation, the people of Palestine 
should choose any affiliation they want.67  Because of his close connection to the people 
of Palestine, Hussein was willing to take control of some of the administration duties of 




build on those past statements and get Hussein to agree to participate, allowing for the 
completion of a more comprehensive agreement.   
Sadat continued to be frustrated by Hussein’s lack of willingness to join his bold 
push for peace.  On July 8, 1978, in a meeting with Shimon Peres, the former Minister of 
Defense, Sadat let his anger with Hussein be known.  He said Hussein “wanted the West 
Bank handed to him as a gift.”  He accused Hussein of pursuing an opportunistic policy 
where he had to risk nothing and in return received everything he desired.  Sadat also 
mentioned Hussein’s father died from schizophrenia and he could see the same signs 
currently in Hussein.   In addition, Sadat said that Hussein consistently made the wrong 
choices.  He joined Nasser in 1967 and lost the West Bank.  He refused to fully enter the 
1973 war and then was not included in the disengagement talks.68   
To reassure Hussein about the progress of negotiations between Israel and Egypt 
during the summer of 1978, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel flew to 
Jordan on July 26, 1978.  After meeting with Hussein, he believed he understood the 
King’s position on the peace talks.  Hussein was willing to join the talks at a moment’s 
notice if it looked like they would get a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank 
and the restoration of Jerusalem in Muslim hands.  Hussein was opposed to Jordan acting 
as an administrator of the West Bank while Israeli troops remained.  Kamel told Hussein 
that Egypt’s goal was to get the United States to focus more on the Arab position and 
separate itself from Israel by demonstrating the radicalness of Begin in his discussions 
about Jordan.  He figured this would be the best way to get a lasting peace on terms the 
Arabs states approved.69  During their discussions, Kamel was struck by the depth of 




Bank.   He said Badran “knew every hill and valley. . . .   He knew the people, the 
families, their women. . . .   He knew who had dealings with the Israelis and who did not, 
who was for the PLO and who merely went along with them.”70  This convinced him that 
no solution for the West Bank would ever occur without the support and consultation of 
Jordan.  Kamel also found that Hussein still was angry about the situation at Rabat, 
especially because he counted on Egypt at the summit to protect him from the more 
radical Arab regimes.  In addition, he believed that the Israeli actions in the West Bank 
were a direct result of Jordan no longer speaking for the Palestinians.71   
The Carter administration also continued to encourage negotiations between all 
the Arabs and Israel, but most of their focus was on Egypt.  As 1978 progressed, it 
became obvious that the US would need to be more directly involved, leading Carter to 
call for a summit at Camp David in September of 1978.  Carter hoped that eventually 
other Arabs would join the negotiations and he believed that it had the potential to lead to 
a comprehensive peace settlement for the region.  While Jordan was invited to attend, 
Hussein declined because he still wanted to negotiate as a joint Arab delegation and he 
was still honoring his commitment at Rabat.72  Without Jordan, Carter knew the 
negotiations would be difficult, but he was determined to continue because he believed it 
was the only current viable path.      
On August 18, 1978, the CIA gave the Carter administration a report that 
provided an accurate depiction of Hussein’s attitudes towards that peace process leading 
up to Camp David.  The report argued that Hussein had tried recently to balance his 
desire for peace while still maintaining his position with the rest of the Arab world.  They 




an Arab agreement about a joint negotiation with Israel.  The CIA also believed that 
Hussein hoped that the West Bank and Gaza would be placed under UN control while it 
decided its future.  Hussein did not want the creation of a Palestinian state because he 
believed it would eventually threaten his rule.  His ideal solution was that the Palestinians 
will eventually choose to live in a federation with Jordan of which he remained the head.  
It also said that while Hussein was willing to accept most of the Israeli demands on ideas 
of normalization, he was firm that East Jerusalem needed to be retained by the Arabs and 
controlled by the Arabs.  It concluded by saying that Hussein needed to have some 
support from its neighbors, mainly Saudi Arabia and Syria, to eventually succeed in 
negotiations with Israel.  Without their support, or at the very least, not open opposition, 
it would be difficult for Hussein to join the negotiations.73   
A week before the commencement of the Camp David talks, Hussein sent Carter a 
letter outlining his position.  In it, he reiterated that while he hoped the talks succeeded, 
he could not publicly support them until he knew the result.  In addition, Jordan would 
not join them unless Israel promised ahead of time to withdrawal from the West Bank 
and allow for self-determination.  Hussein also expressed his disappointment with how 
those talks came about.  In particular, while he acknowledged the bravery in Sadat’s trip 
to Jerusalem, he noted that it wiped out all his efforts to unify the Arabs, now making it 
impossible to have a broad-based, comprehensive peace settlement.  He also believed that 
the Israeli government would never allow a settlement that included rights for the 
Palestinians, making it impossible for the rest of the Arab world to participate.  While 
wishing Carter success, Hussein also made it clear that he and the rest of the Arab world 




opposed and had no part in forming.74  Another reason Hussein did not attend was 
because he did not trust the participants.  He believed Sadat, Carter, and Begin were 
meeting at Camp David to assure that no united Arab front could exist and that Egypt 
always wanted a separate peace without the rest of the Arab world involved.75  Hussein 
view of Sadat and Begin was correct.  Neither leader had much concern for the future of 
the Palestinians.  Sadat was determined to regain the Sinai Peninsula to justify his efforts 
in the October War.  Begin was willing to sacrifice Israeli control over the Sinai if it ne 
the hostility with Egypt, but he had no intention of removing Israeli dominance over the 
West Bank.        
Even after the talks began, Carter attempted to persuade Jordan to join and when 
that failed, continued to discuss Jordan’s role in the future of the West Bank despite their 
absence.  When meeting with Begin and discussing Palestinian rights, according to 
Carter, Begin would not admit the obvious, mainly, that the present time, Jordan, and 
only Jordan had the right and the ability to give the Palestinians the authority to exercise 
autonomy.  Because of this, Carter believed Jordan would need to be brought into the 
negotiations at some point, meaning the Israelis would probably need to make more 
concessions for that to happen.  When the topic came up, Begin always pushed it for later 
while arguing for the Israeli military to retain control for the time being.  In addition, 
Begin promised Carter that once the Palestinians had control of the West Bank, Israel 
only wanted to have control over the import of refugees and matters involving Israeli 
security.  Carter thought this was a reasonable request until he learned that according to 




At the start of the talks, Egypt argued the Jordanian position with both the US and 
Israel.  When it came to the West Bank, Egypt believed that after five years, the area 
should be allowed to vote on its future, and Egypt hoped to encourage them to stay with 
Jordan.  On the issue of settlements, Egypt argued that they thought all Israeli settlements 
should be evacuated from the West Bank, but the details needed to be worked out with 
Jordan.   On Jerusalem, Egypt proposed a united city under an Arab flag, ideally 
Jordan’s, that allowed for global access to the holy city.  Finally, the Egyptian delegation 
told the White House they believed with US, Egyptian, and Saudi support, Jordan and 
Hussein could be convinced of the benefits of this type of plan for the West Bank.77   
Carter laid out his position on the West Bank and Gaza in what would become 
known as the “nine-point approach.”  It called for the Palestinians to have some self-rule 
during a five-year transition from Israeli control to Palestinian control.  The authority for 
creating the system of self-rule would come from Egypt, Israel and Jordan.  Through 
negotiations, these states, along with consultations with the Palestinians, would create a 
Palestinian authority to manage the West Bank.  Neither Israel nor Jordan would have 
sovereignty over this area during the five-year transition period.  After that, it was up to 
the Palestinians.  Israeli forces would withdraw to only a few areas of the West Bank and 
Gaza, still able to maintain a security presence.  During the five-year transition, the 
Israelis and the new Palestinian entity would negotiate final borders and would decide the 
future relationship between the Palestinians and Jordan.  Rights for both Israelis and 
Palestinians currently living in the West Bank would be negotiated.  Finally, an economic 
plan for the area would be established.78  Carter hoped that this would encourage both the 




Even during the negotiations, Carter and Sadat held out hope that Hussein would 
eventually join them.  Sadat reported that in his talks with Hussein, he believed Hussein 
would join them if the deal were to his liking.  Regardless of Hussein’s position, Carter 
and Sadat felt the region and their nations would all benefit from the culmination of the 
Camp David Accords.79  Despite their encouragement, Hussein continued to refuse to 
join them.   In Hussein’s view, Jordan’s goals for the Camp David process was to only 
participate if it became clear that Israel was willing to make major concessions including 
returning the West Bank to Jordan or to a Palestinian entity that would eventually become 
part of Jordan.  He feared the reaction of Syria and Iraq if he openly joined the 
negotiations so he wanted to wait as long as possible to make sure that if he took the risk 
to join the talks, he received something valuable enough to make the risk worth it.80  
Carter was repeatedly told that Hussein could not join the talks unless he knew the 
Israelis would make concessions.  In a conversation with Kamel during a bike ride on the 
seventh day of the Camp David talks, Carter told Kamel that he planned on pressuring 
Hussein and the ruler of Saudi Arabia to eventually join the negotiations so Sadat did not 
have to face the entire pressure from the rest of the Arab world alone.  Kamel responded, 
“There we go again!  Neither King Hussein nor King Khalid will agree to join the talks 
unless they were to be based upon Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank and 
Jerusalem.”81  Carter never grasped the threat to Hussein from his more radical 
neighbors.  He repeatedly demonstrated his belief that it was unreasonable for Hussein 
not join the talks.  On the other hand, Hussein realized that unless he could demonstrate 




regime and he was not willing to take that risk without assurances from the US and Israel 
on the nature of a final settlement.    
As the talks progressed and Sadat believed it was possible to secure a deal without 
Jordanian participation, his attitude towards Hussein and Jordan began to change.  In a 
discussion with Begin and Carter, Sadat argued that the West Bank did not belong to 
Jordan or Israel and the people of that region could only decide its fate.    Sadat also said, 
such a state should not be independent nor have military forces, but should be either 
linked to Israel or Jordan with a preference towards Jordan.82  Because of Sadat’s 
relations with the PLO, he had no interest in an independent Palestinian state with a 
security service run by Arafat.  He feared that Arafat would use that position to make 
trouble for both Sadat and Hussein.      
Jerusalem was the subject of the most difficult negotiations.  Coming into the 
talks, Sadat had previously argued that Jerusalem needed to be controlled by an Arab 
government, especially the Arab sections that belonged to Jordan prior to 1967.  Carter 
attempted to persuade Sadat that Camp David was not the proper place to discuss 
Jerusalem, especially since Israel had previously refused to make any concessions over it.  
Carter believed Sadat would be attacked for any deal he made on the subject.  Because of 
that Carter recommended that Sadat ignore the issue and let Hussein focus on the holy 
places if he joined the negotiations.83  For Carter and Sadat, this had the benefit of 
removing a complicated issue that could block a final agreement and assure that the issue 
would not enter into the discussions because of Hussein’s continued refusal to participate 




to be decided by the people it most affected, the Palestinians and the Jordanians, freeing 
Egypt to complete their agreement with Israel.  
At the time of the Camp David meetings, Hussein was in London on a diplomatic 
mission to discuss the peace process with the British.  While there, he asked a close 
friend of Sadat, Ashraf Marwan, to tell Sadat that he wanted to join the meetings.  The 
instruction was private and not to be shared with anyone except those close to Sadat.   
Marwan immediately flew to Washington to talk to Sadat.  Marwan got his answer and 
flew back to London to tell Hussein that Sadat did not need him there.  After the summit, 
when an aide to Begin asked Sadat why he did not want Hussein to attend, Sadat said, 
“Because if Hussein had arrived at Camp David, we would not have reached any 
agreement.”84 Sadat did not want Hussein at Camp David for a number of reasons.   
Unlike Nasser, Sadat never thought highly of Hussein.  He did not like monarchies and 
did not have any faith in Hussein’s ability.  This was frequently seen later when Sadat 
repeatedly referred to Hussein as schizophrenic.  Sadat also believed that if the West 
Bank was discussed in detail, it could blow up the whole negotiation, making it 
impossible for Sadat to reclaim the Sinai, his only real goal. 
Just days before the announcement of a deal at Camp David, Sadat called Hussein 
and informed him tht he would be returning to Cairo soon because a deal was not 
possible at this time.   This pleased Hussein because he always worried Sadat would sell 
out Jordan and the Palestinians to accomplish his deal with Israel.  While visiting Spain, 
Hussein learned on BBC World Service that Sadat announced a deal had been reached.   




Hussein believed that Sadat betrayed him and lied when he gave Hussein his assurances 
that no deal was forthcoming.      
According to one of Sadat’s associates, a major change occurred with Sadat 
between when he called Hussein and told him that the negotiations were dead and then 
two days later, agreed to a settlement.  The advisor, Ossama Al Baz, said that Sadat 
isolated himself and the Americans fed his ego, eventually making him give in to the 
demands of Israel and Carter on the West Bank, allowing for a deal.86  Sadat’s 
determination to get a deal, despite the advice of his advisors and previous commitments 
he had made to other Arab leaders allowed him to overcome the issues that blocked an 
agreement.  Sadat did what Hussein always feared he would do, sacrifice the interests of 
the Palestinians and the Jordanians to accomplish the return of the Sinai to Egypt, despite 
its impact on the rest of the Arab world.       
During the later stages of negotiations at Camp David, the Americans proposed 
that if Jordan refused to take their role as an administer of the West Bank, Egypt would 
do it.   Before talking to any of his advisors, Sadat agreed to this plan.  When Kamel 
found out about this provision, he ran to Sadat because he could not believe it was true.  
Kamel told Sadat this plan would be seen as a humiliation to Hussein and destroy any 
relationship Egypt had with Jordan.  In addition, he argued Egypt did not know the first 
thing about the West Bank or its people, how were they going to run the area with wide 
opposition from the PLO.  Sadat explained he would send the Egyptian army if 
necessary.  This angered Kamel even more and he asked Sadat when it became Egypt’s 
responsibility to wage war against the Palestinians.  Kamel argued that Egypt’s focus 




he believed that Jordan was the only nation capable of administering the Palestinians 
successfully.  Another Sadat advisor, Hassan El Tohamy argued it did not matter what 
Hussein wanted, he heard rumors that he was going to abdicate the throne and let his 
brother, Prince Hassan, rule.  Tohamy thought Hassan favored talks.  Kamel shot down 
Tohamy’s theory and said that most people knew Hassan has been arguing to avoid Camp 
David.87  Kamal knew that without Jordan’s participation the agreement focusing on the 
Palestinians would be rejected throughout the Arab world and that Egypt was in no 
position to uphold it.  In addition, he believed that Sadat was getting bad advice from the 
advisors, Kamel knew Jordan, under Hussein or his brother, would not participate in any 
settlement like the Camp David talks, especially since it was negotiated without their 
participation.    
Despite Kamel’s protests, Sadat firmly believed that he could convince Hussein to 
join in the talks if necessary.  In a conversation with Israeli Minister of Defense Ezer 
Weizman, Sadat said he believed Hussein would agree to create a police force for the 
West Bank during the period of transition as long as he got support from Saudi Arabia.   
If he did not participate, Sadat told Weizman that “I will take responsibility for the West 
Bank and Gaza.  Don’t worry, my policeman will use their guns.”88  To Sadat, the only 
issue he cared about was the return of the Sinai.  As long as that was accomplished, Sadat 
was flexible in dealing with all other issues between the Arabs and Israel.   
Kamal also had other issues with the agreement.  He believed that the section on 
the West Bank was not in the interest of the Arab world and that Egypt had no place to 
speak for the Palestinians.  In addition, Kamel felt that the calls for autonomy for the 




Arabs and face massive resistance by both the Palestinians and Jordan.  Kamal again tried 
to get Sadat to see his point of view and only focus on the Sinai if he could not get Jordan 
to join the talks, but Sadat refused.  Because of this, Kamel tendered his resignation and 
stopped participating until the delegation returned to Cairo.89 
On the night of September 17, the Camp David Framework for Peace was signed 
by Egypt, Israel, and the United States.  The first part of the framework consisted of 
relations between Egypt and Israel and the goal of returning the Sinai to Egypt and Egypt 
and Israel signing a peace treaty.  For the West Bank and Jordan, the agreement was a 
colossal disaster.  While it called for Palestinian self-determination and a transitional 
government to last five years, the agreement did not spell out what self-determination 
meant nor, what would occur after the transition.  In addition, Begin promised to freeze 
settlements and remove the military government in the West Bank.  Begin’s 
interpretation of the agreement was that he would freeze settlements for the period where 
Egypt and Israel negotiated a formal treaty and that military government would 
physically move out of the West Bank, but would still have authority over any 
government formed by the Palestinians.90  Even though Jordan was mentioned in the 
framework over a dozen times, they did not have any input on how they would participate 
in the West Bank transition.  The agreement called on Jordan “to participate in joint 
patrols [with Israel] and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the 
borders.”91  According to the agreement, Jordan was expected to help the Israelis police 
the Palestinians and target elements that threatened Israeli security.  Hussein was also 
called on to work with Israel to determine which refugees could return to Israel and to 




to be included without his consent and with no tangible gains for Jordan.  The agreement 
encapsulated all Hussein’s fears.  Egypt sacrificed the Palestinian cause to regain the 
Sinai.  It also ended the possibility of a comprehensive agreement between Israel and the 
Arabs, protecting Hussein from his more radical Arab neighbors.  Both the Americans 
and the Egyptians expected him to police the Palestinians while Jordan did not participate 
in the agreement and received no tangible benefit from it.  In addition, Hussein knew that 
if he refused, it would damage his relationship with the US.       
Carter personally called Hussein on September 18 to explain the results of the 
Camp David negotiations.  He told him that Israel had accepted Resolution 242 and all its 
principles and provisions and the Israeli occupation would end once a self-government 
was established on the West Bank.  In addition, it called for the creation of a police force 
made up of Palestinians and Jordanians and while final settlement talks proceeded, Israel 
agreed to pause the creation of new settlements the West Bank and Gaza.   arter also gave 
Hussein the option to determine the level of participation of the Palestinians in 
negotiating a final settlement for the West Bank and Gaza.  Carter promised this was just 
a first step in the path the peace and he was hopeful that it would truly lead to a 
comprehensive peace settlement between the Arabs and Israel.  He offered to send 
someone to brief Hussein on the details of the deal.  Hussein remained positive but 
noncommittal in his response and promised to remain that way till after he was fully 
briefed by Carter’s representatives.93 
In a personal letter to Hussein, Carter told him what he believed the consequences 
were for the failure of the Camp David talks.  He said, “A failure of our effort because of 




certainly lead to the strengthening of irresponsible and radical elements and a further 
opportunity for intrusion of Soviet and other Communist influences throughout the 
Middle East.”94  Carter believed that instability in the Third World gave the Soviet Union 
an opportunity to exploit that tension and expand their presence throughout the world.    
Israel did not help Carter sell the agreement to the Arab world.   Begin faced a 
growing political problem in Israel after Camp David from both the right and the left.  He 
was accused of providing the footing for a future Palestinian state and was also attacked 
for limiting settlements on the West Bank and Gaza.  He always responded by saying that 
he did not agree to anything new at Camp David that was materially different than what 
his cabinet approved of in the past.  He also stated that the Palestinians would have very 
limited administrative autonomy and promised that the block on settlements would only 
last three months while Egypt and Israel finished negotiations.95  Because of this, most of 
the Arabs states believed that the idea of autonomy for the Palestinians was a mirage that 
would never occur and Israel would retain effective control of the area, leaving them little 
incentive to join the talks. 
Despite his promises to wait, on September 19 the Jordanian government released 
a public reaction to the Camp David Accords.  They announced they would not be tied to 
an agreement they took no role in negotiating.  They also believed the only settlement 
should be a comprehensive one that involved all the Arabs.  They also criticized Egypt, 
saying, “The dissociation of any of the Arab parties from the responsibilities of the 
collective action to reach a just and comprehensive solution  . . . constitutes a weakening 
of the Arab stance and the chance of reaching a just and comprehensive solution.”96  




in attitude towards the Palestinians.  Before Camp David, most in the Arab world 
demanded independence for the people of Palestine, either in a state or a federation with 
Jordan.  The Camp David Accords replaced the idea of independence with autonomy, 
which left many Palestinians under Israeli control.  Queen Noor said “the agreement at 
Camp David made autonomy the most that the Palestinians could hope to achieve, and 
only with the consent of the Israelis over a five-year period.  An independent Palestinian 
state was out of the question.”97  In addition, Hussein felt deceived by Sadat.  Before the 
talks took place, Hussein received assurances from Sadat that nothing would be 
negotiated about the West Bank without Jordanian participation. 98  In the end, Hussein 
believed that Begin and Sadat conspired against him to keep him out of the peace 
process.  
On September 20, Secretary Vance met with Hussein and his advisors in Amman.  
Hussein told Vance that because the agreement only focused on Egypt, Egypt would be 
isolated from the rest of the Arab world for going against a comprehensive deal and 
betraying the Palestinians.  He also said Jordan was concerned that at the end of the five-
year transition, he had no way to know what the situation would be in the West Bank.  
There was no guarantee that Israel would evacuate all their troops and security personnel.  
Because of that, it was difficult for Jordan to assume legal, political, and military 
responsibility for the area.  He was also not pleased with the requirement for Jordan to 
participate with Israel in stopping Palestinian subversion without any guarantees that 
Israel would fully leave the West Bank.  Hussein had no desire to act as the police force 
for Israel in Palestine, and that was seemingly what the agreement called for.  Hussein 




West Bank, especially compared to the detailed description of Egyptian - Israeli relations.  
Vance tried to reassure Hussein by explaining to him that the provisions creating 
Palestinian self-governance would make it nearly impossible for the Israelis to reverse 
after five years.  In regards to Jerusalem, Vance assured Hussein that the issue could not 
be solved in these negotiations but that the US still supported his position of a Jordanian 
or Arab role in running a unified city.  In addition, he believed that while it did not 
include everything Hussein hoped for, it did provide a vehicle to end the occupation and 
finally reach a comprehensive settlement between Israel and the Arabs.99  Despite 
Vance’s assurances, Hussein’ prediction of the future of the West Bank proved correct.  
The Israelis did not intend to create a Palestinian self-governing entity in the wake of 
Camp David.  Instead, they hoped to use the five years to deepen their control over the 
West Bank and Gaza, making the creation of a Palestinian state more difficult.   
The head of the Royal Court and a top advisor to Hussein Abdu Sharaf 
complained that the deal represented the Begin plan with Jordanian participation.  While 
Vance argued that Jordan should want a role in determining who takes over as a 
neighboring country, Sharaf believed that by participating in this plan, the people of the 
West Bank would grow hostile to Jordan, who would view as colluding with the Israelis 
in their occupation.  Sharaf also pointed to Israeli leadership publicly saying that 
“Jerusalem is to be united under Israeli rule forever, that Samaria and Judea will not be 
given up.”  He believed that with statements like that, Jordan would give up all credibility 
if it participated because it was clear that Israel never had any intention of giving the 




While the government of Jordan criticized the deal, Hussein himself made no 
public comments immediately.  Jordan faced a difficult decision because of the accords.   
First, they feared the radical regimes, especially Syria and Iraq whom all opposed it.  
Second, public opinion in Jordan was decisively negative towards participating in the 
next stage of the peace process.   Finally, many of the native Jordanians did not want to 
be once again responsible for the Palestinians in the West Bank, which the accord made 
likely.101  King Hussein eventually reacted in a speech on Jordanian television on October 
10.  He said, “First, they do not imperatively link the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the 
solution of the other aspects of the Arab-Israeli problem on the other fronts.  Second, they 
do not clearly show the end of the road concerning the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza 
and the right of self-determination for the Palestinians.”102  Hussein believed that without 
assurance from Israel about the basic structure of a final deal, the Israelis, especially the 
Begin government, would indefinitely delay turning over the West Bank and Jerusalem to 
the Arabs while continuing to pursue policies on the ground that made the eventual 
turnover impossible.   
On October 14, Hussein sent a letter to Sadat outlining his opposition to the deal.  
Specifically, Hussein opposed the framework deal for the West Bank and had little 
concern over the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.  He told Sadat that the agreement was 
useless because Israel continues its policies of settlement expansion making the creation 
of a Palestinian sovereign entity impossible.  Hussein pleaded with Sadat to unite and 
negotiate as one Arab block, otherwise, Israel would not succumb to pressure to deal 




have bended to pressure from a united Arab front, it would have given Hussein the cover 
to participate in the agreement.     
After the negotiations, the Jordanian government sent Carter a list of questions to 
help determine their willingness to participate further.  For example, Hussein wanted to 
know who the US meant to be the representative of the Palestinian people.  Carter replied 
that this point was not predetermined.  Hussein also wanted to know more about the five-
year transition.   Carter told him that the transition was an American idea to ease the 
Israelis in and allow the Palestinians to successfully take control of the West Bank.  
Hussein also focused on the status of Jerusalem.  Carter told him that the people of the 
Arab sections of Jerusalem would have the ability to participate in elections for the 
governing authority, but that authority would not include Jerusalem and his role in the 
new Palestinian entity.  Carter told Hussein that because of Jerusalem’s special status, its 
fate had to be decided with negotiation between Israel and Jordan.   e also told him that 
he believed the Arabs should have some control over the Arab sections of the city.104  
While Hussein appreciated Carter’s personal response to his questions, the answers were 
not enough to convince Jordan to join the talks.    
Israel expressed dismay to Carter’s response to Hussein.  They believed that the 
US was backtracking on agreements it made to them at Camp David to increase Arab 
support of the deal.  For example, Israel believed that the agreement allowed Israelis to 
continue to purchase land in the West Bank while Carter told Hussein that Israel had to 
stop the expansion.   n addition, with regards to Palestinian rights, Foreign Minister 
Moshe Dayan objected to the US mentioning the ability of the Palestinians to fulfill their 




rights.  Dayan believed that the term aspirations implied a Palestinian state in the future 
and protested this to the American embassy because, despite the calls for autonomy, 
Israel would not tolerate an independent Palestinian state.105  This demonstrated that 
Israel had no intentions of allowing for the creation of a Palestinian entity based on self-
determination.  They planned to continue to expand their settlement policy, increasing 
their control over the West Bank.     
In a letter to Carter on November 1, 1978, Hussein explained why he could not 
join the negotiations at this point.  He believed that without some guarantee that the end 
result of the negotiations would lead to an Israeli withdrawal, Jordan could not join the 
talks.  He promised Carter that he would not argue against or attempt to block the people 
of the West Bank from participating but could not join himself.  Hussein also expressed 
why he opposed the West Bank portion of the agreement.  He said:  
Jordan was invited to participate in arrangement of administrative, legal, 
military and political character during a ‘transitional’ period before 
knowing the shape or outline of the future settlement it is invited to 
conclude.  We fear that at the end of the proposed transitional period, the 
results reached might be totally unacceptable.  This particularly in view of 
the fact that Israel is repeating continuously its categorical claims about 
the final annexation of Arab Jerusalem, the expansion of settlements in the 
occupied areas and that the rejection of Arab sovereignty in occupied Arab 
lands.106   
 
Hussein believed that the attitude towards him and his issues by the Israelis had not 
fundamentally changed in his view, making it impossible for him to take the risk of 
participation in a process that he believed was doomed to failure.  If he joined, he would 
face threats from the more radical regimes in Iraq and Syria with no real hope for what he 




regime.  In regards to the upcoming Baghdad summit which was called by the Arab 
leadership to discuss the Camp David Accords, Hussein said, “Jordan will remain, as 
always, a constructive force and a voice of peace.  We have been active in promoting a 
positive atmosphere for the conference and will pursue this effort in the coming days.”107 
In a meeting between Sadat and Carter and their aides on March 18, it was 
obvious they all grew tired of Hussein’s unwillingness to join the delegation or at least 
support it.  While Carter preached patience, Sadat repeatedly called him schizophrenic 
and argued that all his outrage was for show.  Sadat believed Hussein wanted the West 
Bank to restore his old United Arab Kingdom idea and would only join the talks if he 
knew he would get it.  Brzezinski believed that if he explained to Hussein that the US 
could not predetermine results of a negotiation but still favored a large Jordanian role in 
the West Bank, Hussein might change his position.  Despite their efforts, Hussein would 
end his boycott of the negotiations.  To the view of Sadat and Carter, nothing would 
please Hussein but the agreement of his maximum position before the negotiations 
began.108 
Despite Hussein’s rejection, the White House continued to try and persuade him 
to participate.  The White House wanted to use the momentum and attempt to finish the 
remaining issues so Egypt and Israel could formally sign a peace treaty.  Brzezinski saw 
the problems occurring with Jordan.   e believed that the US needed to get some 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank to make sure Jordan did not have a 
negative reaction the deal.  While many in the White House argued that Hussein was too 
timid and “wants [the US] to deliver a settlement to him on a silver platter,” Brzezinski 




important to successfully maintain the deal.109  Carter had a more negative reaction to 
Hussein.  He would later say, that “Hussein was a bitter disappointment, proving to be 
reticent and even obstructive during crucial negotiating times.  He was too financially 
dependent on rich Arab nations to act independently.  I considered him, however, to be an 
honest and decent man.”110   
The rest of the Arab world also had a hostile reaction to the deal.   At the time of 
the agreement at Camp David, Mahmoud Riad was no longer the Foreign Minister of 
Egypt, but head of the Arab League and still close to Sadat.  He was shocked when he 
read the passages consisting of the West Bank and Jordan.  He said, “When I read the 
Framework Agreement . . . I was amazed at [Carter’s] disregard for fundamentals relating 
to Arab feelings and sensitivities.  For instance, the reference in the Agreement is made 
to Jordan and Jordanians fourteen times as if Jordan was one of the States of the US or an 
Egyptian province, with the assumption that the King of Jordan will hurry to either 
Washington or Cairo to do their bidding.”111  When meeting with Hal Saunders at the UN 
on September 29, Riad expressed what he felt would be obvious Arab rejections of the 
plan.  He made reference to the idea that the agreement called for joint Israeli-Jordanian 
military patrols at the border at the Jordan River.  To Riad this meant that the agreement 
had validated Israeli occupation of the West Bank because the new border between Israel 
and Jordan was not the 1967 line, but the line of occupation.  He asked Saunders, “Is this 
what the US means, and how can it expect the Jordanian forces to participate in 
safeguarding [the]Israeli occupation of the West Bank?”112 
Arafat and the PLO also rejected the deal.  Arafat feared that Camp David was an 




because if the Palestinians had a free choice of their future, the likelihood existed that 
they would choose a federation with Jordan, outside of the control of the PLO.  Saunders 
met with politicians and local leaders in the West Bank to try and explain the Camp 
David provisions, many were eager or intrigued about the idea of autonomy.  
Unfortunately, very few would go public with that belief out of fear of reprisals from 
Arafat.113 
On November 2, all the major Arab leaders attended a summit in Baghdad to 
discuss the Camp David Framework and to decide what to do about Egypt’s participation.  
In the lead-up to the summit, it became clear how angry many of the Arab leaders felt 
towards Sadat and his actions.  The Vice-President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, threatened 
to topple any Arab leader that did not outwardly oppose Sadat.114  This did not have the 
desired effect because it turned the more moderate regimes, like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, 
against accepting PLO-prescribed sanctions against Egypt which called for a complete 
economic and political boycott of Egypt.  At the summit, all the leaders expressed their 
outrage at Sadat’s actions.  Many Arabs leaders at the conference wanted immediate 
sanctions against Egypt.  While these measures failed because of Saudi intervention, 
another secret resolution was passed calling for economic sanctions against Egypt if they 
signed a treaty with Israel.115 
The summit called for the suspension of Egypt from the Arab League and the 
removal of the Arab League from Cairo until it rejected the Camp David Agreement.  In 
addition, it resolved that the Camp David Agreement violated previous Arab resolutions 
that called for unity and made the PLO the sole representative of the Palestinian 




between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein.  Saddam would eventually take full control 
of Iraq just a few months later on July 16, 1979.  Saddam was influential in persuading 
the wealthier, oil-rich countries to provide aid to Jordan, which amounted to $1.25 billion 
over ten years.  Saddam argued for Arab unity and the continued financial support of the 
less well-off Arab states.  This new friendship would become even more important as 
Saddam Hussein took full control over Iraq and accelerated his ambitions throughout the 
Arab world.   
On December 30, King Hussein wrote Carter and discussed the Baghdad Summit 
in detail.  Hussein said, “The Arab Summit at Baghdad affirmed the Arabs’ objective of 
seeking a just and comprehensive peace based on total Israeli withdrawal from all Arab 
territories occupied in June of 1967.”  He asked Carter to return to the comprehensive 
approach he originally intended for Geneva as this was the only way to get broad Arab 
support for a peace deal.117  Carter obviously could not agree to stop the Egyptian talks 
because unlike any other Israeli-Arab negotiation, this one seemed to be working.   In 
addition, Carter believed that both Saudi Arabia and Jordan joined the rejectionist states 
at the Baghdad Summit that tried to pressure Sadat to reject any treaty with Israel.  Carter 
believed that because Jordan and Saudi Arabia agreed with some of the political 
sanctions of Sadat if he signed the treaty, they aligned themselves with the rest of the 
Arabs as opposed to the US.118  Because of that, he was not inclined to take Hussein’s 
advice on the future of the peace process.     
Right before the treaty was signed, Brzezinski and Warren Christopher met with 
Hussein to try and persuade him not to take a harsh position against Egypt and to further 




the Arabs and recently began working with the more radical Iraq to deal with the threats 
of the renewed Civil War in Yemen.119  Brzezinski argued that the US needed to improve 
their position in the region for fear that the Soviet Union was making inroads.   n light of 
this, Brzezinski argued, Carter put his political life at stake to try and solve the Middle 
East problems.   Carter believed that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians 
helped encouraged radicals in the region and brought them closer to the Soviet Union.   
The US decided to work with Egypt because they believed a united Arab proposal would 
always be vetoed by the radicals.  They hoped that once the most moderate regimes saw 
the benefits Egypt received from the negotiations, they would be inclined to participate.   
rzezinski also reiterated that his opposition to stating the end results of the negotiation 
before they occurred was not a slight against Jordan or even opposition to Jordan’s 
desired outcome, but a realization that if they stated a position beforehand, it would be 
more difficult to get all sides to participate.120   
The next day, Brzezinski and Vance met with Sadat and discussed Hussein’s 
reactions.  Brzezinski said that Hussein had a very dark attitude and seemed despondent.  
He kept saying that he was saddened about how this situation had impacted relations 
between Jordan and the US.  Hussein also did not rule out encouraging the Palestinians to 
work with the US and Egypt in establishing an autonomous government in the West 
Bank.   When Sadat was told of Hussein’s reaction, he said, “He thinks himself the most 
clever politician in the area . . . .  He wants me and President Carter to come and beg him 
to save the situation.  There are three main influences on him, the Syrians, whom he 




Palestinian rights.  If President Carter and I give him the West Bank, he will be shouting 
praises. . . .  He is an opportunist. . . .  He is schizophrenic.”121 
On March 26, 1979, the official treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed on the 
White House lawn.  The next day, another meeting in Baghdad occurred between the 
foreign ministers of eighteen Arab nations.  The summit demanded that Egypt be 
expelled from the Arab League and the Arab League would be transferred out of Cairo 
permanently.  It ended all Arab economic activity with Egypt and called upon the people 
of Egypt to, “shoulder their responsibility by supporting collective Arab efforts to 
confront Zionist, imperialist plots which have turned the Egyptian region into their 
executive tool.”122  It resolved that Egypt “deviated from the Arab ranks and has chosen, 
in collusion with the United States, to stand by the side of the Zionist enemy in one 
trench.”123 
Despite the pressure from the rest of the Arab states, Jordan and Hussein took a 
more moderate position.  Jordan recalled its ambassador from Egypt but would not 
completely break relations with Sadat.  On March 31, the Arabs leaders did all agree to 
have an economic boycott of Egypt that both Jordan and Saudi Arabia participated in.   
uring the conference, the Saudis originally tried to take an even more moderate position, 
but Arafat immediately attacked them for being soft on Israel.  Because of this, both 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan had to support some sanctions on Egypt or they would have 
faced a united attack by the PLO and the rest of the Arabs that could threaten their hold 




After Jordan did not support the Camp David Peace Treaty, the United States tried 
to pressure them through finances.  This included pressuring Gulf states not to give their 
usual donations to Hussein, along with putting on hold almost one hundred million 
dollars in American aid.  In addition, Jordan found it difficult to get loans through 
international organizations like the World Banks and the International Monetary Fund.   
Hussein withstood these threats and even told Brzezinski that if it continued, he would 
have to explore other options for funding his military, implying the Soviet Union.  
Eventually the pressure resolved itself because of outside events, and Hussein received 
his support, but not before putting more of a strain on American and Jordanian 
relations.125   
 In addition, the Camp David Accords led to some reconciliation between Jordan 
and the Palestinians.  In March 1979, Arafat and Hussein met in Amman to discuss the 
outcome of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty and to decide what the response should be.   The 
meeting was a success from the Palestinian stand point because Hussein allowed Arafat 
to reopen PLO offices in Amman.  Despite Arafat’s requests though, Hussein would not 
agree to allow PLO militants into Jordan or allow the PLO to restart attacks from Jordan 
against Israel.126  While Hussein was angry about the deal between Egypt and Israel, he 
still did not trust Arafat and did not want to allow him and the PLO to return to Jordan 
where it could eventually threaten his rule and further damage his relationship with both 
Israel and the United States.    
While relations between Carter and Hussein remained difficult, during the second 
half of 1979, other events gave both sides incentive to heal their differences.  On 




stormed the American embassy and took almost sixty hostages.  While the Soviet Union 
did not direct the actions of Khomeini, they did issue statements in support of it.127  In 
addition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with thirty thousand troops in December 
1979, provided more instability in the region.128  The combination of these two events 
forced the US to improve relations with other nations in the region for the fear of 
continued Soviet expansion. 
Hussein attempted to further improve relations with the Carter administration in 
December of 1979.  He sent a letter to Carter sympathizing with his plight over the taking 
of American hostages and also expressed his outrage of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.  With large parts of the region now hostile to the US, Carter and Brzezinski 
saw the value in improving relations with Jordan.  In December of 1979, Carter, with the 
recommendation of Brzezinski and Vance, certified that Jordan was an ally working 
towards peace in the region.  If Carter did not assert this, the International Security 
Assistance Act of 1979 would have prevented American military aid to Jordan.  Carter 
mentioned Jordan’s history of helping the US promote peace even before he took office.  
In addition, he said while Hussein does not believe the Camp David Accords would 
succeed, he did not oppose them and would continue to work publicly and behind the 
scenes on behalf of the US to seek peace.  Carter also noted Hussein’s speech at the UN 
on September 25, 1979, where Hussein said Jordan “would continue to stand for a just, 
honorable, viable and durable peace.”129  Without this aid, the relationship between 
Jordan and the US would crumble, making it impossible to reach any settlement in the 
future on the West Bank.  The results of the Ayatollah’s takeover of Iran and the Soviet 




With the Soviets’ advancement in the region, Carter needed to repair the relationship with 
Hussein to increase American allies in the region.  In addition, while Hussein opposed the 
results of the Camp David peace process, he still was a voice for moderation in the region 
and the US could use his voice to promote stability.  For Hussein, he needed the financial 
support from the United States and would eventually need to remain on good terms with 
the US if he ever hoped to regain the land lost in 1967.  Because of these reasons, both 
Carter and Hussein had the incentive to mend their differences.   
On April 14, 1980, the US-Jordan Military Commission issued a report.  In a 
memo sent to the White House by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Brown provided 
the result of that study and made recommendations for the future.  He said that starting in 
April 1979, the US returned to an approach with Jordan that relied more on the carrot 
than the stick.  The United States agreed to meet the military request of the Jordanian 
government that included one hundred M60A3 tanks, a full complement of TOW anti-
tank missiles, and an I-Hawk anti-air firing package.  The goal was to “draw the 
Jordanians into area-wide security consultations, to give them reason to trust our 
determination to balance the Soviets globally and to continue to play an active role in 
area security.”  This was important because in October of 1979, Hussein and his chief 
military advisor General Bin Shaker met with the Soviets and discussed air defense 
systems.  Jordan was also requesting more trainers to help better develop their military 
personnel.  The commission recommended to the White House that the US dramatically 
increase the aid to Jordan and fulfill much of its request.  The goal would be to show 
Jordan that they were not being punished for Camp David and that the US still valued his 




Hussein also attempted to move the Palestinians to a place where they could 
participate in the peace process in 1979.  On September 26, Hussein informed Vance that 
he had begun negotiations with the PLO to form some joint unit.  At this point, he was 
not sure how that would progress but believed it was a positive development.   In 
addition, he hoped that once they had an agreement, he would then be able to join the 
Egyptian – Israeli talks.131  This was important because for the first time it seemed 
because of Camp David, the PLO began to moderate for fear of being left out of the 
peace process entirely.  They even had discussions with the US.  While Hussein told 
Vance that Arafat feared that the discussions with the US were a trap to embarrass him, 
Hussein believed they had continuing value.  Hussein also told Vance he continued to 
work with other Arabs to agree to a position on a new UN resolution along with 
negotiation with Israel.132  Despite his disappointment with the Camp David Accords, 
Hussein continued to argue the American position in the Arab world. 
In a meeting between Hussein and Ambassador Sol Linowitz on January 28, 
1980, Hussein continued his goal to improve relations between the US and Jordan.  At 
this time, Linowitz was Carter’s special envoy to the Middle East working on the peace 
process.  Hussein told him that his biggest issue with Camp David was that he was not 
kept informed.  He felt lied to by Sadat who promised to give him updates who then 
eventually included his participation without his consent.  When the deal was announced 
without his knowledge or input, he felt betrayed.  He argued that he was on a “parallel 
path” to the Camp David process that hopefully would eventually meet.  Linowitz 
assured Hussein that the US was not working against Jordan’s interests and in fact, the 




Palestinians agreed to some kind of confederation.  Linowitz hoped that Jordan would not 
make the peace process with Egypt difficult.  Hussein assured him that he had no 
intention of doing anything to harm the peace process and would continue to work for 
peace with the other Arabs along with trying to convince the PLO to accept UN 
Resolution 242 and the Israeli right to exist.133 
Meeting in the Oval Office on June 17, 1980, Hussein and Carter openly 
discussed the issues created by Jordan not fully embracing the Camp David Accords.   
Carter told Hussein that he was willing to do it his way and they tried with the proposed 
Geneva summit, but the Arabs could not agree on who would negotiate for the 
Palestinians and Syria refused to participate at all.  In Carter’s view, that path seemed 
hopeless.  Now that the Sadat option opened, Carter told Hussein that he had a lot 
invested in it and would appreciate as much support as Jordan could give.  Hussein 
assured Carter that he was not actively opposing him and any disagreement came from a 
lack of communication.  Despite that, Hussein told Carter he continued to work the PLO 
with the hope of finding a way to negotiate with Israel.  Hussein agreed that when he 
returned to Jordan he would continue to work to get the Palestinians to join the 
negotiations and accept resolution 242.134 
In a meeting the next day with Hussein, Carter again addressed the biggest 
obstacle in his mind for a peace settlement, the lack of a reasonable negotiation partner to 
represent the Palestinians.  Carter asked Hussein if he could find members of the West 
Bank community who would take the lead over the PLO.  He told Hussein it did not 
matter how they felt about Israel, but he just needed them to begin to talk.  Carter figured 




Hussein why the Israelis opposed self-determination.  It was because to them, that meant 
the eventual creation of an independent Palestinian state controlled by the PLO.  Carter 
felt he needed to have a reasonable Palestinian negotiating partner that would agree to a 
confederation of some kind with Jordan, easing the concern of Israel and making a peace 
settlement and withdrawal of the West Bank more likely.135  This was the last meeting 
between Carter and Hussein as Carter would go on to lose his reelection bid five months 
later.  Because of that, Carter was unable to participate in the signing of the official 
treaty.  It also ended Carter’s attempts to build on the success of Camp David and move 
towards a comprehensive settlement between the Arabs and Israel.  
The Carter presidency was an increasingly difficult and bitter time for Hussein.  
From the start, he felt betrayed by the CIA leak of his finances and the eventual 
abandonment of the Geneva peace process.  Hussein and Carter both failed to grasp the 
other’s position.  Carter could not understand why Hussein would not join a peace 
process that proved to be successful in its first phase.  Hussein could not understand why 
Carter abandoned his longtime ally in Jordan and sided with Egypt, when as recently as 
five years ago, Egypt was aligned with the Soviet Union.  Hussein also did not believe 
Carter appreciated Jordan’s position relative to the rest of the Arab world.  It was not 
nearly as strong as Egypt and therefore could afford to break radically with the Arab 
consensus on Israel.  Despite these differences, both leaders eventually did what was best 
for their countries.  Carter wanted peace and stability in the region and got that in part 
through the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.  Hussein realized that he would risk his throne if he 
went against the rest of the Arab world and negotiated an agreement with Israel that did 




disagreements between Jordan and the US, outside events led them to rekindle their 
alliance so Jordan could remain an important bulwark against the radicals in the Middle 
East.  Jordan remained part of the US’s Cold War strategy in the Middle East and 












REAGAN’S FIRST TERM AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
The Reagan administration took over from Carter and was determined to 
reestablish America’s place in the world by undoing the perceived failures of the 
previous administration.  Reagan was an optimistic governor from California and an 
ardent Cold Warrior.  For Hussein, it was a welcomed change.  Hussein hoped to rebound 
from the negative relationship during the Carter administration, hoping that Reagan 
would see value in maintaining stability in the region and supporting the American 
position in the Cold War.  Hussein had reason to be hopeful.  He had long-standing 
relationships with many people in the new Reagan administration including new 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Vice President George Bush.   His relationship 
with Bush was particularly strong from working closely together when Bush was the 
head of the CIA.    
The first half of the Reagan administration saw a number of important 
developments in the region.  The US was still recovering from the loss of its longtime 
ally in Iran when Iraq launched a war with the new American enemy.  The US also 
believed that the Soviet Union was attempting to reestablish itself in the Middle East 




also increased tensions and tested the relationship between the US and Jordan.  During 
the Reagan administration, Hussein used his friendship with Saddam Hussein to become 
an important component in the American assistance to Iraq.  In addition, like his 
predecessors, Reagan attempted to solve the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis.   
Because of Jordan’s geographical location and their consistent willingness to work with 
the United States, Hussein played an important role in Reagan’s attempt to bring peace 
between the Arabs and the Israelis.  Finally, because of the Cold War, Hussein served as 
a American agent in preventing Soviet expansion throughout the oil rich Middle East.     
 There were a number conflicts in the Middle East during the Reagan 
administration that impacted both Jordan and the United States.  The first major war 
started between Iraq and Iran on September 22, 1980, when Iraqi forces launched a 
combined air and land invasion of Iran.  Saddam Hussein had a number of reasons for the 
invasion of Iran.  He believed that Iran was at its weakest point since it had broken 
relations with the West and the rest of the Arab world.  Since most of Iran’s military was 
provided by the West, Saddam believed Iran did not have the capability to fight a long 
conflict.  He believed that he would be able to seize enough land to make the conflict 
worthwhile especially, Iran’s oil southern region.  He also saw it as an opportunity to 
replace the exiled Egypt as the leader of the Arab world.1  Because of American anger 
towards Iran leftover from the hostage crisis, Reagan used his allies in the region to 
support Iraq’s war with Iran through the transfer of equipment and intelligence.  The 
renewed American relationship with Jordan was particularly important for this cause. 
 Throughout the 1980s, Saddam tried to develop a friendship with Hussein that he 




Saddam took Hussein to the Hashemite royal family cemetery where he led a prayer to 
the souls of King Feisal and King Ghazi2.  He also restored a statue of King Feisal and 
rebuilt the cemetery so it matched its former glory.  On the visit to Faisal’s grave, 
Hussein later said, “Everybody knew we were going out there, there was a little parade, 
and he let me put flowers on the grave, and say a prayer, and salute the grave.”3  Hussein 
appreciated these gestures from Hussein and it brought the two leaders closer together.  
Saddam also tried to improve the relationship with Hussein through their many personal 
interactions.  Between the years 1980 and 1990, Hussein visited Baghdad sixty-one times 
and during each visit, he met privately with Saddam Hussein to discuss the issues in the 
Arab world, including the war with Iran and Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait.  When 
addressing each other in public, both Saddam and Hussein showed the utmost respect for 
each other, demonstrating their close friendship.4  In a letter from May 31, 1986, Saddam 
said the:  
Agreement and harmony between us – which was built on the foundation 
of commitment and mutual trust, and cooperation and keenness on the 
higher interests of the nation – has been a positive factor in the Arab 
position during the year. . . .  It has likewise contributed to giving the right 
example of how the Arab countries should organize their relationships 
 
He also told Hussein that the relationship between Jordan and Iraq was different from any 
other relations in the Arab world.5  The friendship between Saddam and Hussein became 
so close that Saddam’s family occasionally looked to Hussein for help in dealing with 
Saddam.  In one instance, Saddam’s son Uday murdered a servant and Saddam planned 
to have him executed as punishment.  Saddam’s wife called Hussein and asked him to 




persuaded Saddam to let Uday live.6  This close friendship is important in understanding 
why Hussein continued to show Saddam support, even after he moved his aggression 
from Iran to other Arab nations and against the interests of the US.  Saddam was 
particularly effective in befriending Hussein through gestures of respect while taking into 
account the interests of Jordan and the Hussein regime.       
 Hussein announced his support for Saddam Hussein and Iraq in a television 
address soon after the conflict started with Iran.  He said:  
Where does Jordan stand?  I have no doubt that the unhesitant answer of 
each of you is: we stand alongside Iraq.  This is a decision we have taken 
into knowing where we are going, in championing our brothers, not out of 
fanaticism, ignorance, or whimsical sentimentalism.  Our support for Iraq 
is an inevitable extension of our principled stand because Iraq is right and 
demands nothing but justice.   
 
He also talked about the strength and heroisms of the Iraqi people for “rising up to defend 
right and dignity.”  Finally, Hussein linked the Iraqi battle to the rest of the Arab world.  
He talked about a kinship with the people of Iraq and a great Arab army.7  Hussein 
believed that Iran was a threat to him and stability in the region and feared the 
exportation of their ideology and its hostility to the monarchy.  In addition, Hussein’s 
opposition to the Ayatollah continued to ingratiate Hussein to the Reagan administration.   
Hussein believed that the threat from Iran was also based on religious factors.  He 
said that Iran “under its present leadership, turned Islam, against the teachings and beliefs 
of Moslems, into a dangerous, ruthless, reactionary movement, which became a vehicle 
for questionable power hungry elements to achieve their objectives, rather than the stable 




would soon attempt to spread its beliefs throughout the Middle East.  Khomeini 
highlighted this threat by repeatedly referring to Hussein as “Shah Hussein,” a reference 
to the deposed Shah of Iran.9  Hussein also linked the threat from Iran to the Soviet Union 
and the larger Cold War.  He told the Reagan administration that Moscow told him they 
were going to remove the troops on their border with Iran.  Hussein believed this would 
allow them to move those units and threaten the broader Middle East that opposed Soviet 
expansion, especially the oil rich Gulf States.  He also told the White House that the 
Soviet Union backed the Iran revolution from the start and the only groups to benefit 
from the instability in the region was “Communism and the Soviet Union.”10  From 
experience with American leaders and his brief experience with the Reagan 
administration, Hussein knew the US was easier to persuade if it was possible to link the 
crisis to Soviet expansion.  While the Soviet Union did support Iran in some efforts, 
especially later in the conflict, that relationship was not as strong because of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, which Khomeini opposed. 
The Iran-Iraq War also brought Jordan and Iraq closer economically.  From 1981 
to 1982, the trade from Jordan to Iraq doubled.  Jordan used the refinement of Iraqi oil as 
credit for its massive expansion of Iraqi imports.  This included both minerals and 
agriculture in the form of phosphates and supplies like eggs and tomato paste.  By 1985, 
Iraq was taking in over one third of Jordan’s exports and by 1985; this amounted to $170 
million, with almost all of the corresponding imports from Iraq coming in the form of oil.  
At the port of Aqaba, shipments almost doubled during the Iran-Iraq War, making it one 
of the most important ports for Iraq.11  Jordan created a whole industry to support Iraq 




the conflict centered on the Persian Gulf, Iraq needed another way to transport goods to 
the country.  Through the friendship with Hussein, along with Jordan’s strategic location, 
the Jordanians reshaped their economy to meet this goal.  This included things like 
creating new factories close to the border, creating a massive trucking industry to ship 
goods to Baghdad, and modernizing the port of Aqaba.  In addition, Jordan set up an oil 
refinery specifically designed to process Iraqi crude.  Jordan also set up a number of 
factories to deliver goods to Iraq since Baghdad refitted much of its manufacturing 
capacity for the war effort.  By the end of the conflict, Jordan had close to $1 billion in 
trade with Iraq.12  The economic benefits Jordan received from Iraq became an important 
part of Hussein’s continued support of Saddam.   While Jordan did not have any natural 
resources, through its relationship with Iraq, Hussein could continue to grow his economy 
reducing the pressure on his regime.    
As the war progressed, Hussein took a more active role in helping Iraq.  Hussein 
formed the Yarmouk Brigade that provided support activities for the Iraqi government. 
While the members of the Yarmouk Brigade did not engage in any fighting, it allowed 
Iraq to move more units to the front lines while the Jordanians focused on support and 
supplies.  This force consisted of almost forty thousand troops at its peak.13  Hussein also 
tried to use his influence with the CIA to increase the support for Saddam and Iraq from 
the US.  By the end of the conflict, Jordan and Iraq were no longer just neighbors, but 
strategic allies, including economically, politically and militarily.14  Jordan’s reliance on 
Iraq for both economic and military support became an important element used by 





 In addition to helping Iraq, Jordan also used the conflict to improve relations with 
the rest of the Arab world.  Due to the fears of the Iran-Iraq War spreading, many of the 
Gulf States believed they needed to strengthen their military.  With American support, 
Jordan rented out their military to train the Gulf States as they prepared for any possible 
conflict with Iran.  This worked because the Gulf States had large cash reserves from the 
sale of oil and Jordan had a strong professional military that could use their experience 
gained from conflicts with both Syria and Israel to train the relatively weaker and 
inexperienced militaries of Oman, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.  
Hussein even brokered a deal with Oman to have Israeli advisors enter the country and 
help the leader of Oman, Sultan Qaboos ibn Said, organize his military.  Jordan’s support 
of the Gulf States was important because they provided a significant financial support for 
Hussein and showed his willingness to help American allies in the region prepare for 
external threats.  It demonstrated that Jordan could replace Iran as an important element 
of the American Cold War defense of the Middle East.       
Another reason the new Iraqi alliance with Jordan was important was that it 
provided a counter balance to the possible threat from continued Israeli expansion.  In an 
interview with Hussein’s son, King Abdullah II, Abdullah said, “Iraq, as a counterbalance 
to Israel, would be a lot stronger than Syria or Saudi Arabia.  It was a dividend of having 
a relationship that was built in fighting Iran.  The dividend of having a strong neighbor 
like Iraq allowed my father to have a much firmer position in dealing with the Israeli 
government at the time.”15  Throughout the 1980s, the hostile Likud government still 
controlled Israel with Shamir still at is head.  In addition, Ariel Sharon was the defense 




alliance with Iraq, it gave Hussein the support of the strongest Arab military in the region 
in case of a massive Israeli invasion.  While Israel knew it could wipe out Hussein 
militarily, with the support of Iraq, Hussein had the ability to challenge any possible 
Israeli threat.   
While the US officially took a neutral position in the Iran-Iraq conflict, they 
recognized the potential issues with an Iranian victory to the US position it the Middle 
East.   Secretary of State George Shultz said, “If Iraq collapsed, [Iran] could not only 
intimidate but inundate our friends in the Gulf and be a strategic disaster for the United 
States.” 16  Because of that threat, the CIA began to assist Iraq with intelligence to stop 
Iran’s advancement.  Through Jordan, the United States sent Iraq information on Iran that 
included, supply dump locations, artillery positions, front line positions, and other 
strategic information about the Iranian war effort.  The Jordanians learned that the US 
also had some contact with Iraq, leading Hussein to believe that the US was using Jordan 
as an intermediary to have deniability about their efforts to support Iraq if they ever 
became public.17  Even if you discounted the intelligence information Hussein passed to 
Saddam from the United States, Jordan’s role as a major shipping port for Iraq was 
important for Iraq’s ability to continue to wage war against Iran.  In addition, the United 
States and its allies needed Jordan to deliver effectively to equipment to Iraq.   
For the US, there was also a Cold War component to the Iran-Iraq War.  While 
Iraq’s military had long received support from the Soviet Union, the war with Iran and 
Saddam’s intention to improve relations with both the US and Arab government friendly 
with the West, led the Soviet Union to support Iran in the conflict.  In a meeting with 




He said, “Not only are their reforms anti-imperialist, they also educate the people in the 
anti-imperialist spirit.”  Assad also linked Iraq to the US saying, “The decision on Iraq’s 
war with Iran is an American decision.   The decision [for Iraq] to break relations with 
Syria is also an American decision.”18  They encouraged Syria and Libya to send supplies 
to Iran and the Soviet Armies newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, accused Iraq of expanding it 
aims while cooperating with the expansionist aims of the US.19  In a message by the 
Supreme Soviet in January 1984, to the Iranian parliament, it urged cooperation between 
the two governments “in the struggle against world imperialism and US acts of 
aggression.”  It was also pointed out that, Saddam Hussein was an agent of the US with 
the support of Jordan.20  When Alexander Haig, Reagan’s first Secretary of State, 
traveled to the Middle East in April 1981, he said his goal was to demonstrate that the 
United States was still an important partner in the region.  The Reagan administration 
believed this was in doubt because of the growing strength of the Syrian government 
under Assad, supported by the Soviet Union, along with the fallout from the Ayatollah’s 
takeover of Iran.  Haig said, “The fall of the Shah, after thirty years of the closest 
friendship with America, created profound uneasiness.  So had the advance of Soviet 
influence and the climate of revolutionary ferment in the region.  Few in the Middle East 
failed to make the connection between the decline in American will and strength and the 
rise in tension and disorder.”21  In addition, Reagan, like Carter before him, worried about 
the threat of Soviet control over the oil resources in the region.  He said, “In a region 
whose oil exports were essential to the West, Soviet meddling was something the United 
States could not tolerate.”22  Because of that, Reagan could not afford for Iran to spread 




Arab Emirates, for fear of having a hostile regime dominate a large majority of the 
world’s oil supplies, threatening the American economy.  Because of this, Hussein’s 
continued support of the Iraqi war effort served American interests in the region.      
Hussein also had other fears that he shared with the Americans in the hope of 
increasing the support of Iraq and Jordan.  Hussein worried that Iran’s ally Syria could 
join the fight and threaten Jordan.  Hussein believed that Assad had designs on both Iraq 
and Jordan and could use the excuse of the conflict to try to take both.  While Assad and 
Hussein both belonged to the Baath Party, they each had different ideologies.  In 
addition, Assad was much closer to the Soviet Union and had religious ties with Iran.  
This fear only grew as Iraq suffered a series of defeats on the battlefield.  He relayed this 
fear to the Reagan administration in hope that it would aid both him and Iraq against the 
possible threat from Iran and Syria.23 
The war between Iraq and Iran finally ended with a cease-fire on July 20, 1987.  
The fighting ended only after killing three hundred and sixty-five thousand people in both 
Iran and Iraq, with an additional seven hundred thousand injured.  It cost Iran an 
estimated $627 billion and Iraq $561 billion.24  The devastation from the war cemented 
both Saddam Hussein and Khomeini in power while limiting the expansionist desires of 
both parties.  For Hussein, the conflict brought Jordan and Iraq closer together along with 
strengthening the friendship between the two leaders.  Eventually, this friendship would 
cause problems with Jordan’s Western alliances when Saddam attempted to make up for 




Another issue in the Middle East that affected both Jordan and the United States 
was the civil war in Lebanon and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982.  In an 
invasion led by Ariel Sharon called “Operation Peace for Galilee,” an Israeli forced 
occupied southern Lebanon, attacking the positions of the PLO and allowing their allies 
to attack the Palestinians refugee camps.25  Sharon argued that the invasion would hurt 
the PLO and send a message to the other Arabs.  He said, “The bigger the blow and the 
more we damage to the PLO infrastructure, the more the Arabs in Judea and Samaria will 
be ready to negotiate with us and establish co-existence.”26  Hussein worried that this 
new, more aggressive, Israeli leadership would soon see Jordan as the next logical step.  
Hussein worried that Israel could invade to overthrow him and allow the creation of a 
Palestinian state in Jordan, freeing Israel to formally annex the West Bank.  He believed 
Israel would do this to get the Palestinians out of Lebanon, freeing the northern border of 
Israel from attack.  In a letter sent to Reagan on June 22, 1982, Hussein outlined this fear.  
He said:  
Sharon’s desire, I know, is to drive [the Palestinians] eventually into 
Jordan so that they may be joined by others driven out of the West 
Bank and Gaza so that in time and with more Israeli settlers in the 
occupied Palestinian territories when the issue of self-determination is 
addressed the results would be guaranteed in Israel’s favor.  At some 
point in the future and with the inevitable clashes with Jordan following 
this scenario written by Israel and Sharon and imposed upon us here, an 
Israeli occupation of Jordan, which is unable to arm itself will probably 
give way to an Israeli withdrawal once a docile Palestinian state is 
created on Jordanian soil.27 
 
Hussein sent the chief of his armed forces, Zaid bin Shaker, to Washington in July 1982, 




Shaker received assurances from Shultz that the US still considered Jordan an ally and 
would support its territorial integrity from any Israeli intervention.28 
Hussein was correct to fear Sharon’s intentions to move the Palestinians out of 
Lebanon and the West Bank and into Jordan.  In August 1982, Sharon sent a message 
through Egypt to the PLO that Israel would allow the PLO to leave Lebanon if they went 
to Jordan.  Sharon said, “One speech by me will make Hussein realize that the time has 
come to pack his bags.”  Arafat replied to the message that the Palestinian homeland was 
not Jordan and rejected Sharon’s suggestion.  Eventually, the Israelis allowed Arafat and 
the PLO to evacuate to Tunis undr a deal negotiated by Shultz and his representative 
Philip Habib on August 30, 1982.   This ended the possibility of the PLO replacing 
Hussein in Jordan for the time being.29  Sharon’s attitude also demonstrated the failure of 
the Camp David Accords when it came to the West Bank.  As Hussein predicted, the 
Likud government that signed that agreement, still had no intention of returning the West 
Bank the Arabs.  In addition, many still hoped to push the remaining Palestinians out of 
the West Bank, allowing Israel to annex the region.  This position would have likely been 
unchanged if Hussein participated in the agreement.  Israel would have likely continued 
its expansion policies with the eventual goal of dividing the West Bank up between Israel 
and Jordan.    
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon had a number of consequences for both Jordan 
and the United States. Because of American support of Israel, especially its backing in 
international forums like the United Nations, it forced the opposition to improve relations 
with the Soviet Union.  During the Israeli invasion, it became clear that Syria and its 




increased its aid to Syria and further integrated them with Iran as Western opposition in 
the Middle East.  Because of the relationship between the Soviets and the Syrians, the US 
responded by improving the relationship with Israel, this included an increase in arms.  
The attacks from Israel and their allies, the Mennonite Phalange forces, devastated Arafat 
and the PLO, leaving them desperate for new allies in the region.  Finally, the inability of 
the US to control Israel in Lebanon, including the massacres at Sabra and Shatila, 
convinced many in the Arab world that the US did not intend to challenge Israel to make 
the hard choices associated with peace.30 George Shultz also believed that Lebanon had 
another lesson for the US.   Because the crisis was caused because of radical Palestinian 
elements inside Lebanon attacking Israel, Shultz said in Congressional testimony that, 
“The crisis in Lebanon made painfully clear a central reality in the Middle East: The 
legitimate needs and problems of the Palestinian people must be addressed and resolved 
urgently in all their dimensions.  Beyond the suffering of the Palestinian people lies a 
complex of political problems which must be addressed if the Middle East is to know 
peace.”31   
After Reagan and Shultz had negotiated a ceasefire in Lebanon and the evacuation 
of the PLO out of Beirut, Reagan began his first major effort to solve the problems 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors.  In August 1982, Reagan sent a letter to Israeli 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin urging him to restart the peace process in what came to 
be known as the Reagan Plan.  In the letter, Reagan said, “I feel there are now 
opportunities which lie before us with the PLO militarily weakened and the Soviet Union 
shown once again to have minimal impact on the truly significant developments in the 




Accords and solve the issues with the Palestinians.  He also pledged his commitment to 
Israeli security.32  This was Reagan’s first attempt at solving the issues between Arabs 
and Israel.  He believed that it was an important element in promoting stability and 
American interests in the Cold War.  He also did not want to allow the Soviet Union to 
reassert itself in the region based on an Arab belief that working with the United States 
did not bring any tangible benefits in solving their conflict with Israel.      
In preparing for the Reagan Plan, Shultz argued that the United States needed to 
do something different from past administrations, or the process would again fail.  He 
also believed that any improvement in relations between the Arabs and the Israelis 
evaporated because of Israeli actions in Lebanon.  Because of this, Shultz wanted to 
allow all the parties to come to the talks with their view on how they should end, 
including the US.  He believed that the US should outline its vision for a final settlement 
to prove to the Arabs that it was serious in finding a solution.33  Shultz also did not object 
to a Palestinian state because it threatened the security of Israel, rather, he believed that 
the land that proposed for a possible Palestinian state was too small and barren to have a 
functioning economy.  It would need both an economic connection to Jordan and Israel to 
survive.  Without this benefit, it was likely to end up as a failed state, ripe for infiltration 
by the Soviet Union and other radical elements.34 
 On August 24, 1982, Shultz sent Nicholas Veliotes, the US ambassador to Jordan, 
on a secret mission to meet with Hussein to discuss the outlines of a possible peace 
proposal.  Hussein feared that the US would not stick with Reagan’s plan once Israeli 
opposition became clear.  Hussein also wanted assurances that the US was willing to 




negotiations.  Hussein’s biggest concern was to make sure that neither the Israelis nor the 
PLO would have full sovereignty over the West Bank.  While Hussein was positive in his 
initial discussions with Veliotes, his letter to Reagan in late August had a different 
attitude.  Hussein told Reagan that the PLO needed to be involved in the negotiations and 
that Reagan should repudiate the Camp David Accords and not use them as basis for new 
negotiations.  While Hussein’s response disappointed Shultz, Veliotes and Robert Ames, 
now the CIA’s chief specialist, in the Middle East assured him that Hussein was always 
like this when negotiations began but would warm up once he realized they had a chance 
to succeed.  After another letter from Reagan and Shultz, Hussein agreed to join the 
negotiations and attempted to gain the support from other Arabs.35  Despite the changing 
situation in the Middle East, Hussein’s goals for the Palestinian territories did not change.  
He still wanted to incorporate the West Bank into Jordan and he wanted to prevent the 
PLO from taking control of the area.  After meeting with Shultz, Hussein believed that 
the Reagan administration shared those goals.   
 Once the Israelis got a sense that a new peace proposal was coming from the 
Americans, they began to try to shift it more to their position or reject it if that was 
impossible.  Ariel Sharon sent a letter to Bill Casey, the director of the CIA, and told him 
that if the coming American plan did not meet Israel’s approval, they would consider 
annexing the whole West Bank in response.  The Israeli actions outraged Shultz and he 
still planned to move forward with his proposal.36  Shultz sent Sam Lewis, the American 
ambassador to Israel, to meet with Begin to discuss the upcoming proposal.  Lewis 
brought a letter from Reagan, further discussing his ideas to find a settlement of the 




requested that Reagan make no announcements until after Begin conferred with his 
cabinet and drafted a response.  Begin angrily told Lewis that Israel “know[s] how to take 
care of ourselves, and we will.”37  To Lewis, this implied that Begin would not succumb 
to American pressure and Israel was fine to stand alone if that was the cost of rejecting 
this plan.  To make matters worse, as soon as Lewis left his meeting with Begin, the 
Israeli press had parts of Reagan’s letter.  Begin called supporters in the US to make his 
point that Reagan’s plan was unacceptable even before Reagan introduced it.  The Israeli 
newspaper discussed how the Reagan Plan violated the Camp David Accords and was an 
attempt to drive Israel back to the indefensible 1967 borders.38    
Reagan asked that his letter to Begin remained confidential and was angry Begin 
leaked it to the Israeli newspapers.  Because of that, Reagan rejected Begin’s request to 
allow Israel to respond before he announced the plan.39  On September 1, 1982, Reagan 
gave a speech in California where he announced the Reagan Plan for peace in the Middle 
East.   He argued that there were two main reasons why the US needed to pursue peace in 
the Middle East at this time.  First, he said, “there was a strategic threat to the region 
posed by the Soviet Union and its surrogates, best demonstrated by the brutal war in 
Afghanistan.”  Second, he believed that the war in Lebanon demonstrated that while 
Israel’s “armed forces are second to none in the region, they alone cannot bring a just and 
lasting peace to Israel and her neighbors.”  Reagan also announced his support for the 
plight of the Palestinians.  He said, “the military losses of the PLO have not diminished 
the yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims.”40  Reagan also 
argued that both sides need to accept certain facts as undeniable.  First, the Arabs needed 




to terms with that fact and agree to solve all outstanding issues through negotiations. 
Second, Israel needed to accept the reality of “the homelessness of the Palestinian 
people” and that “the Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is more than a question of 
refugees.” 41 Because of these facts, both Israel and the Palestinian people would need to 
make concessions through negotiation to solve the problems in the region.  Through his 
plan, Reagan attempted to take a more evenhanded approach to the issues of the region.  
He acknowledged both the issue of security for Israel and the plight of the Palestinians 
for the Arabs, believing that it might entice both sides to negotiate.    
Reagan’s plan had a number of points.  First, he called on the Palestinian people 
to have full autonomy as agreed to by the Camp David Accords.  Reagan believed that 
during the five-year transition period, the Palestinians could show Israel and the world 
that they were able to run their affairs and that their autonomy would not negatively 
affect the security of Israel.  Reagan also called for no new settlement activity in the West 
Bank or Gaza during the transitional phase of Palestinian autonomy.  Reagan rejected 
previous Israeli arguments that said the expansion of the settlements was a necessary step 
in promoting Israeli security.  This was important because past presidents were reluctant 
to criticize Israeli settlements for domestic political reasons.  Reagan also declared that 
after the transitional period, he opposed the creation of a Palestinian state, but wanted a 
federation to connect the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan.  Finally, Reagan called for 
Jerusalem to remain undivided, but still subject to negotiations and the principles of 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.  In addition, he called on the 
Palestinians of Jerusalem to have voting rights in any elections to establish the 




Jerusalem should remain united and under Israeli control.  Because of that, the Arabs in 
Jerusalem would be citizens of Israel, having no right to participate in an election to 
govern a Palestinian state.  The Israelis did not want to set a precedent that further 
weakened their claim to a united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.       
Reagan’s new plan for the Middle East had broad support from his advisors.   
Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger called it “the most creative and imaginative plan 
yet put forth” by the United States.  He also noted that the US waited until Israel fully 
evacuated from the Sinai in hopes of building on the success of the Camp David Accords.   
Finally, Weinberger believed that the plan had a chance to succeed because he thought 
very highly of Hussein.  He said, “King Hussein had a full understanding of the security 
needs of Israel and was . . . one of the few heads of state in the area willing to talk to the 
Israelis and to try to help them.”43  Weinberger to developed a high opinion of Hussein 
through the frequent contacts between the Jordanian and American military. 
Before the Reagan Plan arrived, Israel had already rejected a number of its 
important parts.  In a policy approved by the Knesset on August 5, 1981, Israel declared 
that “The autonomy agreed upon at Camp David means neither sovereignty nor self-
determination.  The autonomy agreements set down at Camp David are guarantees that 
under no condition will a Palestinian State emerge in the territory of Eastern Eretz 
Yisrael.  At the end of the transition period . . ., Israel will present its claim and act to 
realize its right of sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district.”44 The Israeli 
cabinet made this statement because parts of the Camp David Accord and the Egyptian-
Israeli Peace Treaty were still being implemented.  The Knesset wanted to be clear that 




of autonomy could mean many things.  The Israeli government still believed that the 
West Bank and Gaza belonged to Israel and nothing in any previous agreement changed 
that calculus.    
On September 2, the Israeli Cabinet issued a statement rejecting the Reagan Plan 
and outlining their reasons for disapproval.  One of the greatest complaints from Israel 
came from how the plan deviated from what they agreed to at Camp David.  For instance, 
Israel believed that Reagan’s call for the Palestinians in Jerusalem to have a voice 
eventually would divide the city, something the Israel rejected in the Camp David 
Accords.  They argued that Palestinians in Jerusalem were part of Israel, and had no need 
to vote in elections in the territories.  In addition, the Cabinet also rejected the calls for 
ties between Jordan and the new Palestinian entity because the negotiations at Camp 
David did not require it.  The possibility of a Palestinian state, even one linked to Jordan, 
also outraged the Israeli Cabinet.  The statement said, “Were the American plan to be 
implemented, there would be nothing to prevent King Hussein from inviting his new-
found friend, Yasser Arafat, to come to Nablus and hand the rule over to him.  The would 
come into being a Palestinian State which would conclude a pact with Soviet Russia and 
arm itself with every kind of modern weaponry.”45  After expelling the PLO from their 
northern border, the Israelis had little incentive to bringing them back in force to their 
eastern border.  While the US could view Hussein’s improved relationship with Arafat as 
a positive step needed to move the peace process forward, Israel still believed Arafat was 
a terrorist and his association with Hussein tainted their view of him.     
Begin also sent a letter to Reagan that formally rejected the plan.  In the letter, 




Saudi Arabia learned of the details of the plan.  In addition, he objected to the fact that 
the US considered Jordan an equal partner in new negotiations related to Camp David 
when Hussein rejected those accords.  He said, “Judea and Samaria will never again be 
the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan which was created by British 
colonialism after the French army expelled King Faisal from Damascus.”  He also 
explained the Jewish people’s historical connection to the land, as a comparison to what 
he believed was Arab control backed by Western colonialism.  Finally, he said, “A friend 
does not weaken his friend; an ally does not put his ally in jeopardy.  This would the 
inevitable consequence were the ‘positions’ transmitted to me on August 31, 1982, to 
become reality.  I believe they won’t” 46   
Begin also made clear he had no intention of giving the West Bank to Jordan or 
allowing for the formation of a truely independent Palestinian state.  He said, “The 
Palestinian state will rise of itself the day Judea and Samaria are given to Jordanian 
jurisdiction; then in no time, you will have a Soviet base in the heart of the Middle East.  
Under no circumstance shall we accept such a possibility ever arising which would 
endanger our very existence.”47  Like Jordan, Israel knew that the Soviet threat was an 
important way to get the support of Reagan, as the Cold War was his primary concern.   
In addition, Begin implied that Hussein was still too weak to prevent the creation of a 
Palestinian state, eventually allowing the takeover of both Jordan and Palestine by the 
Soviet Union.  Despite the rejection, Reagan asked his advisor Philip Habib to continue 
to work with Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia on the peace proposal and together they 




In a meeting with Philip Habib to discuss Lebanon in October 1982, Ariel Sharon 
also brought up the Reagan Plan.  He told Habib that the Reagan Plan would not be the 
basis for future negotiations.  He also said:  
Israeli military forces will remain in the West Bank and Gaza for five 
years and beyond; Israel will remain in charge of internal security as it 
relates to anti-terrorist activities; Israeli settlements will continue to grow 
and multiply; there can be no change whatsoever in the status of 
Jerusalem; there must be no second Palestinian state; although Israel has 
no objection to King Hussein as the ruler of Jordan, which is already a 
Palestinian state, Israel will never negotiate with anyone on the basis of 
those [Reagan] proposals.49   
 
In other statements, Sharon argued that because of terrorism, Israel would never be able 
to give up full control of the West Bank.  He said, “The narrow plain within which most 
Israelis live has a width of nine miles at Herzliya; it is eight miles from the Samarian hills 
to Tel Aviv; three miles from the old demarcation line to Ben-Gurion airport.”  He 
believed Arab terrorist would use those places even if peace Israel and the Arabs 
achieved a peace settlement.  He said the Israelis experienced “One hundred years of 
terror.  And this has nothing to do with our presence in Samaria or Judea or Gaza.  Terror 
was a fact of our lives in the 1960s, ‘50s, ‘40s, ‘30s and ‘20s. . . .  Therefore, we have no 
alternative but to retain responsibility for security there.” 50  He believed that the only 
solution was for the Palestinians to become part of Jordan, but Israel and Jordan would 
secure the West Bank jointly.  Sharon was the leader of the Israeli movement arguing that 
Jordan is Palestine, negating the need for a true Palestinian state.      
Despite Israel’s rejection, Hussein still proceeded and tried to get Arab support 




initiative with Reagan and his hope that through this plan, the Palestinians could end the 
Israeli occupation.  This led to a summit in Fez, Morocco on September 6, 1982.   At the 
summit, the Arabs confirmed, “the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination 
and the exercise their firm and inalienable national rights under the leadership of the 
PLO, its sole legitimate representative.”  The Fez summit also called for Israel to 
withdrawal from all land captured in 1967 along with the removal of all settlements.  It 
called for all religions to operate in Jerusalem and the holy sites without restrictions.  In 
addition, it wanted the UN to have control over the West Bank and Gaza during any 
transition to a Palestinian state. 51  This was not the position Hussein hoped for, but it was 
enough for him to continue to work the peace process.   The Fez statement did not forbid 
Jordan from negotiating with Israel and generally supported Hussein’s views on 
Jerusalem.  For Hussein, the Fez statement gave him the opportunity to work with the 
Reagan administration with the hope of merging the Fez statement with the Reagan Plan.   
In a speech by Hussein on April 10, 1983, he discussed his view of both the Fez 
and Reagan idea for peace.  He said:  
Jordan . . . found that the Reagan Plan lacked some of the principles of the 
Fez peace plan but at the same time, it contained a number of positive 
elements.  Given the realities of the international situation, on the other 
hand, the Arab peace plan lacked the mechanism that would enable it to 
make effective progress.  The Reagan peace plan presented the vehicle 
that could propel the Fez peace plan forward.52  
  
This was an important recognition by Hussein because it argued to the Arabs that they 
could not take the maximum position at the start of the negotiations if they hoped to 




achieve a settlement “because time was, and still is, essential to Israel’s aim of creating 
new facts and bringing about a fait accompli.  Sixteen years have passed since the 
occupation, during which Israel has established one hundred and forty-six colonies in the 
West Bank alone and has illegally expropriated more than fifty percent of that land.”53  
Hussein knew the difficulty in getting the Israelis to give up any settlements.  This 
problem would only multiply as Israel created more settlements, placing more Israelis 
permanently in the West Bank.   
On October 22, 1982, Shultz met with King Hassan of Morocco to discuss the 
Reagan Plan and the Arab reaction at Fez.   While Hassan was positive, he encouraged 
Shultz to “open the file on the PLO” and allow them to be part of the peace process.   
Shultz responded, “When you open that file, you find terrorism.”  Shultz believed that the 
US position was clear if the PLO wanted to participate with US support they had to 
recognize Israel, accept past UN resolutions, and give up terrorism.  Without that, the US 
had no reason to support their inclusion.54  After the meeting with Hassan, Shultz 
explained to his advisors his views of the process at that point.  He said:  
The Arabs are aware of, and accept the difference between, a transition 
regime and final status arrangements.   They seem to think that Begin and 
Sharon are impossible, but not Israel generally.  There is a realistic 
acceptance of negotiations with Israel.   The Israelis, on the other hand, 
have pushed hard with their military strength, and they have used it 
harshly.  They have killed the PLO’s military operation in Lebanon, but 
that have paid a gigantic price.  They are isolated.    
He then discussed conversations with various world leaders who in the past were 
sympathetic to Israel but now took a more hostile view. 55  In particular, after the 
massacres in Sabra and Shatila, Israel no longer had the support in the West that it once 




more willing to take American suggestions for the peace process in exchange for 
continued support both diplomatically and militarily, this would include working with 
Hussein to find some accommodation for the West Bank and the Palestinians.  While 
Shultz’s view was reasonable, the basic nature of the Israeli government did not change.  
They still expected complete American support and had no intention of leaving the 
Palestinian territories.   
It was not just the terrorist actions of the PLO that made the Reagan 
administration hesitant to deal with Arafat.  They also believed that he was a client of the 
Soviet Union and they did not intend to form a new state between two American allies in 
the heart of the Middle East controlled from Moscow.  Reagan’s first secretary of state, 
Alexander Haig said, “The Palestinian Liberation Organization was sufficiently a Soviet 
client that Moscow’s ambassador to the United States and the Soviet foreign minister 
both thought it natural to attempt to deliver messages from the PLO to the US 
government.”57  Combine this with Arafat’s frequent denunciation of the West and 
“American imperialism,” the Reagan administration had little incentive to empower the 
PLO.  For that reason, the Reagan administration focused on Hussein, hoping he could 
provide a voice for the Palestinians without the baggage of the association with the Soviet 
Union.    
While he supported the statement from the Fez summit, Hussein faced additional 
obstacles if he was unable to get full Arab support for his efforts, making the acceptance 
of the PLO more necessary.  Hussein received warnings from Brezhnev not to participate 
in the Reagan Plan.  Brezhnev told Hussein that Israel’s actions in Lebanon had resulted 




isolated from the rest of the world and the Soviet Union would have preferred it to remain 
that way.  He told Hussein that the Soviet Union completely supported the Arab position 
as stated at the Fez Summit and Jordan could not break with its Arab brethren and side 
with the US.  Hussein worried about the Soviet response for a number of reasons.  First, 
he feared the threat from Soviet backed Syria, who still occasionally placed a large 
number of troops on the Syrian-Jordanian border.   Second, because he was not getting 
the necessary arms shipments from the US, Hussein now relied on the Soviet Union to fill 
some of those needs.58  In addition, when Hussein visited Moscow in late 1983, he was 
told by Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov that “the Soviets would do all they could to 
frustrate his efforts with the PLO” to forge a united response to the Reagan Plan.59 
Because of this, Hussein was reluctant to openly join the Reagan Plan, he did not want to 
risk his security on a plan that, while he may have favored, relied on the US forcing Israel 
to make some concessions to the Arabs, something most American administrations had 
been reluctant to do in the past.    
Syria also rejected the Regan Plan and urged all the Arabs to follow their lead.   In 
fact, they rejected the very notion that Israel belonged in the Middle East at all.  Syrian 
Foreign Minister, Abd al Halim Khaddam said, “The struggle with Israel went beyond 
the issue of its occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights.  Israel 
occupied these parts of the Arab world during the 1967 war, not in 1948 when Israel was 
established on Palestinian land.  Hence, the basic issue remains, . . . the future of the 
Palestinian people in exile” and their return to their homeland in Israel60  At this point, 
Syria and the Soviet Union had a very close relationship so it was unlikely that either 




Neither Syria nor the Soviet Union valued another American-led peace effort.  It would 
have isolated Syria from the rest of the Arabs and once again showed that the only way to 
achieve peace with Israel was through the guidance and support of the US.   
 The threats from Syria and their patron the Soviet Union worried Hussein.  In a 
meeting with Special Middle East Envoy Donald Rumsfeld on December 21, 1983, 
Hussein said he believed that if he was able to work out a deal with Arafat, he feared the 
Syrians would eventually react.  He argued that to face this threat, Jordan quickly needed 
an increase in military aid from the US.  He believed that Jordan could face a military 
attack by Syria to prevent any agreement with Arafat.  He asked Rumsfeld what the US 
was prepared to do to protect him in such an instance.  He told Rumsfeld that Jordan was 
not looking for active support in the form of troops, just for the means to defend itself.  
Rumsfeld assured Hussein that he would speak with Reagan about the issue but believed 
that despite the buildup of Soviet weapons in Syria, militarily, their strength was 
exaggerated.61  While Hussein’s fear of Syria was justified, he always requested more 
military aid from the Americans, regardless of the actions of his neighbors.  In addition, 
because of Hussein’s close allegiance with Iraq, Saddam would have seen a Syrian attack 
on Jordan as an extension of his war with Iran because of the relationship between Assad 
and the Ayatollah, giving Jordan some extra protection from a Syrian attack.   
In December 1982, Hussein came to Washington to meet with the Reagan 
administration and discuss the peace process.  Hussein told Shultz he was having trouble 
getting support from the PLO to negotiate.  He believed that the US needed to do more to 
pressure Israel, especially when it came to the expansion of settlements.  He told Shultz 




self-rule by the Palestinians and a freeze on settlements.  After Shultz had accomplished 
that, Hussein agreed to join the talks with or without PLO approval.  If the PLO refused 
to participate, he would work to gain the support of local Palestinians not associated in 
any way with the PLO.62  In addition, Hussein asked Reagan a series of questions to 
gauge Reagan’s attitude towards the peace process.  He hoped that if the answers showed 
Reagan had a fair attitude towards a peace settlement, Hussein hoped to take those 
answers back to the Arab world to increase their support.    In response, Reagan told 
Hussein:  
The President believes, consistent with Resolution 242, that territory 
should not be acquired by war.  He believes as well, however, that 
Resolution 242 does permit changes in the boundaries, which existed prior 
to June 1967, but only where such changes are agreed between the parties.  
Finally, the US believes that all of the principles of 242 – those which 
hold out the promise of peace and those which hold out the promise of 
return of territory – must be fulfilled to the maximum extent possible.63 
 
Reagan and Shultz did not give Hussein the concessions he desired regarding the period 
of the transition and the inclusion of the PLO, but Hussein hoped to take Reagan’s 
response to his questions to the rest of the Arabs to induce them into participating. 
Despite this rejection, Hussein met with Arafat on April 1, 1983, in Amman to 
argue the benefits of the plan to the PLO.  Hussein believed that by joining with the PLO 
to negotiate the Reagan Plan, he could get around the opposition from both the Rabat and 
Fez summits.  Arafat even agreed at one point to a joint Palestinian-Jordanian negotiation 
pact.  He only requested that he have a chance to present the plan to the PLO Executive 
Committee before formally signing it.  Unfortunately, after Arafat left Amman, he did not 




independent Palestinian state.64  When Arafat sent an envoy to Jordan to explain to 
Hussein the rejection of the agreement, Hussein was outraged.  He believed they had an 
agreement and Arafat betrayed him by going against it.  Hussein addressed the people of 
Jordan on April 10, to explain the breakdown with the PLO.  He argued that while it was 
necessary to keep working towards a solution, he accepted the PLO’s rejection and would 
no longer be involved in a joint delegation with the PLO.  He also expressed why he 
wanted to negotiate and why it was a disappointment that the talks between Jordan and 
the PLO ended without an agreement.  He said, “As for Jordan we are directly affected by 
the results of the continued occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through the 
accelerating colonization program and through the economic pressures systematically 
being brought on the Palestinian people to force them out of their land.”65  While Hussein 
wanted to deal with the Israel to regain the territory lost in 1967, it still would have been 
difficult for him to survive if he faced isolation similar to Egypt.  Without the support of 
the PLO, that was the likely result.      
The White House’s initial response to Hussein’s actions was positive.   Once 
Reagan received word that the PLO Executive Committee rejected Hussein’s 
compromise with Arafat, he said they “offered a counter proposal that must have been 
written in Moscow.”  Reagan was pleased that Hussein rejected it and he began to work 
with other allies in the region, specifically Morocco, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, to give 
support to Hussein in his dispute with the PLO.66  Reagan hoped that if the PLO was 
discredited as a reasonable partner, Jordan could move forward with the Reagan Plan.  
Unfortunately, because Hussein could not get the support of the PLO, he eventually told 




that it was too risky to continue without the support of the Palestinians, which in turn 
would have led to the support of the rest of the Arabs. 67  When Hussein ended talks with 
the PLO, he blamed America’s inability to get Israel to stop the settlement expansion as 
the reason he could not move forward with the peace process.  Hussein felt that if the 
Americans could not even get Israel to stop building settlements while negotiations 
occurred, it would be impossible to get them to make larger sacrifices in the name of 
peace.68  The Reagan administration was disappointed in Hussein’s refusal and believed 
he did not work hard enough to convince the other Arabs to support the initiative.  
Because of this, there was a minor strain in American-Jordanian relations for a few years. 
Another factor limiting the ability of the Arabs to accept the Regan Plan was the 
continued aid to Israel.  According to Ambassador Veliotes, the decision by Congress to 
send $500 million in aid to Israel immediately following the announcement of the 
ceasefire in Lebanon showed the Arabs that the US was not willing to challenge Israel in 
any meaningful way.  He said, “We knew this money was going to be viewed in Israel 
and everywhere else as a payment for Lebanon.  We fought and we lost.  With it we lost 
any chance of moving on the Reagan Plan.”  If Reagan succeeded in blocking the aid, it 
“would have demonstrated that [the US was] not rewarding Israel for what they had done 
in Lebanon” and dramatically improved relations in the Arab world, especially Jordan.69  
This aid shipment hurt any efforts of Hussein to get other Arab leaders to support his 
talks with Israel and the Reagan administration.  It would have helped Hussein if he could 
have shown both the PLO and the leaders of the other Arab nations that the US was 
pressuring Israel to negotiate in good faith.  The aid instead showed many that the 




Despite the minor strain in relations, US and Jordan continued to cooperate on 
other issues.  Under the direction of William Casey, the CIA began new covert operations 
with Jordan.  They shared intelligence on the PLO and other terrorist groups in the 
region.   Casey and Reagan believed that Jordan withheld some intelligence information 
because they did not fully trust the Americans after the revelations during the Carter 
administration of Hussein’s payments from the CIA.   The issue of sharing intelligence 
between Jordan and the US regarding terrorist groups became more important after the 
bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983.  In fact, when asked 
about intelligence capabilities soon after the bombing, Reagan said, “We’re feeling the 
effects today of the near-destruction of our intelligence capability in recent years before 
we came here” because some believed that “spying is somehow dishonest and let’s get rid 
of our intelligence agents.”70  In addition to sharing intelligence, Jordan and the US also 
had other national security connections.  Throughout 1983, Casey and Weinberger were 
planning for an elite Jordanian combat unit that could be used to fight Soviet backed 
radicals and terrorist groups in the region that threatened American interests through a 
program called the Joint Logistics Planning Program.71  It was evident even if the peace 
process was not moving forward, the Reagan administration still believed Jordan could 
be an important ally in countering the growing threat of Soviet-supported regimes and 
terrorism to the United States.  Hussein continued to demonstrate his value to American 
interests in the region despite the failures of the peace process.   
In February 1984, both Hussein and Mubarak traveled to Washington to update 
Shultz and Reagan on the peace process.  Mubarak showed new confidence that came 




problems with Arafat and the PLO.  Mubarak wanted to try to bring Arafat closer to him, 
hopefully, encouraging him to join the peace process.  Hussein had a different attitude; he 
wanted to only make public gestures towards Arafat so he could claim to the other Arabs 
he tried to make amends with the PLO.  Eventually, he wanted to continue to build 
support from the people of the West Bank and then restart negotiations with Israel, 
without the inclusion of the PLO.  Unfortunately, the meetings ended badly when in a 
public news conference with both Reagan and Hussein, Mubarak announced that Egypt 
believed that only the PLO had the legitimate right to negotiate for the Palestinian and 
that they must be included in any peace process.  Shultz was angry with Mubarak and 
told him as much.  He believed that Egypt was attempting to continue to improve their 
standing in the Middle East at the expense of the peace process.  Because of Mubarak’s 
statements, Hussein told Shultz that he could not move forward with his attempts to use 
the Jordanian relations with the West Bank to move towards peace on his own without 
wider support in the Arab world.72  Events like this made it clear to Hussein that if he 
wanted to achieve his goals in the region, he would need to come to an agreement with 
Arafat.  That even with American support, without working with Arafat directly, he 
would never have the support of the rest of the Arab world.  To accomplish this, Hussein 
would need to convince Arafat to reject some of the violent actions of the PLO and trust 
Hussein to work for the interests of Jordan and the Palestinian people.   
In March 1984, the Reagan administration was still attempting to work with 
Hussein to arrange negotiations with Israel, despite the lack of support from the Arab 
world.  On March 13, Reagan addressed the Young Leadership Conference of the United 




Today, Jordan is crucial to the peace process.  For that very reason, 
Jordan, like Israel, is confronted by Syria and faces military threats and 
terrorist attacks.  Since the security of Jordan is crucial to the security of 
the entire region, it is in America’s strategic interest – and I believe in 
Israel’s strategic interests – for us to help meet Jordan’s legitimate needs 
for defense against the growing power of Syria and Iran. 
 
To illustrate the importance of the peace process, he discussed the Soviet threat to the 
region he said, “As the crossroad between three continents and the source of oil for much 
of the industrialized world, the Middle East is of enormous strategic importance.  Were 
the Soviets to control the region . . . the entire world would be vulnerable to economic 
blackmail.”73  The US could not allow a hostile government to control the largest oil 
reserves in the world because of the potential for economic blackmail.  This same 
thinking led the US to intervene when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.   
Despite Reagan’s positive words about Hussein and Jordan, on March 15, 
Hussein gave an interview with the New York Times where he attacked US policy 
towards Jordan and accused the Reagan administration, along with Congress, of having 
policies that were so pro-Israel, that the US “had lost its credibility as a mediator in 
efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.”  Hussein further said that “We see thing this 
way: Israel is on our land.  It is there by virtue of American military assistance and 
economic aid that translates into aid for Israeli settlements.  Israel is there by virtue of 
American moral and political support to the where the United States is succumbing to 
Israeli dictates.”  When discussing the actions of Congress, Hussein was upset with the 
strings attached to military aid designed to overcome Israeli objections.  Hussain was 
careful not to criticize Reagan personally, he even said, “I am not critical of the President 




honor and principle.”  Hussein was disappointed in Reagan’s inability to get Congress to 
do what it could to make the peace process successful.74  In addition, much to Reagan’s 
disappointment, Hussein also voted with the Soviet Union in the UN Security Council on 
a resolution supporting Polish human rights.75  Hussein made two requests of Reagan that 
when not granted, led Hussein to give his interview with the New York Times.  In August 
1983, Hussein asked Reagan not to veto a United Nations Security Council resolution 
that denounced Israeli settlement policy.  Reagan chose to veto it to show support for 
Israel against the historically hostile UN.  Towards the end of 1983, Hussein asked 
Reagan to intervene with Israel and allow a number of members of the PNC located in 
Gaza and the West Bank to travel to Amman for a meeting scheduled in November of 
1984.  Reagan was unable to convince the Israelis to wave their restrictions.  Finally, the 
Senate was debating a bill that would have forced the US government to move the 
American embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.  This issue had the potential to 
inflame the region to such a degree that when Veliotes, the American ambassador to 
Jordan, met with a number of Senators to discuss the issue, he asked for a few days 
warning before the bill was passed so he had time to evacuate his personnel before the 
riots started.76  For the Arab world, the moving of the embassy to Jerusalem would have 
symbolized American approval and acceptance of the occupation of 1967.  In addition, 
the Arabs would view it as a rejection of UNSC 242 and its calls to return the land taken 
in that conflict.  Hussein’s interview resulted from his continued disappointment over the 
Reagan administration’s inability to put any pressure on Israel.  In response, through 
Hussein’s rebuke of the administration, he would hopefully show the other Arab nations 




Hussein was careful not to criticize Reagan personally, because he knew he would need 
the relationship with Reagan to advance his goals in the future.     
Reagan tried to improve relations with Hussein by pressuring Congress to 
approve an aid package that consisted of $250 million to Jordan.  While the Jordan 
appreciated the money, they needed newer weapon systems rather than hard cash.   
Congress would not allow Jordan to receive the military equipment it desired unless it 
made significant progress towards peace with Israel.  In addition, Hussein’s interview 
ended an effort by Reagan to sell hundreds of Stinger missiles to Jordan because it would 
have been impossible to get the approval of Congress.  Because of that, Hussein looked 
to Europe and the Soviet Union to meet his military needs.  This included the purchase of 
Javelin anti-aircraft missiles form the Great Britain, Mirage fighter planes from France, 
and a complete anti-aircraft system from the Soviet Union.  Shultz did not blame Hussein 
for his outburst; he knew Hussein had legitimate reasons to be upset with the Americans.  
He was angry and the State Department staff in Jordan for not warning him of Hussein’s 
growing disillusionment of American actions.77  With some warning, Shultz believed he 
could have smoothed out some of the differences between Hussein and the Reagan 
administration and at least kept them from going public.  Even if the dispute remained 
private, the fundamental problem would still have existed.  The US was unwilling to 
significantly pressure Israel to make concessions to the Arabs to achieve a settlement.  
Without that pressure, the underlining issues between the US and the Arabs, including 
Jordan, would remain.     
The first half of the Regan administration ended with disappointment in both 




Israelis to complete a deal that Hussein and the Palestinians could live with.   Reagan 
believed through the Reagan Plan, he had an equitable process to complete a 
comprehensive agreement for the region, despite the rejection from the PLO and the 
Israelis.  The added pressure of dealing with the civil war in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq 
War, made it more unlikely that the US could solve the problems of the region.  The 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the massacre at Sabra and Shatila increased Arab anger 
towards Israel, making it more difficult for Jordan to work actively to solve their issues 
with Israel.  In addition, the relationship between Reagan and Hussein was complicated.  
Reagan saw Hussein as a force for the West in the region but realized he was not strong 
enough to take steps to help the US without at least some support from other parts of the 
Arab world.  Despite his weaknesses, Reagan still treated Hussein as an important ally in 
the region and attempted to overcome congressional and Israeli opposition to that 
support.  Despite their disagreements after the failure of the Reagan Plan, Hussein and 
Reagan continued to work towards peace in the region and promote American interests in 









REAGAN’S SECOND TERM AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
 
 
The second half of the Reagan administration began with the relationship between 
Hussein and Reagan at its lowest point.  Despite the differences in perspectives of the two 
leaders, they both had similar goals.  Both Reagan and Hussein wanted to find a way to 
restart the peace process and repair any damage to US-Jordanian relations over the failure 
of the Reagan Plan.  Both Hussein and Reagan would attempt new initiatives to 
overcome the problems of the Reagan Plan, most importantly, Israeli opposition and the 
question over Palestinian participation.  In addition, both Reagan and Hussein attempted 
on numerous occasions to bring the Palestinians into the process, each time ending in 
failure.  The leaders also had to overcome domestic political problems, both in the United 
States and in the Middle East.  Reagan needed to convince Congress of the value in 
supporting Jordan despite protests from Israel.  In addition, both Hussein and Reagan 
needed to overcome issues with Israeli domestic politics.  Each issue posed a unique 
challenge to the relationship between the US and Jordan, frequently making the 
completion of a formal peace agreement more challenging.  The second half of the 




continued to work to gain support from the Palestinians and the PLO.  Once that failed, 
Hussein tried to supplant the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza.  The intifada interrupted 
the plans for region held by Jordan, Israel, and the United States.  The intifada, and the 
Jordanian reaction to it, fundamentally changed dynamics of the region, forcing the US to 
see the Palestinian-Jordanian relationship in a different light.  Despite their efforts, 
Hussein and Reagan could not overcome conditions on the ground to forge a lasting 
peace deal between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians.    
The position of Arafat in December 1983 was at its weakest since he took control 
of the PLO.  In 1982, the PLO and Arafat evacuated from Beirut, Lebanon, under a deal 
brokered by the US, because they faced constant attacks from both Syria and Israel.  In 
December, Arafat faced attacks from a splinter group of the PLO backed by Syria forcing 
him to leave Tripoli, Lebanon.  In addition, Hussein attempted to demonstrate to Arafat 
that Jordan had other options than working with the PLO.  He reopened the Parliament, 
which was half filled with people from the West Bank, on January 16, 1984.  He also 
appointed Adnana Abu-Odeh as the Minister of the Royal Court, the King’s 
representative in Parliament.  Odeh was an important piece to the King’s strategy because 
he was born in the West Bank while still maintaining a close relationship with Hussein as 
a trusted advisor.  He also held various positions in the Jordanian government, including 
Minister of Information.  Hussein wanted to show Arafat that if he would not moderate 
his position and that of the PLO, Jordan could pursue peace with Israel without their 
involvement by focusing on gaining support from the people of the West Bank.  Hussein 
used these changes to attempt to see if Arafat would be a more willing partner for peace 




seventh Palestinian National Council in Amman on November 22, 1984.1  The decision 
to have the PNC in Amman was symbolically important for both Arafat and Hussein.  For 
Arafat, it showed that he was willing to work with Hussein and no longer saw him as a 
threat to the PLO or someone who worked against the interests of the Palestinians.  For 
Hussein, it demonstrated he was no longer at war the PLO or its affiliates and working 
through him was the best way for the West and Israel to deal with the PLO.   
Hussein had the support of Reagan administration for his actions to pressure 
Arafat to come to the table.  Shultz was pleased that Hussein reopened the Parliament.  
He believed that it was a sign that Hussein would fully engage in the peace process and 
he could use the voice of Palestinians from the West Bank in Parliament for legitimacy in 
the negotiations.2  While the Reagan administration would have preferred Hussein to 
work with the Israelis on solving the issues of the West Bank without the involvement of 
the PLO or the Palestinians, reluctantly, they realized that Jordan coming to terms with 
the PLO was good for the chances of peace.  This was true despite the usual outrage from 
Israel.   
Hussein also tried to rally support in the Arab world for his quest to find a 
workable arrangement with the PLO.  On March 31, 1984, Hussein sent a letter to 
Saddam to gain his support for negotiations with the Americans and Israel.  He hoped 
that with the endorsement of Iraq, the PLO might be more inclined to compromise.   
Hussein told Saddam that despite the US’s failings, they were correct when they 
suggested that a lack of Arab unity made the peace process impossible. 3  In addition, 
while working to gain support for his reconciliation with the PLO, Hussein also 




convinced the other Arab nations to allow Egypt attend the Islamic Conference in the 
December 1984.4  This was important because it increased the support Hussein received 
from Egypt and Mubarak when issues with Arafat eventually broke down.  Saddam did 
not protest when Egypt requested to rejoin Arab organizations and did not openly oppose 
Hussein’s efforts with the Americans.  It was important to gain Saddam Hussein’s 
agreement to welcome Egypt back into the Arab fold because Saddam was one of the 
leading voices demanding their punishment after Camp David.  Hussein knew that 
despite the boycott of Egypt after the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, it 
remained an influential member of the Arab world.  That influence only increased once 
the boycotts ended.     
Hussein had another reason to try to work with the PLO.  In an Israeli election 
held in July 1984, neither Likud nor the Labor Party received enough votes to form a 
government.  Because of that, they agreed to a unity government that called for an equal 
number of members from each party in the cabinet and a rotating prime minister and 
foreign minister.   For the first two years, the more moderate Shimon Peres would be 
prime minister and have the hardline Likud member Yitzhak Shamir as foreign minister.   
Hussein believed that if he could work an agreement with Arafat, then it was possible to 
negotiate with Peres while he was the head of Israel.  Hussein also believed that once he 
reached a deal with Arafat, he would be in a position to negotiate with Israel without any 
preconditions, making it more likely Israel would agree to a formal peace process 
between Jordan and Israel.5  While Hussein rightfully believed that Peres and the Labor 




brought on by a unity government.  Because of that, Hussein frequently placed too much 
faith in Peres’ ability to deliver a deal with Jordan.     
On November 22, 1984, Hussein welcomed the Palestinian National Council to 
meet in Amman and discuss the prospects for peace.  Hussein hoped to garner the support 
of the more moderate elements in the PLO along with the people of the West Bank.   He 
opened the conference with a speech that he transmitted to the West Bank and Gaza 
where he was highly critical of the PLO and Arafat.  He blamed them for underestimating 
Israel’s ability to resist their tactics and told them they were diluted if they believed Israel 
was close to defeat.  Hussein asked, “How long shall we heed those among us who say 
‘Leave it for future generations’?”  Hussein believed that the PLO was the main reason 
why the Arabs had been unable to secure the return of the West Bank and Gaza.6  During 
Hussein’s speech, Jordanian television repeatedly showed Arafat in the audience when 
Hussein mentioned UNSC Resolution 242 and discussed the need for peace.  The 
Palestinians in the West Bank also viewed these images and Hussein intended to show 
that Arafat was moderating his position on the peace process and would begin to work 
with Hussein to move the process forward.7  Despite Hussein’s harsh words in his 
opening speech, the PLO and Hussein continued to negotiate on an agreement to work 
together on the peace process.  Hussein’s speech was an effort to increase his popularity 
in the West Bank and continue to pressure Arafat to moderate his positions, allowing for 
Jordan to negotiate with Israel.  While the pressure on Arafat worked, it did not transfer 
to other factions in the PLO, limiting Arafat’s ability to deal with Hussein.         
The PLO and Hussein signed the agreement on February 11, 1985.  Jordan’s 




should be the nucleus of an agreement on the Palestinian question and wider Arab 
support could be built around this nucleus.”  Masri believed that the agreement between 
the PLO and Hussein ended Arab opposition to Jordan playing a key role in negotiating 
for the Palestinians and allowed for the removal of both the Rabat and Fez summits as 
roadblocks for Jordanian participation in attempting to end the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank.   Hussein believed that his could eventually lead to a rebirth of his Jordanian 
federation ideas represented in his United Arab Kingdom Plan of the past.8  Much to the 
disappointment of Hussein, Arafat immediately began to back away from it.  While 
Hussein believed that the PLO would now accept Resolutions 242 and 338, Arafat 
continued to reject them publically.  An Arafat aide said, “We reject Resolution 242.  We 
rejected it in the past and will reject it in the future.”  They also did not agree if the 
Jordanian-PLO pact called for an independent state or a federation with Jordan.  Finally, 
while the agreement called for a non-PLO joint Jordanian negotiating team, Arafat 
quickly changed and called for the inclusion of members of the PLO.9  Despite Arafat’s 
waffling, he and Hussein continued as if the agreement was still in place.  Hussein hoped 
that as negotiations proceeded, he could continue to get the PLO to moderate their 
position.   
The reaction to the new agreement between the PLO and Hussein was mixed.   
President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak supported the plan, seeing the need to involve the 
PLO to move forward in the peace process.  Unfortunately, Egypt was still isolated from 
some of the Arab world because of continued hostility towards the Camp David Accords.  
The Arabs allowed Egypt to participate in most Arab meetings, but the radical regimes in 




connection between Jordan and the PLO and even rejected the PLO as having the right to 
negotiate anything in regards to the West Bank or a union with Jordan.  Syria also 
convinced their Palestinian allies, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, to reject it and accuse the PLO of sacrificing the interests of the Palestinian 
people.  The Soviets also opposed the agreement because they feared it would lead the 
PLO out of their sphere of influence.  Al-Masri even flew to Moscow to try to persuade 
the Soviets to participate in an international conference but Soviet Foreign Minister 
Andrey Gromyko rejected him harshly.  Hussein and Arafat sent another delegation and 
the Soviets refused their entry.  The Reagan administration took a more cautious 
approach.  They remained neutral for fear that the PLO still would not reject violence and 
become a genuine partner for peace.10 
On May 4, 1985, Hussein discussed his new partnership with the PLO while 
visiting the United States at a convention of the National Association of Arab Americans.  
He said:  
For the first time, we in Jordan, with our Palestinian brethren have 
structured an initiative representing the pursuit of their goals of self-
determination through peaceful means. . . .  They have also agreed to the 
principle that a peace settlement should be based on the return of the 
captured territories of 1967 in exchange for recognition of Israel’s rights 
to exist within secure borders. . . .  The PLO has also ascertained that the 
right of Palestinian self-determination will be exercised within the context 
of a confederated state of Palestine and Jordan.11 
 
Hussein believed that this was a major breakthrough for gaining American and 




maintained this position, the Reagan administration would be willing to pressure 
Israel to allow Arafat to participate in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. 
There were two major challenges to these efforts at forging a peace agreement.  
First, the Americans believed that the Palestinians needed to recognize Israel and give up 
terrorism if they wanted to participate in any peace process, without that, both Israel and 
the US likely would not participate.  Second, the Palestinians believed that the only way 
they could do those things if they felt the US would force Israel to negotiate in good faith.  
In particular, the PLO wanted assurance that the US would not allow Israel to drag on 
negotiations indefinitely while further establishing their control of the West Bank and 
Gaza through the building of settlements.  Because the unity government in Israel 
contained a large contingent of Likud, this problem was difficult to overcome.  Minister 
of Housing David Levy said, “Likud would never accept that we embark on a search for 
territorial compromise with Hussein.”12  The plan agreed upon between the Jordanians 
and the US to integrate the Palestinians into the peace process called on the PLO to 
endorse UNSC 242 and 338 followed by meetings between the US to establish some 
reorganization of the PLO.  The second major issue was the conflict over the nature of 
the talks.  The US and Israel clearly wanted bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan, 
while Jordan wanted an international conference led by the major powers along with 
United Nations involvement.  The US wanted bilateral talks to keep the Soviet Union out 
of the negotiations.  Israel wanted bilateral talks because it believed that was the most 
likely way for them to keep control over parts of the West Bank.  In addition, they did not 




possible involvement of the PLO in the negotiations added to an already complex 
process.      
To further his efforts at a new peace process, Hussein met Peres in London on 
July 19, 1985, to discuss negotiations between the Jordanian-PLO partnership with Israel.  
At this meeting, the two leaders agreed on a plan for the shape of future negotiations.  
First, Hussein and a joint Palestinian delegation would meet with the US through US 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, Richard Murphy.  In that meeting, they 
would express their desire for American help in working out an agreement with Israel.  
After that meeting, the PLO would agree to the American preconditions for openly 
talking with the PLO, mainly the acceptance of UNSC Resolution 242 and 338 along 
with the end of violence.  After this, they agreed that formal peace negotiations would 
proceed with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian partnership.  The only disagreement was how 
much the PLO would be part of this negotiating group.  Hussein argued to Peres the need 
for the PLO to be involved in some form.  While Peres told Hussein he rejected the idea 
PLO participation, he later told Shultz that after publically showing their opposition, he 
would allow some PLO representation.13  The only remaining obstacles were getting US 
approval and gaining the support of the other half of Peres’ government represented by 
the Likud Party.  Hussein and the US routinely faced this issue when dealing with the 
unity government.  One half would agree to a proposal and the other half would 
undermine it at a later date.  This dysfunction severely hampered the ability of Hussein 
and the Reagan administration work out a viable peace process.      
During the negotiations between Peres and Hussein, Peres tried to improve 




conclude a peace deal.  One example of this was when Hussein invited a Palestinian 
leader located in the West Bank, who was not associated with the PLO, to Amman.  
Israel lifted any travel restrictions placed on that leader so he could freely travel out of 
the West Bank and meet with Hussein.  Peres also helped Jordan resolve issues of water 
and electricity for the West Bank. 14  These efforts aimed to dramatically reduce the 
position of the PLO in the occupied territories and increase Hussein’s ability to speak for 
the Palestinians at any proposed peace conference.  The Israelis hoped that if they 
succeeded in increasing Hussein’s popularity, the people of the West Bank and Gaza 
would welcome a federation with Jordan as a solution to the issues of self-determination, 
preventing Arafat from taking control of the West Bank.   Hussein shared this hope and 
while he continued to talk with Arafat, he still planned on replacing him as the head of 
the Palestinians and the primary voice for all Palestinian negotiations with Israel.   
On May 10, 1985, Shultz flew to the region to meet with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan 
to further discuss the peace process.  Before he met with Hussein on May 12, the Israeli 
cabinet issued a statement that said, “There is a readiness for direct negotiations between 
Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that does not include persons belonging to 
an organization committed the Palestinian charter.”  This development pleased both 
Shultz and Hussein who now believed that Israel would negotiate with a Palestinian 
delegation, as long as it did not include active members of the PLO.  It could include 
people who either no longer had an official affiliation with the PLO, but still had 
connections with the group.  Hussein believed that it was enough of a breakthrough that 
he told Shultz that when he visited Washington, he would announce that Jordan was no 




on belligerency was an important step because it would encourage Israel’s participation 
with Jordan and it would allow Congress to dramatically increase Jordan’s aid.  
Unfortunately, both sides began to backtrack on their agreements.  Israel released an 
updated statement that blocked anyone from an organization that had any role in the 
Palestinian National Congress.  The Palestinian Charter called for the destruction of 
Israel and was more associated with the PLO, but the National Congress was just a 
legislative body that included Palestinians not affiliated with the PLO.  In addition, Israel 
rejected any notion of an international conference.  Hussein also retreated from his 
position.  When Hussein was in Washington on May 20, he only talked about “a genuine 
desire for negotiations, proceeding in a nonbelligerenly.” 15  This statement did imply a 
formal peace treaty or an official end to the conflict between Jordan and Israel.  Shultz 
knew Hussein’s weaker statement would not move Congress or Israel any closer to 
working with Jordan.  While Hussein should have followed through with his statement 
“ending the state of belligerency” between Jordan and Israel, he still did not fully trust the 
Israeli unity government and was still unwilling to take dramatic steps towards the peace 
process without assurances of the final result.  In addition, if Hussein made this gesture 
towards Israel, there was no assurances that it would have resulted in new support for 
Jordan in Congress.  In fact, in the future, it would take active Israeli intervention to get 
Congress to support a dramatic increase in aid to Jordan.  
The biggest consequence for Hussein for not making a stronger statement while in 
Washington was its impact on the views of Congress and arms shipments to Jordan. The 
Reagan administration wanted to meet Jordan’s requests for armaments but had difficulty 




He argued that Hussein is “threatened by Syria because of his efforts to bring about peace 
with Israel.  Syria is fully armed by the Soviets.”  Because of that, Reagan was willing to 
battle with Congress to get Hussein the defensive weapons he needed to resist the Syrian 
threat.16  Despite his efforts, after meeting with a group of Senators on June 12, 1985, it 
was clear to Reagan that it would be difficult to get the Jordanian arms package through 
Congress.  He blamed the American Jewish lobby for blocking all arms to the Arabs.   
Despite the rejection from Congress, Reagan told Hussein he had the ability to send him 
sixty Stinger missiles immediately, and would continue to work on the rest of the aid.  He 
described it to Hussein as a delay of aid, not an outright rejection.17  Reagan continued to 
try and get Hussein the aid he desire, but because of opposition from Congress that 
remained difficult.  The minimal aid he could get Jordan improved relations between 
Hussein and the Reagan administration but was not enough for Hussein to take the large 
risks associated with a major peace process that challenged eventual Arab opposition.   
The proposed conference that would include the PLO, Jordan, and Israel began to 
fall apart quickly.  Arafat gave Hussein a list of PLO supporters who were moderate 
enough to deal with the Israelis but still had some connection to the PLO even if they 
were not direct members of the organization.  Hussein gave seven of those names to the 
Americans and told them to pick four of them to be included in the Jordanian delegation.   
Hussein believed that he was giving them this list in confidence, and hoped that they 
would keep it that way so not to endanger the talks.  Almost immediately, Israeli allies on 
Capitol Hill, along with the more right wing members of the Israeli government, leaked 
the list, proceeded to try to disqualify every name on the list as being too radical.  The 




joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.18  The canceling of the trip by Murphy 
demonstrated to Hussein that the hardline Israelis still had some control over the 
American policy decisions. While Israel opposed the names on the list, this was more due 
to Likud opposition to negotiating with the Palestinians rather than a sign of the radical 
nature of people Hussein chose.  Shultz’s unwillingness to pressure Israel at all and 
accepting their rejection of all Palestinians with minimal connection to the PLO wasted 
an opportunity to move the peace process forward.     
When the discussion of an international conference came up, Hussein argued that 
the conference would come at the end of the negotiations, to give the settlement the 
weight of the UN Security Council.  The Arabs believed this was important to force Israel 
to abide by any agreement.  In addition, they believed if the US was only involved, they 
would undoubtedly side with Israel and force a solution on the Arabs.   Jordanian Prime 
Minister Badran said, “In no way will we agree to American and Israel ganging up 
against an individual state such as Jordan.  It happened with Lebanon” which “provided 
vivid proof of the futility of US insistence on making peace on one’s own.”19  Shultz was 
unhappy about the conference idea for a number of reasons.  First, he did not believe that 
it would only be a ceremonial conference to ratify the deal.  He believed it would be used 
by the Arabs and the Soviet Union to put pressure on Israel to come to a deal of their 
liking, especially one tilted towards the Arabs.  Second, he believed the outcome of the 
conference would be either the US betraying Israel for the Arabs, something he did not 
want to do, or the US rejecting the Arab position and pushing them closer to the Soviet 
Union.  Because of this, Shultz told Hussein he did not support the conference idea but 




Despite Shultz’s efforts, the decision of the US to block many of the proposed 
members of the Palestinian delegation, the failed Murphy trip to the region, and the 
disappointment over Hussein’s visit to Washington had a number of consequences.  Peres 
was deeply disturbed by the American reaction to the inclusion of some PLO affiliated 
member in the joint delegation.  He believed that if he was willing to discuss issues with 
the PLO, then the US should not have an objection.  He was disappointed that the Reagan 
administration sided with the more hardline members of Likud who, along with their 
allies in Congress, believed that the PLO should never have a role in the West Bank or in 
any peace process.  The disqualification of the Palestinian members of the delegation led 
the Arabs to believe that the US would always find some opposition to working with the 
Palestinians and there was no use trying to meet those demands.  The failure to move 
forward with the peace process also led to more violence in the region.  On September 
25, 1985, terrorists affiliated with the PLO hijacked a yacht near Larnaca Cyprus, killing 
three Israeli tourists.  The PLO claimed they were Mossad agents but there was no 
evidence to that effect.  In response, the IDF attacked the PLO headquarters on October 
1.   The Peres government believed they needed to respond to the PLO attack for fear of 
looking weak compared to the Likud party.  The Israeli attack killed fifty-six Palestinians 
while wounding another hundred and missed killing Arafat by minutes.  Even after these 
attacks, Hussein still met with Peres and they both attempted to continue the peace 
process.  Unfortunately, on October 7, terrorists associated with the PLO, but members of 
the Palestinian Liberation Front, hijacked a cruise ship called the Achille Lauro.  The 
terrorists executed a wheelchair-bound American Jew named Leon Klinghoffer and threw 




no longer associate with Arafat.  Al-Masri said that this incident was the beginning of the 
end for the Arafat-Hussein partnership and said, “At the end of the day Arafat didn’t 
deliver.”21  While the PLO had many factions, if Arafat could not control those factions, 
he demonstrated he was not in a position to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians.   
The relationship between Hussein and Arafat also began to strain.  On November 
13, 1985, Arafat and Hussein met again to discuss the Jordanian-PLO partnership and 
again Arafat refused to make a firm commitment to Hussein.  In addition, he made new 
demands of the proposed confederation between Jordan and the proposed Palestinian 
state.   Arafat wanted the ability to have a parliament, currency, and flag.  Hussein agreed 
to this provision but could not accept Arafat’s other requests.  Arafat wanted to have a 
separate military in the new Palestinian state and he wanted the head of the confederation 
to alternate between a Palestinian and a Hashemite after Hussein died.  Hussein quickly 
rejected these new conditions.22  First, Hussein believed allowing the Palestinians to have 
their own parliament and currency was a big concession.  Second, neither Israel nor the 
US would agree to any proposal that called for Arafat to have control over an army that 
he could use to threaten Israel.  A Palestinian army was also a threat to Hussein, he could 
not guarantee that Arafat would not eventually use that force to remove him from power.  
Finally, he did not intend to remove his family as the head of Jordan.  He believed he had 
a legacy to protect, and that did not include turning Jordan over to Arafat after he died.   
In addition, if Arafat knew that he would have full control over Jordan upon Hussein’s 
death, it could encourage him to assassinate him.  Hussein also did not trust Arafat to 




Despite these setbacks, Hussein continued to try to bridge the gap between the 
Palestinians and the Americans.  He met with Murphy in January 1986, and discussed 
what would be necessary for the US to agree to allow the PLO into the talks at an 
international conference.  On January 25, Hussein received his official response in a letter 
from Reagan.  In it, Reagan demanded that the PLO recognize UN Resolution 242 and 
338, announce they are prepared for peace with Israel, and renounce terrorism.   When 
Hussein took this letter to Arafat, Arafat replied that he would not recognize 242 because 
it did not include statements about Palestinian national rights.  Hussein went back to 
Washington and got them to include a statement about the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people.  Despite that, Arafat still rejected it because he believed legitimate 
rights did not equal national rights or the guarantee of a Palestinian state.  This was the 
end of Hussein’s involvement with the PLO.23 
On February 19, Hussein addressed Jordanian television, in a speech prepared by 
Adana Abu-Odeh, to announce that he would no longer work with the PLO on an 
agreement to work towards peace with Israel.  Hussein said, “I and the Government of 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan hereby announce that we are unable to continue to 
coordinate politically with the PLO leadership until such a time as their word becomes 
their bond, characterized by a commitment, credibility and constancy.”  The rest of the 
speech laid out in specific details the attempts by Jordan to facilitate a negotiating 
partnership with the PLO.  In addition, Hussein also detailed the attempts by the 
Americans to facilitate the relationship and work with the PLO to find a way to make 
their participation acceptable to all parties.  Hussein explained that when the PLO made a 




to ease their concerns.  Then, the PLO would respond with new demands, making it 
impossible to ever get their approval.24  For Hussein, it was important to show the rest of 
the Arab world that he made every effort to work with Arafat and the PLO.  He believed 
that after this failure, he should have enough goodwill from the Arabs to begin to separate 
from the PLO.  He also wanted the world to know that Arafat could not be trusted as a 
viable peace partner, making him the only possible solution to solving disputes over 
Palestinian territory.  While many Arab leaders might have sympathized with Hussein’s 
problems in working with Arafat, it did not change the actual situation.  For many in the 
Arab world, the PLO still represented the voice of the Palestinians, despite the 
deficiencies in Arafat, and Hussein was still too close to the West to be trusted to look out 
for the interests of the Palestinians.  Hussein needed to work with the PLO if he ever 
hoped to achieve a peace deal with Israel that was broadly accepted in the Arab world.   
While disappointed that Jordan ended its efforts to work with the PLO towards 
peace, for all intents and purposes ending the peace process, Shultz was pleased that 
Hussein praised the US and placed the blame for failure squarely on Arafat.  Shultz 
believed it was important to show the world that the PLO would not change, despite 
many offers and incentives from the Americans.  He also felt that this would show the 
Arab world that the PLO missed an important opportunity to advance their cause with the 
US.25  For the US, it looked like any peace process that involved Jordan would be 
suspended indefinitely.  Despite Hussein’s portrayal of the PLO as the problem and not 
the Americans or Israel, most of the Arab world still refused to recognize Hussein as the 
voice of the Palestinian people.  Without that recognition, it was difficult for Hussein to 




the likelihood that any Israeli government comprised of members of the Likud would 
block Israel from making major concessions.        
Relations between Jordan and the PLO deteriorated quickly after their failed 
partnership.  In fact, things got so bad between Jordan and the PLO, one top official told 
a foreign diplomat that he was sick and felt horrible, but he said he was supposed to greet 
Arafat at the airport the next day where he would, “give him a big kiss on both cheeks to 
make sure he catches it.”26 After breaking with PLO, Hussein attempted to replace them 
in the West Bank.  His first initiative was a five-year economic plan for the area that 
intended to invest over $1 billion in the West Bank.  Hussein hoped his economic reform 
plan, led by Prime Minister Rifai, would demonstrate to the Palestinians of the West 
Bank that the PLO could never bring improvements to their daily lives.   He hoped that 
through his efforts he could demonstrate to the Palestinian people that he was their best 
hope to improve the situation in the Palestinian territories.  Hussein also reopened the 
Amman-Cairo Bank, the largest bank in the region.  By opening the bank, Hussein hoped 
to increase the Palestinians’ access to hard currency while also allowing Jordan to have 
more control over the importation of that currency.  It also made it easier for Palestinians 
living throughout the Middle East to transfer funds back to their families in the occupied 
territories.  According to Hussein’s advisor Abu-Odeh, this goal of this economic plan 
was to, “improve the Palestinians’ quality of life, create jobs, and eventually stop or at 
least slow down Palestinian emigration to Jordan.”27  Hussein also worked with the 
Israelis to crack down on PLO forces in the area.  This included closing all the PLO 
offices in Amman and expelling their representatives. 28  Reporters asked Hussein about 




was not an attempt to undermine the PLO or divide the Palestinians, but an attempt to 
face the problems of Israeli occupation and facing its “dangers as one family.”  He also 
commented on the peace process by saying, in his mind, the land of the West Bank was 
under occupation and “The important thing is to support our brothers in remaining on 
their land.  The important thing is for us and everybody to work to restore the land to its 
owners so they can decide their own destiny.”29   
Jordan also tried to stamp out pro-PLO forces in the West Bank.  For example, it 
had the president of the largest university in the West Bank, Mundir Salah, removed from 
his position because he had pro-PLO positions.  Jordan also had Israel deport some 
Palestinians seen as PLO sympathizers, including Akram Haniyya, the editor of a pro-
PLO newspaper.  In addition, Hussein opened up his own newspaper in the West Bank.  
On behalf of Jordan, Israel also would not allow certain Palestinians to travel abroad.   
Finally, Jordan used economic sanctions to hurt PLO supporters.  Farmers in the city of 
Jenin lost the ability to ship their produce to Jordan because they would not agree to 
pledge their loyalty to Hussein and distance themselves from the PLO.30  These efforts 
did not have their desired effect and most of them ended when the intifada began.    
Israel also tried to aid Hussein in increasing his influence in the West Bank.  They 
agreed to replace the military leaders controlling the major cities with Palestinian mayors 
who generally rejected the PLO and supported Hussein.  This included appointing a 
Palestinian named, Zafir al-Masri, as mayor of Nablus, one of the largest cities in the 
West Bank.31  Upon his appointment, al-Masri argued in the Jordan Times that his goal 
was not self-determination, because that is not what the Israelis offered, but to make the 




establish political control over Nablus.  Al-Masri also announced the he hoped the PLO 
would accept UNSC Resolution 242 so they could join the peace negotiations and end the 
occupation.32  The PLO responded by assassinating al-Masri on March 2, 1986.  Hussein 
even tried to cultivate a relationship with a former member of Fatah with the hope that 
eventually he would replace Arafat.  Once rumors developed that Hussein hoped to 
groom this person to lead the PLO, he lost all support in the West Bank.33    
Unfortunately, for Hussein, the economic and political reforms did not work and 
his attacks on the PLO, while popular in Jordan, diminished his approval in the West 
Bank.  By the end of the year, polls taken in the West Bank showed that a clear majority 
favored the PLO as the true representative of the Palestinian people and few wanted an 
association with Jordan and Hussein.34  Hussein believed that once he broke with the 
PLO publically, he needed to cement his position with the people of the West Bank if he 
ever hoped to lead them in negotiations with the Israel.  Unfortunately, the economic 
program was not successful enough to overcome the ingrained popularity of the PLO for 
their years of resistance to the occupation.  Despite his inability to improve his standing 
in the West Bank, Hussein continued to try to find a breakthrough in the peace process.  
He hoped that if he could get a breakthrough with Israel that returned the land occupied 
in 1967, maybe he could gain the support of the Palestinian people.   
Throughout 1987, Hussein continued his efforts to reach a peace deal with Israel.   
On April 11, 1987, Hussein met with Israeli Foreign Minister Peres in London.  While 
there, they agreed to what became known as the London Agreement.  This new 
agreement called for an international conference with the “object of bringing a 




rights of the Palestinian people.”  After the conference, negotiations between the parties 
would happen in a bilateral forum.  The settlement would be based on UNSC Resolution 
242 and 338 and called for the participation of anyone who accepted those agreements 
and renounced violence.  This included the PLO if they renounced violence and accepted 
Israel’s right to exist.  The Palestinians would participate through a joint delegation with 
Jordan.  If the PLO chose to meet the conditions, then they would join Jordan in the 
negotiations.  If they continued with acts of terrorism, then the delegation would include 
Palestinians from the West Bank not associated with the PLO.  It called for all major 
issues to be decided in various Israeli-Jordanian bilateral working groups.  Finally, Peres 
and Hussein would recommend the plan to the Americans with the hope of gaining their 
participation.  Peres and Hussein wanted the US put forth the plan as their idea in order to 
gain maximum acceptance throughout the region.35  The agreement had elements both 
sides would like.  Hussein wanted the legitimacy of an international conference and Israel 
wanted negotiations to occur bilaterally, hoping to copy their previous success in bilateral 
negotiations with Egypt.  It was also important for Israel to allow Hussein to have 
Palestinians participate in the negotiations so he could still claim to be upholding the 
decision of the Arabs at Rabat.   
During the London meeting, Peres also offered Hussein a number of energy 
projects to help gain his support and boost his popularity in Jordan.  These included a 
hydroelectric power plant, a canal between the Mediterranean and Dead Sea, and an oil 
pipeline from Jordan to the Mediterranean.  These projects were set to begin when the 
intifada started, ending the ability of Israeli engineers to operate safely in the West 




extra energy and would have benefited from canal access to the Mediterranean.  For 
Peres, many in Israel believed that the key to a lasting peace was a growing economic 
relationship between the Arabs and Israel.  If that occurred, it could make war too costly 
between the Israelis and the Arabs.   
One important part of the London agreement was that Hussein negotiated with 
Foreign Minister Peres and not Prime Minister Shamir.  Shamir claimed that Peres acted 
on his own without his knowledge or approval.  Peres claimed that Shamir knew ahead of 
time that he was meeting with Hussein in London.  The only thing Shamir did not know 
was that Hussein and Peres would reach a written agreement.  Peres claimed he did not 
believe this was possible when he left for London, but realized he had an opportunity to 
move the peace process forward and so he took it.37  The divide in Israel between Likud 
and Labor was a problem for the peace process throughout the rest of Reagan’s 
presidency.   For both Hussein and the Americans, it was hard to negotiate with the 
Israeli government because of the split in the government.  In addition, the Reagan 
administration had very little desire or incentive to get in the middle of domestic political 
disputes in Israel.  In addition, Hussein’s impression in meeting with Peres was that he 
spoke for the Israeli government, including the members represented by Likud.  When 
this assumption proved untrue, it permanently damaged Hussein’s attitude towards Peres 
and would impact future negotiations with Peres.    
Shamir believed that the London Agreement was only a vehicle for Hussein to act 
like Sadat, even though he was in a much weaker position.  Shamir rejected the 
agreement from the beginning because he did not trust Peres or believe Hussein could 




Shamir’s distaste for the agreement.  While Shamir likely would have never accepted the 
agreement, Peres made a number of mistakes in his attempt to get the support of the 
Likud side of his government.  First, he would not show Shamir a written copy of the 
agreement, only agreed to read it to him.  Peres believed that Shamir’s allies in Likud 
would leak the agreement and Hussein and Peres agreed to keep it a secret until it was 
completed.  Hussein did not want to acknowledge publically he was negotiating with the 
Israelis until he had concrete benefits from the negotiations he could use to generate 
support for his plan.  Hussein wanted the proposal to look like it came from the 
Americans, to give him some more space in the Arab world.  In addition, Peres continued 
to go around Shamir without his notification or support to try to involve the Americans in 
the plan.   Shamir also had an aversion to international conferences, because he believed 
that is where the maximum pressure on Israel would come.  Like in the past, he preferred 
bilateral talks between Jordan and Israel.  In a message to Hussein in January 1987, 
Shamir said, “there is no substitute for direct negotiations and that, at some point in the 
future; Jordan will come to realize that his path will, in the long run, ensure the best 
rewards.  No international conference can produce the solution to our problems.”38 
Another possible benefit to the London agreement came on April 7, 1987.  At this 
point, the relations between Jordan and Syria had dramatically improved.  Hussein 
frequently worked to bridge the differences with Assad and even unsuccessfully tried to 
mediate the dispute between Assad and Saddam Hussein.  Prime Minister Rifai sent a 
message to the US that Syria was willing to join an international peace conference if the 
US could agree with Jordan on the nature of that conference.  Shultz believed this was an 




negotiation between Israel and Jordan.39  It also made the agreement in London more 
important because it looked like an international conference could unite the Arabs. With 
Syrian, Jordanian, and Palestinian participation, any agreement that the London talks 
produced would have settled all remaining issues between Israel and its neighbors.   
Shultz still had problems with American participation in the manner proposed by 
Peres and Hussein.  His main concern was he did not want to deceive Shamir nor get 
directly involved in a dispute between Israel’s main political parties. It was not a tenable 
position for an American secretary of state to be arguing the points of Israel’s foreign 
minister to the prime minister.  While Shamir did not outright reject the plan when Peres 
presented it to him, he did not give it his support either.   In addition, on April 1, Shamir 
sent a Passover message to Reagan where he said it was “inconceivable that there may be 
in the US support of the idea of an international conference, which will inevitably 
reintroduce the Soviets into our region in a major role.”40  Another issue was the promise 
of an international conference.  When Shultz talked to Shamir about, Shamir was 
adamant that he would not support any form of an international conference.   His 
objection was that any conference would be stacked with anti-Israeli members and feared 
that even if the Americans promised direct negotiations, the conference could take 
control, making that unlikely.  Shamir told Shultz, “I’m talking about Israel’s survival. . . 
.  With all my friendship and deep respect for you, you must understand that I cannot 
agree to what I believe may be in store for us as a result of such a conference.”  Shultz 
tried to ease Shamir’s worries but he was unwilling to budge in his opposition.41    
While Shultz supported the idea, he was consistently lobbied by both sides of the 




envoys to Shultz to suggest he should not come to the region and argued that the plan 
could not go forward without the support of the whole Israeli government.  Peres also 
sent representatives to Shultz that argued that this was a real opportunity for peace, and 
the US would be sorry if they did not seize it.  Because Shultz and Reagan did not want 
to get in the middle of an internal Israeli dispute, they did not push the agreement and did 
not travel to Israel to try to launch the peace conference.  The possible inclusion of Syria 
was an important opportunity missed by Shultz and Reagan.  Because Hussein received 
Assad’s support, the negotiations had the potential to end the hostilities between Israel 
and its neighbors.  It would have taken continued American pressure on the Likud brank 
of the Israeli government, but it was the first real opportunity in a decade to forge an 
agreement between Israel and its neighbors. 
Shamir believed that he could meet with Hussein directly and through that 
relationship, he could convince Hussein to attend bilateral negotiations without the 
participation of an international conference.  The two leaders met on July 18, 1987, 
where each had a vastly different attitude about the success of the meeting.  Shamir 
reported to Shultz that the meeting could lead to more Israeli-Jordanian cooperation.  In 
addition, he felt he could work with Hussein in finding a mutually beneficial solution to 
the problems of the region.  Hussein told Shultz that the meeting with Shamir was a 
disaster and he did not believe he could work with Shamir at all.42  One reason Shamir 
might have believed that the meetings succeeded was because of how Hussein treated his 
guests.  Hussein asked Shamir to stay the night at his estate in England, so he did not 
have to travel on the Sabbath.  Hussein also provided a complete menu of kosher food, 




not trust Shamir, and believed that he still was loyal to the Likud platform that called for 
all of the West Bank to part of Israel.  The combination of the internal Israeli politics, 
Hussein’s disdain for Shamir and his Likud allies, and the unwillingness of the United 
States to engage in the process directly ended the chance for a peace deal based on the 
London Agreement.  This was a missed opportunity for all involved.  For Israel, they 
finally had an agreement from Hussein to commit to bilateral talks, but Shamir could not 
get past his distrust of Peres and his opposition to even a pro-forma international 
conferences.  For the US, if Reagan and Shultz had been more willing to pressure Shamir, 
they would have had their best chance to achieve a peace settlement in the Middle East 
that had the possibility to expand into a comprehensive agreement between Israel and the 
Arabs.   The failure of these leaders to act directly led to the uprising known as the 
intifada.   
On December 9, 1987 in the Gaza town of Jabaliyah, an Israeli truck driver ran 
over four Palestinians killing them.  This seemingly minor event launched what was 
known as the intifada in the Palestinian territories.  No outside group, including the PLO, 
directed this uprising and it led to violent demonstrations throughout the occupied 
territories.  Palestinians responded to the killing with the throwing of rocks and Molotov 
cocktails at Israeli security services that responded with firing rubber bullets and 
eventually live ammunition at the Palestinian protesters.  This uprising was a reaction to 
the never-ending Israeli occupation and the realization that it could become permanent as 
Israel continued to build and expand settlements on land many hoped would be a future 
Palestinian state.  All this was widely viewed internationally through television news 




rifle fire and tear gas helped increase international support for the Palestinian cause. 44  
While the PLO was not involved in its beginning, it quickly joined the uprising and 
eventually helped to shape it as a pro-PLO movement.45 
Hussein was deeply disappointed that the London Agreement failed.  He believed 
that Peres misunderstood Israeli opposition and did not negotiate well with Shamir.  
Hussein felt that Peres should have brought the plan to Shamir from the beginning, not 
ambushed him when it was complete.  It convinced Hussein that Israel had no desire for 
peace and that would not change until Israel formed a government.  He believed that 
Shamir would not go against his party members who many, including Sharon, still 
thought that the removal of Hussein was the solution to the Palestinian problem.46  This 
ended any chance of peace between Jordan and Israel for the time being.  While Hussein 
would still discuss the issues with the Americans, he had not real prospects in succeeding 
with Israel.  For Hussein, it was necessary to keep the dialogue open between the US and 
Jordan, so any failures to move the peace process forward would come from Israel, 
keeping Hussein on good terms with the Reagan administration.     
Despite the failure of the London Agreement, Shultz continued to attempt to 
arrange for a peace process between Hussein and Shamir.  Shultz met with Hussein in 
London on October 19, 1987, where he presented the idea of Shamir and Hussein 
meeting along with Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev at an upcoming American-Soviet 
summit.  Shultz believed that this forum could get Hussein’s approval because it was an 
international conference, but not too big a conference that Shamir would reject it outright.  
After some pressure, he received Shamir’s agreement to work towards an interim 




Shultz, “Well, Mr. Secretary, you know our dreams, and you know our nightmares.  We 
trust you.  Go ahead.”47  With Shamir’s agreement, Shultz believed this could finally be a 
breakthrough and scheduled a meeting with Hussein to present him with his new idea.  
Hussein was less enthusiastic than Shultz hoped.  Hussein did not trust Shamir and 
believed that while he may agree to an interim agreement, he would never allow for a 
final settlement.  When Shultz presented the plan to Hussein, Hussein rejected it because 
he did not believe Shamir would ever move away from the transitional phase of 
Palestinian rule, never giving the people of the West Bank the option of real self-
determination.  Hussein expressed his disdain for Shamir, telling Richard Murphy that he 
“can’t be alone with that man.”  Hussein also told Shultz that Syria would never agree to 
this plan and would do everything to block it.  He believed that eventually, the Soviets 
would back Syria, placing him at risk without any hope of success.48  In addition, Hussein 
had scheduled the Arab League to meet in Amman relatively soon and feared the reaction 
if he announced he was opening up bilateral negotiators with Israel that did not include 
the Palestinians in any form.49  The relationship between Hussein and Shamir was too far 
damaged to allow for any bilateral negotiations.  While Shultz’s effort was worthwhile in 
the name of peace, he had very little hope of succeeding.   
To make matters worse, after Shultz left his meeting with Hussein, he forgot his 
briefing book and the Jordanians immediately copied it.  In it, it appeared to Hussein that 
the US was taking Shamir’s position on almost every issue.  In addition, it was critical of 
Hussein personally.  It argued that Shultz should try to get Hussein alone because he was 
much weaker when he was not around his advisors.  The comments personally offended 




this new conference idea.  In fact, Hussein barely agreed with any of Shultz’s suggestions 
to move the process forward.50  Eventually, Hussein told Shultz he could not participate.  
Shultz decided not to push the idea any further and dropped the plan to associate the 
peace process with the upcoming US-Soviet summit.   
In January 1988, Shultz attempted one more effort at the peace process in 
response to the intifada.  His plan had a number of steps that he intended to happen in 
quick succession.  He hoped to show both sides signs of progress.  First, the Arabs would 
attempt to end the intifada and Israel would agree to stop the expansion of settlements.  
After that had occurred, the next month, negotiations began on autonomy for the 
Palestinians.  Six months after the negotiations started, Israel and the Palestinians would 
sign the autonomy agreement, beginning a three-month period before elections in the 
West Bank and Gaza to determine the makeup of the autonomous government.  Three 
months after the autonomy talks were scheduled to end, talks on final status would start.  
The discussions on final status would start regardless of the state of the autonomy talks.  
Shultz believed that by interlocking the autonomy and final status talks, he would 
overcome Arab fears that Israel would drag out autonomy discussions, so they never had 
to move on to the issues of a final status agreement.  Shultz also called for an 
international conference, but only for the purpose of kicking of the process.  He wanted 
to assure Israeli fears that an international conference could devolve into something more 
hostile to Israeli interests by only using it to mark the formal start of his plan.  He also 
believed that it would give Hussein the cover to participate.  Before he announced the 




When meeting with Israel, Shultz found the normal objections.  Israel opposed 
any form of international conference and was opposed to the speed of talks.  They 
believed that a much longer transition was needed to judge the impact of Palestinian 
autonomy, something much closer to the five-year transition seen in the Camp David 
Accords.  Hussein showed some initial caution, but eventually gave his support because 
of Shultz’s concept of interlocking the autonomy talks with final status talks.  Hussein 
believed this was an important feature to overcome Arab fears that final status talks 
would never occur.52  The concept of interlocking was important for the Arabs because it 
overcame the biggest downside of the Camp David Accords.  While those accords called 
for Palestinian autonomy, it never progressed to a final settlement negotiation.  Shultz’s 
plan moved to final status negotiations no matter the state of autonomy talks, limiting the 
ability of the Israelis to repeatedly stall progress.   
 Because of his support in the initial meetings with leaders from the Middle East, 
Shultz decided to announce his plan publicly.  In a meeting at the Council of Foreign 
Relations, attended by the ambassadors to the US of many Arab countries, Shultz laid out 
his plan.  He said, “you have three substantive things [in the plan]: one dealing with 
things that can be done quickly; another dealing with issues of final status; and a third 
dealing with the interrelationship between them, a kind of interlocking between these two 
areas of substance.”  He also mentioned that the plan would be based off UNSC 
Resolution 242 calling for the exchange of territory for peace.  He also said that there 
would be bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbors.  He hoped that Syria 
would join, but acknowledge it was unlikely.  Shultz also argued that ideas of complete 




security and access to resources.  Because of that, he believed this negotiation process 
had the potential to final succeed.53 
Once the plan was officially announced, Shultz received different reactions than 
what he expected.  He believed that he had Shamir’s support, but in fact, only Foreign 
Minister Peres supported it.  Shamir said, “I reject the whole initiative, I only accept two 
words in it, and the two words are the signature – George Shultz – and nothing else.”  In 
addition, Mubarak of Egypt also was unwilling to give his support.  He did not believe 
the Americans would pressure Israel enough to make the concessions to achieve piece on 
the West Bank.  He also did think that with the intifada raging, any plan could work that 
did not include substantial support from the Palestinians or the PLO.54 Hussein took a 
more cautious approach the Shultz Initiative.  When Shultz announced it, Hussein did not 
publically support it or reject it.  In a meeting with Shultz on March 1, in Amman, 
Hussein told him that the PLO needed to be included and that the international 
conference had to have the power to impose terms if necessary.  He did not reject the 
ideas behind the conference but still believed changes needed to be made for it to be 
successful.55  In a message to Shultz, the American embassy further elaborated on 
Hussein and his government’s view of Shultz proposal.  They told him that while the 
Jordanians were not unhappy about American involvement, they did not believe this was 
a true peace effort, rather just an attempt to save Israel from the intifada.  Many in Jordan 
felt the US had “breaches of faith in the peace process” in the past and had no reason to 
believe it would not continue.56  Because of the uprising and the decrease in Hussein’s 
stature in the West Bank, he knew that he could not negotiate for the PLO.  In addition, 




settlement that turned over the West Bank to the Palestinians, so he believed that the 
international conference needed to have more power to force the Israelis to negotiate an 
enforce any final agreement.  Shultz also underestimated the impact of the intifada on the 
peace process.  The daily pictures of Israeli soldiers assaulting rock-throwing Palestinian 
civilians diminished any appetite for a peace process in much of the Arab world.  No 
leader, including Hussein, could appear at a negotiating table with the Israeli leadership 
while the intifada raged and still expect to retain the support of their people.       
Shultz went to Jerusalem on February 25, to build support for his plan.  When he 
met with Shamir, he was told that after consultations with Begin, Shamir believed that 
without at least five years for the transition between autonomy and final status talks, the 
plan was unworkable.  He told Shultz that the Israelis needed that time to prove that the 
Palestinians could act in good faith.  Shamir’s attitude discouraged Shultz, but he pledged 
to keep working.57  While in Jerusalem, Shultz set up a meeting with a few local 
Palestinian leaders located in the West Bank with the goal of getting their support for his 
plan.  He hoped that if he had their blessing, it would overcome any opposition from the 
PLO.  Shultz agreed to meet them in the Arab part of Jerusalem, which would have made 
him the first secretary of state to visit that section since the Israeli takeover in 1967.  The 
day before the meeting, he was told that the PLO threatened the participants so they 
canceled.  Shultz decided to go anyway, hoping to show the Palestinians how far he was 
willing to go to achieve peace.  When nobody showed up to the meeting, Shultz made a 
statement to the Arabic television networks.  He said, “Peace has its enemies.  Even small 
steps towards peace can be significant in moving beyond mistrust and hatred.”  He also 




affect their lives and be active participants in negotiations to determine their future.”  He 
called on the Jews and the Palestinians to “look to a future of dignity, security, and 
prosperity.  New respect for rights and new readiness for political change must replace 
old recrimination and distrust.”58  Despite the continued statements from the PLO that 
anyone working with Shultz would be a traitor to the cause and statements from people 
close to Shamir that the proposal was dead, Shultz believed his plea to the Palestinians 
helped and hoped to continue moving forward.   
In March, Reagan invited Shamir to the White House to discuss Shultz’s plan.   
Reagan attempted to reassure Shamir that in any international conference, the US would 
protect Israel’s interests.  Shamir told Reagan that if the Soviets and the Europeans 
participated, it was unlikely that bilateral negotiations would ever occur.   He believed 
that the Soviets, in particular, would not want a repeat of Camp David where they 
participated in the early stages, only to be cut out when the more consequential bilateral 
talks began.  Reagan argued to Shamir that Israel’s fears were overblown and “the United 
States would never let them down.”  In a meeting with Shultz, Shamir told him, “I’m 
talking about Israel’s survival. . . .  With all my friendship and deep respect for you, you 
must understand that I cannot agree to what I believe may be in store for us a result of 
such a conference.  Please go slowly.  I know how much you do not want to injure us.”59 
While Shultz attempted to build support for his initiative, Hussein’s position in 
the West Bank continued to diminish.  Onn March 11, 1988, the Unified National 
Command, an organization set up to speak for the intifada, issued a communiqué that 
called for the people of the West Bank to “intensify the mass pressure against the 




regime.”  It also called on all members of the Jordanian Parliament that came from the 
West Bank to resign their positions “and align with the people.  Otherwise there will be 
no room for them on our land.” At this point in the intifada, Hussein regularly shipped 
supplies to the West Bank for use in the uprising, so he felt betrayed that the Palestinians 
called him an Israeli collaborator.  This statement angered Hussein because he believed 
that he was helping the intifada through both political and financial support.60  This 
statement also had the effect of further separating Jordan nationals with Palestinians 
living in Jordan.  It showed that even the non-PLO leadership in the West Bank did not 
see any relation with the people of Jordan, making the people of Jordan more likely to 
want nothing to with the West Bank and the problems of the Palestinians.  For Hussein, it 
led to the conclusion that nobody wanted him involved in the Palestinian issues.  He did 
not have the support of the people in Palestine because of the intifada and his failed 
economic plan.  He did not have the support of the PLO because of his crackdown on the 
PLO after the last failed effort to produce a joint delegation.  He did not have the support 
of the Israeli government, who under Shamir did not want to return any of the West Bank 
back to full Palestinian sovereignty.  He also did not have the support from most of the 
other Arab states who did not trust Hussein nor believe he had the best interests of the 
Palestinians at heart.  Finally, he did not have the support from his population, who tired 
of the constant insults of the Palestinians and the drain they caused on the Jordanian 
economy.   Because of these factors, Hussein’s goal of negotiating a return to the 1967 
Jordanian borders appeared to be at an end.       
In April, Shultz again traveled to the region in hopes of beginning his peace 




not in an international conference.  When Shultz met with Hussein, Hussein handed him a 
document outlining Jordan’s position.  Most of the points were similar to past Jordanian 
attitudes towards a peace process.  Mainly, he wanted the settlement to have the full 
withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank, a settlement based on UNSC Resolution 242, 
and he wanted the conference to have the power to force negotiations assuring Israel to 
negotiated in good faith.  In addition, it contained the principle of self-determination for 
the Palestinians and stated that Jordan would participate in the negotiations with a joint 
Jordan-Palestinian delegation, but would only do so if all parties agreed.  It stated clearly 
that Jordan did not represent the Palestinians or the PLO and those parties needed to 
negotiate on their own.  Hussein also broadcasted these conditions publically so there was 
no mistaking his attitude towards the initiative.61 
The Arab League met on June 7 to discuss the intifada and how to respond to it.  
They called for direct Arab money to help support the Palestinian uprising.  This was 
detrimental to Hussein because at this point, money donated to support the protests 
flowed through Jordan and then Jordan distributed it through a joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
committee.  When Hussein had control of the distribution, he could direct towards people 
and groups that had an affinity to the Jordan, while keeping it away from the more radical 
elements of the PLO.  At the meeting, Hussein tried to assure his fellow leaders that he 
had no desire anymore to retake the West Bank, but the other Arab leaders rejected his 
pleas and decided to focus on helping the Palestinians without the participation of 
Hussein and Jordan.62  This along with the communique from the Palestinians increased 




support of the Palestinian cause.  It helped to persuade him that another approach was 
necessary.       
The combination of the intifada, the continued failure of the peace process, and 
the reaction of the Palestinians towards Hussein and Jordan dramatically changed 
Hussein’s attitude towards the West Bank.  On July 28, Hussein canceled the economic 
plan for the Palestinian territories, and on July 31, Hussein gave a televised address to the 
nation where he announced that Jordan was disengaging from the West Bank and 
focusing the government’s efforts on the actual state of Jordan.  He said, “Of late, it has 
become clear that there is a general Palestinian and Arab orientation which believes in the 
need to highlight the Palestinian identity in full in all efforts and activities. . . .  It has also 
become obvious that there is a general conviction that maintaining the legal and 
administrative relationship with the West Bank, and the consequent special Jordanian 
treatment of the brother Palestinians living under occupation through Jordanian 
institutions in the occupied territories, goes against this orientation.”63  From this point 
on, Hussein announced, Jordan would no longer participate in any form of running the 
West Bank and Gaza.  Jordan would no longer consider Palestinians on the West Bank 
Jordanian citizens and issue them Jordanian passports.  Jordan would stop paying West 
Bank civil servants.  Palestinians on the West Bank would no longer participate in the 
Jordanian political system.  Jordan would no longer talk to the Americans or the Israelis 
about the West Bank, the US would have to discuss those issues directly with the 
Palestinians and their representatives.64  This was a complete break from any Jordanian 




existed since its founding.  Hussein tired of fighting with the Palestinians, decided to 
focus more on his actual people, the Jordanians.      
In the speech, Hussein also tried to unify the Palestinians who remained on the 
East Bank with Jordan.  He called them, “an integral part of Jordan” who had the same 
“full rights of citizenship and all its obligations . . . .   They are an integral part of the 
Jordanian state.”  According to Adnan Abu-Odeh, who wrote the speech, this was 
because of the fear that some in Jordanian society had so tired of the Palestinians that 
they would try to strip the citizenship rights of any Palestinian living in Jordan.   In 
addition, some believed that the Palestinians living on the East Bank in Jordan were 
supposed to be guests and now that the West Bank had been split from Jordan, they 
should leave.65  For many Palestinians, Jordan had been their home almost their entire 
life, making the discrimination some felt inside Jordan particularly difficult.  For many, it 
showed the need to have an independent Palestinian state and a true homeland for the 
displaced Palestinians to return. 
When discussing the disengagement later, Hussein said:  
It was the intifada that really caused our decision on disengagement from 
the West Bank.  It was again our lack of ability to get any agreement with 
our Palestinian brethren.  I wish to God they had been frank enough about 
what they wanted and they would have got it a long time before.  But we 
were torn apart trying to get all the pieces of the jigsaw together to help 
them.  However, suspicions and doubts got in the way.  But beyond that, 
we recognized there was a definite trend that had started before the Rabat 
resolution of 1974 and continued all the way through.  They could give, 
they could take, and they could whatever do they liked.  They could 
probably give more than we could but they decided they wanted to have 






Hussein believed it was important for Jordan to allow the Palestinians to deal with their 
issues, allowing him to focus on Jordan.  His only hesitation came from the status of the 
holy places in Jerusalem.  Hussein still believed his family had a duty to safeguard the 
holy sites and he planned to continue that duty.  Queen Noor said Hussein viewed his 
“responsibility [for the holy sites] as a personal and spiritual obligation as well as a 
political necessity, since there was no guarantee that the Israelis would allow the 
Palestinians sovereignty over those disputed sites.”67  He continued to pay the religious 
workers whose job it was to manage and safeguard the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem 
and continued to claim a Jordanian role in protecting the holy sites.68   
Salah Khalaf, the head of intelligence for the PLO, said, “The King was betting 
the PLO would not be capable of making an initiative for peace.  The best was that either 
there would be a failure to make decisions, or a failure to implement and that in either 
case, the PLO would have to go back to him.”  Arafat also agreed with this sentiment.  
He believed that Hussein was setting the PLO up for failure because it had no money or 
infrastructure in the occupied territories and because of that when things turned bad for 
the inhabitants, they would blame the PLO for their misery.69  Many Palestinians 
believed that when the PLO failed, Hussein would attempt to reclaim his role in the West 
Bank.  While it was probably correct that Hussein hoped the PLO failed, giving him 
another opportunity to regain control of the West Bank, the separation between Jordan 
and the Palestinians had enough support inside Jordan, it would have been difficult for 
Hussein to rejoin the two side of the Jordan River.  In addition, even if the PLO had 
difficulty running the daily operations of the West Bank, it was likely they would blame 




After Hussein’s announcement, the State Department received a cable from the 
American consulate in Tel Aviv that described the expected impact from Jordan’s 
disengagement with the West Bank.  Economically, they expected to have a severe 
impact on the West Bank economy.  They also believed in the short term most people 
would be paid, but Jordan would discontinue additional subsidies immediately given to 
the Palestinian workers.  One of the biggest areas of concerns was health workers.   
Talking to a health official in the West Bank, the embassy staff found that Jordan paid for 
almost a quarter of the staff.  Another issue was the removal of development funds.  The 
embassy believed that since Jordan provided most of those funds in conjunction with 
Israel, it would be impossible to find another to the nation to contribute funds and was 
willing to work with Israel.  Because of this, many infrastructure projects in the West 
Bank would end.  Finally, they believed there would be a political struggle between the 
PLO and the people living in the West Bank for control over the territory.  Whoever 
gained control would then have found a way to deal with Israel to improve lives of the 
people in the Palestinian territories.70 
Before Jordan ended its relationship with the West Bank, it was paying for over 
one third of the Palestinian civil servants.  Over eighteen thousand people lost their 
source of income because of Hussein’s decision.  This included ten thousand teachers and 
fourteen hundred health workers.  In addition, West Bank passports issued by Jordan now 
only had a two-year life before expiration.  Once those passports expired, many 
Palestinians working in other countries needed to return to the region to renew their travel 
documents with passports issued from a new Palestinian entity or Israel.  Jordan also put 




ability of many on the West Bank to earn a living.  Hussein also limited travel from the 
West Bank into Jordan and dramatically reduced the number of Palestinians who could 
attend schools and universities in Jordan.  Finally, all goods produced in the West Bank 
and sent to Jordan faced an import tax.71  The announcement that Jordan was severing its 
ties with the West Bank led to a panic amongst the Palestinians as they raided banks to 
get their savings and many found they no longer had an income.  The PLO tried to 
smuggle money into the West Bank to help the situation, but much of it was lost to greed 
and corruption.  In one example, the PLO paid an Israeli office ten percent to smuggle 
$500,000 into the territories.  Unfortunately, he kept $150,000 for his efforts.   Similar 
things happened when the PLO operatives took a large cut to smuggle in cash to the 
desperate residents of the West Bank.72  The lack of cash in the territories led to more 
hardships for the Palestinian people, including inflation and the lack of basic supplies, 
making the job of the PLO in managing the West Bank that much more difficult.   
Israel also reacted to Jordan’s ending its relationship with the Palestinian 
territories.  Shamir said that Hussein’s only goal was to “to ensure survival of the royal 
Hashemite house his grandfather had founded and he has headed virtually all his life.”  
He also believed that Hussein was desperate “to keep the intifada from spilling over into 
Jordan and thus, among other danger to him, agitating and perhaps strengthening Jordan’s 
large Palestinian population.”73 Shamir also announced that Israel no longer saw Hussein 
as a partner for peace in the West Bank and some in his party called for the immediate 
annexation of the Palestinian territories.  Because the Labor party and Peres put so much 
stock in Hussein, they were largely discredited in Israeli politics and they lost the election 




There were many consequences for Hussein’s announcement.  First, it ended the 
Shultz Initiative.  If Jordan was no longer willing to negotiate for the Palestinians and 
Israel under Shamir’s leadership was unwilling to negotiate with the PLO, the hope for 
Shultz’s plan evaporated.  Peres quickly realized his desire to continue negotiations under 
the London Agreement also ended.  Hussein was now unwilling to continue with that 
agreement in any form.  Finally, it forced the PLO to make changes that allowed for 
negotiations with Israel.  During the intifada, the PLO faced pressure from local leaders 
in the West Bank and Gaza to moderate enough that it allowed for talks with Israel.  They 
feared that if the PLO did not open negotiations, it would be impossible to see any gains 
from the intifada.  Without negotiations, the status quo was destined to remain and Israel 
would continue to expand their settlements.  Because of that, on November 15, the 
Palestinian National Council and Arafat passed a resolution agreeing to all previous UN 
resolutions, recognizing Israel, and calling for a two state solution.75  This statement 
allowed the PLO to begin open communications with the United States, allowing the 
PLO to be recognized worldwide as the legitimate voice of the Palestinians.     Before 
leaving office, on December 14, Shultz issued a statement that said, “The Palestinian 
Liberation Organization today issues a statement in which it accepted UNSC Resolutions 
242 and 338, recognizes Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and renounce 
terrorism.  As a result, the United States is prepared for a substantive dialogue with PLO 
representatives.”76    
The Reagan administration saw many changes in the relationship between Jordan 
and the United States.  Hussein and Reagan managed different peace initiatives that 




importance to the US in stopping Soviet expansion while at the same time using the 
threats from the Soviet Union to show the White House that Jordan was an indispensable 
ally in the region.  When Congress refused to provide Jordan with sufficient military aid, 
Hussein looked elsewhere.  In addition, Reagan and Hussein clashed over similar issues 
faced by previous administrations, mainly American support of Israel and finding a just 
solution to the Palestinian problem.   
There were also a number of missed opportunities for Jordan, the US, and Israel 
to achieve a peace deal.  Many of these occurred because of dysfunction in the Israeli 
government but both Shultz and Reagan had opportunities to move the process forward if 
they were willing to pressure the Israeli government.  Because they were not, the 
situation in the occupied territories continued to deteriorate, leading to the intifada. 
The intifada fundamentally changed the situation in the occupied territories.  The 
uprising destroyed any efforts by the Reagan administration to achieve a breakthrough in 
the peace process.  Through Hussein’s decision to walk away from his role in the West 
Bank, the United States lost its most important partner in dealing with the Palestinians.  
While Hussein still harbored a desire to control the West Bank, especially the holy sites 
in Jerusalem, the continued uprising along with the growing opposition to the 
Palestinians from his population made that goal impossible.  Hussein’s actions forced 
both the PLO and the United States to reexamine their previous conflicts and agree to 
overcome the opposition of the inclusion of the PLO in any future peace talks with Israel.  
The PLO now how the responsibility to govern the West Bank and Gaza, forcing them to 




Israel.   Despite Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank, he would continue to play 









HUSSEIN, BUSH AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 
 
When George H. W. Bush won election after Reagan, Hussein hoped that his past 
relationship with Bush would lead to real progress in the Middle East peace process.  
Despite their close personal relationship, the Bush presidency brought a number of 
challenges to Jordan’s relationship with the United States.  Hussein enthusiastically 
worked with Bush to propel his first effort at solving the issues between the Israelis and 
the Arabs.  He hoped to use his friendship with Bush to finally accomplish Jordan’s goals 
in the peace process.  Bush’s efforts were interrupted when Saddam Hussein invaded 
Kuwait, leading to the first real break in American and Jordanian relations in decades.  
The Gulf War was a traumatic event for both Hussein and Jordan.  It challenged Jordan’s 
historical role as an important American ally in the region.  Despite their divisions caused 
by the Gulf War, Hussein and Bush would eventually collaborate again to try and bring a 
peaceful solution to the Arabs and Israelis, demonstrating Hussein’s importance to the 
interests of the United States in the region.  While Bush did not get to participate in the 
culmination of the peace process between Jordan and Israel, the progress made during his 




The relationship between Bush and Hussein began while Bush was director of the 
CIA during the Ford administration.  They had a friendly relationship built on mutual 
respect and admiration built over countless interactions while Bush led the CIA and 
amity continued when he became Reagan’s Vice President.  When Bush won the 
presidential election, Hussein was one of the first foreign leaders to call and congratulate 
him and told him he could not, “say how optimistic I am about the prospects for working 
together.”  The Bush and Hussein family were so close that Queen Noor also called to 
congratulate Barbara Bush.1  On November 21, Bush wrote Hussein a letter and said, 
“You and your countrymen are on my mind.  As I begin to form my foreign policy 
agenda, Jordan and the Middle East will remain one of my top priorities.  I want to work 
together with you to forge fair and just solutions to the region’s problems.”  He also told 
Hussein that he was happy he would, “be able to continue the wonderful working 
relationship with you that we have developed over the last several years.”2   
Bush and Hussein’s first meeting after Bush’s inauguration occurred at the funeral 
of Emperor Hirohito on February 23, 1989.  In the meeting, they discussed the state of 
the peace process and the possibilities of future collaborations to draft a final settlement 
for the region.  Hussein told Bush that he believed that Israeli public opinion was 
changing and that the Israeli government would soon be willing to discuss issues directly 
with the Palestinians.  Bush responded to Hussein that he was pleased that the PLO 
finally met the minimum conditions necessary for discussions with the US.  Hussein and 
Bush also agreed that some form of international conference would be needed to get all 
the major Arab states involved with the hope of reaching a comprehensive solution.  In 




Security Council Resolutions.  Finally, Hussein told Bush that despite his break from the 
West Bank, the possibility for a confederation between Jordan and the Palestinians was 
still possible because of his improving relations with Arafat.3  The meeting between the 
leaders reaffirmed their friendly relationship and showed that for once, the US and Jordan 
had similar views of the future peace process.  Hussein finally had hope that the 
American leadership would pressure Israel into making the hard decisions necessary for a 
comprehensive peace deal.  It also demonstrated that while Hussein publically broke with 
the West Bank, in private he still desired its eventual incorporation into Jordan.   
Without the presences of aides Bush and Hussein had a private dinner the next 
night, together with their wives.  At the dinner, Hussein gave Bush a booklet that 
described the Jordanian efforts for peace since 1967.  Hussein used it to explain a number 
of myths he believed existed concerning his negotiations with Israel.  He told Bush that 
the stronger Israel was, the less likely it was willing to make concessions for peace.  This 
countered the traditional American belief that the US needed to make Israel secure before 
it would agree to a peace process.  It was also a way for Hussein to argue for more 
weapons from the Americans.  If Israel’s state of security had no impact on the peace 
process, the US had no reason not to give Jordan modern weapons.  Hussein also 
dismissed the need for bilateral negotiations by saying, “during the past two decades I 
have personally met in secret, on more than 150 occasions, totaling approximately 1,000 
hours of talk, with almost every top Israeli official . . . all those efforts have not brought 
us any closer to the peace I am determined to achieve.”  Hussein closed his paper to Bush 
by saying, “The history of the problem and the record of past negotiations makes it clear 




terms for which are already substantially agreed upon and to which all parties, except 
Israel, are committed to attend.”4  Hussein hoped that this argument would sway Bush to 
pressure Israel to commit to a conference to settle their dispute with the Arabs.  He also 
wanted to show that he was, and had always been, a committed friend and ally to the 
United States and he hoped to continue that role during Bush’s presidency.  The private 
dinner between the leaders and their families demonstrated the friendship they developed 
over years of working together.  Finally, Hussein wanted to demonstrate to Bush that 
Jordan was not the problem in solving the issues between the Arabs and Israel.  He 
needed a partner willing to work towards peace and up until this point, that has been 
missing from the negotiations.     
Bush’s first foray into the peace process started when Shamir announced a plan 
on May 14, 1989 with a goal of stopping the still raging intifada in the occupied 
territories.  His plan became known as the “Four-Point plan” and it called for elections in 
Gaza and the West Bank that would form a negotiating delegation to work out a five-year 
interim settlement with Israel.  During that five-year period, the newly elected delegates 
would administer the West Bank and Gaza as the negotiation proceeded, the Palestinian 
delegation would move the territories towards self-government, with Israel retaining 
some security control.  The delegation would not include any members of the PLO.5  
New Secretary of State James Baker believed Shamir’s plan was too vague to get any 
support from the Arabs.  In addition, it had no workable mechanism to discuss final 
settlement talks.6  When meeting with Bush during a Washington visit on July 7, 1989, 
Hussein told him that the Israeli plan did not meet the basic elements required for a 




allow elections until after all demonstrations from the intifada ended.  In addition, there 
was no possibility of a Palestinian state in the final status agreement and while 
negotiations continued, Israel would continue to expand its settlements in the West Bank.  
Bush told Hussein that he had the same concerns, but so far pressure on Israel to 
moderate its settlement activity had not succeeded.  He also told Hussein he was 
frustrated by the actions of Shamir and that the US policy against expansion of 
settlements and for immediate free and fair elections in the territories had not changed.  
Hussein explained to Bush that the point of Shamir’s plan was “to engage in a process of 
considerable apparent motion without substantial progress.”7  For Hussein, this was a 
very positive meeting.  He believed that in Bush, he finally had a president who would 
not fall victim to the usual games and delaying tactics of the Israelis.  While on its face, 
the Shamir plan showed Israel willing to engage in a substantial peace process, in fact it 
was an attempt to end the intifada.  Shamir later demonstrated he had no interest in 
allowing the Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank.  His only goal was to end the 
intifada and argue to the world that the lack of movement in the peace process occurred 
because of Arab radicalness.   
Both Mubarak and Baker responded with their own version of Shamir’s plan.  
Mubarak’s “Ten-point Plan” added the people of Jerusalem to the voting population and 
called for final settlement talks to begin sooner.  Israel wanted to avoid allowing the 
Arabs of Jerusalem to participate in any Palestinian elections because it implied that they 
belonged in a future Palestinian entity, something Israel did not accept.  Israel’s historic 
position was that the Palestinians in Jerusalem belonged to the state of Israel and 




discussed the actual mechanisms of the election process, including the idea that Israel 
could not interfere in any way.  Finally, it called for any negotiation to be based on past 
UN Security Council resolutions.  Baker also responded with his own version.   It tried to 
ease some of the concerns about the final composition of the Palestinian delegation, but 
still included most of the points made by Mubarak’s plan.  It made Egypt the center of the 
negotiating strategy while making no determination on the how the Palestinian election 
took place nor how who represented them in talks.  Finally, it called for a meeting in 
Washington after the initial gathering in Cairo.8  Because Hussein abandoned his claim to 
the West Bank, the US did not need him to participate in the process with the 
Palestinians.  Egypt continued to restore relations with the rest of the Arab world and 
because they already had relations with Israel, Mubarak replaced Hussein as the lead 
Arab negotiator for the Palestinians.   
Israel accepted Baker’s proposal reluctantly on November 9, 1989.  The Israelis, 
the Americans and the Egyptians agreed to meet in Cairo on January 24, 1990, to further 
discuss these ideas.  While in Cairo, Israel and Shamir added new conditions for future 
discussions before the talks moved to Washington.  This included no prohibition on the 
expansion of Israeli settlements while negotiations took place and a demand that the 
intifada ended before any elections could occur.  There was also disagreement on if Israel 
formally accepted the idea of trading land for peace and if the PLO could have any 
involvement at all.  Egypt opposed these conditions but pledged to Baker to continue to 
work with him and the PLO to find a solution that satisfied everyone.9  Baker found that 
every time he believed he had an agreement to move forward with the talks, another issue 




Because Israel continued building settlements on the West Bank and in Gaza, every delay 
helped them alter the status quo on the ground, making it more likely that Israel would 
retain significant portions of the West Bank and Gaza.  In addition, Arafat had little 
incentive to end the intifada before Israel made concessions.  His position as the leader of 
the Palestinians was only enhanced while Israel failed to contain the uprisings.     
In the background of the attempts to restart the peace process, Israel faced the 
growing problem of the influx of Soviet Jews immigrating to Israel due to of the ongoing 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Israel believed that to absorb those immigrants, it 
needed to continue to expand their settlements in the West Bank, a policy which also had 
the benefit of further asserting their control over the West Bank.10  In a dramatic change 
in American policy, during a news conference on March 3, Bush said, “My position is 
that the foreign policy of the United States says we do not believe there should be new 
settlements in the West Bank or East Jerusalem.  And I will conduct that policy as if it’s 
firm . . . and I will be shaped in whatever decisions we make to see whether people can 
comply with that policy.”11  This was the most public opposition to Israeli settlement 
activity to date by an American president and a significant gesture towards the Arabs.   In 
addition, it contained the implicit threat that continued Israeli settlement activity could 
harm relations between the US and Israel.  It was also an attempt by Bush to show the 
Arabs his commitment to the peace process and pressuring Israel to make the necessary 
concessions to achieve a deal.          
Another challenge to the negotiations came from the PLO.  While Arafat had 
accepted the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and renounced violence, there 




Palestinians from the Palestinian Liberation Front, landed on a beach in Tel Aviv with the 
intent on attacking Israeli civilians.  Fortunately, Israel security forces were able to stop 
them before they executed their attack. 12  When Arafat refused to condemn the attack, 
Baker and Bush suspended all talks with the PLO.  Baker said, “Arafat had squandered 
any chance of establishing his credibility or even a scintilla of moral authority. . . .  From 
a political standpoint, the PLO was no longer a reliable interlocutor.”13  Bush also 
condemned the PLO for not reacting sufficiently to the attempted attack and pledged to 
only work with the PLO if Arafat took steps to remove groups from his organization that 
still used violence.14  Since Hussein still refused to represent the Palestinians, and if the 
US refused to work with Arafat, Baker and Bush had very few options for moving the 
peace process forward.  In addition, because of the intifada, Hussein could not have 
easily replaced Arafat in the negotiations even if he wanted to.  His efforts would likely 
end in failure, diminishing his position with both Israel and the United States.   
The challenges from Israel continued to frustrate Baker, and in July 1990, the 
negotiations finally collapsed when Shamir was reelected and added more conditions to 
the negotiations.15  Shamir told Baker that despite his objections, Israel never 
relinquished the right to settle in the West Bank and believed their presence there was as 
legitimate as any Palestinian.16  In his frustration, Baker told new Israeli Foreign 
Minister, David Levy:  
Unless all parties tempered their inflexibility, there won’t be any dialogue, 
and there won’t be any peace, and the United States of America can’t 
make that happen. . . .  It’s going to take some really good-faith 
affirmative effort on the part of our good friends in Israel.  If we don’t get 
it, and we can’t get it quickly . . . I have to tell you that everybody over 
there should know that the telephone number is 1-202-456-1414.  When 




   
This failed attempt at the peace process, while short, shaped Bush and Baker’s views of 
the Israeli government and its inability in their view to make the hard choices needed to 
achieve peace.  While in Baker’s view, the PLO and Arafat also were not ready to make 
the hard choices for peace, he did find some Arabs, in Mubarak and Hussein, willing to 
help the US to solve the problems of the Palestinians and the Israelis.  Baker’s assessment 
of the situation proved correct as peace process ended until after the Persian Gulf War.   
After that, Baker’s attitude towards Hussein and Mubarak would also prove true as both 
led a positive role in the peace process. 
 While the peace process was not moving forward, Hussein continued to improve 
his relationship with Saddam Hussein of Iraq.  Starting in 1988, and continuing in 1989, 
the connection between Jordan and Iraq’s military and intelligence services expanded.   
This included joint Iraqi-Jordanian air force training, reconnaissance flights in the Jordan 
Valley and by 1990, a joint Iraqi-Jordanian air squadron.  Hussein claimed that he needed 
this partnership to maintain the readiness of his troops at a reasonable expense and did 
not represent a new alliance between Jordan and Iraq.18  This was a strong signal to Israel 
that any attempt to harm Jordan would be met by a joint Iraq-Jordanian force.   On 
February 16, 1990, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen formed the Arab Co-Cooperation 
Council (AAC).  It was joint idea between Saddam and Hussein that they presented to 
Egypt with the hope of creating an economic block to rival the power of the Gulf States.  
Hussein believed that the combination of the military of Iraq, the educated workforce of 
Jordan, and the manpower of Egypt, combined with their access to ports on the 




benefited all its members.19  Others saw the more nefarious goals behind the AAC.  
Mubarak believed the council’s primary mission was trade related, but he also believed 
Saddam saw it as a way to increase his power in the Arab world.  Once the council was 
formed, Saddam sent a fleet of Mercedes to Egypt for Mubarak and all his top political 
appointees.  Mubarak rejected the gift but believed others took it.  Mubarak later believed 
that Saddam tried something similar to gain support for his invasion of Kuwait.  He told 
Baker that Hussein took bribes from Saddam before and likely would again.  He said, 
“You go to Amman and you’ll see all the new Mercedes.”20  Stories about Saddam’s 
attempts to bribe other Arab leaders gave credence to future charges that Saddam bribed 
Hussein to support his invasion of Kuwait.  Hussein’s connections to Saddam were built 
on friendship but also due to the strategic needs of Jordan.  Iraq was a strong military ally 
that could protect Hussein from Israel or Syria.  In addition, by merging elements of their 
military and intelligence service, Jordan received the benefit of Iraq’s much larger 
security apparatus at a fraction of the cost.       
The economic issues of the region and the ability of the wealthier oil states to help 
the poorer Arab states was the main issue at the Arab League Summit in Bagdad on May 
28, 1990. The main topic discussed by the Arab leaders was financial aid for both the 
Palestinians and the non-oil rich Arab states.  Currently, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia only 
pledged money on a year to year basis, which upset Hussein because it prevented him 
from making long-term infrastructure improvements without knowing his future finances.  
Despite Hussein’s pleas for change, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait maintained their 
policy of only deciding on foreign aid on a year to year basis.  In addition, Saddam 




the conference, Saddam urged for the Arabs to unite against the rest of the world.  He 
said that the Arabs controlled the sixty-five percent of the world’s oil and needed to unite 
to take advantage of that to make sure the West respected the Arab world’s interests.  He 
also talked about how the Arabs should view themselves as one Arab nation, and the 
strongest nations had to support the smaller ones so there was not a hole in the common 
Arab defense.22  Needless to say, Saddam envisioned himself as the head of this united 
Arab nation. While at the conference, Saddam tried to establish himself as the leader of 
the Arab cause, he also tried to unite the poorer Arab states under his leadership.  His 
speech argued to leaders like Hussein that under Iraq’s leadership the inequalities created 
by the vast oil wealth of some Arab states would, an incentive for leaders like Hussein to 
continue to support Saddam. 
After the Arab summit in Baghdad, Saddam promised Hussein he would quickly 
repay a loan from the Iran-Iraq War of over $600 million.  In addition, Saddam agreed to 
give Hussein $50 million in financial aid.  This was important for Hussein because he 
currently faced many economic challenges including bread riots and forced austerity as a 
condition of an International Monetary Fund loan.23  Compare Iraq’s support to the 
support Hussein received from Kuwait during the 1980s.  On numerous occasions, 
Kuwait promised to deliver aid to Jordan to help them out of an economic crisis.  Each 
time, before the aid was delivered, for some reason or another, the aid was canceled or 
delayed.24 The support from Iraq was public knowledge and compared to the support 
Jordan received from other Arab countries, was very high.  Because of that, it is not 
surprising that Hussein and the people of Jordan had an affinity for Saddam in his dispute 




supported Jordan and its people and another that consistently broke its commitments to 
help Jordan.   
Another factor in Hussein’s support of Saddam was the views of the people of 
Jordan.  Saddam was a large supporter of the Palestinian cause and a friend to Arafat and 
the PLO.   The goodwill between Saddam and the Palestinians transferred to Palestinians 
on the West Bank and inside Jordan.  To gain Arafat’s support, Saddam told him in a 
meeting in March 1990 that, “We will enter Jerusalem victorious and will raise our flag 
on its walls.  You will enter with me riding on your white stallion.”  He also explained to 
Arafat that, “From now on we shall not need any more concessions or political efforts 
because you and I know that they are useless. . . .   We shall support the intifada by our 
air force and accurate missiles in order to deal a blow on the enemy and defeat it even 
without ground fighting.”  Saddam also ordered the murder of any PLO official who did 
not support Arafat’s position.25  Since Saddam was able to get the support of many of the 
Palestinians for his cause, it put more pressure on Hussein to not break with Iraq.  If he 
did, he faced increased domestic pressure on his rule from the huge Palestinian 
population still residing in Jordan. 
Any efforts to continue the peace process was interrupted in the summer of 1990 
when Saddam Hussein began vocally attacking his neighbors in Kuwait for their 
economic and oil policies.  Saddam needed to fix the Iraqi economy and pay off his large 
accumulated debt from the Iran-Iraq War.  The only way that was possible was through 
the sale of oil.   In September 1988, the price of oil fell to $13.54 a barrel and in June 
1990, oil traded $17.05 a barrel.26  The drop in oil prices from their high in July 1987 cost 




it cost Iraq $1 billion.  Saddam blamed Kuwait for the overproduction of oil and its 
inability to raise oil prices.  In addition, Saddam believed that Kuwait was drilling from 
their land into the Rumelila Oil field in Iraq.  He also believed that Kuwait set up farms 
and police posts on the Iraqi side of the border.  Finally, Saddam wanted a number of 
islands in the Persian Gulf that belonged to Kuwait to build a deep water port for his 
navy.27  While Saddam had legitimate complaints about Kuwait, especially Kuwaiti 
violations of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil export quotas, 
his larger concern was improving the Iraqi economy, ending his foreign debt from the 
Iran-Iraq War, and establishing himself as the leader of the Arab world.   Many of these 
complaints aligned with the interests of Hussein.  If the Iraqi economy grew, Jordan 
would also benefit.  In addition, Jordan could benefit if the wealthy oil states shared some 
of their profits with smaller states devoid of natural resources like Jordan.   
The first signs that Iraq could attack Kuwait occurred when some Iraqi forces 
moved south on July 21.  Through a series of phone calls, Saddam told Mubarak and 
King Fahd that they were heading to the Faw peninsula, an area controlled by Iraq but 
disputed by Iran.  He assured them he had no intention of attacking Kuwait.  In addition, 
Fahd believed that those units were not Saddam’s elite forces, the forces that would be 
used if he attempted to invade his neighbors.  Because of that, Fahd and Mubarak were 
not too worried about Saddam’s actions and did not believe and invasion was imminent.  
In other phone calls, Saddam told both Mubarak and Hussein that he was just trying to 
scare Kuwait, while he still expressed outrage at Kuwait’s financial habits and its 
unwillingness to share with the rest of the Arab world.  He told Mubarak that Sheikh 




half of Egypt’s debts.”28  Saddam also told Hussein to, “Let the Gulf States know that if 
they do not give this money to me, I will know how to get it.”29  Both Hussein and 
Mubarak assured their allies in the region and throughout the West that they had no 
reason to believe Saddam had any intention of attacking Kuwait.  Mubarak called Bush 
on July 25 and told him, “I left for Iraq and had a long discussion with President Saddam 
Hussein.  I believe he is interested in resolving this issue and has no intention of attacking 
Kuwait or any other party.  Hussein followed up on July 29, telling Bush, “Nothing will 
happen.”30  Hussein again talked to Bush two days later and was still confident that Iraq 
had no intention of attacking Kuwait.31        
In a meeting between Saddam and the American ambassador to Iraq, April 
Glaspie, on July 25, 1990, Saddam explained his attitude toward Kuwait.  He argued that 
after eight years of fighting Iran for the Arab cause, he could not continue to take the 
insults from Kuwait and its attempts to damage the Iraqi economy through its oil policies.   
He said the actions of Kuwait were “harming even the milk our children drink, and the 
pensions of the widow who lost her husband during the war, and the pensions of the 
orphans who lost their parents.”32  He also gave a warning to Glaspie, saying, “If you use 
pressure, we’ll deploy pressure and force.   We know that you can harm us. . . .  But we 
too can harm you. . . .   We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but 
individual Arabs may reach you.”33  Because of these disputes and after the clear warning 
to the US to stay out, on the morning of August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.    
From the start of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Hussein argued that it was an Arab 
issue that should be solved by Arabs.  Once he found out about the invasion, he called 




long as there were no more provocations.  Hussein passed this message on to Mubarak, 
who agreed that this should remain an Arab matter with the hope of keeping outside 
powers out of the Middle East.  Mubarak and Hussein agreed to keep the Arab League 
from condemning Saddam’s invasion as long as he agreed to withdraw and attend a 
summit that would mediate his disputes with Kuwait.34  Outside involvement in the 
dispute had the potential to hurt Hussein in a number of ways.  First, any sanctions on 
Iraq would damage the Jordanian economy.   In addition, he sympathized with Iraq’s 
attacks on Kuwait because he too felt the wealth oil states did not adequately support the 
rest of the Arab world.  Finally, Hussein frequently argued for the need for a united Arab 
front to deal with the West and Israel, and he agreed with Saddam that states like Kuwait 
did not support that unity through their economic policies.  
On August 3, Hussein and Mubarak met in Alexandria and decided Hussein 
would fly to Baghdad and meet with Saddam.  They agreed that they should attempt to 
get Saddam to withdrawal his forces and attend a mini-summit in Saudi Arabia to work 
out his differences with Kuwait, peacefully, as Arab brothers.  The leaders differ on their 
interpretations of what happened next.  Mubarak said he told Hussein that before the 
summit occurred, Saddam needed to withdrawal and restore the rightful Kuwaiti 
government.  Hussein believed that he was flying to Iraq to get Saddam’s agreement to 
withdraw after a summit worked out the issues between him and the Kuwaiti leadership.  
Hussein said, “my mission was to convince him of the idea of a mini-summit so that we 
could discuss a dangerous situation . . . and to ensure that the Emir of Kuwait could take 
part.”  Hussein felt that if Saddam allowed the Emir’s participation, he recognized that 




believed that he had an agreement from Mubarak not to allow any action at the Arab 
league until he had his chance to persuade Saddam to attend the summit and withdrawal 
his forces.  He hoped that this would be enough to end the crisis and avoid an escalation 
that plunged the region into war. 
In the meeting between Hussein and Saddam, Hussein said, “I know the West 
better than many others, and I can tell you that the West will intervene.  I plead with you 
to withdraw.”  Saddam replied, “Abu Abdullah (which meant father of Abdullah and was 
a formal title Saddam used when talking to Hussein as a sign of respect), don’t let them 
scare us. . . .  We are going to withdraw.  It was announced in the communiqué we issued 
this morning.”  The message that the Iraqi Revolutionary Council Command put out 
agreeing to withdraw its forces put the invasion of Kuwait in religious terms.  In addition, 
it compared the Kuwaiti family to a legendary Islamic monarch who hoarded all the 
worlds gold and kept it from the people.  In addition, the message said that Iraq entered 
Kuwait through the invitation of the Kuwaiti people to liberate these riches and return it 
to its proper place.36 Despite the harshness of the message, Hussein believed he had an 
agreement with Saddam that would end the crisis.  On August 4, the Iraqi Revolutionary 
Command Council announced “It there are not threats against Iraq or Kuwait, Iraqi forces 
will start to withdraw [on August 4].  A plan to withdraw has already been approved.”37  
For Saddam, he believed he could not leave Kuwait under pressure but only on his terms.  
Threats from outside powers, particularly the United States, would force Saddam to 
reconsider his plan to evacuate Kuwait because he believed it would weaken him in the 




On the evening of August 5, the Arab League met in Cairo and issued a statement 
condemning Iraq and demanding its unconditional evacuation of Kuwait along with the 
restoration of the Kuwaiti ruling family.  Mubarak faced pressure from both Saudi Arabia 
and the US to condemn Iraq and to take a hardline against acquiring land through 
aggression.  In addition, Mubarak believed that Saddam and Hussein were too close both 
economically and personally for Hussein to act as an effective representative of the Arab 
position.  Finally, Mubarak did not trust Hussein and accused him of a conspiracy to 
divide up any land conquered by Iraq, including Saudi Arabia.38  Instead of ending the 
crisis, these actions just escalated it.  The actions of the Arab League outraged Hussein.  
He believed that he had a solution to the crisis and Mubarak did not give him the time he 
promised to complete it.39  Egypt and the Arab League’s statement condemning Iraq 
ended the possibility of a quick solution to the crisis.  It increased the likelihood that 
Saddam would not leave Kuwait without the use of force.  In addition, when Jordan did 
not support the statement from the Arab League, it further complicated Hussein’s 
relationship with the US and his neighbors.  It is difficult to be certain if Hussein was 
correct that Saddam planned on leaving Kuwait if he faced no provocations from the 
Arab League.  Saddam frequently lied to both Hussein and Mubarak, making it difficult 
to trust his word.  Hussein did accept Saddam at his word and saw Mubarak’s action as a 
personal betrayal.       
Starting on August 6, the White House and Saudi Arabia began negotiating on the 
stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia to defend against a possible invasion by 
Saddam.  In addition, Egypt participated in these negotiations and agreed to send a force 




Mubarak changed his stance against Saddam.  He was working with the Americans to 
allow for a large foreign force, including Egypt, into Saudi Arabia.  He believed that to 
justify that effort, he needed the support of the Arab League, making it necessary for the 
League to condemn Saddam’s invasion.  Keeping foreign troops out of Saudi Arabia was 
one of Saddam’s main demands when he agreed to withdrawal from Kuwait.40  For King 
Fahd of Saudi Arabia, it was an easy decision to invite the Americans in, despite the 
predicted protests from some in the Arab world over the placement of non-Muslim 
foreign troops in the nation containing Islam’s holiest sites.  Fahd said, “The Kuwaitis 
delayed asking for help, and they are now our guests.  We do not want to make the same 
mistake and become someone else’s guests.”41  With the dramatic arrival of foreign 
troops, any withdrawal by Iraq would appear to been as a result of the threat of foreign 
intervention.  While Saddam was willing to negotiate, he was not willing for it to appear 
he was forced out by external threats.  This ended any direct dialogue between Iraq and 
the other Arabs and eliminated the possibility that this crisis would be resolved through 
only Arab mediation.  It also diminished Hussein’s position because he could not get 
either side to abide by promises made to him.  Iraq was not removing its troops and Egypt 
was looking outside of the Arab world for a response to his condemnation of Iraq.    
The United Nations passed a number of major resolutions after the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq.  UNSC Resolution 660, passed on August 2, condemned the Iraqi 
invasion and “Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces 
to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.”  It also called for Iraq and 
Kuwait to begin negotiating to solve their disputes.42  While this resolution condemned 




Saddam if he chose to take it.  When Iraq did not comply, on August 6, the UNSC passed 
UNSC Resolution 661 that called for an immediate ban on the import of “all commodities 
and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait.”43  Resolution 661 was particularly damaging 
to Jordan because Iraq was still Jordan’s largest trading partner.  The Jordanian economy 
already in bad shape, could not afford a total break with Iraq.  Jordan’s violations of the 
sanctions, even if they did it covertly, caused great stress between Hussein and the 
Americans but Hussein had little choice because of Jordan’s integration with the Iraqi 
economy over the previous decade.   
Another impact on the Jordanian economy from the Iraqi invasion came from the 
massive influx of refugees.  People from all over the Arab world left Kuwait and Iraq.  In 
some cases, they just passed through Jordan with the intention of returning to Egypt, but 
many had no place to go and remained in Jordan.  In total, Jordan had almost four 
hundred thousand displaced refugees.  For most of the conflict, it averaged over ten 
thousand people entering Jordan a day.  In total, over three million people passed through 
Jordan during the conflict.44  Jordan had no way to house, clothe, feed, or provide 
employment to all these refugees and because of Hussein’s refusal to condemn Saddam, 
he did not receive adequate assistance from the US or the rest of the Arab world deal with 
this crisis.    
The current state of affairs hugely disappointed Hussein.  He believed that both 
Saddam and Mubarak lied to him, with Saddam previously assuring him that he had no 
intention of invading Kuwait and Mubarak going back on his word to let Hussein try and 
end the crisis peacefully.  In addition, the economic impact of the sanctions crippled the 




possibility of abdicating the throne.  Hussein believed that his deteriorating position in 
the Arab world and with the US was hurting his nation and it might be better for his 
people of someone else took the lead.  In addition, with Iraq and Saddam not listening to 
him, there did not seem to be a viable way out of the problem for Jordan.  A number of 
his aides, including Prime Minister, al-Masri, along with the Queen, convinced Hussein 
to remain on the throne and continue to fight for Jordan’s position.45    
On August 5, Hussein contacted Fahd and told him that he just spoke with 
Saddam who assured him that his forces were not moving towards Saudi Arabia.  In fact, 
he said the only forces he had close were searching for the Kuwaiti royal family.  Hussein 
told Fahd that Saddam was still willing to meet at a summit to discuss the issues between 
Iraq and Kuwait and that the Iraqi press was showed pictures of some Iraqi troops leaving 
Kuwait.  Hussein even offered to send his troops to patrol the border between Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia to make sure Iraq did not invade.  Fahd ignored Hussein’s request and told 
him that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were no longer interested in participating in a summit 
after Iraq rejected their calls for a full withdrawal.46  Because of Hussein’s closeness with 
Saddam, King Fahd could not trust Hussein completely, and Hussein’s offer to send 
troops to the border did not ease that suspicion.  
At an Arab League summit in Cairo on August 10, the Arab leaders passed a 
statement that called for all Arabs to assist Saudi Arabia in preventing an attack by Iraq.  
The statement was clumsily written and gave the impression to many at the summit that it 
was drafted in English and translated to Arabic so the Saudis could present it.  Hussein 
even acknowledged that it seemed like the statement was drafted in Washington and not 




Iraq to persuade him to leave Kuwait.  While he was making his presentation, Mubarak 
and Fahd were informed of Iraqi radio broadcasts that called for the people of Egypt to 
close the Suez Canal and the people of Saudi Arabia to revolt and retake the holy sites 
from government because of their welcoming foreign troops to Saudi soil.  Because of 
that, both leaders rejected going to Baghdad.  When Hussein was asked if he would go, 
he said he had gone many times already and some believed he was not impartial.  For that 
reason, he had no intention of going again.  Another controversy at the summit occurred 
over the voting rules.  In the past, on issues of security, the Arab League required a 
unanimous vote for any resolutions. In this case Mubarak and Fahd claimed the votes 
only needed a simple majority.  When the resolutions passed without a unanimous vote, 
leaders like Gadhafi and Arafat protested the legality of the resolutions 47  Hussein 
largely stayed out of this debate, hoping not to alienate anyone else at this point.  Any 
actions Hussein took at the summit would only isolate him further.  He could either 
abandon his most strategic ally in the region or challenge his longtime friendship with the 
United States, neither outcome would benefit Jordan.         
During the meeting of the Arab League, Bush saw some attempt by Hussein to 
improve relations with both the US and the rest of the Arabs.  Hussein voted with the rest 
of the League to sanction Iraq, a big change from Hussein’s previous opposition to any 
coercion on Saddam.  In addition, when the Arab League voted to send troops to Saudi 
Arabia, Hussein announced his reservations, but did not officially oppose it.  Hussein’s 
abstention in the vote to send troops to Saudi Arabia was important because the vote 
would not have passed if he opposed it.  Hussein’s actions in the Arab League showed 




complaints about Hussein, at the Arab league he demonstrated that what he was saying 
was true, he believed that the Arabs should resolve the issues between Kuwait and Iraq.  
In addition, he made it clear that when he discussed the issues with Saddam, it was not as 
an ally, but as a someone trying to avoid war.  He had no love lost for the Kuwaitis, and 
Saddam and Iraq had been important for the economy and the stability of Jordan, 
regardless, Hussein continued to try and prevent a large scale war that he believed would 
devastate the region.       
Many in the region and throughout the world still questioned Hussein’s motives 
and his loyalty to Saddam and Iraq.  Mubarak was one of the leading voices claiming 
Hussein had ulterior motives for his support of Saddam.  In a call with Bush in August, 
Mubarak told Bush that Hussein and Yemen agreed to support Iraq for a portion of all 
future Kuwaiti oil sales and a portion of any financial assets Saddam could loot from 
Kuwait during his invasion.49  Mubarak also told similar things to American lawmakers, 
including Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey.  Lautenberg told the world the 
accusations against Hussein in an interview with CNN.  Later, when he met with Queen 
Noor, Lautenberg admitted that it was Mubarak telling people that Hussein was on 
Saddam’s payroll.50  As stated in the past, Mubarak never though highly of Hussein or his 
monarchy.  In addition, Mubarak had incentive to minimize Hussein’s role in the Middle 
East because it increased the importance of Egypt.  If Hussein fell out of favor with the 
US and the Bush administration, Egypt would be the only Israeli border state with good 
relations with the US, making them indispensable in any future peace process.   
Compared to Egypt, the relationship between Hussein and Saudi Arabia was 




Hussein was aligned with Saddam and not to trust his assurances that Iraq had no 
intention of attacking them.  When the AAC was formed, the Saudis believed that 
Hussein persuaded Yemen to join, making it so that Saudi Arabia was encircled by the 
members of the council.51  While they did not object to its formation, believing it was just 
an economic unit, they still worried that it had the potential to be a military threat.  In 
addition, historical rivalries between Hussein and the Saud family over the possession of 
the Muslim holy places also increased suspicion.52  The head of the Saudi military, 
General Khaled bin Sultan said, “it was not far-fetched to fear that King Hussein dreamed 
of retaking the Hijaz, once ruled by his great-grandfather.”53  When Hussein referred to 
himself as Sharif in a speech to tribal leaders in Jordan, Sultan said, “The term ‘Sharif’ is 
an honorific title reserved for those who claim decent from the Prophet Muhamad. . . .  
The King’s words angered and alarmed our leadership because it seemed to signal 
Hussein’s ambition . . . to seize territory in the Hijaz.”54  While there is no evidence 
Hussein had any intention of attacking Saudi Arabia, especially since it would likely 
mean the end of his rule, the beliefs of the Saudi leadership that Hussein was 
untrustworthy increased the view of many in the region that Hussein’s meetings with 
Saddam were not about looking for a peaceful solution, but to give Saddam the space he 
needed to consolidate his invasion.  In addition, because many of the American allies did 
not trust Hussein and repeatedly told the White House of their issues, it increased the 
view of the Bush administration that Hussein was too close to Saddam.   
Hussein repeatedly denied any such relationship with Saddam, he continued to 
state that his only goal was avoiding a devastating war.  Hussein tried numerous efforts to 




called on him to withdraw his forces.  In addition, Hussein ordered other measures to 
show the world that he did not accept Saddam’s actions in Kuwait.  For instance, he 
never recognized the false government in Kuwait installed by Saddam.  In addition, when 
some cars came across the border between Iraq and Jordan, Hussein removed their 
license plate.  At that time, licenses plates from Iraq contained the province location and 
if an Iraqi car’s plates stated it was from Iraq but the province of Kuwait, then the driver 
was forces to remove it before entering Jordan.55  Hussein also supported the sanctions by 
the Arab League.  Despite his efforts, Hussein could not persuade the Bush 
administration nor many of his Arab neighbors that he did not support Saddam. 
The Iraq crisis did help Hussein’s popularity inside of Jordan despite the 
economic problems associated with it.  Many of the Jordanian people did not like Arabs 
from the Gulf States.  They believed they were too wealthy and privileged and then 
abused that wealth.  They felt it was hypocritical for the US to condemn Iraq because of 
its occupation of Kuwait but allow and support Israel’s occupation of Arab land.  For one 
of the first times in the history of the regime, Hussein allowed anti-Western protests to 
show the public’s opposition to intervention by outside forces in Iraq.56  Hussein needed 
to allow the public to vent its outrage against the actions of the coalition for fear they 
would turn their frustrations towards him and his regime.  It was important for Hussein to 
receive the backing of his people because, before the conflict, his popularity waned due 
to poor economic conditions in Jordan including bread riots in some of Jordanian cities in 
April 1989.57  Now the people blamed the economic troubles on the West and the other, 
wealthier Arab states.  Hussein benefited from the opportunity to divert blame for 




While the situation in Iraq severely hampered Jordan’s economy, it had been suffering 
even before the conflict started.    
 In a speech on August 12, 1990, Saddam linked the fight in Kuwait to the 
Palestinian issues.  He said he believed that all issues of occupation should be resolved in 
the same forum.  He said Iraq would make withdrawal arrangements in Kuwait, “in 
accordance with the same principles for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of 
Israel from occupied Arab territories in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, [and] Syria’s 
withdrawal from Lebanon.”  He also called on the Security Council to pass similar 
resolutions like the ones against Iraq calling for the end of all occupations.  He said 
despite being welcomed in by the Kuwaiti people, who wanted to return to Iraq, he would 
remove his military from Kuwait if the Israelis and the Syrians also complied.58  This was 
an effort by Saddam do two things.  First, he wanted to show the hypocrisy of the West’s 
opposition to seizing land by force.  Second, he wanted to increase his popularity in the 
Arab streets by linking his efforts to the Palestinian cause.  He hoped that if he remained 
popular, it would be much more difficult for Arab leaders to unite behind a military 
action to remove him from Kuwait.  This strategy worked in Jordan where Saddam’s 
increasing popularity limited Hussein’s ability to criticize him harshly. 
Another issue Hussein faced was dissension from his advisors.  A number of his 
advisors had strong pro-Iraq beliefs and sometimes kept information from Hussein 
because they did not want him to oppose Saddam’s actions.  In one particular case, 
Jordan’s ambassador to the United Nations, Abdullah Salah, met with the American 
ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, to discuss possible ways to end the crisis in 




claims if it withdrew its forces from Kuwait.  The hope was Hussein would deliver that 
message to Saddam.  Unfortunately, the message never made it to Hussein and was likely 
blocked by Prime Minister Mudar Badran, who was close to Saddam and believed the US 
had no intention of launching a military effort.59  While it was unlikely that Saddam 
would have accepted the deal, it could have improved Hussein’s relationship with the US 
if he had the opportunity to try.      
While a majority of the Jordanian public supported Hussein’s attitude towards 
Saddam Hussein and Iraq, the same could not be said about the royal family.  Hussein’s 
younger brother Crown Prince Hassan believed that Saddam was a dangerous despot who 
should be avoided.  Hussein and Hassan would get into loud arguments over Hussein’s 
relationship with Saddam.  Hassan believed that Jordan was sacrificing its position with 
the West and the Gulf states to support Saddam’s goals of taking land by force, 
something Jordan had always opposed.60  Usually, Hussein trusted his brother’s advice, 
but with Saddam and Iraq, Hussein believed he was doing what was best for the region 
and the Arab world and could not be persuaded otherwise by anyone.  In the long-run, 
Hussein would have been better off if he listened to his brother’s advice and dumped his 
relationship with Saddam when Iraq refused any efforts at a compromise.      
In a meeting with Bush at Kennebunkport, Maine, on August 13, Hussein tried to 
convince Bush to allow him to try and mediate the crisis again.  Hussein believed that he 
could convince Saddam to withdraw eventually if the US would reduce the pressure on 
him.   Bush rejected Hussein’s overtures and believed it was a personal betrayal by 
Hussein to side with Saddam over the United States.  At one point, Bush said, “I will not 




this seemed hypocritical since the US supported Iraq when it attacked Iran unprovoked.  
In fact, they believed that the US only cared about oil, not some noble idea of opposition 
to unprovoked aggression.61  Bush called the meeting a disappointment.  He said Hussein 
tried to persuade him to moderate his position, but Bush was firm that the only option left 
was for Iraq to leave Kuwait.  Hussein tried to explain the issues to Bush, but Bush 
believed that if Iraq was allowed to prosper at all from this, it set a bad precedent to the 
world that stronger nations could use force against their weaker neighbors to get 
concessions.  Bush also told Hussein that while Hussein was meeting with Saddam and 
getting his assurances that he was withdrawing, the US saw Iraqi troop movements 
heading south to Saudi Arabia.  Because of that, they would not accept promises of a 
future withdrawal from Saddam, only active withdrawal would keep the US from a full 
scale attack to remove Iraq from Kuwait.  Bush was also disappointed because he 
believed that Hussein was bringing a message from Saddam, or some signal that a full 
scale war could be avoided.  When Hussein came empty handed, with only similar 
arguments that he presented in the past, Bush believed the meeting was a waste of time.62  
Bush did try and persuade Hussein to join his coalition.  He also rejected calls from some 
of his advisors to take a hardline with Hussein.  The Bush administration worried at one 
point that Hussein might actually formally join with Saddam, and Bush did not want to 
push him in that direction.63  While it would have helped to have Hussein’s support to 
completely isolate Iraq, Jordan’s involvement did not make a difference strategically.  In 
addition, as long as Bush convinced Hussein to stay out of the conflict, it would not end 
Jordan’s long-term relations with the US.  While Hussein’s actions damaged the 




After Hussein’s trip to meet Bush in Maine, he was handed a letter by the 
American ambassador to Jordan, Roger Harrison.  It read:  
We recognize that Jordan, because of its geographical location, is 
vulnerable to Iraqi pressure . . . .  It is vital for Jordan’s essential interest 
that it not be neutral in the struggle between Iraq and the great majority of 
the Arab states.   The perception of de facto Iraqi-Jordanian alliance has 
already damaged the reputation of Jordan in the United States and 
elsewhere.  We sincerely hope that you would take firm steps to reverse 
this deterioration.  
 
Hussein was personally offended by this message.  He believed that he was trying to be a 
neutral arbiter in the crisis and to bring it to an end. 64  Hussein was also likely angry that 
such a formal and cold letter came from someone he considered a personal friend in 
President Bush. 
Throughout September, Hussein toured European capitals to try and argue for a 
peaceful settlement to the crisis.   He had positive meetings with most of the foreign 
leaders, with the exception of Margret Thatcher in Great Britain.  She dressed Hussein 
down for “backing a loser” and repeatedly called Saddam a “third-class dictator.”  Like 
Bush, Hussein believed he had a long standing friendship with the Prime Minister, but 
after this meeting, which his aides described as humiliating, that friendship ended.  In 
those meetings, Hussein attempted to argue that the idea of pride was an important 
component in the Arab world.  He believed that if the West gave Saddam a face-saving 
way out of the crisis, he would take it.  If they demanded the humiliation of Saddam, he 
would continue until removed by force.  Hussein argued that in Saddam’s mind, it was 
better to be removed by force rather than a humiliating retreat if he wanted to retain 




about Saddam saving face.  Many wanted to demonstrate the precedent that the 
conquering of nations would not be tolerated in a post-Cold War world.  This was 
especially true of George Bush and Margret Thatcher.   
While Hussein faced pressure from both the US and Great Britain, he received 
additional pressure from his neighbors.  In September, Saudi Arabia began to limit the 
amount of oil that went to Jordan, eventually, cutting if off completely.  A pipeline 
traveled from Saudi Arabia to Jordan that transported over eighteen thousand barrels of 
oil a day to Jordan.  Both the British and the Americans tried to persuade the Saudis to 
restore the oil shipments, for fear that it would only push Hussein closer to Saddam but 
failed.  In addition, they both realized that if the economic conditions in Jordan 
deteriorated too much, Hussein’s rule could be jeopardy.66  While angered by Hussein’s 
actions, both the British and American leadership realized he was an important part of a 
future peace process once the war was over and did not want to see him replaced by 
someone not inclined to consider the interests of the West while making decisions.   
Saddam Hussein used the issues of Arabism, the plight of the Palestinians, and 
religion to increase his support amongst the Arab populace, making it difficult for some 
leaders to oppose him, especially Hussein.  In an open letter to Mubarak, on August 23, 
1990, Saddam tried to link his actions to helping the poor in the Arab world against the 
greedy Gulf States who rejected Islam and became puppets of the West.  He said the 
masters of the oil sheiks plotted against Iraq because it refused, “to see the Arab wealth 
used to damage the Arab’s character, heritage, religion, and ethics.”  He also linked it to 
the Palestinian cause and said, “The aggression of the oil sheikhs . . . increase against Iraq 




and also whenever it said loud and clear that Jerusalem was Arab and that Palestine was 
Arab.”67  This statement implied that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait used their oil money in 
the service of oppressing the Palestinians because they were under controlled by their 
masters in the West.  Saddam argued that ending that control, the Arabs could then use 
their oil money to free the Palestinians and promote Pan-Arabism throughout the region.  
Statements like this also increased the pressure on Hussein and Jordan to not support the 
coalition.  Because Jordan had such a large Palestinian population, Hussein could not 
openly go against them and side with the “oil sheiks” and still hope to retain his 
monarchy.  In fact, in a speech to the graduating class of officers in the Jordanian 
military, Hussein also linked the issue of the Palestinians to the Iraq crisis.  He said, “The 
Gulf crisis, the world economy in its oil dimension, the Palestinian problem and weapons 
of mass destruction are interrelated Middle Eastern problems.  In our view, any position, 
approach or international effort to resolve only one of these problems in isolation from 
the others, would fail to produce security, stability, and peace in the region..”68  Hussein 
faced constant pressure from his desire to maintain his historical ties to the United States 
and the impact of Saddam’s rhetoric on the Jordanian population.  It severely limited 
Hussein’s options, damaging his relationship with the Bush administration and the United 
States. 
Saddam talked about the upcoming fight against the American in grand terms.  He 
believed he could remove the US from the region because the Americans could not 
sustain a war effort.  In a meeting with Arafat in August 1990, Saddam told him, “we will 
fight America, and with God’s will, we will defeat it and kick it out of the whole region.  




America has more rockets than us, but I think that when the Arab people see real action 
of war, when it is real and not only talk, they will fight America everywhere.”69  He 
foreshadowed this desire in a meeting John Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State for the 
Near East, on February 16, 1990.  Saddam told the ambassador, “When I look southward 
in the Gulf what do I see? . . .  Warships?  And they are American warships. . . .  I am not 
a threat . . . .  They ought to take their ships and go home.  They don’t need to be there.”70  
If Saddam could remove American influence from the region, Iraq would clearly be the 
dominant power and Saddam would be the unquestioned leader of the Arab world.  For 
Hussein, it was not in his interests for the US to be removed from the region.  He still 
needed American help if he hoped to get Israel to make the necessary concessions with 
Jordan for establishing peaceful coexistence.    
Saddam also frequently tried to put his fight in Kuwait and with the American-led 
coalition in a religious context to increase his support throughout the Arab world.  In a 
speech on September 5, Saddam said, “Standing at one side of this confrontation are 
peoples and sincere leaders and rulers, and on the other are those who stole the rights of 
God and the tyrants who were renounced by God after they strayed from the path of God 
until they eventually opposed it when they became obsessed by the devil from head to 
toe.”71  On a speech to the Iraqi people on February 10, he said, “We are now in the 
seventh month since the day when atheism and falsehood reached a most extensive 
agreement to implement an unjust siege on the Iraqi people.”72  Saddam’s use of religious 
language had a number of goals.  He wanted to rally people throughout the Arab world to 
his cause by showing he was fighting the enemies of God through jihad, not the Arabs.   




allowing outside “atheists” on their land, the land containing the holiest sites in the 
Islamic world.   In addition, he wanted to justify his invasion of Kuwait by portraying the 
Kuwait royal family as enemies of God.  He hoped that he could use these calls to 
promote instability against his Arab enemies and to rally support from the Arab masses.  
These arguments were effective inside of Jordan, increasing the Jordanian populations 
support for Saddam and making it more difficult for Hussein to oppose Iraq.   
On September 11, Hussein again met Saddam in Baghdad.  Hussein told him that 
Saddam’s attempts to arrange an agreement with Saudi Arabia would not work because 
the Americans were running the diplomatic effort for the crisis.  In addition, Hussein told 
him, “It is no longer a question of the future of Kuwait, it’s a matter of saving Iraq.”  
Hussein also explained to Saddam that he was in a tough position.  He used the Falkland 
War as an example, saying that he supported the British in the Falklands, not because he 
cared about the island, but the principle prohibiting the seizure of land by force was 
important, especially for the Palestinian cause.  Saddam rejected these warnings and said 
he believed that the West would split and not be able to sustain an invasion.  He also 
called an officer into the room and asked him how would the army respond to an order to 
leave Kuwait.  The officer responded. “Oh God forbid, sir, please don’t utter those 
words.”73  This demonstrated why Saddam could not leave Kuwait under pressure.  If he 
did, he would have lost his status with his people.  Even if the American coalition forced 
him out through force, it was much easier for him to blame that debacle on a conspiracy 
of the “oil sheikhs” instead of the weakness of Iraq and Saddam Hussein.    
On September 19, after a meeting with King Hassan II of Morocco and President 




withdrawal from Kuwait.  While praising Saddam’s strength, the letter told him they 
were opposed to the acquisition of territory by force.  They believed if the Arab world 
accepted this policy it would give the Israelis a legitimate argument for keeping the West 
Bank and Gaza.  In addition, they argued that if a war occurred it would play into the 
hands of outside powers looking to dominate the region by destroying the Iraqi army.  
Saddam’s reply repeated his previous demands.  He would only leave Kuwait if an Arab 
summit addressed his disputes with Kuwait or Israel and Syria also removed their forces 
from the West Bank and Lebanon.74  With each passing day, war became more likely 
because of Saddam’s refusal to budge. 
While the relationship was strained because of Hussein’s refusal to oppose 
Saddam openly, Bush still attempted to appeal to his friendship with Hussein and 
convince him of the importance of his cause.  In addition, he still hoped to persuade 
Hussein to join the coalition.  In a personal letter to Hussein on October 10, 1990, Bush 
stressed to him that he knew the difficult position he was in and believed his efforts 
towards peace were sincere, but he was still disappointed by some of Hussein’s public 
comments about the US.  He also described the horrors of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.  
Bush said, “surely you must be shocked and offended by the documented reports of rape, 
of shooting children for passing out leaflets, of the systematic dismantling of Kuwait 
from the hospitals to the factories and stores.  It is tragic.  It is indeed reminiscent of how 
Hitler behaved in Poland before the rest of the world came to its senses and stood up 
against him.”  He also told Hussein he did not hold him responsible for angry protests 
against the US held in Jordan.  Finally, he said, “I know you have tried hard to find peace 




can be no compromise that stops short of the United Nations’ demands.”  Bush closed the 
letter by highlighting their personal friendship and mentioning the affection of their 
spouses.75  The letter shows why Bush was so disappointed with Hussein’s support of 
Saddam.  The two leaders did have a close personal friendship, and Bush viewed some of 
Hussein’s actions as a personal betrayal.  Not only were Hussein and Bush close, their 
wives interacted socially and Bush spent time with the whole Hussein family, including 
his children when he visited the region in the past.76  While he was sympathetic to the 
position of Jordan, he still believed Hussein should stand with the US and oppose the 
actions of Saddam, whom he viewed as a modern Hitler.   
Despite the anger towards Hussein, the US still provided him with the arms 
necessary to defend his country.  From August 2 to October 1990, the State Department 
approved the sale and transfer of over $5 million dollars in military equipment to Jordan.  
This included things like TOW missiles, helicopter parts, weapons, and artillery shells.  
In addition, the British also continued meeting Jordan’s need for artillery shells.77  This 
demonstrated that despite their desire for Hussein to take a more proactive role in 
stopping Saddam, his Western allies still believed it was important for him to maintain 
his position in the region.  It addition, it recognized the fact that because of Jordan’s 
geographical position, it faced invasion threats from Israel, Syria, and Iraq because of its 
policies.  The Bush administration believed it was necessary for Hussein to have the 
ability to defend himself against these threats justifying the continued shipments of 
military equipment to Jordan.    
On November 29, UNSC Resolution 678 was passed which authorized the use of 




attempted one more meeting with Saddam to try and persuade him to avoid the conflict.   
On December 4, Saddam met in Baghdad with Hussein, Arafat, and the vice-president of 
Yemen, Ali Salem Al-Bid.  This group argued to Saddam that he needed to leave Kuwait 
now before it was too late.  Jordan’s head of the armed forces, Sharif Zaid bin Shaker, 
explained that Iraq’s military was no match for the American forces and would be routed 
on the battlefield.  Saddam and his generals dismissed these warnings.  The believed that 
the Americans had no will to fight and once they received enough casualties, they would 
retreat.   One Iraqi general said, “if the Americans [come], [we] will crush them under 
[our] boots like cockroaches.”78  In addition, Hussein also pressed Saddam to release the 
hundreds of Western hostages he held as “guests” at important military targets throughout 
Baghdad.   This included over twenty-five hundred Americans and four thousand Britons.  
After pressure from both the French leadership, who still did not commit to joining the 
coalition and Hussein, in early December Saddam released all his hostages.79  While 
Hussein’s efforts to help the hostages was a humanitarian gesture, it was also an attempt 
to start to improve relations with the United States and their allies.  Hussein’s 
understanding of the military situation led him to conclude that Iraq did not stand a 
chance against the American coalition and it was in his interests once the war ended to 
begin to restore his previous relationship with the United States.   
On December 31, Adnan Abu-Odeh flew to Baghdad to deliver a simple message 
to Saddam.  He said, “I carry His Majesty’s greeting to the President and His Majesty’s 
wish is to let you know that in case war flares up he does not want to see Jordanians 
territory or Jordanian skies violated by anyone.” 80  Hussein knew the war was coming 




Iraq could attack Israel with either conventional or nonconventional missiles, forcing 
Israel to respond, with Jordan stuck in the middle.  He hoped to stay out of it and protect 
the interests of Jordan above all else once the conflict began.    
Despite their differences, as the war drew closer, Bush still believed it was 
important to keep some communications with Hussein alive.  He tasked Richard 
Armitage to be an envoy to the King.  Armitage flew to Amman sometime during the 
third week of January to hand deliver a note to Hussein from Bush.  The letter said Bush 
still believed Hussein could play a positive role in ending the crisis.  In addition, he said, 
“We cannot escape the fact that we differ profoundly concerning events in your part of 
the world.  I am prepared to accept this fact without questioning the permanence of 
friendly relations between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United States.”81 In 
one of Armitage’s meeting with Hussein, he was able to persuade Hussein to allow the 
Israelis to fly a certain route over Jordan to attack Iraq if it became absolutely necessary.  
While this was never publicized, it did help Hussein improve relations with both Israel 
and the US.82    
As war looked more likely, Hussein needed to decide how Jordan should react.   
Hussein later said of this time period:   
The pressure built up on us in such a way that we were totally isolated but 
we mobilized and that was another one of the best moments I have ever 
seen in Jordan.  Our people came together and we of course received 
400,000 refugees from the bidun (stateless people from Kuwait), those 
who had no citizenship rights, from Kuwait and from the Gulf on top of all 
the other problems we had to cope with.  We were encircled.  We 
mobilized almost a quarter of a million Jordanians and through that we 
controlled the situation.  We made it very clear to the Iraqis, we spoke to 
the Israelis, we spoke to everyone else who might attack us, we said “We 




invincible, we are not.  But neither our land nor our air space can be used 
by them.”  We had our forces deployed facing Iraq and facing Israel, 
facing north and facing south.83   
 
Israel was pleased by Jordan’s mobilization and determination to keep Iraqi troops out of 
Jordan as long as Hussein did not direct it towards them.  They feared that Saddam could 
attack Israel by moving his troops through Jordan.  They now saw the benefit of having a 
more moderate Arab leader on their border and repeatedly sent Hussein messages 
assuring him that they had no hostile intent towards Jordan and respected their desire to 
stay out of the conflict.   
Because the potential of being dragged into the war, Hussein secretly met with the 
Israelis to discuss the situation.  The deputy director of Mossad, Efraim Halevy, met with 
Hussein in October 1990, to further discuss the situation in Iraq.  Halevy asked if Hussein 
would like to meet with Shamir to discuss the issues.  Hussein agreed but he did not 
believe Shamir would agree to meet with him.  When Halevy talked to Shamir, he agreed 
but did not believe Hussein would risk meeting him for fear that it would become public.  
Shamir was unaware that Hussein already agreed to the meeting.  On January 4, 1991, the 
leaders met in Ascot, Scotland at one of King Hussein’s private residences.   Shamir told 
Hussein he worried about the Jordanian mobilization.  He said, “In October 1973 our 
people were not vigilant enough and the Arab attack took place and caused us a lot of 
damage.  Now you have your troops mobilized and my general are calling for me to do 
the same. . . .   There isn’t much distance in the Jordan Valley and it would be totally 
irresponsible, they say, if I did not take the same measures.”  Hussein immediately 
promised not to allow Iraq to use its territory to attack Israel but also said Israel could not 




position is purely defensive.  If anybody crosses my border or enters my air space, from 
Iraq or anywhere else, I will treat that as a hostile act and will act accordingly.  And I will 
not allow anyone to attack anyone else through Jordan.”  While Israeli army chief, Ehud 
Barak wanted more assurances from Hussein, Shamir cut him off saying, “King Hussein 
has given me his word, and that is enough for me.” 85  Shamir did not hold it against 
Hussein for his sympathy towards Saddam.  Later, he acknowledged the difficult position 
of Hussein. He said he believed that if Jordan did not either side with Saddam or at the 
very least not openly oppose him, he would have likely lost his monarchy and probably 
his life the very next day because of the public outrage from the Jordanian people.86  
Hussein also knew that he would have to deal with Israel once the war ended and Israel’s 
support could be crucial in repairing his relationship with the United States.  Hussein also 
knew that if the war entered Jordan, it could lead to the destruction of his kingdom.  
Because of these reasons, Hussein was determined to keep the fighting as far away from 
Jordan.   
The issue of Iraqi chemical weapons also was raised with Jordan by Israel.   Israel 
feared that Iraq had ballistic missiles armed with chemical weapons ready to fire at 
Israel’s major cities.  Barak told his Jordanian counterparts that, “We have been gassed 
once, and we are not going to be gassed again.  If one single chemical warhead falls on 
Israel, we’ll hit them with everything we got.  If unconventional weapons are used 
against us, look at your watch and 40 minutes later an Iraqi city will be reduced to 
ashes.”87  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powel also heard warnings about 
the potential of Iraq using chemical weapons on Israel and the likely Israeli response.   




the Iraqi Scud missile launchers.  Both Jordan and Saudi Arabia had previously made it 
clear they would not allow Israel to use their airspace for an attack.   Barak told Powel, 
“If we don’t go in and clear out the Scuds, Saddam may use them to deliver chemical 
weapons. . . .  They may fire nerve gas or a biological warhead at our cities.  If that 
happens, you know what we must do.”88 This message was passed on to the Iraqis, and it 
had the desired effect.  Iraq did have ballistic chemical weapons ready to fire at Israel, but 
Saddam never gave the order for their use.   
In a letter to Bush on January 10, Hussein started by telling him he always 
considered him a friend and despite their differences still believed that friendship existed.  
He also said:  
I am now facing the choice, once again, of either committing all my 
energies and resources to averting the looming horrendous disaster, by 
actively engaging all concerned towards that end, as I did at the outset of 
the Gulf crisis, or remaining an observer while adhering to our announced 
policy of preventing, to the best of our ability, any violation of our 
territory and air space by any side to the impending carnage which will be 
one of the greatest setbacks the human race has yet encountered.   
 
Hussein also asked Bush to delay an attack and allow him one more chance to find a 
peaceful solution.89  Bush did not respond to the request and on January 7, launched 
Operation Desert Storm to remove Iraq from Kuwait.   
Once Iraq hit Israel with a number of Scud missiles, the US pressured Israel not to 
react.   The main reason this occurred is that the US feared that any Israeli retaliation 
could crumble the coalition made up of so many Arab countries.  Another reason was to 
support Jordan.  They believed that without an agreement ahead of time, Israel using 




considering the Jordanian public’s views of Saddam.  The US feared that if Jordan did 
enter the conflict, they would be crushed, leading to the end of Hussein’s reign.90  Despite 
Hussein’s lack of support for the coalition effort, the US still believed he was the best 
possible leader they could expect in Jordan and saw the value of keeping him on the 
throne.  If Hussein fell, the US could not predict who would replace him.   It would cause 
a conflict between Palestinian forces and Jordanian nationalist who still supported the 
crown.   It would also make it near impossible for Bush to promote his ideas for a new 
world order once the fighting in Iraq ended.  Despite Hussein’s flaws and his support for 
Saddam, the Bush administration did not have any other viable alternatives and Jordan 
remained an important part of any future peace process.      
During the air war, tensions between Jordan and the West increased.   The people 
of Jordan were angered by the images on television of the total destruction of Iraqi cities 
by coalition aircraft.  In addition, the Western allies attacked oil trucks leaving Iraq and 
heading into Jordan on the Baghdad-Amman International Highway.  In total fourteen 
Jordanian civilians were killed along with twenty-six injured.  This led to mass protests 
throughout Jordan.  Many in Hussein’s inner circle believed he needed to make a 
statement to calm down the public outrage.  Things got so bad in Jordan that Western 
media reported the royal family made arrangements to flee if necessary.  While both 
Hussein and Noor denied this, it does demonstrate the pressure on Hussein to react to the 
airstrikes by the coalition.  In address to the nation on February 6, Hussein blamed the 
West for the war, saying they blocked his attempts to find a peaceful solution because 
their real goal was, “to destroy Iraq, and rearrange the area in a manner far more 




arrangement would put the nation, its aspirations and its resources under direct foreign 
hegemony and would shred all ties between its parts, thus further weakening and 
fragmenting it.”  He also denounced the Arabs who assisted in the war effort saying they 
never put forth a similar effort to liberate the Palestinians.91  While Hussein was still 
likely angered by the failure of the West to allow him to mediate the crisis, it was 
important for him to demonstrate he understood the outrage of his population if hoped to 
retain his position as the head of Jordan.  Without Hussein’s public response, the protests 
in Jordan could eventually grow target the Hashemite monarchy.     
Bush’s response to Hussein’s speech was quick and angry.  He told Hussein, “I 
am not going to hide my deep disappointment with your speech. . . .  If we do not agree 
on these matters, so be it.  But we must understand that a public, political posture that 
takes Jordan so far from the international and Arab consensus has damaged very 
seriously the prospect for eliciting international help for Jordan.”  Hussein replied the 
next week explaining that he was speaking for many Arabs and Muslims about what they 
viewed in Iraq.  In addition, he said, “I am convinced that time will prove that my 
relationship with you has been that of an honest friend concerned for you personally and 
for Jordanian-American and Arab and Muslim-American relations.”92  While Hussein’s 
speech seemed personal to Bush, Hussein viewed it as an expression of what many 
people in the Middle East believed.  Not that Iraq was right or just, but the Arabs should 
have resolved the problem, not with the military might of the United States.  Hussein felt 
he needed to express the view of Arab nationalists everywhere that opposed the 
American actions in Iraq.  In addition, Hussein needed to demonstrate to his people that 




the unrest in Jordan directed towards the coalition could begin to focus on him.  The 
Persian Gulf War continued to place Hussein in a difficult position.  He could not go 
against the vast majority of his public and by not doing so, further damaged his relations 
with the US.  While Hussein tried to have it both ways, his speech attacking the United 
States injured his relationship with Bush even after the conflict ended.        
The American coalition defeated Saddam’s forces fairly quickly but even after it 
was over, Jordan continued to feel the consequences of the crisis.  In total, between 
money spent on the over four hundred thousand refugees and lost trade, the war cost 
Jordan $1.5 billion.93  Because of the UN sanctions on Iraq, trade at the port of Aqaba 
plummeted, further damaging the Jordanian economy.  Saudi Arabia also continued their 
protest of Hussein’s actions by refusing to ship oil to the kingdom.  At the conclusion of 
the war, while Hussein’s popularity with the Jordanian public might not have ever been 
higher, he knew to survive long-term, he would need to rehab his image with his 
neighbors and his strongest patron, the United States.  
Another issue Hussein faced was another wave of refugees that continued ever 
after the fighting ended.  Once the Kuwaiti royal family returned to power, they expelled 
almost all of the Palestinians in their country.   The Kuwaitis took this action in response 
to Arafat and the PLO’s support of Saddam.  A number of the other Gulf States soon 
followed suit, making the extreme refugee crisis in Jordan worse.  Because most of these 
people had Jordanian passports, Kuwait returned them to Jordan.  Since Israel controlled 
the West Bank, they refused to allow entry to most of these refugees.  This created over 
two hundred thousand new Palestinians in Jordan.  These new refugees increased the 




increased the hostility of many native Jordanians towards the Palestinians, as caring for 
them became an increasing burden.94   
After successfully defeating Iraq, Bush turned his attention back to the Middle 
East peace process.  On March 6, 1991, Bush addressed a joint session of Congress where 
he talked about the need for peace between Israel and the Arabs.  He said:  
By now, it should be clear to all parties that peacemaking in the Middle 
East requires compromise. . . .  We must do all that we can to close the 
gap between Israel and the Arab states. . . .  There can be no substitute for 
diplomacy. . . .  A comprehensive peace must be grounded in United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and the principle of 
territory for peace.  This principle must be elaborated to provide for 
Israel’s security and recognition and at the same time for legitimate 
Palestinian political rights.  Anything else would fail the twin test of 
fairness and security.95   
 
Bush announced that Baker would fly to the region and listen to the Israeli and Arab 
leaders to determine the best way forward.  For the United States, the continued fighting 
between the Arabs and Israelis jeopardized Bush’s new world order springing forth with 
the end of the Cold War.  Bush believed that diplomacy needed to replace armed conflict 
and the best place to put that theory to test was the Middle East.  In addition, Bush hoped 
to capitalize on American goodwill in the region from the successful defeat of Iraq.    
Once the war ended, Hussein knew he needed to improve relations with the US 
and he began immediately.  To further that aim, Hussein wrote to Bush and said:  
It is a crisis which I had tried so hard to resolve before it escalated.  In any 
event, well done my friend and you will find me more than ever 
determined to contribute my utmost to the healing of wounds and to the 
opening of a new and bright chapter in the history of this region for the 




the best Jordanian/American and Arab/American relations on sound, clear 
and solid formations.96  
 
Despite their continued anger at Hussein for his support of Iraq, the US believed 
he was an important leader in the Middle East and his survival was in the American 
interests.  To help him overcome his economic challenges, the Bush administration 
facilitated the survival of Hussein’s monarchy through foreign aid.  Because of 
opposition from Congress, the Bush administration looked elsewhere to help Hussein 
recover from the Gulf War.  They secured pledges from Germany and Japan to help the 
Jordanian economy.  Japan provided a loan of $450 million dollars, becoming the largest 
provider of aid to Jordan, and Germany offered a grant of $210 million over two years 
starting in 1990.  By May 1991, Jordan received over $1 billion in combined loans and 
grants from foreign entities, allowing it to rebound its economy after the Gulf War and 
keep Hussein in power.97  It was an important gesture by Bush to lobby for aid from 
foreign governments for Hussein.  While he began to get over Hussein’s actions during 
the war, it was much harder to convince Congress to do the same.  Despite his anger, 
Bush knew it was important to keep Hussein as a viable leader in Jordan.     
In an interview with Middle East reporters on March 8, Bush discussed the 
situation with Jordan.  The previous months had large anti-American protests in Amman 
and Bush was asked to respond.  He said that there were a lot of hurt feelings and 
disappointment in the United States on the street, but he recognized a stable Jordan was 
in everyone’s interest.   In addition, he said: 
We’ve had a good relationship with the Hashemite King.  But I’ve 




way on this question(Iraq).  And I’m not saying it was all his fault because 
there were some people out there in the streets.  And they’re still out there 
yelling about me personally, and the whole United States. . . .  But my 
view is, hey, we’ve all got to live together in peace, so let’s take a little 
time now and sort this one out.  We don’t want to see a radicalized Jordan, 
and yet I must confess to a certain disappointment in [Jordan]. . . .  But 
I’ve learned in life . . . take a little time, let it simmer, and then let’s try to 
put together a more peaceful Middle East.98 
 
This was the first public sign that the relationship between Hussein and Bush was 
reparable.  Bush also mentioned that he was bothered by the actions of the Jordanian 
press.  Bush hoped that the Jordanian press, under direction from Hussein, would stop the 
attacks on the US and the US would begin working with Jordan to repair the relationship, 
furthering their joint goal of a peaceful solution between the Arabs and Israel.   
In April 1991, Secretary of State James Baker met with Hussein in Aqaba to 
continue repairing the relationship between the US and Jordan and restarting the peace 
process.  There, Baker described a new peace effort with the goal of finally settling all 
remaining issues between the Arabs and Israel.  He planned on having a superpower-
sponsored conference that included the Arabs and the Palestinians.   He wanted the 
Palestinians to be part of a Jordanian delegation and promised Hussein that if he 
enthusiastically participated, all problems in the past would be forgotten.  In addition, 
Baker believed he had leverage over Hussein because of his need for American support.  
Baker told him, “you need to know that it’s going to be a tough row to hoe to repair 
Jordan’s relationship with the United States.”  Hussein agreed to Baker’s terms and even 
promised him that even if Syria was unwilling to participate, he would.99  While Hussein 




wanted to move forward with peace with Israel and the outline of Baker’s plan contained 
many of the ideas he supported in the past.   
In his meeting with Hussein, Baker also told him that he would try and work on 
the Saudis’ attitude toward Jordan, in hopes that this would help the Jordanian 
economy.100  Baker was not the only one to try and help repair Jordan’s relationship with 
the Saudis.  In May 1991, the British ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alan Muro, went to 
King Fahd in the hopes of improving relations between Jordan and Saudi Arabia.  The 
British, like the Americans, believed it would be necessary to bring Hussein back into the 
fold because he would be necessary for completing a peace deal between the Arabs and 
Israel.  Despite the pleas from the British and the Americans, the Saudis were still 
unwilling to completely forgive Hussein.101     
Hussein believed that helping the Palestinians in the peace process was his 
responsibility.  In addition, he needed to show the American his value to the process.  He 
said later, “I thought that a process was about to start that was irreversible, and that we 
had to go.  The Palestinians had to go and speak for themselves, and we had to provide 
them with the umbrella they needed.  And that’s what we did.”102  Like Hussein, the PLO 
also sided with Iraq during the Gulf War and because of that much of the Arab world 
denounced them.  At this weakened state, they could not demand to be included because 
they had very little support from other Arab leaders.  Because of that, Hussein could 
include Palestinians from the West Bank, not associated with the PLO, in his delegation.  




Hussein initially hesitated to have a joint delegation with the Palestinians.  He 
wanted only to focus on Jordan and allow the Palestinians to do their own negotiating.   
For Baker and the Americans, the PLO was still a problem and a joint delegation was the 
best way to assure Israeli participation.  When Hussein met with Baker on May 14, he 
told him he was willing to have the joint delegation.  Baker thanked Hussein and told him 
that he would push through Congress $27 million in food aid to Jordan to help with the 
refugee crisis.103  This was an important act by Baker because many in Congress still 
believed that Hussein betrayed the US with its neutrality during the Gulf War.  For 
Hussein, it appeared relations with the US were beginning to return to normal. 
Hussein also took other steps to make the new peace process successful.  In an 
interview in a French newspaper, Hussein argued that the Arab position of not having 
bilateral talks with Israel needed to end. 104  Hussein also began back channel talks with 
Israel to discuss the potential makeup of the Palestinian part of the Jordanian delegation.  
Hussein did not want the talks to blow up, as they had in the past, over whom the 
Palestinians chose to represent them.  Baker and Hussein already agreed not to allow the 
PLO to be publically involved.   Baker told Hussein, “The Palestinians from the occupied 
territories need to be visibly working with you, and you have to keep your PLO tie in the 
background as you work on a delegation.  Arafat cannot show up in Amman during the 
process.”105  Hussein’s efforts to facilitate the negotiations helped to improve the 
relationship between Jordan and the US and repair the damage left over from the Gulf 





Despite their past negative attitude towards each other, the Gulf War brought 
Shamir and Hussein closer together.  Hussein’s promises not to threaten Israel and 
guarantee that he would not let Iraq attack through Jordan during the war dramatically 
increased the trust level between the two leaders.   In fact, in the run-up Madrid, Shamir 
often argued on Hussein’s behalf to the Americans.  Shamir told Baker that the peace 
process must run through Hussein because he was the only Arab leader Israel trusted.  In 
addition, when Baker met with Shamir in March 1991, Shamir insisted that the US 
forgive Hussein for his actions in the Gulf War.  He told Baker a stable Jordan was the 
best hope for peace and the US should do everything possible to keep him in power.106  
Shamir also justified Hussein’s actions during the Gulf War as consistent and necessary 
because of Jordan’s relations with Iraq and Hussein’s continued efforts to promote peace 
in the region.  Shamir even worked with Congress to try and end hostility some members 
had towards Jordan.  The level of support Shamir showed to Jordan reached such a high 
level that a Bush administration official once asked Shamir,”Who are you, the King’s 
lawyer?”107  Shamir was a valuable ally for Hussein.  He eased many of the Americans 
concerns and was an important ally for Hussein to improve his relationship with the Bush 
administration and members of Congress.  It demonstrated to Hussein Israel’s ability to 
assist Jordan if they remained on friendly terms.  Hussein would use this lesson 
frequently during the Clinton administration. 
In June 1991, the US and the Soviet Union issued letters to Israel and all its 
neighbors proposing a joint peace conference in Madrid for October.  Hussein and Assad 
agreed at the early stages to participate.  Baker’s only trouble was the Palestinians and the 




privately issued a number of threats if they blocked his proposal.  In a meeting in October 
1991, Baker told the Palestinian delegation that if they did not go, not only would he 
unfreeze the $10 billion loan guarantees for Israel, he would increase it to $20 billion.  In 
addition, he would not restrict the construction of settlements.  Finally, he said, “If you 
are worried about the PLO now, name me one country that will host them, let alone a 
PNC meeting.”108  That Palestinians, like Jordan, had very little leverage to demand more 
participation because the PLO had very little support from the rest of the Arab world due 
to Arafat’s support of Iraq and Saddam Hussein.   
The letter inviting the parties to the Madrid Conference called for a joint meeting 
in Madrid followed shortly by bilateral meetings between Israel and the Arab nations.  It 
called for a joint delegation of Palestinians and Jordanians to negotiate “on region-wide 
issues such as arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues, environment, 
economic development, and other subjects of mutual interest.”109  It also promised that 
the conference could not force decisions on any of the participants, a concession to Israel 
who feared that was the only point of an international conference.  In a separate letter to 
the Palestinian leadership, Bush mentioned his belief that “there should be an end to the 
Israeli occupation” and his rejection of any changes made by Israel to East Jerusalem.110  
This letter was important for a number of reasons.  First, it referred to Israeli control over 
the West Bank and Gaza as an occupation, not as a dispute that needed to be resolved 
through negotiation.  The labeling it an occupation meant that the US believed that the 
land never belonged to Israel and should be returned to the Arabs after the outcome of 
negotiations that took into consideration the security of all nations in the region.  Past 




Israelis who would accuse the US of deciding the outcome of negotiations before they 
occurred.  In addition, many members of the governing Likud Party still hoped to annex 
much of the West Bank and Gaza, even after a negotiation was complete.    
One of the major issues increasing the tensions between the US and Israel was the 
construction of settlements.  Because of the ongoing collapse of the Soviet Union, a large 
influx of Soviet Jews immigrated to Israel.  Shamir asked Bush for $400 million in loan 
guarantees and another $10 billion over five years to support that immigration.  Shamir 
promised not to use the loans to expand settlements in the occupied territories.  After the 
Israelis had continued to build settlements, Baker and Bush pushed Congress to delay a 
vote for four months on the future loan guarantees in September 1991.111  This delay 
outraged Shamir.  He said, “this was the first time that the US Government decided to 
make humanitarian aid to Israel conditional on Israel’s acceptance of a policy under 
dispute.”112  Israel responded by calling their allies in the United States to make a full 
scale lobbying effort in Congress to oppose Bush’s delay.  Bush responded on September 
11, saying, “For the first time in history, the vision of Israelis sitting with their Arab 
neighbors to talk peace is a real prospect.  Nothing should be done that might interfere 
with this prospect.  And if necessary, I will use my veto power to prevent this from 
happening.  Peace is what these new emigrants to Israel, and indeed all Israelis long 
for.”113  This was important because it showed the Arabs that the US was finally willing 
to punish Israel and force them to negotiate.  In addition, it demonstrated to the Arabs 
that the Bush administration was committed to progressing through the peace process and 
would not allow actions by anyone that could upend it.  Israel eventually agreed to attend 




practically dragged to Madrid by President Bush.  The message was forcefully, by way of 
pressure and intimidation, brought home to him that he could either have America’s 
friendship or the territories, not both.”114 
In a letter to Hussein on October 9, 1991, the Bush administration tried to reassure 
him about the purpose of the upcoming Madrid Conference.  It said:  
The United States continues to believe firmly that a comprehensive peace 
must be grounded in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 
and 338 and the principle of territory for peace.  Such an outcome must 
also provide for security and recognition for all states in the region, 
including Israel and for legitimate political rights of the Palestinian 
people.  Anything else . . . would fail the twin tests of fairness and 
security.115 
 
This statement met most of Hussein’s requests for negotiating with Israel.  It included 
Palestinian representation, an international conference, and negotiations based on past 
Security Council resolutions.  Hussein had made most of these demands for decades with 
the United States and despite his dispute with Bush during the Gulf War, he finally 
achieved these goals.   
 The letter also discussed the American attitude towards the fate of Jerusalem, 
another very important issue for Hussein.  It is said, “the United States understands the 
importance that all parties attach to the city.  For this reason, it has long been the position 
of the United States that the city must not be divided again, its future status to be 
determined by negotiations.  Thus, we do not recognize Israel’s annexation or the 
extension of its municipal boundaries.”116  While this statement did not recognize 
Jordan’s special role in Jerusalem, it was important for Hussein that the US did not 




continued settlement expansion.  Hussein hoped that through negotiations, he would be 
able to regain his lost position as the caretaker for the Islamic sites in the city.   
Jordan readily accepted its place at the Madrid Conference.  In an address to the 
nation on October 12, Hussein announced his acceptance of the invitation to Madrid 
saying, “Peace demands no less courage than war.  It is the courage to meet the 
adversary, his attitudes, and arguments, the courage to face hardships, the courage to bury 
senseless illusions, the courage to surmount obstacles, the courage to engage in a 
dialogue to tear down the walls of fear and suspicion.  It is the courage to face reality.” 
He also addressed Jordan’s role in assisting the Palestinian people and promised that role 
would not change in these negotiations.  He ended his speech calling on the Jordanian 
people to:  
Let us awake and put an end to self-destruction in our minds and our 
beings.  Let us put an end to the sweeping tendencies of outbidding each 
other and to illusions.  Let us heed God, for our nation, our children, our 
present and our future.  Let us shoulder our responsibilities and not seek 
escapism under the guise of leaving it to a future generation.  Let us 
remember that the majority of Jordanians and Palestinians cannot afford 
the luxury of betting on the unknown. 117 
 
That same week, Bush sent a letter to Hussein telling him that he appreciated his 
friendship and thanking him for his cooperation in the peace process.  He also said, 
“Time heals a lot of wounds,” welcoming Hussein and Jordan back into the good graces 
of the United States.118  Hussein reverted to his previous position of being America’s 
strongest ally for peace in the region.  He continued to work for the success of the peace 




In a meeting on October 12, Baker asked Hussein to send an official list to Shamir 
of Palestinian representatives that would participate at Madrid that were not members of 
the PLO but still connected enough that they would be excepted by the Palestinians.   
Baker told Hussein that “You are the only one who can do this.  He’ll trust you more than 
us on this one. . . .   This is the key to the whole process.”  Baker also told Hussein that he 
was going to have technology delivered that would outfit Hussein’s personal plane with 
anti-missile technology. 119  For Baker, it was a sign to Hussein that the animosity over 
the Gulf War was past them and he needed Hussein once again be an American ally in 
the peace process.  In addition, it showed Hussein that the US still valued his position as 
the head of Jordan and would help defend him against threats if necessary. 
The Madrid Conference began on October 30, 1991, and was led by the US and 
the Soviet Union with the UN present as an observer.  While publically it was a joint US 
and USSR conference, at this point the Soviet Union was in the middle of falling apart, 
making Baker in charge of the actual structure of the conference.  The conference opened 
with speeches from all the major participants.  The Jordanian delegation, led by Kamel 
Abu Jaber, stated Jordan wanted to sign a peace deal with Israel, based on and upheld by 
international law and the United Nations.  Israeli Prime Minister Shamir’s opening 
statement was much more divisive.  He blamed almost all of the conflict on the Arabs’ 
refusal to recognize Israel and did not publically acknowledge the ideas of trading land 
for peace.  Finally, Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi, representing the Palestinians addressed the 
conference.  While Shafi was not a member of the PLO, he did take directions from them 
and was there with their support.  In his opening statement, he called for self-




In addition, he said that the new Palestinian state should be part of a confederation with 
Jordan.120  This was important because it was the first time a representative associated 
with the PLO ever publically suggested a confederation with Jordan as a possible solution 
to the Palestinian problem.  In the past, Arafat would accept that position in private 
negotiations with Hussein, but never would acknowledge it publically.    
The Madrid Conference lasted its prescribed three days followed by bilateral 
negotiations in the coming weeks in Washington D.C. under the directions of the United 
States.  Baker believed that fact that Madrid happened at all was a success.  He felt every 
time he visited the Middle East, one side or the other would make a new unreasonable 
demand, not to further the talks, but to scuttle them.  When the conference occurred, he 
said, “After forty-three years of bloody conflict, the ancient walls of Jericho, the 
psychological barriers of half a century came tumbling down.”  Baker argued that without 
Madrid, the peace process between Jordan and Israel and Israel and the Palestinians 
would never have occured.121  The head of the Jordanian delegation in Washington, 
Abdul Salam Majali, credited Baker for organizing the Madrid Conference and moving 
forward the peace process.  He said, “His talents, diplomatic skills, intelligence, and wit, 
his immense courage, fairness and persistence made a difference today.  He has 
meticulously designed the process so that all parties who have a stake in the outcome will 
play a role of some kind.”122  The Madrid Conference was an important event for both 
Baker and Hussein.  Hussein finally achieved his international conference.  It would give 
him the cover he needed to achieve his goal of ending the state of belligerency between 
Jordan and Israel.  Hussein played an important role in mediating any disputes between 




Palestinians.  He demonstrated his importance to the United States if they wanted to 
achieve a lasting peace in the region.  For Baker, by using American pressure where he 
could, he achieved a meeting between the Palestinians and Israel that started the 
discussion for settling their over forty-year conflict.     
In the upcoming negotiations, Jordan had a number of major concerns that they 
felt Israel would need to address before the completion of a Jordan-Israel peace treaty.  
Jordan wanted to make sure that any agreement with the Palestinians did not include 
Jordan without their consent, similar to the agreement from Camp David.  In addition, 
while not in possession of any weapons of mass destruction, Jordan wanted to make sure 
that in the future Israel did not target them with their nuclear capability.  Finally, because 
of the demographic changes in the region, mainly Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza had 
a much higher birthrate than the Israelis, Jordan needed assurances from Israel that there 
would be no forced movement of a population out of the West Bank into Jordan in 
response to the demographic challenges faced by Israel.123  Jordan had two issues it 
believed it could not violate while making a deal with Israel.  First, Jordan would not 
violate the Arab League Charter or the Arab Defense Pact.  This meant that Jordan would 
not violate past rulings by the Arab League, including Rabat, and would not sign a 
defense agreement with Israel.  In addition, Jordan would also not agree to abdicate its 
responsibilities under the Arab Defense Pact to come to the aid of another Arab country 
under attack from external forces.  Second, Jordan would not agree to any deal with Israel 
that would prejudge a deal with the Palestinians.  In particular, Jordan would not agree to 




provision that limited the right of return of Palestinian refugees.  Hussein believed that 
was an issue that should be worked out between the Palestinians and Israel.124 
The Washington Conference began with the arrival of a joint Palestinian-
Jordanian delegation to Washington D.C. on December 2, 1991.  While it was a joint 
delegation, Baker promised both parts of the delegation they would work out their issues 
with Israel bilaterally.  The Jordanian delegation was led by Dr. Abdul Salam Majali and 
the Palestinian delegation was led by Abdul Shafi.  To stress the division in the 
delegation, the Jordanians and the Palestinians stayed in separate hotels, had separate 
meeting rooms, and planned on having separate goals for their meetings with the Israelis.   
Unfortunately, when the Israelis arrived in Washington D.C. on December 3, they had 
different ideas of whom they would negotiate with.  They were led by Dr. Elyak 
Rubinstein, a legal scholar in Israel that had connections with both Shamir and Rabin.  In 
the tour of the States Department wing that was the planned site for the negotiation 
sessions, the Israelis objected to having two different rooms for negotiations, one for 
Israeli-Jordanian talks and one for Israeli-Palestinian talks.  When the Jordanians and the 
Palestinians saw the new structure of the negotiating room, Israel on one side and the 
Palestinians and Jordanians on the other side, they refused to enter and begin 
negotiations.  Majali and Rubinstein continued to debate the set-up for a longtime in the 
hallway.  The debate lasted so long that the State Department brought down sofas so the 
leaders could rest while they continued to work out this first detail of the negotiations.  
After a week of “sofa diplomacy,” both sides agreed to take a break until after the 




The start of the next round of negotiations hit an immediate problem, even before 
the issue of the who would negotiate with who was worked out   At the end of December, 
Israel deported a dozen Palestinian activists to Lebanon for celebrating the anniversary of 
the intifada.  The Palestinian delegation was outraged and refused to go Washington.  
Majali believed that Shamir was doing it to antagonize the Arabs, with the hope of 
canceling the negotiations.  In response, the United Nations Security Council passed a 
resolution calling for the return of the activists and declaring their deportation illegal.  
The US voted with the rest of the council, showing to many of the Arabs that Bush and 
Baker planned to remain neutral in the negotiations, and not blindly support Israel like 
many presidents had in the past.126 
  While all sides returned to Washington on January 7, it was not until January 11 
that an agreement was reached on the makeup of the negotiating teams.   The Israelis 
agreed to one larger session that contained an equal amount of Jordanian and Palestinians 
that focused on issues faced by all parties.  In addition, they agreed to a split of nine 
Jordanians and two Palestinians for the bilateral Jordanian negotiation and two 
Jordanians and nine Palestinians for the bilateral Palestinian negotiation.127  The 
Jordanians felt it was important to have members on each track for a number of reasons.  
First, they had different issues than the Palestinians.  The Jordanians had less concern 
over the internal security of the West Bank or issues of Palestinian governance but were 
concerned about issues involving water rights for the region and the final border 
agreements.  Second, the Jordanian delegation worried that if it was totally separate, the 
Israelis could complete a deal with the rest of the Arabs quickly and then drag out 




Arab states except the Palestinians, the pressure on Israel to make concessions would 
diminish.  With Jordanian representation present, it was possible to keep the Jordanian 
and Palestinian talks at the same pace.   
 Shamir’s continued feud with the Bush administration over the issue of 
settlements eventually hurt his political standing in Israel and he lost his reelection bid on 
June 23, 1992.  The Bush administration welcomed his replacement Yitzhak Rabin, who 
they believed had a moderate view of the peace process and was someone who they could 
work to achieve Bush’s goals for the region. 128  Jordan and Hussein did not have the 
same feelings towards Shamir and Rabin.  For while Hussein and Shamir did not always 
get along, they reached a level of mutual respect and honesty.  The Jordanians had a 
different attitude towards Rabin.  They saw him as a general from 1967 war, the Defense 
Minister who attempted to violently put down the intifada and someone who had the 
same ideology as Shamir, but presented it in a friendlier way.129  The Jordanians 
preferred to keep working with Shamir, believing they knew exactly where he stood on 
issues and did not have the ability to hide his intentions like Rabin.  After the election, 
the Bush administration’s view of Shamir proved correct.  In an interview after his defeat, 
Shamir explained his negotiating strategy.  He said, “I would have conducted 
negotiations on autonomy for ten years and in the meantime we would have reached a 
half million people in Judea and Samaria.”130  As they demonstrated in the past, Shamir 
and the Likud Party never had any intention of returning the West Bank to the 
Palestinians.  Hussein’s belief that he achieved a level of understanding with Shamir was 
misguided.  While Shamir would deal with Hussein, he would never allow the return of 




 The replacement of Shamir with Rabin helped continue the momentum towards a 
deal between Jordan and Israel.  On November 8, 1992, the Jordanians agreed to the 
Common Agenda, setting out the plan finalize a peace treaty between the two 
governments.131 The agenda called for “The achievement of just, lasting and 
comprehensive peace between the Arab States, the Palestinians and Israel as per the 
Madrid Invitation.”  It called for bilateral working groups, each to address a different 
issue as the sides worked to a formal peace treaty.  These issues included security, water 
rights, refugees, borders and future areas of bilateral cooperation.132  While they agreed 
on the structure of future peace negotiations, the Jordanians did not want to announce it 
publically until the Palestinians made more progress in their negotiation.  Both sides 
believed that they had taken the necessary steps to overcome the remaining differences 
and formally end the state of belligerency in a timely manner.  Unfortunately for Bush, he 
did not win reelection and could not see the culmination of his efforts.  
 Despite his failed reelection bid, George H. W. Bush was responsible for 
momentous changes in the Middle East.  While his first efforts at the peace process 
established his views of the region, it did not achieve a lasting settlement.  His greatest 
contribution occurred when he demonstrated that he would take a different approach to 
the Israelis, not allowing them to dictate terms of the negotiations.  In addition, he was 
the first American leader to challenge Israel’s settlement policy, even withholding 
American aid to Israel over their continued insistence on expanding settlements in the 
West Bank and Gaza.  This showed both Hussein and other Arab leaders that the 
Americans finally would pressure Israel into negotiating a settlement for the region.  




aggressive pursuit of a settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians.  While 
Hussein appreciated Bush’s efforts, after years of struggling to get full American support 
for the peace process, he no longer was in position to negotiate for the Palestinians.   
Despite these setbacks, after the Persian Gulf War, Hussein became an active part of the 
peace process, assisting the Bush administration in their efforts to forge an agreement 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis.  In the lead up the Madrid Conference and 
during the Washington meetings, Hussein continued to support the Palestinians and assist 
the Americans in advancing the peace process.  He played a valuable role in bridging the 
gaps between the Israelis and the Palestinians by mediating the composition of the 
Palestinian delegation and supporting their role in the Washington negotiations.     
While the peace process during the Bush administration showed Hussein’s value 
to the Americans, the Gulf War also dramatically altered the Middle East and caused the 
first real break in American and Jordanian relations.  Through Hussein’s support of 
Saddam Hussein, he undermined decades of friendship with the US and diminished his 
value to many American leaders.  While Hussein might have had strong economic, 
strategic, and domestic political reasons for supporting Saddam, his actions almost 
destroyed the American-Jordanian relationship.  Hussein’s efforts to repair that damage 
led him to work even harder to come to an accommodation with the Israelis.  Eventually, 
many in the American leadership realized the dire position Hussein was in because of his 
people’s opposition to the American coalition and welcomed him back into the American 
partnership, especially after he made real strides towards peace with Israel.  The outcome 
of the Madrid Conference eventually led to a joint Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, 




fact the Bush did not get to participate in the outcome of his work towards the peace 
process, his leadership was fundamental in making the Israelis work with the Arabs 










CLINTON AND THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN PEACE TREATY 
  
When the Bill Clinton assumed office after George H. W. Bush, King Hussein did 
not know what to expect from the new American administration.   He never had any 
dealings with the former governor of Arkansas and was worried about some of Clinton’s 
campaign statements.  For example, while Clinton supported the peace process started at 
Madrid, he was highly critical of Bush’s actions toward Israel.1  Hussein quickly learned 
that Clinton was an engaged leader who used his personal charm and attention to details 
to build a relationship with many leaders around the world, including Hussein.  He also 
witnessed Clinton’s practicality when it came to addressing the issues in the Middle East.  
During the Clinton administration, Jordan and Israel completed a formal peace treaty and 
Hussein completed the restoration of American-Jordanian relations damaged from the 
Gulf War.  In addition, Hussein proved a valuable ally for the United States by furthering 
the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians while also supporting the American 
position in its continued dispute with Iraq.  Clinton and Hussein developed a friendship 





Just before Clinton took office, Hussein faced a health scare that would eventually 
influence his involvement in the peace process.  In August 1992, Hussein traveled to the 
Mayo Clinic to have an obstruction removed from his ureter.  Doctors removed Hussein’s 
kidney as a precaution after some tests found that the blockage was cancerous.  While 
there were no signs that the cancer spread, between this and previous heart issues, the 
King’s health was now in question.  It would take Hussein a long time to recover and his 
doctors recommended that he try to avoid stress as much as possible, a challenge while 
leading a nation in the Middle East.  One benefit of Hussein’s health crisis was the 
improved relations with Saudi Arabia.  One of Hussein’s visitors while in the hospital 
recovering was Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the US.   
Prince Bandar was particularly close to his uncle King Fahd and his long visit singled the 
start of the restoration of ties between Jordan and Saudi Arabia.2  Hussein’s health crisis 
made him want to work harder to achieve peace between Israel and Jordan.  He believed 
it would be his legacy.  In addition, tightening Jordanian-Israeli and Jordanian-American 
relations through the formation of a comprehensive peace deal would help assure his 
heir’s security as the head of the Hashemite regime. 
When Clinton took office, the Israelis and the Jordanians continued to negotiate in 
Washington based off the agreed upon Common Agenda.  The negotiations continued to 
move slowly because the Jordanians did not want to get ahead of the Palestinians.  The 
Clinton administration continued to support those negotiations, attempting to mediate 
when it was appropriate.  What the Jordanian delegation was unaware of was that the 
Palestinians and the Israelis entered into a separate, secret negotiation in Oslo, Norway.  




Palestinians signed the agreement on September 13, 1993, on the White House lawn. 3  It 
called for Israel to recognize the PLO as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people.  
The PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist and live in peace with its Arab neighbors.  In 
addition, it set up a Palestinian government for the West Bank and Gaza, called the 
Palestinian Authority, and called for Israel and the Palestinian Authority to negotiate all 
remaining issues peacefully.  The agreement did not mention a solution for final borders, 
refugees, or the fate of Jerusalem.  Israel and the Palestinian Authority would work those 
issues out in future negotiations.4  Many considered the agreement a major breakthrough 
for negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel and hoped that it was just the first 
step in securing peace throughout the Middle East.  For Hussein and Jordan, the Oslo 
Agreement ended any chance of Hussein returning to lead the Palestinians of the West 
Bank.  The agreement placed Arafat and his new Palestinian Authority as the permanent 
representative of the Palestinians in the eyes of the Israelis and the rest of the world.     
 The fact that the Palestinians did not inform Hussein of the Oslo talks even 
though he was working with the Palestinians in their negotiations in Washington outraged 
Hussein.  He believed he went out of his way to help the Palestinians in Washington, 
even delaying the Jordanian negotiations so not to hurt the Palestinian efforts, and PLO 
betrayed that trust and effort.  Mahmoud Abbas, one of the leaders of the PLO, 
mentioned later that it was unfair to keep Hussein out of the loop in regards to the 
negotiations at Oslo and he had every right to be angry.  Abbas credited Hussein with 
helping the Palestinians in their negotiations with the Israelis by providing them legal 
cover to negotiate and helping them force the Israelis to discuss issues with a majority 




Hussein.  He believed that Arafat did not trust Hussein nor wanted him included in any 
discussions about the West Bank for fear of Jordan attempting to end its disengagement 
and return to an active role in the territories.5  While the Palestinians and Israelis were 
justified in keeping the talks secret for fear that if they became public outside forces 
could disrupt them, it hurt the relationship between Hussein and both the Israelis and the 
Palestinian Authority.  Hussein negotiated with both side in good faith and they repaid 
that faith by agreeing to a deal behind Hussein’s back.  It would negatively impact 
Hussein’s view of both Arafat and Peres, who led the negotiations for the Israelis.     
Hussein was also not pleased with the outcome of the deal.  He believed the PLO 
gave away too much without getting Israel’s assurance that it would favorably resolve the 
remaining issues.  He believed at the very least, Israel and the Palestinians should have 
solved the issues of final borders and the status of refugees.  Despite his disappointment, 
there was not much Hussein could do about it.  In an interview shortly after the 
announcement of the Oslo Accords, Hussein said, “I came up with the conclusion that we 
should close up the umbrella and really get it into the closet of history, and move on our 
own deal with our own problems, and as far as our Palestinian brethren were concerned 
to give them all the support we could.”  He also said that he would support the Palestinian 
Authority leadership in any way he could.6  Hussein did not have many options for 
protest after the Oslo Accords.  He previously agreed to disengage from the West Bank 
and therefore had little right to complain if the Palestinians made their agreement 
separate from him.  Despite being powerless to effect the negotiation, Hussein still had to 




For Hussein, the actions of the Palestinian Authority posed a number of threats.  
First, he worried about the fate of the holy sites and Jordan’s traditional role in protecting 
and managing them.  In a letter Hussein received from Arafat at the end of 1993; Arafat 
explained that the Israelis promised the Palestinians a special status in control over the 
holy places in Jerusalem.7  This caused two problems for the King.  First, he worried the 
Israelis and the Palestinians were continuing to negotiate secretly, with the potential to 
strike even more bargains that affected Jordan.  Second, he realized if negotiations with 
the Israelis waited too much longer, he might lose any control over Jerusalem to the 
Palestinian Authority, and in turn, the prestige in the Islamic world that went with that 
position.  Hussein could no longer delay the process and increased his contacts with 
Israel in the hope of solving their issues and moving towards peace.  
An additional threat posed by the Oslo Accords was Arafat’s new position in the 
West Bank.  Up until the Oslo Accords, Arafat was in Tunis, Tunisia, making it difficult 
for him to take direct control over the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.  The Oslo 
Accords allowed Arafat to return to the West Bank and personally lead the new 
Palestinian Authority.  Hussein worried about the growing influence of Arafat on the 
West Bank and the fear that Arafat could still have designs on incorporating Jordan into a 
future Palestinian state.  Hussein scheduled an election for November 8, 1993, but feared 
a threat to his power because of Arafat’s interference and considered canceling it.  
Hussein knew that Jordan still contained three and a half million Palestinians in the East 
Bank who could vote in Jordanian elections, Hussein feared Arafat could use the 
upcoming elections to increase the opposition to Hussein in the Jordanian Parliament.  A 




challenging times for Jordan.  Yasser Arafat did not pull a rabbit out of his hat, but a 
damned camel.” 8  Finally, Hussein worried that the Oslo Accords dramatically altered 
his relationship with Israel.  In particular, he worried that Israel would abandon its 
policies of the past of supporting the Hashemite role as the head of Jordan in favor of 
turning Jordan into a Palestinian republic.   Abu-Odeh said, “King Hussein feared that 
Israel may have reached with Arafat an agreement that would weaken or threaten Jordan.  
Regarding the Palestinian question, the king was always afraid of being left out of the 
picture.  This was for good reason because it might entice some to think that ‘Jordan is 
Palestine.’”9  While past experience justified Hussein’s fears, the new Israeli government 
led by Rabin was not the Likud government of Shamir and Sharon.  Israel still valued 
Hussein as a partner for peace, and Rabin would demonstrate that as talks between Israel 
and Jordan continued.  
Hussein realized that politically in Jordan, he might have trouble pushing a peace 
process through with an opposition block led by angry Palestinians hostile to his 
monarchy.  To increase his ability to control Parliament, he amended the election law on 
August 4, 1993.  After this amendment, the people of Jordan could only vote for one 
candidate in an election.  Previously, voters could select a number of different candidates 
from very different parties and give their support to all of them.  This change had a 
dramatic impact.  First, it decreased the support of both the Islamist and Leftist parties.  
Since people could only vote for one candidate now, there were more likely to vote along 
family or historical tribal lines.  In effect, the parties that gained ground were the less 
ideological parties, particularly ones loyal to Hussein.  This was important because any 




Hussein had control over Jordan, in recent years he started a process of democratization, 
giving more power to Parliament and allowing free elections.  Hussein did this to reduce 
domestic tensions, but Hussein worried that the growing Islamic radical movement led by 
the Muslim Brotherhood, could use the democratization process to hinder Hussein’s 
future peace objectives.11   
Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin met in Aqaba on September 26 to discuss the Oslo 
agreement and the future of Jordanian-Israeli negotiations.  Rabin tried to assure Hussein 
that Israel still valued the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan and would continue to 
coordinate with Jordan while discussing the peace process with the Palestinians.  Israeli 
intelligence advised Rabin that Hussein was deeply concerned about the Oslo Accords 
and the future of Jordanian-Israeli relations.  The intelligence service told Rabin, “King 
Hussein’s political world has collapsed around him and the most direct means are 
required to calm him down.” 12  Rabin also wanted to progress on the peace treaty 
between Jordan and Israel.  Rabin suggested signing the peace treaty now, while 
continuing to negotiate on the issues that still separated Israel and Jordan.  Hussein 
rejected this notion, arguing that the treaty is a culmination once Jordan and Israel 
resolved their remaining issues.  They agreed to take Hussein’s approach and have their 
experts continue to negotiate on the remaining outstanding issues.  Hussein surprised 
Rabin by telling him that unlike in the past, he did not need to wait for the other Arab 
countries, mainly Syria in this case, to complete a deal with Israel.  He was ready 
whenever the negotiations were complete.13  The advice of the Israeli intelligence service 
to Rabin was important because Israel still valued Hussein’s position in the Middle East 




presence in Jordan still had the potential to benefit Israel and the Israeli leadership should 
move forward with a peace process with Hussein to stabilize his position.    
The peace process between Jordan and Israel continued to move forward.  
Hussein and his brother, Crown Prince Hassan, led the Jordanian negotiators and Rabin 
and his foreign ministers Shimon Peres represented the Israelis.  Both leaders met in 
Washington in October, later meeting with Clinton and setting up a joint US-Israel-
Jordan economic committee to promote economic ties between the three countries.  This 
was important for Hussein because the Jordanian economy was still suffering from the 
fallout of the Gulf War and the continued disputes between the world and Iraq.  On 
November 3, 1993, Peres secretly went to Jordan and met with Hussein to discuss 
elements of a future treaty.  Peres also came with plans to invite “four thousand 
businessmen to Amman to invest in a new peaceful Middle East”.  During their meeting, 
Hussein and Peres worked out the basic structure for a final peace accord.  In it, Israel 
agreed to restore to Jordan land still occupied on the Dead Sea from the 1967 war.  
Jordan agreed to retake sovereignty over that land but to allow Israel to lease it from 
Jordan.  The two countries agreed to have normal relations, including the opening of an 
embassy and the exchange of ambassadors.  Finally, Jordan and Israel agreed to 
cooperate in the fields of agriculture, tourism, transportation and energy production.  
They also agreed to schedule an economic conference in Jordan to bring Israeli business 
to the country.  Peres also agreed to work with the Clinton administration and Congress 
to ease Jordan’s debt and increase its aid.  Finally, they agreed to a defense pact, where 
Israel would come to the aid of Jordan if an outside power attacked it.14  While much of 




peace treaty, the leadership of the two countries needed to work out the details.  To 
accomplish that, a level of trust was needed between Hussein and the Israeli leadership.   
While the meeting between Peres and Hussein was supposed to be secret, Peres 
could not help dropping hints to the Israeli press when he returned.  He told reporters 
“put in your calendars November 3 as a historic date” and that the only thing missing 
from his discussions with an unnamed Arab country was a pen to sign the agreement.  
This caused numerous problems for Hussein and affected the future nature of the talks.  
First, Hussein had elections scheduled for the near future and did not want them 
influenced by the possibility of an Israeli peace treaty.  In addition, it also changed the 
relationship between Hussein and the leadership of Israel.  Hussein had issues with both 
Peres and Rabin based on past dealings with them.  Hussein did not have confidence in 
Peres because of the failure of the London Agreement and because Peres was the lead 
negotiator for the Oslo Accords.  Hussein did not trust Rabin because of Rabin’s role in 
the 1967 war and his belief that Rabin was more of a general rather than a statesman.   
The Peres trip changed this dynamic.  Hussein and Rabin believed that Peres could not be 
trusted because of his inability to keep that trip secret.15  Rabin had many other reasons to 
exclude Peres from the negotiations.  First, Rabin believed that Peres eventually intended 
to challenge him for leadership of the Labor Party.  Because of this, Rabin not only did 
not trust Peres but also did not intend to allow him to gain any credit for assisting with a 
peace treaty, especially if it later could use against him in an inter-party battle.  Rabin and 
Hussein agreed to a set of aides that would communicate with each other and maintain 
strict secrecy.16  Working closely on the peace process brought Rabin and Hussein closer 




culminating a peace deal.  This friendship was important to completing an agreement 
between Jordan and Israel because both leaders needed to trust each other to overcome 
the more difficult disputes based on water and final borders.      
Hussein believed in the importance of keeping the talks secret.  He said, “The fact 
that we did not announce peace contacts publically all through the past was due to a 
mutual agreement.  At first, we were so far apart that there would have been no benefit in 
announcing the meetings.  These meetings enabled us to get to know each other.  They 
enabled us to examine our positions every now and then to see if there was any chance of 
progress.”17  Hussein did not mention that it also made it so outside agitators could not to 
blow up the peace process.  This included both Palestinian and Israeli extremist bent on 
making sure Israel and Jordan never completed a peace deal.  Even though Hussein 
opposed the secrecy in the Oslo negotiations, he rightfully believed that people like 
Arafat or members of the Israeli opposition could do things that increased tensions 
between Israel and Jordan, making it more difficult for them to negotiate an agreement.  
Things like a terrorist attack by a radical Palestinian group like Hamas had the potential 
to make it impossible for Israel and Jordan to continue to work towards an agreement.      
Rabin wanted to continue the dialogue with Hussein and asked Efraim Halevy to 
secretly discuss a peace process with him, without letting the office of Peres and the 
Foreign Ministry becoming aware of it.  In April 1994, Rabin asked Halevy to brief the 
Americans on his recent talks with Hussein and Hussein’s new desire to work towards 
peace and settle all remaining issues.  Rabin believed that eventually he would need 
American support, so it was important to begin to get them involved.  In this first meeting 




Some were still angry about Hussein’s actions during the Gulf War.  Another issue was 
Syria.  Warren Christopher had been in the middle of a major diplomatic effort to secure 
a peace deal between Syria and Israel, and while the pace was slow, they believed they 
were making progress.  The Americans were reluctant to sacrifice the Syrian talks in any 
way to work with Hussein.  Halevy suggested to Ross that Christopher call Hussein 
himself and he would see that Hussein was ready for peace.  Christopher did make the 
call, and Hussein surprised Christopher with his pleasant attitude.18  It was important for 
Israel to get an American buy-in for the peace process with Jordan because Hussein 
would need added incentives to complete a deal.  For Hussein, it was a sign that he could 
end the dispute on his border and at the same time return to the good graces of the United 
States.   
On April 26, 1994, Christopher met with Hussein in Amman.  In the meeting, 
Christopher told him that if he could reach an agreement with Israel, the US would likely 
forgive his debt and help him modernize his military.  Believing that Hussein was 
moving towards a deal with Israel, Christopher began working with the Treasury 
Department on a plan to forgive Jordan’s debt of over $700 million along with an 
additional $200 million to upgrade his military.19  Other than peace, the benefits to the 
Jordanian economy and military through a large aid package from the US cannot be 
understated.  In 1990, Jordan’s GDP growth rate was only one percent, while it increased 
the next few years; this increase came almost entirely from the influx of refugees and did 
not indicate any economic gain.20  To handle the continuing influx of refugees from the 
Gulf War, Jordan needed the assistance of the US.  Hussein correctly assumed that if he 




dramatic increases in American aid.  In addition, the benefits to the Jordanian military 
would diminish Hussein and his heir’s vulnerability to outside forces.      
Hussein saw signs during the early stages of the Clinton administration that the 
US was willing to move past the dispute from the Gulf War and begin to assist Jordan.   
On October 1, 1993, Crown Prince Hassan met with Peres and Clinton at the White 
House to discuss the situation in Jordan.  In the meeting, Peres lobbied Clinton to forgive 
Jordan’s debt, hoping it would help move the peace process forward.  Later, at a press 
conference, Clinton gave his approval for easing Jordan’s debt burden if Jordan made 
peace with Israel.21   It was an important moment for Hussein because it demonstrated 
that Israel had the power to dramatically help Jordan financially through its relationships 
in the US, along with its ability to persuade both Clinton and the Congress.  It increased 
Hussein’s trust towards the Israelis and gave him further incentive to continue his 
positive relationship with Rabin. 
On May 4, 1994, Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement, giving Arafat control over those areas of the Palestinian territories.  The 
Jericho element of that agreement was particularly important for Hussein because of 
Jericho’s proximity to the Jordanian border.  Hussein feared that Arafat would use his 
position to influence Palestinians on both sides of the border, weakening Hussein’s 
position in Jordan.22  Because of that, Hussein had a new incentive to increase 
negotiations with Rabin in the hopes of completing an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. 
Other than Arafat’s control, Hussein had two other problems that influenced his decision 
to accelerate negotiations with Israel.  First, he needed an economic agreement with 




components of the accords would limit Jordan’s access to the West Bank market.  In 
particular, the Oslo Accords limited the products Jordan could sell in the West Bank and 
placed a tax on other goods to encourage trade between Israel and the Palestinians.  The 
goal of this provision was to give Israel preferential treatment in the West Bank as an 
incentive to continue to move the peace process forward.  In addition, Hussein feared that 
the United States was losing patience with him and no longer considered Jordan a 
worthwhile ally in the peace process.  If this became permanent, Hussein feared he could 
lose the chance to improve relations with the United States, an important financial 
component of any peace deal. 23  While peace with Israel had its own benefits, without 
the additional support from the United States, it was not worth the risk to Hussein to fight 
for a peace deal with Israel.  While there was less pressure on Hussein from other Arab 
countries over his potential talks with Israel, he still needed to worry about the reaction of 
his own population.   If he could demonstrate tangible benefits because of a peace 
agreement with Israel, it would make it easier for the Jordanian public to accept any 
future agreements.     
On May 19, Rabin and Hussein met in London to discuss the progress in the 
Jordanian-Israeli talks.  At that meeting, Rabin told Hussein that Israel was willing to 
give Jordan a privileged role in the responsibility and maintenance of Muslim holy sites 
in Jerusalem.  In addition, Israel would respect this role in all future talks with the 
Palestinians.  They agreed to have a public meeting at the in the region to announce to the 
world that they were not only working towards a Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty but those 
talks would soon be completed.  Rabin told Hussein that he would work with Congress 




would give him both economic and diplomatic security, enhancing his control over 
Jordan.  In addition, for Hussein, the return of his role at the Muslim holy sites in 
Jerusalem had special value.  Since he lost that control in 1967, almost every effort to 
make peace with Israel was based on Hussein’s desire to return the control of those sites 
to the Hashemite family.  This desire became even more important because of Israel’s 
deal with the Palestinians and the potential of the Palestinian Authority to permanently 
replace Hussein as the guardian of the holy sites in Jerusalem.     
The US saw other signs that Jordan and Israel were rapidly moving towards a 
breakthrough in the peace process.  Ross met with Israeli representative Eli Rubinstein 
and Jordanian ambassador to the United States Fayez Tarawneh, to discuss a number of 
issues dealing with relations between Jordan and Israel.  These included “tourism, Jordan 
Rift Valley Development, a transnational them park in the Dead Sea, civil aviation, and 
the development of the ‘Camp David Road’ that would connect Egypt, Israel, and 
Jordan.”  The willingness of both sides to engage in the issues in a way that moved the 
talks forward led Ross to believe that not only a peace deal was possible, but likely.  He 
even went as far to see if the Jordanians would be open to holding a joint press 
conference with the United States and Israel.  Much to his surprise, both the Ambassador 
and the King quickly agreed.  The purpose of the press conference was to announce these 
minor agreements and to settle on a place where a larger tri-party agreement could occur.  
Again, much to the surprise of Ross, Tarawneh said he nor the King were worried about 
where the next summit occurred, it could happen in Jordan or Israel.25  It was an 




eagerness to do so increased Ross’s belief that both Jordan and Israel were rapidly 
moving towards a historic agreement.     
In June of 1994, Ross met with Jordanian Prime Minster Abdul Salem Majali.  
Majali was concerned that Jordan was not getting enough for taking these peace steps 
with Israel.  Ross made some promises to the Prime Minister to reassure him of the 
United States’ effort in assisting Jordan.  Ross promised to try to convince France and 
Japan to reschedule Jordanian debt.  He also would find some American aid to Jordan.  
One problem with this promise was Congress was reluctant to send aid directly to Jordan 
because of residual anger over Hussein’s support for Iraq during the Persian Gulf War.  
In addition, new congressional budgeting rules required all debt relief to be paid for in the 
budget.   Because of this, in the eyes of Congress, forgiving Jordanian debt had a similar 
budgetary impact as giving Jordan cash directly.26  To solve this problem, Ross promised 
to use a food assistance program already established to aid Jordan.  He also said he would 
help Jordan get loans through organizations like the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, hoping that would attract foreign investment.  Finally, Ross promised some 
kind of military aid.  While the Jordanians were unhappy with this package, Ross said 
that was the best that he could do unless Jordan made real progress towards peace.27  
Short of that, it would be impossible to convince Congress to spend any more money.  
Ross’s efforts further supported Hussein’s desire to agree to a peace deal with Israel.   He 
saw all the economic and military advantages from the United States, encouraging him to 
continue his work with Rabin.    
At the same time, Majali met with Ross, Hussein also visited Washington to 




When Hussein met with people from the Clinton administration, he received 
disappointing news.  Clinton’s aides told him that if he wanted the aid to begin, he 
needed to take more public steps towards peace.  When Rabin found this out, he sent 
Israel’s ambassadors to the US, Itamar Rabinovich and Efraim Halevy, to meet with 
Dennis Ross to argue Jordan’s position.  Halevy told Ross Jordan needed a squadron of 
F-16s to upgrade its air force.  Ross was shocked that Israel asked the US to deliver F-16s 
to Jordan even though they still had not reached an agreement on the peace initiative.28  
During the conversation, Ross asked Halevy, “Tell me Efraim, who are you representing 
here?  Israel or Jordan?”  Halevy immediately replied, “Both.”29 Ross promised to take 
the requests under advisement and scheduled a meeting between Hussein and Clinton on 
June 22.30  The scale of collaboration between the Jordanian and Israeli delegations was a 
surprise to US officials.  It showed that both sides made a commitment towards peace and 
had been working closely together outside of the public eye.   Rabin and Halevy’s 
intervention on Hussein’s behalf was also important because it increased the level of trust 
between the two leaders.  It was unlike any relationship Hussein had in the past with 
Israeli leaders.  While Hussein was on good terms with past Israeli leadership, for the 
first time in Rabin, he had a partner who looked out for Jordan’s interests as well as 
Israel’s.   Rabin realized he needed a strong and stable Jordan if he expected Hussein to 
take the risks necessary for peace.    
The meeting with Clinton greatly pleased Hussein.  Before the meeting, at the 
instruction of Halevy, Hussein sent over a list of the things he hoped to achieve working 
with the US.  Halevy intended it to be a two-page list, but Hussein sent over a complete 




Hussein’s requests and recited them without notes.  Clinton told Hussein that he believed 
he could persuade Congress to remove all Jordan’s debt if Hussein completed a peace 
treaty with Israel.  In addition, Clinton told Hussein that he would direct the Pentagon to 
sell to Jordan military equipment that the US no longer needed in the US, but still had 
value to Jordan.31  After the meeting, Clinton, Hussein and their wives spent another long 
lunch together where Clinton tried to persuade Hussein to replace his air fleet with planes 
made by Boeing.32  Clinton’s ability to memorize Hussein’s needs and speak to them 
without the assistance of notes or aides, along with Clinton’s personality, impressed 
Hussein.  It gave the impression that Clinton was fully engaged in the issues surrounding 
Jordan.  For Hussein, the meeting with Clinton showed a number of important things.   
He believed he had someone in the White House who would listen to Jordan’s issues and 
consider their interests when dealing with the region.  In addition, the talk about airplanes 
showed Hussein that Washington would be open for business again for Jordan.  It was a 
clear sign that the US was ready to forgive Hussein for his support of the Saddam and 
Iraq, returning Jordan to its previous status as an important American ally in the region. 
On July 4, 1994, the State Department called Ross because they received an 
urgent letter from Hussein.  Ross anticipated it was a letter of delay or agreeing to some 
minor meeting between Jordanian and Israeli low-level minister to work out the details 
for later meetings.  Much to his surprise, King Hussein agreed to have Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher fly to Jordan and have a meeting with the Prime Minister Majali and 
a high-level minister designated from Israel to begin work on a peace treaty. Ross felt this 
was the breakthrough they needed and attributed the change in Jordanian attitude directly 




and would try to help them with their economic problems.33  Hussein had many reasons 
to move slowly in the process and not rush into a public meeting with Rabin.  First, he 
needed to prepare his people for the idea of peace with Israel.  After so many years of 
fighting, it would not be easy to just end it for many Jordanians.  In addition, because of 
his large Palestinian population, Hussein did not want to do anything that hurt his 
standing with them for fear he could lose control of his country.  It helped Hussein that 
the Palestinian Authority already signed the Oslo Accords, removing their ability to 
attack Jordan for selling out the Palestinians.  Second, Hussein did not want to move too 
fast and have the talks fall apart as they repeatedly did in the past.  Hussein had too much 
riding on their success, especially the return of his favored status with the US.   Because 
of that, Hussein took a deliberate systematic approach that built on successes, slowly 
moving the process forward and culminating in a peace treaty. 
On July 11, another important event happened for the peace process, but all the 
major parties almost missed it.  King Hussein, in a speech to Parliament announced he 
was willing to go and meet directly with Rabin if it would help the peace process.  Most 
in the State Department thought he was saying it just so it would make the upcoming 
trilateral meetings seem unimportant. The New York Times did not even report it and the 
Washington Post only had a small wire report on the subject.  In fact, Ross believed 
Hussein was “pulling a Sadat” and announcing to the world that he was willing to do 
whatever it took to reach a peace agreement.  This was confirmed when the State 
Department received a letter from Hussein agreeing to meet with Rabin in two weeks 




 When Clinton found out of the plan for Rabin and Hussein to meet, he wanted 
them to make the announcement at the White House.  At that point, both Rabin and 
Hussein planned on meeting on the Jordanian-Israeli border.  Clinton promised Hussein 
all sorts of financial inducements to have the agreement in Washington.  Because of that, 
Hussein felt that he had to do it.  Hussein told Queen Noor that, “This is the only time 
I’ve ever compromised for the profit of the country.”  After Hussein had agreed to meet 
in Washington, Clinton announced publically that Jordan and Israel had been in secret 
talks and were coming to Washington to announce the ending of their conflict.  Hussein 
had no knowledge of what Clinton would say nor did he know the structure of the 
Washington meeting.  Clinton planned an elaborate signing ceremony, a joint banquet 
celebrating the agreement, and an address to a joint session of Congress by Rabin and 
Hussein. 35  For Hussein, while frustrating not to be involved or even informed of the plan 
by Washington, he needed the American economic help and appreciated the chance to 
speak to the American people from Congress.  In the end, Hussein accomplished his 
goals by allowing the Americans to direct some of the processes, despite his preference to 
have the ceremony in the Middle East.  For Clinton, because he was preparing for 
reelection while fighting off growing attacks from Republicans, he could use an 
achievement in foreign policy and an agreement between Jordan and Israel would achieve 
that goal.  
 In preparation for the announcement in Washington, Rabin and Hussein continued 
their work in writing what became known as the Washington Declaration.  While the US 
tried to help with the wording for the Washington Deceleration, both Jordan and Israel 




secret talks and were comfortable working out their issues without outside interference.  
In fact, when the American ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, met with Crown Prince 
Hassan just days before the scheduled meeting at the White House, Hassan rejected 
Indyk’s suggestions on the context for the declaration, saying that Jordan initialed a draft 
with the Israelis the previous day.36  After his meeting with Hassan, when Indyk 
presented Rabin with a copy of the American version of the Washington Declaration, 
Rabin told him to keep it, he said, “We have something better.”  He passed Indyk a copy 
of what Rabin agreed to with Jordan, and Indyk shouted, “What you have here is 
peace!”37   
On July 20, 1994, just before the planned White House meeting, the trilateral 
economic talks continued on the coast of the Dead Sea.  This meeting was a special event 
for many Israelis that demonstrated the importance of a peace deal with Jordan.  Majali 
and Peres led the summit to further discuss the new economic relationship between 
Jordan and Israel.  It was the first time leaders of Israel and Jordan openly met in the 
region.  It was such a shocking turn of events that a number of the Israeli diplomats, 
along with the Israeli reporters, were seen calling home on their cell phones to tell people 
they were actually in Jordan.38  This demonstrated how important it was to for many 
Israelis to improve relations with their neighbors.  It was a constant reminder how 
isolated they were when they could see Jordan, but they had very little hope of actually 
going there in their lifetime.   
Right before the scheduled meeting at the White House between Rabin and 
Hussein, it was becoming clear that a peace treaty could be the possible outcome of the 




announcement seemed possible to many in the Clinton administration.  Hussein and 
Rabin were working out the details independently and continued to keep the Americans 
uninvolved in the details.  Rabin told Ross that only one other person in Israel even knew 
about the private talks. This became uncomfortable when Ross met with Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres the night before the Washington announcement and it was clear Peres was 
not the other person in Israel who knew of the talks. The Israelis asked the United States 
not participate in the negotiations directly because they believed they were making good 
progress solely because of the personal relationship between Hussein and Rabin.39  The 
State Department figured if the two sides are actually working together, maybe it was 
best not to interfere.  This marked a major change for the United States.  In the past, the 
US frequently mediated any sensitive negotiation between the Arabs and Israel, this 
includes talks between Jordan and Israel.  Because of the friendship and trust between 
Hussein and Rabin, the Israelis and the Jordanians no longer needed the US to force them 
to work out their differences. 
On July 25, Hussein, Rabin and Clinton made a joint statement on the White 
House lawn that became known as the Washington Declaration.  The Declaration opened 
by saying, “After generations of hostility, bloodshed and tears and in the wake of years of 
pain and wars.  His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin were 
determined to bring an end to the bloodshed and sorrow.”  It ended the state of 
belligerency between Jordan and Israel by promising, “Neither side will threaten the 
other by use of force, weapons, or any other means against each other, and both sides will 
thwart threats to security resulting from all kinds of terrorism.”  In addition, it committed 




subject of Jerusalem it said, “Israel respects the special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan in the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem.  When negotiations on permanent status 
will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these 
shrines.”  In addition, it increased the connections between Jordan and Israel by 
connecting the phone lines, electric grid and establishing new border crossings and 
tourism exchanges.40  The agreement was a major achievement for both leaders.  Israel 
received from Jordan both recognition and the increased economic and diplomatic ties 
that it always sought from the Arab world.  Hussein received peace with Israel, the return 
of Jordan to the good graces of the US and affirmation of Hussein’s role in Jerusalem.  
Both Israel and Jordan accomplished their most important goals in the peace deal.  The 
only thing that remained was formally writing the final peace treaty and working out any 
technical issues that remained.    
The term belligerency almost ended the agreement before Rabin and Hussein 
could announce it.  The lawyers advising Rabin told him that belligerency has no 
meaning in international law and he needed to replace it by calling for the end of war 
between the two nations.  Hussein promised Rabin that in his statement in Washington he 
would make it clear what the text meant.41  He said, “The term used in international 
documents as have affected us so far, is ‘the state of belligerency’ and the ‘end of the 
state of belligerency.’  I think both in Arabic and Hebrew, our people do not have such a 
term.  What we have accomplished and what we are committed to is the end of the state 
of war between Jordan and Israel.”42  Once again, the trust between Rabin and Hussein 
prevailed and Hussein made clear to the world that the age of conflict between Israel and 




The following day, both Rabin and Hussein addressed a joint session of Congress.  
Hussein discussed his history with the United States, declaring: 
“I value the long friendship between Jordan and the United States, 
inherited from the era of my grandfather.  I have sought over thirty-four 
years, since the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, to ensure that it be 
honest and true.  It has been a friendship built on mutual respect and 
common interests.  I am proud to remind you how we stood shoulder to 
shoulder during the long years of the Cold War.  And now together we 
share a great hope.  To establish lasting peace in the Middle East.”43   
 
Hussein showed Congress and the American people that disputes from Gulf War were in 
the past.  In addition, for decades he had led Jordan as a partner with the US and with 
American help, he would continue that partnership and bring peace to the rest of the 
region.   It reminded the Americans that Hussein would be there when necessary to 
facilitate an Israeli relationship with other nations in the region, including the 
Palestinians.  Hussein happily returned to the embrace of the United States and all the 
benefits that went with it.  For Hussein, the Washington Declaration and his speech to 
Congress marked the successful completion of over forty-years of work.  He overcame 
the problems associated with the Persian Gulf War and reinserted himself as a valuable 
American ally.  In addition, he completed the work of his grandfather, establishing a 
peaceful relationship with Israel.  Finally, he secured the future for his family in Jordan 
by removing both the Israeli and Palestinian threat, while placing Jordan under the 
protection of the United States.            
To mark the new relationship between Israel and Jordan, Rabin invited Hussein to 
fly through Israeli air space on his return trip from the United States.  The plan worried 




Jordan aircraft.  Hussein decided to ignore his advisors and both he and the Queen 
enjoyed the view of Israel as Hussein flew the plane himself.  In addition, to make sure 
nothing happened, Israel gave Hussein’s plane an escort through Israel.  As Hussein flew 
over Israel, he remained in contact with Rabin and the two celebrated the new era of 
Israeli-Jordanian relations.44 
After the signing of the Washington Declaration, Jordan faced very few protests 
at home and throughout the Arab world for their efforts at peace with Israel.  In Jordan, 
there was a small protest led by the Islamic Action Front and the Syrian press attacked 
the king for abandoning a united Arab front.  However, there was no direct protest from 
Syrian President al Assad.  The only real loud protest came from the Palestinian 
Authority, upset over the provisions giving Jordan a special place in the final settlement 
of Jerusalem.45  Hussein’s efforts to prepare the Jordanian people for peace had paid off.  
In addition, many in Jordan hoped that the economic benefits of a peace agreement would 
help the struggling Jordanian economy.    
After the Washington Declaration, both sides began to work on the details of the 
treaty.  This time, the US participated more than in the past.  Ten days after the 
Washington announcement, Warren Christopher traveled to the region and brokered a 
deal allowing for the opening up of the border at Wadi Arava and resuming postal service 
between the two nations.46  It was remarkable that the changes announced in the 
Washington Declaration began to occur so quickly.  Christopher wanted to show the 
people of the Middle East that the Declaration was not just words on paper, but a 
demonstration of actual progress.  In the past, all actions in the Middle East peace process 




move too fast for fear of ending progress.  Because of the relationship between Hussein 
and Rabin, that fear largely faded away.  
Hussein faced an immediate issue in the negotiations when members of Congress 
informed him that Congress would not grant Jordan debt relief until Israel and Jordan 
officially signed the treaty.  Hussein immediately informed Rabin of this issue and Rabin 
put Hussein’s nephew, Talal in contact with an influential member of AIPAC named 
Steve Grossman.  After Grossman had talked to Rabin, he called Talal back and told him 
that Congress would pass the bill, not to worry.47  In addition, an issue arose because a 
Jordanian national living in New Jersey murdered his wife in a domestic dispute and 
returned to Jordan.  Because Jordan did not have an extradition treaty with the US, it 
would not extradite him back.  Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey threatened to 
block the aid if Jordan did not return him.  Rabin asked Halevy to broker a compromise 
that ended the crisis.48  For Hussein, it demonstrated the power of AIPAC and Israel in 
Congress and helped explain in some cases why he had trouble dealing with them in the 
past.  In addition, it showed Hussein that he would continue to benefit from his improved 
relationship with Israel through Israeli support in the United States.       
During the next five months, the hard work of negotiating a final peace treaty 
began.  The two major issues were water rights and a small Israeli settlement on the 
border that Israel hoped to keep.  The first round of negotiations between Israel and 
Jordan at Wadi Araba were tense.  The negotiations took place in an army tent set up on 
the exact border between the two nations.  It was so precise that the Jordanian and Israeli 
delegations remained in their own territory while the negotiating commenced.  Dr. 




delegation.  The talks almost broke down immediately when Haddadin perceived an 
insult from Shimir because Shimir began with a discussion of future economic projects.  
Haddadin stormed out angrily because he believed any talks surrounding future projects 
could not start until they settled other issues.  If Shimir had not quickly apologized, it 
could have stalled the peace process.49     
 One of the largest areas of contention between Israel and Jordan came from the 
issue of water rights.  Eventually, the two nations solved this issue not in the large 
traditional meeting, but through the personal diplomacy of Dr. Haddadin and Noah 
Kinarti, the Israeli representative on water issues.  Their meeting occurred during the 
August meetings in Israel, after the Washington Declaration.  Kinarti pulled Haddadin 
aside and asked him if they could meet in private and if Haddadin had the authorization 
to negotiate the water issues on his own.  When he told Kinarti that was acceptable, they 
went to look for a private place to meet where they could discuss the issues without 
raising suspicion amongst the other delegates and the press that something was going on.  
Haddadin figured the best way to have a secret meeting was to do it in the open, so 
nobody would suspect a meeting was occurring.  To accomplish this, they went to the 
cafeteria, asked to borrow the laptop of a reporter, sat down at the side of the room, and 
began the discussion.  They separated themselves from everyone else and began to work 
out the water issues between their respective nations.  Because it was so open, and they 
were using a reporter’s laptop, nobody suspected an important meeting occurred.  
Eventually, after a lengthy discussion, the two sides reached an agreement on the 
distribution of water from the Jordan River.  Israel pledged to send fifty million cubic 




through other sources like desalination.50  Jordan feared that Israel could make changes to 
the Red Sea, the Jordan River, or the aquifer underneath the region that would limit 
Jordanian access to water.  The completion of this stage of the negotiation was important 
to provide Jordan and Hussein confidence that they could solve other issues through 
compromise.   
 The other major issue between Jordan and Israel was a tract of land south of the 
Dead Sea.  Since 1967, Israel placed a number of kibbutz farms on this land that they 
hoped to keep in any deal with Jordan.  Jordan was determined to get all the land lost in 
1967 war returned.  After direct intervention between Halevy and Hussein, Israel and 
Jordan agreed to a deal where Israel returned the settlements to Jordanian sovereignty and 
Israel would lease the land from Jordan for twenty-five years.  Israel also agreed to 
replace any water these farms used.51  This was the last major issue and both sides found 
a formula allowing each side to leave the negotiations satisfied.  Israel for all intents and 
purposes kept the farms, but Jordan would have formal control.  The relationship between 
the Jordanian and Israeli leadership allowed most issues to be worked out in this fashion, 
and if the delegations reached a sticking point, Rabin and Hussein solved the issue 
personally.   
On October 26, 1994, Rabin and Hussein singed the peace treaty on the border 
between Israel and Jordan.  The place for the gathering was an active minefield just days 
before.  Clinton and other foreign leaders attended the ceremony, marking only the 
second Arab nation to sign a formal peace treaty with Israel.  While similar in some 
aspects to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, this treaty focused less on security and more 




Israelis and the Jordanians did not require any UN or US force to serve as a buffer 
between the two nations.  Hussein believed Jordan and Israel should do everything 
possible to promote the peace agreement, including fast tracking the economic 
connections between the two nations.  Hussein described peace as:  
Tearing down of barriers between people.  It is people coming together, 
coming to know one another.  It is the children of martyrs on both sides 
embracing.  It is soldiers who fought each other coming together and 
exchanging reminiscences about the impossible conditions they had faced 
in a totally different atmosphere.  It is people getting together and doing 
business.  Real peace is not between governments but between 
individuals.52   
 
The peace treaty dramatically improved relations with the US, returning the US as the 
chief benefactor of Jordan.  It also ended the notion of Israel pushing the Palestinians into 
Jordan and possibly making Jordan a Palestinian state.  It provided for the long-term 
security of Jordan from any outside threat.  In short, it provided for the long-term stability 
of the Hashemite family’s control over Jordan.  
At the ceremony, Clinton addressed the gathered leaders and showed through his 
speech that it was a new era in American-Jordanian relations, exclaiming:  
King Hussein, today in this arid place, you bring to full flower the 
memory of the man who taught you to seek peace, your grandfather, King 
Abdullah.  When he was martyred four decades ago, he left you with a 
great burden and great dream.  He believed that one day, on both sides of 
the River Jordan, Arab and Jew would live in peace.  How bravely you 
have shouldered that burden and carried that dream.  Now after so much 
danger and so much hardship, Your Majesty, your day has come.  Truly, 





Hussein appreciated the speech because of the respect Clinton showed to his family’s 
legacy.  Hussein’s relationship with Israel began when he took over the monarchy at the 
age of seventeen and through the guidance of his grandfather, learned at a young age the 
importance of a friendship with Israel and benefits of peace.  After the ceremony, Clinton 
delivered an address to the Jordanian Parliament.  Clinton tried to highlight the historical 
connection between Jordan and the United States.  He mentioned Hussein’s first meeting 
with Eisenhower, where Hussein pledged to stand with the US to keep communism out of 
the Middle East.  Clinton said, “Both of us, Jordan and America, are fighting the same 
battle.  Today, that battle is the struggle for peace.  And I say again, on behalf of the 
United States, we will not let you down.”  Clinton also hoped the peace deal would 
improve relations between the United States and other Arab nations.  He said, “America 
refuses to accept our civilizations must collide.  We respect Islam . . . the traditional 
values of Islam, devotion to faith and good work, to family and society, are in harmony 
with the best of American ideals.  Therefore, we know our people, our faiths, our cultures 
can live in harmony with each other.” 54  Clinton’s hoped that Hussein would continue to 
be an American partner promoting the peace process in the region.  His optimism about 
Hussein’s desire to continue to work with the United States was confirmed when Hussein 
continued to assist the Clinton administration as it continued the peace process between 
the Palestinians and the Israelis.   
Both the Israeli and Jordanian public celebrated the signing of the peace deal.  For 
Israel, it meant an end to the constant conflict on their eastern border.  For Jordan, it 
meant an end to the threat of Israel making Jordan Palestine.  Prime Minister Majali said, 




wing Israeli politicians, mainly associated with the Likud party, could not claim Jordan 
was an alternative to a Palestinian state.55  It would forever prove invalid that statement 
that Palestinians already had a state in Jordan. 
 There were immediate benefits from the peace deal for Jordan.  Clinton declared 
Jordan a Major Non-NATO Ally of the United States, entitling them to a major increase 
in military aid that continued after the signing of the treaty.  Jordan had a major increase 
in tourism from Israel because of the treaty.  Before Israel and Jordan signed the treaty, 
Jordan received only $35 million in support from the US.   By 2014, that number reached 
$700 million annually.  In 1993, Jordan only received $9 million in total military aid.  
This increased to $300 million in 2014, including fifty-eight F-16s.  Finally, the US 
undertook a number of major military related construction projects in Jordan, including a 
counterterrorism facility and the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center built 
in 2006.  The US also made a number of economic investments in Jordan to help their 
economy.  In 1996, Congress authorized the establishment of Qualifying Industrial Zones 
in Jordan that allowed for goods produced in Jordan and shipped through Israel to enter 
the US duty free.  The only requirement was that while in Israel, the products had to have 
some value added to it.  By 2002, products from these thirteen zones accounted for over 
ninety percent of Jordanian exports to the US.56  There was also a dramatic increase in 
economic development between the Israel and Jordan.  Israel cut tariffs on Jordanian 
imports by almost fifty percent.  Israel started to invest in Jordan with over fifteen major 
investments in the fields of textiles, manufacturing and agriculture.  They also started $90 
million joint project to produce bromine on the Dead Sea and a $60 million plant to 




of Jordan witnessed the benefits of peace.  Hussein’s efforts to work with Israel assured 
his families survival as the head of Jordan and dramatically improved both the economic 
and military security of Jordan.   
 The relations between Israel and Jordan continued to improve.  On October 31, 
1995, Rabin and Peres led an economic conference in Amman to increase foreign 
investment in both Israel and Jordan.  While there, the Israelis noticed a dramatic change 
in how the Jordanian public viewed them.  Peres and Israeli ambassador Shimon Shamir 
took a walk towards the end of the conference around the streets of Amman.  The public 
immediately recognized them and ran up to shake their hands and congratulate them on 
their achievement.58    
In the Arab world, Egypt was the biggest loser from the Israeli-Jordanian Peace 
Treaty.  Both the Americans and the Israelis frequently compared how both Egypt and 
Jordan reacted after they achieved peace with Israel and Egypt frequently came out 
looking worse in the eyes of the Americans.  In addition, Egypt quickly realized that 
Israel no longer needed to rely on Cairo as a gateway to the Arab world; Hussein was 
willing to assume that role.59  Egypt showed its frustration in late October 1995, at the 
Amman Economic Summit,  when Egyptian foreign minister Amre Moussa launched an 
attack against an “unnamed Arab government” for rushing too fast to normalize relations 
with Israel.   Hussein countered this argument saying, “If peace meant a better life for his 
people, we are not just rushing, but running.”  Moussa was taken aback by Hussein’s 
retort and immediately said his argument was misconstrued and apologized to the 
attendees of the conference.60  Hussein supplanted Egypt and Mubarak as the preferred 




willingness to work with both Israel and the Palestinians along with his good relations 
with Rabin.  In addition, without the threat of Israel pushing the Palestinians into Jordan 
or Hussein taking control of the West Bank, the relationship between Arafat and Hussein 
also improved.  This would be important when the Americans and the Israelis needed 
Hussein to mediate disputes between the Palestinians and Israel.   
Egypt was not the only Arab nation upset by Hussein’s peace deal with Israel.  In 
late December 1995, Hussein received word from the CIA of a Syrian plot to assassinate 
him.   The CIA said that Syria opposed Hussein’s treaty with Israel and his support of the 
opposition to Saddam.  Syria believed that both ideas were a threat to the stability of 
Syria.  In addition, the CIA told Hussein that Syria would start a propaganda campaign 
against Hussein, so to justify the assassination.  The CIA also warned Hussein of Iraqi 
efforts to promote terrorist attacks inside Jordan, with the hope of destabilizing the 
regime.  Hussein took these warnings seriously and changed his security situation to 
prevent an attack, including replacing all his bodyguards.61  Syria and Iraq had different 
reasons to be hostile to Hussein.  Syria feared that because of Hussein’s deal, the US 
would pressure them to make a similar deal.  In addition, with the Palestinian Authority 
coming to terms with Israel, Syria was losing influence with the Palestinian groups in the 
region, threatening their position in Lebanon.  For Iraq, Saddam saw the deal as another 
step for Jordan to regain its position with the US.  Because of their shared border, he 
feared the US could use Jordan continue to undermine his regime.   
Relations between the US and Jordan continued to improve after the signing of 
the treaty.  Jordan’s aid from the US dramatically increased and his personal relationship 




demonstrated their appreciation for Hussein’s efforts towards peace.  Meeting with 
Hussein in October 1994 after the Cairo Economic Conference, Christopher told Hussein, 
“You have done more in one year to bring peace with Israel than the Egyptians had done 
in seventeen years.”62  Later that month, in a speech in to Georgetown on October 24, 
1994, Christopher acknowledged the benefits of peace for the region.  He said, Hussein 
and Rabin:  
are determined that their border will become a gateway rather than a 
barrier.  Already, there are ads in Israeli papers for tours of Jordan’s great 
historical sites in Petra and Jerash.  Through the work of the US-Jordan-
Israel Trilateral Commission, plans are underway to develop joint 
economic projects, to share water resources, and to develop the Jordan 
River Valley.  These projects will build bonds of human contact and 
common interest.  They will cement an enduring peace.63 
   
Christopher wanted to show the economic benefits of peace to the region.  He also 
wanted to demonstrate that with peace came improved relations with the US, hoping to 
encourage other Arab regimes to formalize relations with Israel.   
 Hussein’s first big test to measure the strength of his repaired alliance with the US 
occurred throughout 1994 and 1995 when Saddam and Iraq again threatened its 
neighbors.  In October 1994, Iraqi forces again headed in the direction of Kuwait.   The 
US responded by again threatening military action.  For Hussein, it was an opportunity to 
show that he learned the lessons of the previous Gulf War and in a meeting with Iraqi 
deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz, Hussein scolded him for Iraq’s actions.  In addition, he 
told him to tell Saddam “Jordan will not support Iraqi aggression.”64  Hussein needed to 
make it clear to the Arab world and the United States that he no longer supported Saddam 




willing to put his country at stake for the sake of his past friendship with Saddam.  In 
addition, because of his improved relationship with Israel and the US, he no longer feared 
Saddam’s military capability to threaten Jordan.  He also did not need Iraq to defend 
against Israel or to keep Israel from making Jordan part of Palestine.  Hussein even 
allowed the CIA to open up a station in Jordan with the goal of over-throwing Saddam.65  
On August 8, 1995, Saddam’s two sons-in-laws, along with their wives and children, 
sought asylum in Jordan.  Hussein granted their request and allowed them to speak out 
against the regime in Iraq.  In addition, Hussein allowed the US to use Saddam’s family 
to gain intelligence about Saddam’s weapons programs.  In late August, Hussein sent 
Saddam a letter, asking him to abide by UN resolutions and end his hostility to the West.   
When Saddam rejected these request, Hussein made a televised speech where he called 
for the removal of Saddam from power.  He accused Saddam of threatening Jordan and 
his other neighbors, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. He said Saddam’s continued actions 
would threaten the survival of Iraq and remove it as a barrier to Iran.   He also pledged to 
continue to “assist the people of Iraq until the long night of their suffering comes to an 
end”66  Hussein took the opposite approach to Saddam and Iraq compared to the first 
Persian Gulf War.  Hussein no longer had the threat of popular support for Iraq and could 
firmly side with the Americans.  In addition, while in the first Gulf War his economic 
stability relied on Iraq, now he needed continued American support to maintain his 
economy.    
Relations between Jordan and Israel suffered a shock when on November 4, 1995, 
an Israeli assassin murdered Rabin at a peace rally in Tel Aviv.  The news devastated 




for the funeral with leaders from around the world.67  At Rabin’s funeral, Hussein gave 
one of the eulogies where he spoke of his friendship and partnership with Rabin to bring 
peace to the region.  He started by saying how sad he was that it was under these 
circumstances that he visited Jerusalem for the first time at the invitation of the Israeli 
government.  He said:  
We achieved a peace, an honorable peace and a lasting peace.   He had the 
courage, he had vision, and he had a commitment to peace, and standing 
here, I commit before you, before my people in Jordan, before the world, 
myself to continue with our utmost, to ensure that we leave a similar 
legacy.  And when my time comes, I hope it will be like my grandfather’s 
and like Yitzhak Rabin’s.68   
 
Like Rabin, militants hostile to peace between Israel and Jordan assassinated Hussein’s 
grandfather over rumors that he planned to make a separate peace with Israel in July 
1951.  For Hussein, comparing Rabin to King Abdullah was a clear sign of the esteem 
and respect he had for Rabin.  Hussein’s pledge to carry on and strive to bring peace to 
the region became more important as his health began to fail and he still fought to bring 
peace between Israel and the Arabs.  He announced these intentions by saying about 
Rabin, “You lived as a solder, you died as a solder for peace. . . .  We belong to the camp 
of peace.  We believe in peace.  We believe that our one God wishes us to live in peace 
and wishes peace upon, us for these are His teachings to all the followers of the three 
great monotheistic religions, the children of Abraham.”69  Going forward, for Hussein, 
the quest for peace was a holy promise to his departed friend and a religious duty that he 




Hussein worried that the death of Rabin would hurt Jordan’s normalization efforts 
with Israel.  He believed Peres was too close to Arafat and he missed the personal 
relationship and trust he enjoyed with Rabin.  In addition, Peres made a number of 
military moves that stressed the relationship with Jordan.  This included the assassination 
of a bomb maker from Hamas and Israeli attack in southern Lebanon on Syrian backed 
forces from Hezbollah called “Operation Grapes of Wrath”70  Hussein still did not fully 
trust Peres after the failures from their dealings in the past.  Many of the challenges in the 
relationship between Jordan and Israel would not have occurred if Rabin lived to 
continue his leadership of Israel. 
In May 1996, Binyamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party became the Prime Minister 
of Israeli, defeating Peres by thirty thousand votes.  At first, Hussein believed that 
Netanyahu would make a better partner for peace than Peres because Hussein feared 
Peres might sacrifice the relationship with Jordan to achieve a deal with Syria.  Hussein 
even made efforts to help Netanyahu in the election by inviting him to a meeting in 
Jordan.  Unfortunately, Hussein badly misjudged Netanyahu, who upon taking office, 
began dismantling the peace process with the Palestinians.  This included breaking 
previous agreements and instituting a policy of mass arrests of Palestinian leaders.  In 
addition, this included a dramatic increase in settlement construction on land in the West 
Bank.  The situation took a dramatic turn when Netanyahu allowed the opening of an 
ancient tunnel near the Al-Aqsa Mosque on September 25.  Because of Netanyahu’s 
actions, mass protests occurred throughout the Palestinian territories.71  Netanyahu’s 
decision to open the tunnel threatened the new peace between Israel and Jordan.  




because of that, Hussein believed that no changes to the site should occur without his 
approval.  In a meeting between Arafat, Hussein, Netanyahu and Clinton on October 2, 
1996, Hussein appealed to Clinton to help work out the crisis.  At the meeting, Hussein 
told Netanyahu, “I speak for myself, for Yitzhak Rabin, a man whom I had the great 
pride to call my friend, and for all people who benefit from peace.  All this good will is 
being lost.  We are at the edge of the abyss, and regardless of our best efforts, we might 
be just about to fall into it, all of us.”72 Clinton’s intervention convinced Netanyahu to 
reclose the tunnel.73  Hussein again showed that he was a moderating influence in 
disputes between the Palestinians and the Israelis and he demonstrated to Clinton that he 
would continue to play a positive role in securing peace in the region.     
The peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians also began to bog 
down.  Previously, in a meeting with Clinton, Hussein told him that the US and Israel 
needed to take a different approach than what he and Rabin took.  Hussein felt that the 
step-by-step approach that he used with Rabin would not work with the Palestinians 
because of the lack of trust between the two sides.74  The Palestinians feared Netanyahu 
would use the old Likud trick of delaying final status talks indefinitely while Israel 
changed the situation on the ground through increased settlement expansion, making it 
impossible to create a Palestinian state.  In 1997, the Palestinians and the Israelis were in 
the process of negotiating the pull out of Israeli forces from Hebron.  With the 
negotiations falling apart over exactly when the Israeli pullout would begin, Hussein 
called Ross and said he was willing to fly to Gaza and meet with Arafat if it was helpful.  
Arafat agreed and invited Hussein.  Hussein landed in Gaza and proposed a compromise 




October and the Palestinians were set on a date in May.  Ross had tried to use Egypt to 
broker a compromise, but they proved less than helpful by arguing strictly for the 
Palestinian position.  Hussein’s proposal left the situation vague, allowing both sides to 
see victory in it.   Hussein even flew with Ross and Palestinian negotiator Seab Erekat to 
Jerusalem to seal the deal.75  The agreement was called the Hebron Protocols and it called 
for the splitting of Hebron, with the Palestinian Authority taking control of eighty percent 
and the Israelis retaining the other twenty percent.  Each side would make their own 
security arrangements.76  Hussein demonstrated to Ross and the Americans that he would 
go to any length to help the peace process move forward.  He showed that he could put 
old disputes behind him and do what was best for the region, even if that meant working 
with two people, Arafat and Netanyahu, that he spent decades at war with.  It also 
showed the US that even after Hussein received the benefits of his peace deal with Israel, 
in the form of US aid, unlike Egypt, he would continue to assist the US in its efforts to 
overcome disputes in the region. 
A number of incidents in 1997 had the potential to derail the peace accord 
between Israel and Jordan.  On March 13, 1997, a Jordanian soldier opened fire at the 
Jordanian border on a group of Israeli schoolchildren.  The attack killed seven children 
and wounded another six.  The attack outraged Hussein.  He scolded the members of the 
military who had control of that area, telling them, “Shooting children is something one 
must not do in wartime, let alone when they are at peace.”  Hussein also went to the 
Israeli village that was home to the children and apologized to all the family members.  In 
addition, he allowed Jordanian television to film it, showing him on his knees grieving 




did not care.  He wanted it shown so the people of the Middle East saw that the hatred of 
old times needed to end.  He said, “If there is any purpose in my life it will be to make 
sure that all the children do not suffer the way our generation did.”77  Finally, Hussein 
quietly asked the Israeli government if it would be appropriate to make a donation to the 
families.  They agreed, and Hussein transferred a million dollars to help the grieving 
families.78  While Hussein’s gestures did not help him in the wider Arab world, it did 
grant him a level of respect in the Israeli public. The mayor of Rimon, where the girls 
attended the school, wrote Hussein a letter.  In it, he said, “Your wonderful personality, 
personal courage and humanity, which you showed when you visited the bereaved 
families, have further strengthened the support and sympathy you have from the citizens 
of Israel.  We all see you as one of the most important, central figures in the Middle East, 
striving continuously, for many years, for the establishment of true peace between our 
two countries.”79  Hussein’s main concern was the importance of promoting the peace 
process that he worked so hard to achieve and was outraged and ashamed that a member 
of his military tried to destroy that legacy. 
Also in March, Hussein had a confrontation with Netanyahu over the King’s 
plane entering Israeli airspace.  Hussein agreed to fly Arafat personally in the royal 
airliner to a new airport located in Rafah jointly built by Jordan and the Palestinian 
Authority.  When Hussein entered Israeli airspace, as he frequently did since the signing 
of the peace treaty, Israeli air traffic control denied his plane entry into Israel.  The 
closing of Israeli airspace forced Hussein to return to Amman, deeply embarrassed by 




tragic actions . . . .  You are pushing all the Arabs and Israelis toward an abyss of 
disasters and bloodbath.”80 
 The third incident occurred on September 25, 1997, when two Mossad agents 
attempted to assassinate a Jordanian citizen named Khalid Mishal, a leader in Hamas, in 
response to a number of Hamas bombings in Israel.  While the Mossad agents injected 
Mishal with poison, Mishal’s bodyguards captured two agents and another four hid out in 
the Israeli embassy in Amman.  This assassination attempt outraged Hussein.   Just a few 
days before Hussein met with Israeli representatives to discuss cooperation in fighting 
terrorists.  In addition, he secured an agreement from Hamas for a thirty-year truce with 
Israel.  Hussein called Clinton to express his outrage.  Clinton agreed with Hussein’s 
assessment and yelled about Netanyahu, “This man is impossible!”  Hussein told Clinton 
that if Israel did not bring the antidote to Jordan immediately, he would storm the 
embassy, put the Israelis on public trial and suspend the peace treaty.  Hussein was not 
bluffing about the threat to storm the embassy.  He had a Special Forces unit lined up 
ready to do under the command of eldest son Abdullah II.81   
While Netanyahu at first balked at providing the antidote, eventually he realized 
he had no choice.   Even then, at first Netanyahu sent the antidote but would not reveal 
the toxin or the chemical makeup of the antidote.  Netanyahu called Ross to get his 
opinion on the situation and sought his help for ending the crisis.  Ross was outraged.  He 
repeatedly asked Netanyahu what he was thinking.  Ross told him that he needed to give 
in to the King’s request.  Netanyahu was reluctant without assurances that the Jordan 
would return the Israeli agents.  Ross told him, “Prime Minister, you embarrassed the 




going to have to make amends.  Start with the antidote, make an apology, and promise 
you won’t do anything like this again and these agents will never again set foot in 
Jordan.”82  Netanyahu also had to call in Halevy, who was now the Israeli ambassador to 
the European Union, to help negotiate a release of the Israelis.  After meeting with 
Hussein, Halevy told Netanyahu that he did not believe Hussein was bluffing and urged 
him to give into Hussein’s demands.  Halevy was able to make some headway with 
Hussein, but it in a surprise, it was left to Ariel Sharon to finish the negotiations.  Halevy 
made a personal request to the King to allow the agents in the Israeli embassy to leave 
with him.  Because of their friendship, Hussein granted the request.  While a member of 
Netanyahu’s party and a member of his cabinet, Sharon hated Netanyahu.  Sharon agreed 
to the exchange of Hamas leader, Shaikh Ahmad Yassin, twenty-three Jordanian citizens 
and fifty Palestinians for the safe return of the Israeli agents.83  This incident created a 
back channel relationship for Sharon and Hussein that would be important if Netanyahu 
lost power.  It also once again demonstrated to the US that Hussein was the voice of 
moderation in the region, and Netanyahu was the obstacle to peace.  While Hussein had 
every right to be angry because of the Israeli actions, he worked with the US to find an 
equitable solution that preserved Jordan’s sovereignty while maintaining his relationship 
with the US and the Clinton administration.     
Hussein had another idea for a peace plan March 1998, with the hopes of breaking 
the logjam in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.  Hussein proposed to Mubarak that all 
the Arab nations meet at a summit and pledge that all twenty-two Arab countries would 
sign a peace deal with Israel if Israel agreed to return all the West Bank to the 




Mubarak was the sponsor of the summit.  They also informed the White House of their 
plan.  Eventually, Mubarak was contacted by Albright who told him that she was working 
on her own plan with the Palestinians and Israelis and an Arab summit would mess that 
up.   Because of that, Mubarak and Hussein dropped their effort.84  Hussein continued to 
work towards peace in the Middle East, but he was unwilling to do anything that went 
against American interests in the region. 
In July 1998, Hussein’s health took a turn for the worse.  He had numerous tests 
run at the Mayo clinic and he was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.  Because 
the cancer had spread, he would now need frequent treatments in the United States.  His 
wife believed that diagnosis only meant Hussein had months to live.85  Because of his 
condition, Hussein was more determined than ever to advance the peace process.  He saw 
it as a legacy issue and believed that a region in peace would help the transition for his 
eldest son, Abdullah, when he took the crown. 
On October 17, Clinton called for a summit outside of Washington D.C. at the 
Wye Plantation so the Israelis and Palestinians could make progress on final status talks.  
Despite his physical condition, Clinton asked Hussein to attend to help the negotiations.  
Hussein was so sick and his immune system so compromised, any delegation that met 
with him had to first cover their arms in an anti-bacterial solution.   He was unable to eat 
and lost all his hair.   It was obvious to everyone he was really sick.  Hussein addressed 
the summit and said, “These differences pale in comparison to what is at stake.  After 
[an] agreement both sides will look back and not even recall these issues.  It is now time 
to finish, bearing in mind the responsibility that both leaders have to their people and 




Clinton believed that the sight of Hussein in such dire condition, still working for peace, 
ended much of the posturing from the participants.87  After he finished his speech, many 
of the participants went to thank him for coming but did not want to shake his hand for 
fear of making him sick.  Arafat kissed him on the shoulder instead of the cheek.88  Even 
in his weakened state, Hussein made an impact on the peace process and his presence 
inspired many of the participants at the summit.  George Tenet later described how 
important Hussein was to making a breakthrough at Wye and called his actions at the 
summit heroic.89        
When negotiations hit a standstill, Clinton called Hussein and told him that 
Netanyahu had threatened to leave.  Hussein advised Clinton to call his bluff and if he 
left, they would hold a joint news conference together blaming Netanyahu for the failure.  
Eventually, the Palestinians and the Israelis agreed to a deal to restart the process 
between them.  Israel agreed to return another thirteen percent of the West Bank to the 
Palestinians and release a number of Palestinian prisoners.  Arafat and Netanyahu signed 
an agreement on October 23, with Hussein’s participation.90  At the press conference 
announcing the deal.   Clinton praised Hussein for his efforts and in response, Hussein 
made a gesture to help Clinton in his impeachment battle with Republicans.  At the 
signing of the Wye Agreement, Hussein said, “But on the subject of peace . . . never, with 
all the affection I held for your predecessors, have I know someone with your dedication, 
clearheadedness, focus, and determination . . . and we hope you will be with us as we 
seek greater success and as we help our brethren move towards a better tomorrow.”  
Clinton later mentioned the importance of world leaders like Hussein in prevailing in his 




demonstrate his value to the Americans.  He was willing to work towards the peace 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis despite the detriment to his health.   He assumed 
the role as an elder statesman of the region and continued to use his relationship with 
Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the Americans to promote the peace process in the 
Middle East.     
The Wye agreement marked the end of Hussein’s involvement in the peace 
process as his health continued to deteriorate.  Despite that, during the Clinton 
administration, Hussein achieved a great deal in securing peace with Israel.  His 
friendship with Rabin finally accomplished the goals started by his grandfather to 
normalize relations with Israel.  His efforts to improve relations with the United States 
after the Gulf War were finally completed, bringing much needed economic relief to 
Jordan.   In addition, even after achieving peace and security with Israel, Hussein 
continued to work on behalf of the Palestinians so they too could benefit from the peace 
process.  Hussein’s action during the Clinton administration firmly established Jordan as 
an important ally of the US in the region.  This is even more remarkable when 
considering that Jordan’s only real importance came from geography and the moderation 
of its leadership.  It did not have the resources that Saudi Arabia or the other Gulf States 
had.  Despite that, Hussein continued to place Jordan at the center of American foreign 
policy in the Middle East during the Clinton administration and played an important role 










As the Clinton administration came to an end, Hussein’s cancer progressively 
worsened.  While he continued to fight the disease through several bouts of 
chemotherapy and trips to the Mayo clinic, he died in Jordan on February 7, 1999.  His 
death ended the reign of one of the most significant leaders in the modern Middle East.  
He survived numerous coup and assassination attempts, a civil war, an invasion by a 
hostile neighbor and three major military conflicts.  Despite having no natural resources 
to speak of, Hussein placed Jordan in the middle of American foreign policy in the 
region, assuring the monarchy and his nation’s survival long after his death.  While 
Hussein should be credited with all he has done for his nation and for promoting 
American interests in the region, his real legacy is his efforts to bring peace to the Arabs 
and the Israelis.  Especially later in his life, Hussein consistently attempted to facilitate an 
agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians with the hope of promoting peace and 
stability throughout the region.  Fortunately for him and Jordan, the desire for stability 
coincided with American interests in the Middle East and many presidents found him a 




Four American Presidents attended his funeral along with leaders from all over 
the world.  Israel sent the largest foreign delegation to the funeral, an acknowledgement 
of Hussein’s importance to promoting peace and security in the region.   Even Hussein’s 
old foes Assad, Mubarak and Arafat attended the funeral.  Clinton’s statement on 
Hussein’s death said, “Today the world mourns the loss of a partner and friend.  He was a 
magnificent man.  And like so many, I loved and admired him.” 1  George H. W. Bush 
said of Hussein, “His contributions to world peace will go down in history.  He was a 
loyal ally of the United States and a visionary advocate of Middle East peace.  The world 
has lost one of its great leaders, and he will be sorely missed on the world scene.”2  The 
people of Jordan deeply felt the loss of King Hussein and an estimated eight hundred 
thousand mourners lined the streets Amman for his funeral procession.3  His funeral was 
of the largest gatherings of foreign leaders in recent memory and had dignitaries from all 
the Middle East nations, Europe, Asia, South America, Russia, and the United States.  
This was a testament to Hussein’s importance to world peace and the importance of his 
over the forty-five-year reign as the king of Jordan.   
Why did the US place such high value in the survival of King Hussein as the head 
of Jordan?  It could not have been for domestic political reasons because Israel always 
had more public support in the US than any of the Arab nations.  This was especially true 
after the October War in 1973 and the Arab oil boycott that followed along with Jordan’s 
role in the First Persian Gulf War.  Jordan had no viable economic resource like the oil 
reserves in Saudi Arabia, it had no access to a strategic waterway like the Persian Gulf, as 
the United Arab Emirates did.  Jordan was not a great military power like Egypt or Iraq.  




Hussein’s moderation and willingness to promote American interests in the region.  For 
the first two-thirds of his reign, this came from Hussein’s willingness to assist the US in 
blocking Soviet expansion in the region.  Hussein played an important part in preventing 
Soviet expansion and the takeover of a vital natural resource.  Without Hussein’s efforts, 
Jordan would have likely become a Soviet client as early as 1970 during Hussein’s fight 
with Syria and the Palestinians.  This would have surrounded Israel with hostile regimes, 
making it more likely a war like the October War could have exploded into a conflict 
between the superpowers.  In addition, if the Soviet Union had control of Jordan, Iraq, 
and Syria, it could have threatened the American access to oil through the Gulf States 
who would have been surrounded by anti-American governments.  In addition, Hussein 
became an important element in the American efforts to stop the spread of Iran’s radical 
agenda.  Hussein gave the Americans a way to counter the growing threat of Iran and its 
proxies in Syria and Lebanon by aiding Iraq through Jordan.  Because of Hussein’s 
relationship with both Saddam and the United States, he was able to facilitate aid from 
the US to Iraq for its war with Iran.   
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hussein continued to be a moderate voice 
in the region, striving to achieve peace between the Arabs and the Israelis, including 
working with the PLO to end their conflict with Israel.  He became an important 
American ally in facilitating negotiations between the Palestinians and the Arabs.  
Hussein’s actions differed from Egypt, who similarly signed a peace treaty with Israel, 
because Hussein continued to promote the broader peace process and did not exclusively 
focus on his own interests.  Hussein used his relationship with Israel and the Palestinians 




Authority and for American efforts to bring stability to the region.  It was clear towards 
the end of this life that the Clinton administration relied on Hussein to bridge the gaps 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis.            
From the start of his monarchy, Hussein attempted to forge good relations with 
the West and the United States.  Beginning after the debacle of the Six Day War in 1967, 
Hussein accelerated those efforts and became a reliable ally for the United States and 
peace in the region.  During his reign, he repeatedly showed that he was instrumental in 
bringing peace between the Arabs and the Israelis while also promoting American 
interests throughout the region.  In addition, Hussein attempted to block the growing 
Soviet influence in the region throughout the Cold War in places like Syria, Iraq, and 
Egypt.  Various American administrations responded to Hussein’s efforts with large 
amounts of both economic and military aid that facilitated the survival of King Hussein 
and his monarchy.    
During the Nixon administration, King Hussein dramatically improved his 
relationship with the United States.  The Nixon administration demonstrated the value it 
placed on King Hussein’s success through efforts like the Rogers Plan to find a solution 
between the Arabs and Israel.  In addition, through the Rogers Plan, the Nixon 
administration demonstrated the belief that Jordan was an important part of Nixon’s Cold 
War strategy of preventing further Soviet expansion in the Middle East.  Through the 
Rogers Plan and Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy after the conclusion of the October War, 
the United States strived to show the Arabs that if they wanted to achieve their goals with 
Israel and regain the land lost in 1967, it could only be done through relations with the 




negotiations, facilitating American efforts to reach a disengagement agreement between 
Israel and Egypt and Syria.  Unlike other leaders in the region, Hussein not only worked 
with the American to find an agreement between Jordan and Israel, he also worked with 
other Arab countries to improve the chances of success for Kissinger’s efforts.   
In addition, the Americans’ view of Hussein as a valuable ally in the Cold War 
became important for Hussein’s survival when he attempted to remove the Palestinian 
militants from his country in 1970 and faced an invasion from Soviet backed Syria in 
response.  The combination of previous American military shipments to Jordan and 
American diplomatic efforts were important for Hussein’s ability to survive the crisis.  In 
addition, Hussein’s request for Israeli aid and the Nixon administration’s attempts to 
facilitate that aid demonstrated the importance of the Jordanian-American relationship.  
The Nixon administration tried to get support from Israel for an intervention, but only on 
terms that made Hussein’s eventual survival paramount, showing the value they placed 
on the personal leadership of Hussein and the fear of who could replace him.  If Hussein 
lost his conflict with Syria and the Palestinians, Hussein would have likely been replaced 
by a Soviet-backed leadership who had would continue to thwart American goals in the 
region.      
The Nixon administration also saw another major Middle Eastern war that placed 
Jordan and Hussein in considerable danger during the October War of 1973.  In this 
conflict, Nixon and Kissinger argued on behalf of Hussein to the Israelis.  They believe it 
was necessary for Jordan needed to enter the war in some fashion and Israel should not 
respond with a full-scale attack on Jordan.  They hoped to protect Hussein from both the 




The diplomatic messages sent to the Israelis arguing Hussein’s position demonstrated 
Nixon and Kissinger’s regard for Hussein and his importance for promoting American 
interests in the region.  They hoped to help Hussein by balancing his need to retain his 
position in the Arab world while not facing the consequences of any action he took, 
similar to the devestating Israeli response which occurred when Hussein supported Egypt 
in the Six Day War.  Without Hussein’s history of moderation and his ability to work 
with Israel, it is likely that the war could have continued to expand.  Israel barely 
survived an invasion on two fronts and even threatened the use of nuclear weapons to 
stop the Arabs advance, making.  It is possible Israel’s position would have been a lot 
worse if they faced an active invasion from Hussein on its eastern front.  Hussein’s 
willingness to work with the Americans and the Israelis was important in keeping the 
conflict expanding.         
During the Nixon administration, Hussein experienced a number of setbacks in 
his attempts to regain his lost territory from the 1967 war and maintain his position as the 
voice of the Palestinians.  When the Arab League passed the Rabat resolution in 1974, 
making the PLO the sole representative of the Palestinian people, Hussein needed to 
adapt his efforts in the peace process.  This resolution passed despite American efforts to 
get other friendly regimes to block it during the meeting.  Hussein responded by adapting 
his negotiation strategy to include representatives of the Palestinian people and on 
numerous occasions, putting aside his past disputes with Yasir Arafat to forge a peace 
deal with the Israelis with the support of the United States.  In addition, the rise of the 
Likud Party in 1977 dramatically changed the nature of the Israeli government, making it 




fact, some members of the Israeli government believed that Jordan was the natural home 
for the Palestinian people and the Israeli government should attempt to move them out of 
the West Bank and into Jordan.  Despite these setbacks, Hussein continued to promote 
American interests through the peace process.  While the Rabat resolution and the rise of 
Likud hampered his ability, Hussein still tried to organize the Arabs for a conference in 
Geneva that allowed for a US-led settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis.       
Even when the actions of the United States disappointed Hussein, he did not 
fundamentally change his attitude towards the West.  For example, after the destruction 
during the October War, Hussein hoped that Kissinger and Ford would focus on 
Jordanian relations with Israel and Hussein’s quest to return the land lost in 1967.  He did 
not try to sabotage the talks between the US and the other Arab nations when the 
Americans focused more on securing a disengagement agreement between Egypt and 
Israel and Israel and Syria.  Instead, he provided advice and encouragement to the US 
efforts to facilitate a disengagement agreement between Israel and the Arabs, 
recommending to Kissinger certain actions that might make his efforts more successful.  
Other leaders like Mubarak of Egypt only concerned themselves with their own national 
interests, willingly sabotaging other efforts if necessary.  He helped to facilitate American 
efforts to keep the Soviet Union out of the negotiations to resolve the crisis with the goal 
of showing the rest of the Arab world that only through the United States could they 
achieve their desires of a peace process with Israel.  Throughout the Nixon and Ford 
administrations, Hussein consistently showed an attitude of moderation that encouraged a 





At the start of the Carter administration, Hussein excitedly promoted a 
comprehensive plan to forge a peace deal between Israel and all of the Arab states with 
the hope of expanding the process started by Kissinger in Geneva.  When those plans 
merged into the Camp David Accords, the first real break occurred in American and 
Jordanian relations.  While Hussein opposed Sadat’s deal with Israel, it was not out of 
revulsion to making peace with the Jews, but for fear that it would end Israeli efforts at 
forging a peace deal with the rest of the Arab world.  In fact, this is generally what 
occurred.  Hussein, it turned out was correct.  Israel was willing to make a peace deal 
with Egypt but had no intention of making the sacrifices necessary to end the state of 
belligerency with Jordan.  Even when almost all of the Arabs reacted harshly to the 
Egyptian deal, Hussein remained a voice of moderation.   He remained close to the 
Egyptians and did not participate in the complete economic boycott of Egypt and its 
people like most of the other Arab nations.  While at the Baghdad Summit in 1978, 
Hussein did not participate in the many of the resolutions that condemned Egypt in the 
harshest terms and continued to argue the need for a comprehensive solution to the 
conflict with Israel.  Hussein chose not to isolate Egypt fully keeping some of the 
economic connections between the two nations.  This was important because it would 
hurt future American led efforts at the peace process if signing a treaty with Israel 
resulted in hostility and total isolation from all neighboring countries.  Other Arab leaders 
boycotted and verbally attacked Egypt because of its deal with Israel.  While Carter was 
disappointed Hussein did not participate in the Camp David process, he eventually 
embraced Hussein again when the American position in the Islamic world diminished 




Hussein wanted to replace Iran as a pillar of American policy in the region through his 
moderation and his willingness to work with Israel and oppose the Soviet Union.   
During the Reagan administration, President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz 
found Hussein to be a friendly ally in their efforts to bring peace to the region.  The 
Reagan administration had three major peace efforts, beginning with the Reagan Plan.  
King Hussein supported all these plans in some form.  While all ended in failure, Hussein 
generally pushed for their success.   The first plan, the Reagan Plan, failed because of 
Israeli domestic politics and the Likud Party’s continued power.  Hussein consistently 
worked with Reagan to find a solution that was agreeable to the Arabs and the Israelis 
that would allow for the peace process to move forward.  He proposed a number of 
different arrangements that allowed for the Israelis to negotiate with non-PLO 
Palestinians while still respecting the wishes of the other Arab nations expressed by the 
Rabat resolution declaring the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.  
During the Reagan administration, while Hussein worked with the PLO to attempt to 
bridge the gap between the Arabs and Israel, other nations attempted to sabotage it.   This 
was particularly the case with Syria.  With Soviet support, Syria frequently attacked 
Jordan and the PLO with propaganda for their efforts to negotiate with Israel and even 
tried to replace Arafat because of his collaboration with Hussein.  If Syria replaced 
Hussein in 1970, it is likely Israel and the US would have faced a more radical 
Palestinians movement stationed in Jordan, promoting war instead of peace.  In addition, 
Hussein became an important ally for Reagan’s attempts to counter Soviet expansion 




region.  In the case of Iran, Hussein and Jordan served an important role in connecting the 
United States with Iraq and Saddam Hussein, supporting his efforts in the war with Iran.   
Changes in the Palestinian territories ended Hussein’s ability to support the 
American led peace effort towards the end of the Reagan administration.  The rise of the 
intifada increased tension with Israel and made it impossible for either side to make a 
concerted effort at solving the issues between the Arabs and the Israelis.  The intifada 
also led Hussein to change his relationship with the West Bank.  Before the intifada, 
Hussein dealt with numerous betrayals from Arafat and in turn, tried to supplant him as 
the voice of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.  The intifada interrupted 
that billion-dollar economic plan.  With the Israeli help, Hussein hoped to improve the 
everyday lives of the Palestinians, believing that it would increase their desire to align 
with Jordan and his leadership.  Once the intifada started, those plans ended.   In response 
to continued insults from the Arabs and the Palestinian leadership, along with growing 
discontent for the Palestinian territories from his own people, on July 31, 1988, Hussein 
announced that Jordan was ending the ties to the West Bank.   This ended the Reagan and 
Shultz’s attempts at the peace process because they realized without Jordan’s 
participation, it was unlikely to succeed.  This was especially true because the Israelis 
would only agree to negotiate with the non-PLO Palestinians if they merged into a joint 
delegation with Jordan.  Israel also refused to accept a Palestinian state, only some form 
of confederation with Jordan.  Unwilling to make the mistakes of Camp David, the 
Israelis and the Reagan administration could not negotiate a deal without the active 
participation of Jordan and Hussein.  While Hussein’s efforts to disengage Jordan’s role 




eventually had the positive effect on the peace process.  Hussein’s decision to end his role 
in the West Bank forced the Palestinians and the PLO to take ownership of their situation.  
It forced the PLO to moderate because it now needed to negotiate with Israel and the 
United States to improve the daily lives of the Palestinian people.  In addition, it forced 
Israel to break its prohibition of not negotiating directly with the Palestinians.  Without 
Hussein’s actions, the agreement reached between Israel and the Palestinians in Oslo was 
unlikely.  Despite this personal setback, Hussein continued to believe he had a role to 
play in bringing peace between the Arabs and the Israelis and would continue that role 
when Reagan’s Vice President, George H. W. Bush became president in 1989. 
During the Bush administration, the biggest challenge to Hussein’s relationship 
with the United States occurred.  When Saddam Hussein and Iraq invaded Kuwait, 
Hussein found himself in a very difficult position.  He had a number of factors working 
against him, including his close economic ties to Iraq, the population of Jordan’s feelings 
towards Iraq, and his personal relationship with both Bush and Saddam.  Hussein 
continued to try and find a peaceful way out of the crisis, much to the chagrin of his 
Western allies, and he refused to join the Western coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait.  
Despite the accusations that Hussein either planned to join Saddam or was paid off by 
Saddam, it seems clear that Hussein’s Arab nationalism, economic survival,  and the will 
of his people led him to take this position of neutrality in the First Gulf War.  While he 
knew it would damage his relationship with the US, and in particular George Bush, he 
believed that consequence of the American-led military effort would be detrimental to the 
region.  Even during the war, Hussein used his well-developed relationship with Israel to 




relationship was at its lowest point, Hussein’s actions continued to support American 
objectives for the region.  His refusal to allow Iraq to use Jordan to attack Israel was 
important for the American efforts to maintain the coalition.  If Iraq used Jordanian air 
space to attack Israel, it had the possibility of expanding the conflict and destroying the 
American-led coalition.  Once the war ended, Hussein immediately tried to improve 
relations with the US and became an enthusiastic support of Bush’s Madrid Conference 
and the bilateral negotiations that followed.  He worked to find a role for the Palestinians 
in the negotiations and continued to take into account their position while moving 
Jordan’s negotiations forward. He used his unique relationship with the Americans, 
Israelis, and the Palestinians to find a way to include the Palestinians in the process.  
Shamir’s willingness to trust Hussein’s efforts to build a joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation to the Madrid Conference was an important element of the conference’s 
success.  It is difficult to imagine another leader who could have facilitated the 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.  This process culminated during the 
Washington Conference when Israel and Jordan finished working on an agreement that 
outlined the principles for a future peace treaty between Jordan and Israel.     
The success of the Washington Conference led directly to the Israeli-Jordanian 
peace treaty and the announcement between Yitzhak Rabin and Hussein on the White 
House lawn in 1994 that the state of war between Jordan and Israel officially ended.  This 
was accomplished with the personal diplomacy that Hussein frequently relied on and the 
support of the United States to help Jordan’s economic situation after the end of the Gulf 
War.  Without the leadership of Hussein and Rabin it is unlikely Jordan and Israel would 




negotiating process is demonstrated when comparing Jordan Syria.  Unlike Jordan, Syria 
still does not recognize Israel and there are continued attacks against Syrian forces by 
Israel.  In addition, Syria continues to support hostile militant groups like Hezbollah in 
their efforts to attack Israel.  Hussein’s moderation and pragmatism were important in 
establishing peace between Jordan and Israel.  The Clinton administration played an 
important role in assisting Jordan recover, allowing Hussein to argue to his people the 
benefits of peace.  The culmination of the peace treaty with Israel finally achieved for 
Hussein something that his grandfather first attempted, Jordan could finally live in open 
peace with its neighbors in Israel.  The treaty also ended any residual hard feelings over 
Hussein’s role in the First Gulf War because the US witnessed Hussein’s efforts to 
compromise and achieve peace with Israel.  After the treaty, Jordan became an important 
non-NATO ally to the US, and the US delivered countless forms of economic and 
military aid to strengthen Jordan’s position in the region.    
Even after his treaty with Israel was signed, Hussein continued to demonstrate his 
importance to the United States in the region through his assistance in American efforts 
to remove Saddam Hussein from Iraq and his continued to support the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace efforts.  During the Clinton administration. Hussein allowed Saddam’s family to 
defect to Jordan while allowing the US to use them for intelligence.  He also let the US 
setup efforts in Jordan through the CIA focused on deposing Saddam from Iraq while 
also supporting numerous Iraqi opposition groups.  In addition, he continued to act as 
arbiter between the Palestinians and the Israelis, striving to help them reach a peace 
settlement.  This occurred during the negotiations for the Hebron Protocols and 




process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.  Through his efforts, Hussein 
demonstrated why the Americans always valued his leadership in the region.  He would 
frequently be a voice for moderation and peace, trying to bridge the gaps between the 
Israelis and the Arabs and promoting American interests throughout the region.    
Hussein’s relationship with the US continues to be important because it laid the 
foundation for the American relationship with his successor and eldest son, King 
Abdullah II.  After the attacks on September 11, Abdullah pledged Jordan’s full support 
for the Americans to strike at those responsible.4  In addition, the sons of Bush and 
Hussein continued the work of their fathers to develop George W. Bush’s road map for 
peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis in July 2003.5  During the Second Gulf 
War, in a meeting with the head of the coalition forces, Tommy Franks, Abdullah told 
him, “General, I must protect my nation’s interests.  But I assure you those interests 
coincide with America’s.  You can count on Jordan.” 6  When it came to Iraq, Abdullah 
learned the lessons from closely observing his father, Saddam Hussein was a menace and 
it was in Jordan’s long-term interests to help the United States remove him.  Jordan 
allowed the US to use Jordanian territory to launch Special Forces attacks against Iraq 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.  The US stationed between two and three 
thousand Special Forces troops at the Jordanian air base Safawi, allowing them to freely 
operate inside Iraq.  The US also stationed Patriot anti-missile batteries in Jordan to 
protect Israel from incoming Iraqi Scud missiles.7       
Even in the Obama administration, Jordan is still reaping the benefits from 
Hussein’s actions with the United States.  Trade between Jordan and the United States 




increase since the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.8  The relationship 
between Jordan and the US also benefited Jordan during the Arab Spring uprisings 
throughout the Arab world in 2011.  The US has facilitated aid from Jordan from 
wealthier oil states like Saudi Arabia and financially supported Jordan’s efforts to absorb 
the massive refugee population from Syria.9 Jordan continues to assist the United States 
in training fighters against the Islamic State and has partnered with Israel to confront both 
Syrian and Russian actions in the region.10  Abdullah also continues his father’s legacy of 
working to promote American interests and ideals in the region.  In an interview with 
CNN, Abdullah echoed Obama’s frequent argument that ISIS does not represent Islam.  
He said ISIS was, “trying to invent falsely a linkage to a caliphate, link to our history in 
Islam that has no truth or bearing to our history.”  Jordan is also an active participant in 
the airstrikes against ISIS sometime launching up to sixty strikes on ISIS targets a day.11  
All these actions are a directly related to the efforts of Hussein to forge a lasting alliance 
with the United States.  The alliance Hussein worked to develop still benefits both Jordan 
and the United States long after Hussein’s death.      
The choices by Hussein and the leadership of the United States during his 
monarchy created the environment that allowed the Jordanian-American relationship to 
continue to flourish today.  Hussein’s ability to manage his nation’s interest and align 
them with the United States made it possible for Jordan to remain one of the most pro-
Western nations in the Middle East.  While Hussein efforts to place Jordan in the 
American sphere of influence during the Cold War are important, after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, Hussein’s real legacy is his quest to achieve peace between the Arabs and 




between the Arabs and Israel while working with the United States to achieve similar 
goals.  At Rabin’s funeral, he talked about that legacy and said,  
We belong to the camp of peace.  We believe in peace.  We believe that 
our one God wishes us to live in peace and wishes peace upon us, for these 
are His teachings to all the followers of the three great monotheistic 
religions, the Children of Abraham.  Let’s not keep silent.  Let our voices 
rise high to speak of our commitment to peace for all times to come, and 
let us tell those who live in darkness who are the enemies of life, and 
through faith and religion and the teachings of our one God, this is where 
we stand.  This is our camp.  May God bless you with the realization that 
you must join it and we pray that He will, but otherwise we are not 
ashamed, nor are we afraid, nor are we anything but determined to fulfill 
the legacy for which my friend fell, as did my grandfather in this very city 
when I was with him and but a young boy.12 
Despite any troubles the various US leadership had with Hussein, his legacy of peace and 
stability in the region provided the best example of his value to American interest in the 
region and cemented his position as one of the most important American allies in the 
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